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This book represents a comparative research 
of the prosecution institution in nine diff erent 
countries. The main objective of the compara-
tive analysis is to identify the international stan-
dards and best practices in terms of account-
ability, eff ectiveness and independence of the 
prosecution services. The study should guide 
and enrich national debates in countries where 
the prosecution needs to be reformed. 
In the last twenty years there have been sig-
nifi cant changes in criminal procedure and in 
public prosecution in many parts of the world. 
The reports included in the volume aim, in part, 
to examine some important instances and ex-
amples of that trend. The country reports repre-
sent a broad range of practices and approaches 
about the manner of organization of the pros-
ecution service. The focus of the research is on 
the lessons learned from the reform in demo-
cratic states and the challenges for the coun-
tries in transition in designing the prosecution 
institution. 
The comparative research shows that there is 
not a universal model of prosecutorial indepen-
dence and accountability. Hence, the reformers 
and decision makers have on their disposition 
a large variety of approaches to choose from 
on the occasion of a concrete reform. However, 
they should have in mind an important fi nd-
ing of the comparative analysis, namely—im-
porting an apparently successful element of a 
reform should not necessarily produce the ex-
pected positive results. 
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Foreword
This book is the culmination of a project spanning almost six years. As initially con-
ceived, the project sought to encourage and support vibrant debate on prosecutorial 
reform in Bulgaria. During the intervening years the project’s mandate grew to in-
form a broader, global audience of reformers interested in promoting prosecutorial 
accountability, independence, and effectiveness. Given the expansion of the project’s 
goals, it is instructive to provide a brief history of this ambitious undertaking. 
Bulgaria’s first post-communist Constitution, which came into force in 1991, recog-
nized the principle of the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of the state. Judges, prosecutors, and criminal investigators became 
part of the judiciary and were given equal status by the Constitution. This was mo-
tivated by a desire to afford the prosecution service a high degree of independence 
and to prevent executive meddling in the work of the country’s prosecutors. By fo-
cusing on guaranteeing prosecutorial independence, the authors of the Constitution 
neglected to ensure adequate accountability and oversight mechanisms for the pros-
ecution service.
Within a few years of the promulgation of the new Constitution, the decision to el-
evate prosecutorial independence over accountability proved to be flawed. Evidence 
of the abuse of power within the Bulgarian prosecution service mounted. Despite 
widespread corruption in government, very few legislators and government officials 
were prosecuted. Expectations that partisan political considerations would not play 
a role in prosecutorial decision making were proved wrong. As a result of ineffective 
oversight mechanisms the abuse of power by the prosecution service went unsanc-
tioned. This generated considerable public mistrust in the ability of the justice sys-
tem and the prosecution service to effectively combat crime; in particular corruption 
within the higher echelons of government.
By the late 1990s, there were widespread calls for the reform of the Bulgarian pros-
ecution service. The reformers were hampered by a lack of consensus on the details 
of the reform—what legal, institutional, and practical changes were necessary to es-
tablish an accountable prosecution service. Moreover, many reformers had limited 
comparative knowledge about the operations of criminal justice systems and pros-
ecution services in other countries.
Sensing a political opening for reform, and a belief that prosecutorial reform was 
necessary to further the creation of an open society, the Open Society Foundation-
Sofia (OSF-Sofia) launched a project in 2002 to promote informed debate on pros-
ecutorial reform in Bulgaria. Shortly thereafter, the Open Society Justice Initiative, an 
operational program of the Open Society Institute (OSI), joined forces with OSF-So-
fia. The joint project set out to undertake comparative institutional and legal research 
on prosecution services in a variety of countries. The objective was to document 
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
16
good legal and institutional “practices” which foster prosecutorial transparency and 
accountability.
In April 2003, the project suffered a setback when the Bulgarian Constitutional 
Court delivered a ruling which substantially limited the legislature’s ability to reform 
the prosecution service. The court ruled that any constitutional changes to the struc-
ture of the judiciary, including the prosecution service, could be adopted only by a 
Grand National Assembly. A Grand National Assembly consists of 400 deputies (as 
opposed to 240 in the ordinary National Assembly) specifically convened in order 
for matters of national importance to be resolved, such as adopting a constitutional 
amendment.
The 2003 Constitutional Court ruling meant that significant prosecutorial reform 
could no longer be achieved in Bulgaria within the timeframe the project had hoped 
for. The ruling, and the Justice Initiative’s growing interest in promoting prosecutori-
al reform in other parts of the world, resulted in an expansion of the project’s param-
eters and timeline. The revised project no longer confined its mandate to promoting 
prosecutorial reform in Bulgaria. Instead, it sought to explore at a global level how 
best to balance prosecutorial accountability with independence whilst promoting 
prosecutorial effectiveness. Two prosecution services from the Global South—Chile 
and South Africa—were added to the comparative research project.
The nine countries reviewed in this volume represent a broad range of experience 
and approaches about the manner in which prosecution services can be organized, 
including both common law and civil law systems, developed and developing states, 
high and low-crime countries, unitary and federal legal systems, as well as estab-
lished and transitional democracies. A focus of this volume is on the lessons offered 
by prosecutorial reform in democratic states, and the challenges democratic (and 
democratizing) states face in designing prosecutorial services.
The methodology employed by the project focuses the debate about the organization 
of prosecution services on purposive reforms that improve the capacity, competence, 
independence, and accountability of the prosecution as an institution to achieve spe-
cific social aims. The project recruited local scholars and researchers—often senior 
prosecutors or erstwhile prosecutors—to provide first-hand accounts of the prac-
tices of the prosecution services in their countries. The country reports contained in 
this volume have consequently been prepared by persons familiar with the domestic 
workings of the prosecution service in each country.
The authors of the country reports were asked to focus on actual practice, rather than 
formal rules. Many prosecution services have good formal rules based on interna-
tional standards and norms. In practice, however, such rules are often ignored. The 
country authors were further encouraged to move beyond description to analysis and 
evaluation. We wanted to know what really happened within selected national pros-
ecution services, why, and to what effect. By addressing these questions it is hoped 
that that the reports will assist policymakers, who are considering the organization 
or reform of a prosecution service, anticipate what the likely actual effects of formal 
rules and regulations may be.
Foreword
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The country reports show that there is unlikely to be a universal model of prosecuto-
rial independence and accountability. The forms which independence and account-
ability take vary greatly between states. As a result, reformers have a wide array of 
models to choose from. Reformers should, however, recognize an important find-
ing of the comparative research presented in this book: piecemeal reforms are not 
easily transportable between justice systems or countries. Reformers should avoid 
importing a seemingly successful element of a reform—an innovative institutional 
mechanism or a new regulation, for example—directly from a country with a suc-
cessful prosecutorial model. This should be done only once the broader context of 
the reform in which such an element plays a part is properly understood. As Timothy 
Waters points out in the overview chapter:
One of the core comparative lessons is that different constitutional, institutional, 
and functional structures must be considered comprehensively, not in isolation, 
to understand their operation and effects in a given social and political context. 
A single element in isolation—or introduced in a reform, for example—may have 
very different effects if the totality of relevant, interrelated elements is not in place 
as well.
It is hoped that this book will assist the reader to better identify and understand good 
practices in terms of prosecutorial accountability, independence, and effectiveness. 
It should also serve as a useful reference for anyone interested in prosecutorial re-
form, including policy makers, senior prosecutors, academics, and civil society lead-
ers. Moreover, the book should guide and enrich national debates on prosecutorial 
reform, especially in countries—such as Bulgaria—which have recently transitioned 
to democracy.
Martin Schönteich
Senior Legal Officer: National Criminal Justice Reform
Open Society Justice Initiative
July 2008
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A. Introduction
I. Purpose of the Project
This Overview and the accompanying Reports survey the structure, institutional 
relationships, working methods, and performance of prosecution services in nine 
countries,1 focusing on actual practice as well as formal rules. The Overview and 
Reports focus debate about the organization of prosecution services on purposive 
reforms that improve the capacity, competence, independence, and accountability 
of the prosecution as an institution designed to achieve specific social aims. This 
necessarily means acknowledging that a prosecution service is an institutional actor 
embedded in a political process—it is not an isolated, insulated element removed 
from politics—and should be evaluated by its de facto relationship with other politi-
cal and social actors. 
This need not and does not mean that prosecutors ought to be “political” in any 
conventional sense. Indeed, as noted below, one of the few clear points of universal 
practice is that for the most part prosecutors properly ought to be neutral2 or non-
political in their decision-making.3 Yet this commitment to neutrality should not 
blind reformers to the political nature of the processes within which a prosecution 
service—or for that matter a judiciary—operates. Budgeting decisions, appointment 
and disciplinary proceedings, and legislation organizing prosecution services or de-
1 Bulgaria, Chile, England and Wales, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, South Africa, and the United 
States of America. Reference in this Overview to the specific circumstances in each country is 
generally made without citation; full citation is included in the accompanying country-specific 
Reports.
2 This Overview generally refers to prosecutors’ “neutrality” rather than their “impartiality,” but these 
terms should be read as being functionally equivalent. In certain systems, “impartiality” is sup-
posed to be a quality of judges, and it might be confusing to suggest that prosecutors ought to 
demonstrate a quintessentially judicial quality. However, those characteristics represented by the 
judicial norm of impartiality are only antithetical to the role of a prosecutor if one considers pros-
ecutors to be ‘partisans’ of the government. Prosecutors ought to pursue particular arguments and 
outcomes because they comport with externally defined values, not because they are the views of 
a particular party. (Likewise, a judge is not partial simply because he ultimately rules in favor of 
one party, or even because, in so doing, he is following externally defined values, such as the rules 
formulated by the legislature.) This is most clearly captured in systems, such as Germany, in which 
the prosecutor is explicitly identified as a guardian of legality, but even in strongly adversarial sys-
tems prosecutors (and defense attorneys) have obligations to the court and to the truth. Several 
international standards—issued by the United Nations, Council of Europe and the International 
Association of Prosecutors, for example—refer variously to prosecutors’ obligations in regard to 
“impartial” investigation, for example, or the obligation for prosecutions to perform their duties 
without favor or prejudice, or more generally in connection with the functioning of the criminal 
justice system.
3 Indeed, all actors in the governing process, including elected figures, have obligations not to act 
arbitrarily, or to use their powers for personal gain; thus even the exercise of expressly political 
power does not entail unrestrained partial or partisan activity.
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fining their powers are all political processes that involve other, explicitly political 
actors.4 The need for prosecution services to account for their use of public resourc-
es itself implies involvement in a politically mediated process. Where prosecution 
services have a formal or informal role in crime reduction and public safety, their 
charging decisions are necessarily related to a broader set of political and social con-
siderations. Even the expectation that prosecution services will act neutrally logically 
implies some means of defining, monitoring, and ensuring that neutrality, which en-
tails accountability to other institutional actors. Indeed, it may be that only by un-
derstanding and engaging with those political processes can a meaningful neutrality 
be maintained, or a reasoned evaluation of and debate about prosecutorial reform be 
conducted.
A key element in such evaluation is the prosecution’s ability to accomplish legiti-
mate, publicly desirable goals and objectives, while effectively resisting improper in-
terferences. Accordingly, in a very broad sense, effectiveness means the ability of the 
prosecution to meet legitimate public objectives.5 This implies two things. First, the 
evaluation of a prosecution service requires assessment of society’s aims for that ser-
vice, which may differ from country to country and may change over time. 
Second, evaluation ought to focus on pragmatic effects, rather than formal design. In 
considering the organization or reform of a prosecution service, policymakers need 
to ask what the actual effects of statutes and regulations are—do they make prosecu-
tors effective or not in achieving the specific social aims they have been assigned? Do 
they make prosecutors accountable in ways they should be and independent in ways 
they must be? If not, what alternatives might work in the broader legal and political 
context of the country? This Overview and its accompanying Reports aim both to ap-
ply that approach and in so doing demonstrate its effective potential for policymak-
ers interested in prosecutorial reform.
4 These Reports occasionally refer to “the political branches,” meaning the executive and legislature, 
and in context the civil service inasmuch as its senior ranks are politically appointed. See European 
Union Accession Monitoring Program [EUMAP], Monitoring the European Union Accession Pro-
cess: Judicial Independence, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2001, at 17, footnote 3.
5 That is, goals which are determined through a legitimated and authoritative process of deliberation 
consistent with the decisional norms of that society, and, more broadly, goals which are commonly 
or informally agreed or understood. (A common example is responsibility for reducing crime: in 
some states, the prosecution service has no formal role in reducing crime, but it is a rare prosecution 
service that, in practice, is utterly indifferent to or unaffected by trends in criminality.) “Meeting pub-
lic objectives” should not be understood as a referring to the prosecution service’s popularity.
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II. Project Structure and Methodology
In the last twenty years there have been significant changes in criminal procedure 
and in public prosecution in many parts of the world; this project aims, in part, to 
examine some important instances and examples of that trend. The nine countries6 
reviewed in this Overview represent a broad range of historical and contemporary 
experience and approaches to the question of how to organize a prosecution service, 
including both common law and civil law systems, as well as both long-established 
and transitional democracies.7 
The Reports on which this Overview is based were prepared by reporters familiar 
with the domestic workings of the prosecution service in each country, and then re-
viewed and edited in a collaborative process by an advisory board of internationally 
recognized experts8 and consultants for the Open Society Justice Initiative to ensure 
their functional comparability while retaining perspectives relevant to each country. 
Each reporter worked from a common methodology developed by the Justice Initia-
tive in consultation with the project’s advisory board and administration and the 
reporters themselves.9
The Reports and Overview do not constitute a strictly “scientific” analysis of the 
nine systems in question, nor are their results directly translatable to other systems. 
However, the common methodology does allow meaningful consideration of which 
structures and practices achieve which results, across a reasonably wide range of 
social and political conditions, such that the findings provide a useful, generative 
framework for designing prosecutorial reform.
The next section of this Overview, Section B, synthesizes the individual country Re-
ports into general comments concerning the organization and reform of prosecution 
services within their broader political and institutional context.
6 In this Overview, “state” generally refers to the country-level entity; for federal states, like Germany 
and the United States, “state” may refer, in context, to the sub-federal units (the German Länder, 
for example), while the country-level entity will be referred to as the “State” in majuscule, or the 
“federal” level.
7 All of the societies examined have solidly democratic institutions. There may be no theoretical 
reason why an effective, neutral, and accountable prosecution service could not function in a non-
democratic state, and indeed, valuable lessons might well be gained by comparative study including 
such countries. Consistent with the broader commitments of the Open Society Justice Initiative, 
however, the Overview and Reports focus on the specific lessons offered by prosecutorial reform in 
democratic states, and the challenges that face democratic states in particular in designing prosecu-
tion services.
8 The advisory board included Károly Bárd, Central European University; Giuseppe Di Federico, 
Research Institute on Judicial Systems, Bologna; Barry Hancock, International Association of Pros-
ecutors; Joachim Herrmann, University of Augsburg; Cristián Riego, CEJA-Chile; and Ekaterina 
Trendafilova, International Criminal Court.
9 This Overview was prepared by a consultant involved in the design and editing of the Reports, and 
draws its conclusions principally from the data and evidence produced for the Reports.
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B. Findings: Policy and Practice in the Design of Prosecution Services
The following sub-sections of this Overview examine particular aspects of the design 
and reform of prosecution services, in light of the evidence from the nine coun-
tries surveyed. These sub-sections examine: general issues of independence and ac-
countability (I.); the structure and organization of public prosecution services (II.); 
functions and powers of prosecutors (III.); the relationship of the public prosecution 
service to other organs of the state (IV.); information control concerning the pros-
ecution service’s activity (V.); and the use of statistics (VI.). Each section begins with 
a summary in italics that highlights the main issues and findings.
I. General Issues
This section considers the proper measure of independence and accountability a prose-
cution service should be afforded, and the best ways to ensure that the service effectively 
and efficiently fulfills the purposes it serves in society. All prosecution services are a 
society’s principal means of pursuing punishment of criminal behavior and its interface 
with the adjudicative power. A prosecution service must be able to provide neutral, 
non-political, non-arbitrary decision-making about the application of criminal law and 
policy to real cases. 
Prosecutorial independence is thus not an absolute quality; it is a means of ensuring 
that the prosecution service performs those tasks society assigns to it. Yet analysis seldom 
considers whether or not the prosecution service is effective or efficient; performance 
measurement, especially statistical evaluation, tends to focus on quantitative processes 
without attending to the outcomes that actually affect individuals and society.
There is no single model for a prosecution service, and each must be evaluated in con-
text. Many configurations are consistent with international standards, and the choice 
among them is political and constitutional; it is negotiable. Recognizing the availabil-
ity of various models does not imply a casual or “cafeteria“ approach to reform, but 
rather deliberation about the interrelatedness of different design elements, which must 
be evaluated in their full historical, social, and political context; proposals for reform 
must consider their complex interactions.
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1.1. Independence, neutrality, and accountability
There is very little theoretical, academic, political, or practical discussion about the 
meaning of prosecutorial independence. In most Western European countries the in-
stitutional dependence of prosecutors on the executive branch is the accepted status 
quo. At the same time, recognition of the problems related to prosecutorial depen-
dence upon the executive branch is growing, and there is a trend towards increasing 
the independence of prosecution services from the executive; this is especially evi-
dent in the transitional democracies of Central Europe and Latin America.10
Although some models posit an analogy between judicial and prosecutorial inde-
pendence, the independence afforded to (or required by) a prosecution service or 
individual prosecutors usually differs considerably from that of the judiciary or in-
dividual judges, due to their different purposes and functions. Although in some 
systems prosecutors are afforded status and independence similar to that of judges,11 
this is not necessary for a properly functioning prosecutorial system; indeed, systems 
which entirely subordinate individual prosecutors to a centralized and hierarchical 
decision-making process,12 or even to the political process directly,13 nonetheless 
maintain a measure of decisional independence and function effectively.
In many countries in transition, the independence of judicial and prosecutorial au-
thorities is seen as an integral part of the broader transition from authoritarianism 
to open, democratic societies.14 Yet this foundational, constitutional function is not 
the only, or even necessarily the primary purpose of a prosecution service, because of 
course societies create prosecution services first and foremost to punish and control 
crime, or otherwise ensure the legality of public and private behavior, not to vindi-
cate democratic institutions.15 In Chile, for example, reform of the criminal justice 
system—although sweeping in its own right—has not been seen only or even princi-
pally as part of the broader political transition from military rule; this separation of 
10 For example, the 1991 reforms in Bulgaria that afforded the prosecution service a high level of au-
tonomy were designed to protect the public from politically motivated prosecutions and guarantee 
to the service the freedom to prosecute persons in power. Robust accountability mechanisms were 
not incorporated into the reforms; the largely unchallenged assumption of reformers was that once 
the service and individual prosecutors were afforded autonomy, they would not be influenced by 
improper political considerations.
11 As in Bulgaria and France, where prosecutors and judges are considered members of the Magistracy.
12 As in Germany or Hungary, where prosecutorial office heads hold considerable authority over the 
line prosecutors subordinated to them.
13 As in the United States, which holds direct elections for most District Attorneys at the county level, 
and subordinates federal Attorneys to a politically appointed Attorney General answerable to the 
President.
14 Cf. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation 19/2000 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member states on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system (adopted 
Oct. 6, 2000), Explanatory Memorandum (General Considerations)(see Sec. 1.4, below)(referring to 
“practical objectives to be attained in pursuit of the institutional balance upon which democracy and 
the rule of law in Europe largely depend[]”).
15 This can be seen in the fact that even non-democratic societies have police, investigation, prosecu-
tion, and adjudication functions—often very effective ones.
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criminal justice reform and restorative justice efforts contrasts sharply with the tran-
sitions in Central and Eastern Europe and South Africa, where justice-sector reform 
has been part of the transformation of the state and is suffused with the politics of 
transitional justice.16 In these states, reconciliation, reparations, and the affirmation 
of justice coincided with efforts to establish the rule of law, independence of the judi-
ciary (and often of the prosecution service), and democratic institutions of the state, 
but the example of Chile shows that this is not a necessary relationship.
The experience of the countries surveyed shows, therefore, that no particular model 
of independence and accountability is necessary.17 One of the core comparative les-
sons is that different constitutional, institutional, and functional structures must be 
considered comprehensively, not in isolation, to understand their operation and ef-
fects in a given social and political context. A single element in isolation—or in-
troduced in a reform, for example—may have very different effects if the totality of 
relevant, interrelated elements is not in place as well.
What then, if anything, is the essential quantum of independence for a prosecution 
service? By the same token, what measure of accountability to society or political 
actors is irreducibly necessary? Review of international standards18 and state prac-
tice shows that a prosecution service must be able to provide neutral, non-political, 
non-arbitrary decision-making about the application of criminal law and policy to 
real cases.19 To ensure this, the institutional decisional independence of the entire 
16 In South Africa, for example, this process involved, among many other reforms, the nearly simul-
taneous introduction of majoritarian democracy and a system of separated powers that dramati-
cally reduced executive supervision of the prosecution service, the dismantling of apartheid-era 
laws (and the consequent introduction of previously excluded communities into the prosecution 
service’s workforce), the dramatic expansion of defined constitutional rights, and creation of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission process, which required the prosecution service to accom-
modate a system of amnesties for politically motivated crimes from the apartheid era. Many of 
these elements, including the status of the National Prosecuting Authority, were defined in the new 
constitution and seen as integral elements of the broader project of reforming the state.
17 Independence and accountability are not contradictory elements, but complementary ones. In-
deed, they may be thought of as expressing two ends of a continuum from total autonomy to total 
hierarchical subordination in the decision-making process. Cf. EUMAP, Monitoring the EU Ac-
cession Process: Judicial Independence, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2001, at 18 (making this 
argument in connection with judges’ independence and accountability). No system occupies either 
extreme; all combine various elements of independence and accountability.
18 See Section 1.4, below.
19 See, e.g., International Association of Prosecutors, Standards of Professional Responsibility and 
Statement of the Essential Duties and Rights of Prosecutors, adopted Apr. 23, 1999, at http://www.
iap.nl.com/(see Sec. 1.4., below), St. 3 (“Prosecutors shall perform their duties without fear, favour 
or prejudice. In particular they shall: carry out their functions impartially; remain unaffected by 
individual or sectional interests and public or media pressures and shall have regard only to the 
public interest; act with objectivity[]”). The role is related to the traditional European function of 
the prosecution as the “guardian of legality” within the state, a role driven by the gradual ascent 
of the rule of law as fundamental principle of governance. The conceptual legacy of this role for 
the enforcement of the criminal law is still very much alive, in that the fundamental task of the 
prosecution is not so much to represent the State in all its power, but rather to ensure public order 
and legality—a fundamentally apolitical (or at least non-partisan) role. The prosecution ideally is a 
symbol of justice in a system based on the rule of law. 
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prosecution service appears to be more important than the independence of the in-
dividual prosecutor.20
The practical check on prosecutorial decision-making is the judiciary itself—or, in 
functional terms, there is a division of social response to criminality between a pros-
ecution that initiates and pursues, and a judiciary that decides.21 It is combination of 
initiating and adjudicating functions in a single institutional or individual actor that 
almost always violates norms of independence, and almost always results in either 
ineffective response to criminality or over-response.22
It follows from this that the judiciary—because it provides the final or effective 
check23—is generally better positioned to ensure against abuse of liberty, and for that 
reason is more in need of independence. It follows too that the prosecution—because 
its role is to initiate, not decide—does not necessarily have to be as independent, 
although it can be. So long as the judiciary is independent, the risks from political 
interference with prosecutions probably run more towards improperly failing to pur-
sue crimes than the wrongful pursuit of false and persecutory charges. 
Unfortunately, the risks that arise from non-investigation or non-prosecution are 
more difficult for the judiciary to check. Political actors can perceive advantage in 
20 It is instructive to compare this with the independence afforded judges and the judiciary. Indeed, 
although the individual judge’s independence is widely considered an essential ingredient of a free 
society, it may well be that the judiciary’s institutional independence is actually more important—or 
at least that more expansive definitions of individual judicial independence, which resist any form 
of instruction or remand by higher judges, are probably unnecessarily (that is, redundantly) protec-
tive of society’s interest in avoiding external influence on judicial decisions. See EUMAP, Monitor-
ing the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independence, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2001.
21 Judges are generally expected to be non-initiating agents who adjudicate disputes submitted by 
conflicting parties, assuring to each party an equal chance to present the arguments in their favor; 
a judge’s legitimacy depends on being and appearing impartial and independent in his role. (This 
is true of both civil law and common law judges, who, despite their differing social status, power in 
the courtroom, and level of involvement in proceedings, normally do not initiate disputes. Obvi-
ously, this observation does not apply to investigative judges, but then that is precisely why systems 
employing investigative judges separate their functions from the sitting judge at trial.) Prosecutors, 
on the other hand, are expected to be active agents who initiate and conduct criminal proceedings, 
direct the police during the investigations and act as parties to judicial proceeding; a prosecutor is 
not supposed to be passive or neutral in the judicial process. See G. Di Federico, Independence and 
accountability of the judiciary in Italy. The experience of a former transitional country in a compara-
tive perspective (paper presented at the 9th Annual Conference on “The Individual vs the State,” Cen-
tral European University, Budapest, May 4-5, 2001), in A. Sajó (ed.), Institutional Independence and 
Integrity, The Hague: Kluwer International (forthcoming). From this it follows that prosecutorial 
neutrality does not mean indifference to social or policy preferences or outcomes; rather, prosecu-
tors are supposed to be guided by preferences determined in some other (political) process, and so 
long as they act consistently with those preferences (that is, with defined social policies, expressed 
in legal authorizations), they are said to be acting neutrally.
22 An example might be the growth in the phenomenon of plea bargaining in the United States, which 
according to some views, affords prosecutors extraordinary practical power to define not only 
charges but outcomes, given the tremendous leverage and bargaining power that sentencing ranges 
afford them in compelling rationally motivated suspects to plead guilty to lesser charges in order 
to avoid the risk of a catastrophically long sentence at trial; judges’ involvement in this process is 
largely formal and residual.
23 The true ultimate check on prosecutorial activity is constitutional and political—the capacity of the 
broader political community to intervene in and alter the terms of the prosecutorial enterprise.
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encouraging investigations even if they will ultimately fail to pass muster with an 
independent judiciary. Investigation and prosecution can last for years, consider-
ably inconveniencing and intimidating their targets, without ever reaching a stage 
at which the judiciary can effectively intervene—and when it finally does, the costs 
may be relatively low, as even an independent, active, and powerful judiciary may not 
prove particularly effective at policing abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Criminal in-
vestigation often is, de facto, a sanction in itself, which may continue for years before 
any judicial review.24 At the opposite end of the spectrum, a prosecutor’s discre-
tionary decision not to proceed with a prosecution can provide valuable cover for 
powerful actors, both outside and inside government; an independent judiciary 
can check unjust prosecution, but it cannot effectively force the investigation or 
prosecution of crimes.25
The level of independence prosecutors are afforded, or the degree of accountability 
to which they are subjected, is therefore not an absolute quality they can be adduced 
in the abstract; it is rather a means of ensuring that the prosecution service performs 
those socially valuable tasks we assign to it.26 (One of those purposes, especially in a 
democracy, is to provide protection against politically motivated use of the criminal 
law and justice system, which can be ensured by an independent judiciary and pros-
ecution service.)
Yet even though this independence is contingent and instrumental, experience sug-
gests that it is detrimental to the maintenance of a balance between independence 
24 There are particularly egregious examples of extended and unjustified investigation in Italy, where 
prosecutors have a very high level of independence and a formal constitutional obligation to inves-
tigate all possible criminality. See, e.g., Delfo Del Bino,   Il caso massoneria, un decennio di politica, 
giustizia e democrazia (2001)(discussing a massive, nine-year investigation of Freemasons ordered 
by a single prosecutor).
25 Cf. James Vorenberg, “Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Discretion,” 94 Harvard Law Review 1523 
(1981) (“[T]he existence of trials cannot check prosecutorial powers not dependent on trial. These 
powers include the prosecutor’s wide discretion in making decisions about charging . . . and allo-
cating investigative resources.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 
1969, at 22 (“[T]he power not to prosecute may be of greater magnitude than the power to pros-
ecute, and it certainly is much more abused because it is so little checked.”); Timothy William           
Waters, “Unexploded Bomb: Voice, Silence, and Consequence at the Hague Tribunals—A Legal 
and Rhetorical Critique,” 35 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 1025 
(“One power the [ICTY] Prosecution possesses is the ability to decide whether or not to proceed to 
court”). In some systems there are limited and highly formalistic opportunities to intervene in pro-
secutorial decisions about charging. For example, in the German system, a victim may appeal to the         
state Supreme Court to require the prosecutor to bring a case to trial (Klageerzwingungsverfahren). 
However, this possibility is available only if the case has been dropped for lack of evidence, not be-
cause of a prosecutor’s discretionary determination that there is no public interest in prosecution. 
Since it has become common for prosecutors to drop cases for the latter reasons, in practice little 
control exists on prosecutorial discretion to drop charges. In any event, such appeals are rare and 
courts seldom grant them.
26 To the degree a system assigns its prosecution services any of the decisional functions of judges, it 
should also afford them a level of independence commensurate with that afforded judges, which 
although not absolute—judicial independence is itself instrumental of social interests—must none-
theless be considerable, and must extend to all aspects of the core decisional process. This set of 
functions may change over time; in many countries the decision on pre-trial detention was not con-
sidered a judicial decision, but today it has become self-evident that only judges should authorize 
deprivation of liberty for all but brief periods of time.
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and accountability, and to the underlying social purposes, if that balance is altered 
too frequently or in an ad hoc manner (either for partisan gain or to achieve a partic-
ular outcome in a particular case); the legitimate purposes society may assign a pros-
ecution service are broadly defined, not tailored to short-term political outcomes.27 
To be clear: while such micro-managing is harmful to prosecutorial independence, 
it is only a concern to the degree it impinges on other values, such as neutral, non-
political criminal prosecution, equal application of the law, or effective realization of 
other tasks assigned to the prosecution service; independence for the prosecution is 
not an end unto itself, but a contingent social commitment designed to create an ef-
fective and efficient service.
1.2. Effectiveness and efficiency
Purposes of a Prosecution Service: Effectiveness is first a function of purpose; without 
a clear sense of what purposes a prosecution service is supposed to serve, it is defini-
tionally impossible to say how effective it is.
Surveying the countries considered in these Reports, prosecution services have some 
or all of the following social purposes:28
▶ Pursuing criminal charges, including initiation (though they may share this 
with police or other investigative authorities), prosecution—that is, pursuit of 
the interests of the state or particular parties in court—and enforcement;
▶ Contributing generally to public order and implementation of society’s crimi-
nal policy;
▶ Ensuring the legality of administrative, political, and fiduciary activity, as well 
as the actions of individuals;
▶ Representing state social, or individual interests in civil claims; and
▶ Representing the interests of legally incompetent persons.
27 The Hungarian experience, for example, shows that if the only channel through which prosecuto-
rial conduct can be influenced is legislation, frequent interventions will make the legal system too 
rigid, since legislation can only react to any individual decision with a general rule.
28 Cf. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation 19/2000 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member states on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system (adopted 
Oct. 6, 2000)(see Sec. 1.4., below), Recs. 2-3:
2.  In all criminal justice systems, public prosecutors: 
 −  decide whether to initiate or continue prosecutions;
 −  conduct prosecutions before the courts;
 −  may appeal or conduct appeals concerning all or some court decisions. 
3.  In certain criminal justice systems, public prosecutors also: 
 −  implement national crime policy while adapting it, where appropriate, to regional and 
 local circumstances;
 −  conduct, direct or supervise investigations;
 −  ensure that victims are effectively assisted;
 −  decide on alternatives to prosecution;
 −  supervise the execution of court decisions. . . .
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In general, these purposes involve representing society’s interest in initiating and 
pursuing legal resolutions to social problems, but not adjudicating those problems. 
The social interest in achieving final determinations concerning criminal actions, 
violence, harm to social peace, or justice rest with the judiciary.
All prosecution services serve as society’s principal means of pursuing punishment 
of criminal behavior, along with the police and the judiciary, and as its principal in-
terface with the adjudicative power.29
Effective and Efficient Pursuit of Purposes: Effectiveness simply measures whether or 
not the prosecution service is achieving the goals society has set for it. Does the 
work of the prosecution service punish enough criminals? Does it reduce crime? 
Does it represent the interests of specific parties? Does it contribute to greater legal 
certainty? 
Efficiency differs from effectiveness in its measure of costs. A measure which is ef-
fective achieves its stated goal, but without reference to the costs; a measure which 
is efficient achieves its goal at an acceptable cost, or at lower cost than alternatives. 
Efficiency therefore measures whether or not the prosecution is achieving the goals 
society has set for it within some framework of costs, monetary or other. Does the 
prosecution service achieve its goals within budget? Does it discover and punish 
criminals without catching up the innocent? In representing some parties’ interests, 
does it under-represent other parties’ interests? Does it achieve legal certainty with-
out sacrificing flexibility or harming important interests and rights?
If analysis seldom considers whether or not prosecutors are effective, it even more 
rarely considers if they are efficient, and they rarely figure in policy planning or sta-
tistical measurement. Yet each of these parameters is important and useful. Without 
clear purposes and mechanisms for measuring performance towards those purposes, 
there is no way for society to know if the prosecution is contributing towards a better 
society, however defined; without also considering the costs of its contribution, there 
is no way for society to know if it is making a worthwhile investment in the prosecu-
tion service, or the criminal justice system more broadly, or if it should consider dif-
ferent strategies that would cost less or yield more.30
Effectiveness and efficiency allow us to recognize more clearly the instrumental na-
ture of independence and accountability mechanisms, rather than treating them as 
shibboleths or as absolute—and thus non-negotiable—prerequisites of a free society. 
29 The recently adopted mission statement of South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority typifies 
the most common foci of a prosecution service—prosecution, crime control, legality: “Guided by 
the Constitution, we in the National Prosecuting Authority ensure justice for the victims of crime 
by prosecuting without fear, favor or prejudice, and by working with our partners and the public to 
solve and prevent crime.” Annual Report 2005/06, National Prosecuting Authority, 2007, at 9 (not-
ing also that crime prevention—a new formal role for the prosecution service—will be achieved 
by adopting a problem-solving approach to crime, enhancing prosecutors’ role in guiding inves-
tigations, applying case-flow management principles, and engaging in joint problem-solving with 
other stakeholders).
30 If limiting costs is conceived of as a secondary purpose of a given institutional or functional ar-
rangement, then an effective measure and an efficient one become practically identical.
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This does not in any way imply a lesser commitment to these values.31 On the con-
trary: properly understood, the efficiencies and social goods produced by a suffi-
ciently independent and accountable prosecutor should actually increase social com-
mitment to independence and accountability.
1.3. Measuring performance
Even if the purposes are clearly agreed upon and costs estimated, measuring the 
prosecution service’s success in meeting those purposes, and the price of its doing 
so, requires creative and sophisticated metrics that focus as much on qualitative out-
comes as they do on numbers or points in the process. Yet present performance mea-
surement, especially statistical evaluation, tends to focus on quantitative processes 
without attending to the outcomes that actually affect individuals and society.32
Some current measurements, to be sure, do exhibit attention to outcomes: drops in 
crime rates, for example, directly measure a phenomenon of significance to individu-
als and the whole community.33 But many of the internal measurements commonly 
used by prosecution services to evaluate themselves (and to justify their operations 
and budgets before the legislature or the executive) focus on quantitative processing 
with little real-life relevance. An increase in the number of cases filed per attorney, 
for example, may bespeak a busier office, but does not tell us if this reflects a rise 
in efficiency, a rise in the rate of crime reporting, or a rise in the crime rate itself, 
or even some combination of these; it does not tell us if those attorneys are over-
worked. Internal processing measurements, alone, tell us little about the outcomes of 
the prosecutorial enterprise, which are ultimately the justification for social support 
of a professional prosecution service.
Thus orienting measurement and evaluation towards public policy standards—
meaning a focus on outcomes of direct interest to the final beneficiaries, who are the 
citizenry, rather than intra- or inter-institutional standards—can be a useful means 
of ascertaining the prosecution service’s performance. Possible criteria for such pub-
lic policy-oriented measurement could be drawn from work done with trial judges 
in the United States, where the following criteria were identified: access to justice; 
expeditiousness and timeliness; equality, fairness, and integrity; independence and 
accountability; and public trust and confidence.34 These are admittedly very broad 
measures (and some are measures of perceptions), but their direction is towards 
qualitative measures of outcomes which are of real consequence to the public.
31 Obviously, effectiveness and efficiency are not values unto themselves, but are measures of how well 
one vindicates other, underlying values, such as the protection of individual rights, human dignity, 
or the security and well-being of the community.
32 Cf. Access to Justice: The Prosecution Service, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, 
2006, at 3-4 (outlining standards and questions for assessing prosecution services’s statistics).
33 The existence of a causal relationship between prosecution of crime and crime levels is controver-
sial; the example is raised here for purposes of illustration only.
34 National Center for State Courts Commission on Trial Court Performance Standards, Trial Court 
Performance Standard Project (1987).
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In addition to facilitating other political or institutional actors’ efforts to ensure and 
support the prosecution service’s effective and efficient operation, public policy eval-
uation can itself be a potent form of accountability. In some contexts, it can be more 
powerful, as an analytical and evaluative tool, than measuring the performance of the 
prosecution against a set of constitutional arrangements or procedural benchmarks.
1.4. International standards
Another aid to conceptualizing the purposes of a prosecution service and measur-
ing its performance is the limited number of international standards concerning 
prosecutorial independence, accountability, and organization. For example, the UN 
Guidelines and Council of Europe Recommendations on the role of public prosecu-
tion include suggestions for how to structure relationships between governments, 
courts, legislatures, police, and prosecution services, and how to encourage neutral-
ity and fairness in the administration of criminal justice.  These guidelines and rec-
ommendations are both convenient and compelling, backed by recognized regional 
and international bodies and representative professional organizations. They are, 
however, very general.
UN Guidelines: The United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors of 199035 
contain 18 articles addressing the qualifications, career path, and service conditions 
of prosecutors, as well as their role in criminal proceedings. The UN Guidelines are 
both extremely general and non-binding, but precisely for these reasons they may 
indicate the broadest range of acceptable practice: practices that unambiguously con-
tradict the Guidelines would probably not describe a meaningfully effective, neutral, 
and accountable prosecution service, even if, as a formal matter, such practices might 
not clearly violate any binding legal obligation.
Council of Europe Recommendations: The Council of Europe’s Recommendation 
19/200036 contains 39 recommendations concerning the organization, powers, rights, 
and duties of public prosecutors. The Recommendations are somewhat more detailed 
than the UN Guidelines and aim at “identify[ing] the major guiding principles. . .that 
ought to govern” public prosecution services given the existence of two separate sys-
tems in Europe.37 The Recommendations naturally relate only to Council members,38 
35 United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (adopted by Eighth United Nations Congress 
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990), U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 189 (1990), at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/i4grp.htm.
36 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation 19/2000 [Rec. 2000/19] of the Com-
mittee of Ministers to member states on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system 
(adopted Oct. 6, 2000).
37 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Explanatory Memorandum (General Considerations) (“The com-
mittee . . . took a dynamic approach and set out to identify the major guiding principles—common 
to both types of system [i.e. the civil and common law]—that ought to govern Public Prosecution 
as it moves into a new millennium. At the same time it sought to recommend practical objectives 
to be attained in pursuit of the institutional balance upon which democracy and the rule of law in 
Europe largely depend[]”).
38 The Recommendations clearly have no formal relationship to the prosecution services of Chile, 
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and are likewise non-binding, but may be considered indicative of possible or advisable 
practice for other states. The Recommendations also include an extensive explanatory 
memorandum.39
International tribunals’ standards and ICC code of conduct: The prosecutorial stan-
dards of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,40 and the 
draft code of professional conduct for prosecutors of the International Criminal 
Court,41 are only narrowly applicable to the prosecutors of the Tribunal and Court 
respectively. Yet precisely because they are instruments for international institutions, 
they likely rely upon and are fully consistent with the practice of the principal legal 
systems, and thus constitute contemporary expressions of standards that, by their 
nature and design, represent and are declarative of a shared minimum.
IAP standards: The International Association of Prosecutors has issued a set of Stan-
dards of Professional Responsibility,42 intended as “a working document for use by 
prosecution services to develop and reinforce their own standards.”43 The IAP Stan-
dards address prosecutors’ professional conduct, independence, neutrality, profes-
sional role, obligations towards other organs of the state, and rights to protection in 
their professional capacity.
The IAP Standards are a private and non-binding initiative, and understandably ad-
dress the perspective of prosecutors rather more that of other institutional actors, 
but they may reasonably be said to represent “standards and principles which are 
generally recognised internationally as necessary for the proper and independent 
prosecution of offences.”44
ABA standards: The American Bar Association has developed a series of standards 
for the prosecutorial function,45 as well as an international Prosecutorial Reform In-
dex which draws on them. The 42 standards cover the full range of actions, pow-
ers, obligations, and institutional relationships affecting prosecutors and prosecution 
services. 
The ABA’s Standards reflect an American perspective, and obviously have no author-
ity outside the particular context of the United States. Nonetheless, they represent a 
South Africa, and the United States, which are not members of the Council of Europe.
39 See http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-operation/Conferences_and_high-level_meet-
ings/European_Public_Prosecutors/Rec%20(2000)%2019%20E%20PR%20Expl%20Memo.asp.
40 Registrar of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Standards of Profes-
sional Conduct for Prosecution Counsel.
41 Draft Code of Professional Conduct for Prosecutors of the International Criminal Court, at http://
www.iap.nl.com/icc_guidelines.html [ICC Draft Code]; see also Draft Regulations of the Office of 
the Prosecutor, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/draft_regulations.pdf.
42 International Association of Prosecutors, Standards of Professional Responsibility and Statement 
of the Essential Duties and Rights of Prosecutors, adopted Apr. 23, 1999, at http://www.iap.nl.com/ 
[IAP Standards].
43 IAP Standards, Foreword.
44 Constitution of the International Association of Prosecutors, Art. 2.3 (noting that it is one of the 
objectives of the IAP to promote such standards).
45 American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function, American Bar 
Association Criminal Justice Section, 1993.
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canonical restatement of prosecutorial standards in an influential and much-emu-
lated system. The Standards are also of interest in part because the ABA’s Prosecuto-
rial Reform Index analyzes various countries’ prosecution services in light of the 
ABA standards, and as such constitutes a valuable comparative, if still non-binding, 
assessment.
Guidelines and recommendations, however, do not determine how a particular state 
should design or reform a system. Reflecting their origins in non-sovereign organi-
zations with multiple state (or private) members of diverse traditions and interests, 
such documents are highly general, and cannot be quickly or easily converted into 
specific organizational principles, draft laws, or regulations. They cannot definitively 
resolve disputes within a country about what would constitute an optimal arrange-
ment; indeed, they cannot authoritatively determine what is a good or bad—let alone a 
better or worse—practice. There is an absence of consensus or determinative authority 
on the questions of what a prosecution service should do and how it should do it.46
This absence of robust, well-defined, and binding international standards might 
seem to suggest that there is little that can be productively said at the comparative 
level concerning institutional design of prosecution services. Yet this relatively open 
international framework itself offers an important lesson: In many states one finds 
an overwrought sense of institutional rigidity, and, in many transitional societies, 
an overly rigid commitment to strong models of prosecutorial independence. Yet 
a comparative view shows that many configurations are consistent with the broad 
parameters of international standards, and so in any given society a number of con-
figurations may be possible. The choice among them is political and constitutional; 
it is negotiable.
Recognizing the political and constitutional nature of the choice in system design 
may free debate about reform from unnecessarily rigid assumptions about the limits 
of system design. Directly elected prosecutors can be consistent with international 
standards, and so can prosecutors directly subordinated to the executive; various 
disciplinary, budgeting, and reporting practices can be consistent with the standards. 
What one cannot derive from the extant international standards and a comparative 
examination is a claim that only a single model of the relationship between prosecu-
tor and politics is possible. 
Recognizing the availability of various models does not imply a casual or “cafeteria” 
approach to reform, in which states simply pick attractive options. Simply copying a 
design feature from one state and inserting it into an another state’s prosecution sys-
tem will seldom do much to improve the effectiveness or efficiency of the service—or 
as much as a more integrated approach might—and may create more problems than 
it solves. Rather, it implies deliberation about the interrelatedness of different design 
elements. One can discern certain organic relationships between possible reform de-
sign elements; for example, early entry into the profession is often paired with longer 
46 Cf. Access to Justice: The Prosecution Service, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, 
2006, at 1 (“Due to the sheer diversity of prosecution structures and approaches, it is difficult to 
address all the potential issues in every system in a single assessment tool.”)
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probationary periods, while strong internal hierarchical control over individual pros-
ecutors’ decisions often appears with relatively stronger institutional independence 
of the prosecution service as a whole. The case of Italy in particular demonstrates the 
unintended effects of linking the legality principle to strong prosecutorial indepen-
dence norms. Direct election of prosecutors—found only in the United States—is not 
incompatible with international norms, but does create unique risks of introducing 
political considerations into the core deliberations of the prosecution service in a way 
that other models simply do not, and consequently requires some balancing structure 
or theory about the role of democratic accountability.47 The point, more generally, is 
that individual elements of design must be evaluated in their full historical, social, and 
political context, and proposals for reform must consider the complex interactions of 
those elements with the rest of the system and with each other. 
II. Structure and Organization of the Public Prosecution Service
This section considers how the prosecution service can or must be organized internally, 
as well as the impact different designs have on the prosecution service’s ability to achieve 
its socially assigned purposes. The prosecution’s internal structure is normally deter-
mined by the need to coordinate with other institutions and the need to respond to 
particular social goals. Coordination can enhance accountability, while specialization 
can ensure that the service is responding to general societal interests.
Prosecution services are financially dependent on the legislature and executive, which 
creates the potential for improper influence; still, the political process can help ensure ac-
countability. Often the chief prosecutor acts as an interface between the prosecution and 
the political branches. There is no requirement that individual prosecutors exercise any 
given quantum of decisional independence; standards call for the career path of prosecu-
tors to be clearly regulated in a manner that does not discriminate against qualified indi-
viduals. Promotion in particular often bears little relationship to the prosecution system’s 
effectiveness or an individual prosecutor’s competence.
States often restrict prosecutors’ outside activities to ensure their neutrality. However, 
certain kinds of activity—such as membership in unions—may actually contribute to 
prosecutors’ effectiveness and independence. Restrictions on outside activity ought not 
isolate prosecutors from the broad process of policy formation.
Evaluation, discipline, and training can reinforce accountability. Evaluation, if properly 
designed, can also increase effectiveness; however, few countries have developed effective 
47 Although direct election of prosecutors has long-standing roots in one of the world’s most influ-
ential states—whose democratic and institutional traditions have frequently been emulated—this 
particular feature is never copied; like the non-textual constitutionalism of the United Kingdom, it 
functions in a highly particular historical and social context.
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evaluation systems. Similarly, disciplinary proceedings are infrequently used in many 
jurisdictions—indeed, the greater risk is not to prosecutors’ independence from intru-
sive punishments but to the accountability of an insular, self-protective guild. Initial 
and continuing training of prosecutors could make an important contribution to the 
prosecution service’s effective capacity, but here too, efforts are often haphazard.
2.1. Internal structure
International standards are largely silent on the internal composition of the prosecu-
tion service;48 rather, decisions about structure are guided by specific political cir-
cumstances, the shape of other institutions, and social expectations concerning the 
role of the prosecution service, and only at the background level might the general 
concern with prosecutorial neutrality suggest that, in context, a particular model 
may not be appropriate or may be essential.
Prosecution services vary widely in their internal structure, with most services high-
ly centralized and hierarchical (Bulgaria, Chile, Hungary, South Africa) and others 
devolving considerable autonomy to individual offices and prosecutors (England and 
Wales, Italy and to some degree France); the federal states, Germany and the United 
States, present a mixed model, with multiple, highly autonomous prosecution ser-
vices, yet considerable hierarchy and centralization within each individual service.49
Most prosecution services have a territorial and hierarchical structure that mirrors 
the organization of the court system, whether or not there is a formal institutional 
relationship to the judiciary.50 This is a fairly conventional, though by no means nec-
48 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 4 (“States should take effective measures to guarantee that 
public prosecutors are able to fulfil their professional duties and responsibilities under adequate 
legal and organisational conditions. . . . Such conditions should be established in close co-opera-
tion with the representatives of public prosecutors[]”), Rec. 8 (“[S]pecialisation should be seen as 
a priority, in terms of the organisation of public prosecutors. . . .”), and Rec. 9 (“With respect to the 
organisation and the internal operation of the Public Prosecution, in particular the assignment and 
re-assignment of cases, this should meet requirements of impartiality and independence and maxi-
mise the proper operation of the criminal justice system. . . .”). The only specific standard concerns 
the need to memorialize hierarchical instruction in writing. Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 
10 (“All public prosecutors enjoy the right to request that instructions addressed to him or her be 
put in writing. Where he or she believes that an instruction is either illegal or runs counter to his 
or her conscience, an adequate internal procedure should be available which may lead to his or her 
eventual replacement[]”).
49 Prosecution in Germany and the United States, considered as a whole, is extremely decentralized, 
but within each autonomous prosecution service there is typically considerable centralization of 
authority. Indeed, in many smaller county prosecution services in the United States, there is almost 
no internal structure, in that the entire service consists of one or two part-time employees; in most 
offices, internal organization is a matter for the discretion of the District Attorney. 
50 Thus this parallelism obtains both in magistracy systems, such as Bulgaria, France, and Italy, and 
in systems that maintain clear status separation, such as Germany. (Some German states have two 
Supreme Courts, and they also have two Prosecutors General.) Chile has a tripartite division of 
its prosecution service, corresponding to the principal administrative and territorial divisions of 
the state. Where courts are functionally organized, prosecution services often reflect this: Italy, for 
example, has special anti-Mafia prosecution directorates as well as juvenile units, corresponding to 
the jurisdiction of the anti-Mafia and juvenile courts, respectively.
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essary,51 response to prosecution services’ core function as representative of state and 
public interests before the courts.52 
Alongside this system, many prosecution services also have specialized functional 
divisions.53 One California county has a special eight-attorney Adult Sexual Assault 
Prosecution Unit responsible for prosecution of sexual offenses, for example, while 
in Bulgaria, the prosecution office corresponding to the Supreme Court of Cassation 
recently created six separate units within its investigation department with responsi-
bility for policy priorities such as organized crime, corruption, and economic crimes. 
In South Africa, the National Prosecuting Authority includes a National Prosecution 
Service responsible for most of the core functions of instituting proceedings, but 
also a Directorate of Special Operations, which engages in specialized investigation 
and prosecution of organized crime, complex financial crime, and corruption, and a 
Priority Crime Litigation Unit, responsible for prosecution of international crimes, 
terrorism and crimes against the state, and prosecutions arising out of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission process.54
Within each territorial or hierarchical office there are often functional organizational 
divisions, such as criminal and civil divisions and special crimes units.55 Units vary 
tremendously in size—in Italy, for example, the 166 prosecution offices (Procure della 
Repubblica) employ between three and 117 prosecutors.
Decisional authority is similarly varied, and international standards seem to require 
only functional autonomy—or at least insulation from political agendas in individual 
cases—for the core decision-making process of the prosecution service as a whole; 
internally, individual prosecutors’ roles in that process may be autonomous or rigidly 
controlled. 
In some systems, superior prosecutors may intervene directly in a subordinate’s case 
(Germany56), or may initiate a chain of instruction rather than intervening directly in 
work at lower levels (France). In others, there is considerably greater independence: 
In Hungary, for example, the prosecution service as a whole is highly independent, 
but within the service the Prosecutor General has almost total discretion to direct 
cases, even reserving a right of intervention in any given case, and has extensive 
authority over prosecutors’ career path; each office head is likewise fully responsible 
51 In England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service is organized in parallel with police districts, 
which previously had responsibility for prosecutions.
52 Where a prosecution service interacts with other state institutions, it often has a chain of command 
or functional organization that parallels that of the other institution, much as it normally does the 
courts; for example, in Hungary, the department dealing with review of punishments principally 
functions at the state level, as prison administration is centralized at that level.
53 Cf. Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 8.
54 There are several other functional divisions within South Africa’s National Prosecuting Author-
ity, which is organized into business units responsible for different core or administrative aspects of 
prosecution: The National Prosecution Service is the largest such unit, but others include the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit, the Witness Protection Unit, and the Sexual Offenses and Community Affairs Unit.
55 For example, Hungary’s prosecution offices have criminal and civil-administrative divisions; the 
criminal divisions have further specialized prosecutors dealing with traffic crime, juvenile crime, 
and (at the county level) with economic crime, organized crime, and complex cases.
56 However, the Prosecutor General may only reassign a case, not take it over personally.
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for the work performed in his office, with individual prosecutors acting as his depu-
ties rather than as truly autonomous decision-makers. In Bulgaria, a higher-ranking 
prosecutor in the chain of command has full power to intervene in any case and also 
the power to replace prosecutors on individual cases. In South Africa, the National 
Director issues binding general policy directives, may intervene in cases in which 
these directives are not followed, and may also review decisions to prosecute, al-
though he may not otherwise intervene in the conduct of the case; more generally, 
ranking prosecutors with administrative authority over junior colleagues in a territo-
rial jurisdiction can in practice overrule a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute or not.
However, despite the frequent existence of a formal right of direct or indirect inter-
vention, most systems afford considerable practical autonomy to the chiefs of in-
dividual offices to set policy and work practices within their own offices; guidance 
from higher levels is often sufficiently general to allow flexible responses to local 
conditions.57 But most often this is an institutional autonomy; individual prosecutors 
at various stages of the hierarchy may have very limited autonomy, although practice 
is quite varied: in Italy, prosecutors have considerable autonomous control over their 
cases and cannot be reassigned without cause, but in France the principle of inter-
changeability (indivisibilité) applies, and chief prosecutors have considerable power 
to assign and reassign cases.
Many prosecution services rely on prosecutors to handle supervisory and adminis-
trative matters.58 Especially in larger systems, this is not generally conducive to effec-
tive administration and management, and can constitute a considerable drain on the 
ability of professional prosecutors to focus on their core competences. In many US 
jurisdictions, for example, administrative divisions are overseen by prosecutors who 
lack specialized training—in contrast to the court systems, where administrative pro-
fessionalization is far more advanced. Given the small numbers of prosecutors in US 
services relative to cases—itself a function of the relatively widespread use of clerical 
personnel and the prevalence of plea-bargaining—this can divert scarce prosecuto-
rial resources from core functions.
In the main, it seems clear that the internal structure of a prosecution service is nor-
mally determined by two concerns: the need to coordinate with other territorially 
and hierarchically organized institutions, such as the judiciary and the police, and 
the need to respond to particular social goals and problems by creating specialized, 
functional (non-territorial) units. Coordination can enhance accountability by ori-
enting the prosecution service towards the needs of other actors, while functional 
57 Even in systems that allow hierarchical intervention, this power is often exercised in a limited 
fashion. In Hungary, for example, the Prosecutor General’s office rarely exercises its authority to 
take over cases; more often it reviews the case and returns it to the originally responsible office with 
instructions. See Sec. 3.1 (discussing prosecutorial discretion), below.
58 Germany is an exception, as generally a specialized unit reporting directly to the head of the Pros-
ecution Service and directed by a professional manager handles administrative matters. Prosecu-
tion offices generally have large administrative staffs, and prosecutors do little administrative work. 
Chile also assigns management of daily operations, at both the regional and national level, to a 
professional executive director, and at the national level, employees are involved in management 
and administration, not prosecution.
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specialization can ensure that the service is responding to general societal interests 
and legitimate policy goals.59
There are rarely strong incentives to resist functional specialization, but specialization 
does raise issues of internal coordination and hierarchy, as functional and territorial 
units may have overlapping claims to priority over certain cases; still, these concerns 
are probably not greater than those raised by dealing with crime across territorial 
jurisdictions, for example—which is one reason functional units are developed in the 
first place. Reform efforts should therefore consider structuring levels of responsibil-
ity to correspond with relevant external actors’ organization; structures organized 
at odds with other institutional actors—such as the courts or police—should only 
be adopted for specific and persuasive reasons of efficiency or to meet a legitimately 
defined public goal, not for internal convenience.
2.2. Budgetary process
International standards are largely silent on the budgeting process,60 reflecting a 
strong sense of deference to the core competences of the political branches,61 which 
normally includes discretionary authority over budgeting. The standards suggest that 
prosecutors ought to be consulted in the formulation of the budget;62 however, there 
is no indication that prosecutors must or even should have any particular or disposi-
tive role in budget deliberations. The standards can reasonably be read to include a 
general obligation to ensure adequate funding to support prosecutorial functions,63 
and indeed it follows logically that the responsible authorities would have a deriva-
tive obligation to give practical effect to other obligations in the standards, or at least 
to not take discretionary steps to obstruct their realization; denying funding would 
effectively negate those obligations. Still, any such derivative obligation is highly gen-
eral, and it would be difficult to ground a claim to a particular level of funding, or to 
funding for any particular activity, on the standards.
59 The standards call for specialization as a hortatory goal, Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 8, 
although it is not clear how this would be formulated as a necessary measure apart from the specif-
ics of a given system’s caseload and priorities.
60 Only Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 4 mentions a general obligation for states to provide 
“budgetary means” for prosecutors to “fulfil their professional duties”).
61 See, e.g., Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 12 (“Public prosecutors should not interfere with the 
competence of the legislative and the executive powers[]”).
62 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 4 (providing that “adequate. . .organization conditions. . .condi-
tions should be established in close co-operation with the representatives of public prosecutors[]”).
63 See, e.g., Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 4 (“States should take effective measures to guar-
antee that public prosecutors are able to fulfil their professional duties and responsibilities under 
adequate. . .organisational conditions as well as adequate conditions as to the means, in particular 
budgetary means, at their disposal[]”); see also Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 5(d) (“States 
should take measures to ensure that. . . public prosecutors have reasonable conditions of service 
such as remuneration. . .commensurate with their crucial role. . .and that these conditions are 
governed by law[]”); UN Guidelines, Art. 6 (“Reasonable conditions of service of prosecutors [and] 
adequate remuneration. . .shall be set out by law or published rules or regulations[]”).
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In general, prosecution services remain reliant on the legislature, and often also on 
the executive, for the planning, preparation, and approval of their budgets, in a pro-
cess that is inevitably discretionary, political, and often outside the control of the 
prosecution service itself. Budgets for prosecution may be constitutionally identi-
fied (as in Hungary), and prosecution services often have considerable formal and 
informal opportunities to influence the initial development and negotiation of the 
budget proposal (France, Hungary,64 South Africa65), but do not have decisional au-
thority. This is one of the areas in which legislatures and executives retain their great-
est indirect influence on prosecution services. In Bulgaria, for example, although the 
Supreme Judicial Council prepares its own budget proposal for the magistracy, the 
government routinely submits a parallel (and considerably smaller) budget which 
appears to be the actual basis for parliamentary deliberations;66 there is also no public 
review of the parliamentary budgeting process. In England and Wales, the prosecu-
tion service’s budget is directly allocated by the Attorney General from the broader 
budget of his office determined by Parliament; the allocation is considered a matter 
for the executive. Even the directly elected county District Attorneys of the United 
States generally have no independent source of financing, and mostly negotiate a 
budget with county legislatures and executives, and occasionally federal, state, or 
municipal sources, although some prosecution services also have independent reve-
nue sources, such as forfeiture programs. The Italian prosecution service has perhaps 
the most latitude in determining its own budget, as, formally at least, prosecutors 
are constitutionally unrestrained in their expenditures and the Ministry of Justice is 
obliged simply to procure the funds prosecutors deem necessary; even there, how-
ever, the legislature in fact must decide on the allocation, and of course in practice 
funds are not limitless.
Some prosecution services have considerable autonomy to allocate their overall bud-
get once it is determined, although the level of autonomy within the service varies 
considerably: in Hungary, the Prosecutor General retains considerable control over 
the ultimate allocation; in Germany, individual prosecution services have recently 
been given greater flexibility in their own spending decisions, although this discre-
tion does not extend to core functions such as investigations; in England and Wales, 
internal formulae based on levels of activity are used to disburse funds to individual 
offices. In the United States, District Attorneys generally have very broad discretion 
to allocate their budget, and as noted, the Italian system leaves the prosecution ser-
vice almost total latitude.
Although this financial dependence creates the potential for improper influence, 
de-linkage of the prosecutorial budgetary process from other institutions and their 
political deliberations is not necessarily a positive aim. Even the most independent 
64 In Hungary the Prosecutor General’s office submits the prosecution service’s budget directly to 
Parliament.
65 The Department of Justice consults with the National Director in preparing the budget proposal for 
the National Prosecuting Authority that it submits to Parliament, but the Director has no decisional 
authority.
66 It is common for an element of the executive—the Ministry of Finance, Treasury, or Ministry of 
Justice—to have final authority for preparing the actual budget proposal (for example, Chile, Eng-
land and Wales, Germany, respectively) and thus the prosecution service’s input is advisory.
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prosecution service is funded with public monies, concerning the use of which the 
public reasonably has an interest. Likewise, legislators who allocate those funds have 
a direct political responsibility to voters for their allocative decisions, and therefore 
can serve as an effective and legitimated check on the prosecution services.67
Nonetheless, certain funding models can moderate the risks of improper political in-
fluence without damaging accountability: multi-year grants; block grants with mini-
mal instructions concerning internal allocation; and regularization of the budgeting 
schedule (that is, avoiding ad hoc decisions which are more likely to be in reaction 
to particular decisions of the prosecutor). A few of the states examined here have 
seriously employed multi-year or block grant approaches to funding, such as France, 
which recently implemented a five-year budgeting cycle, and England and Wales, 
where the Treasury allocates budgets on a three-year cycle. Some states in the United 
States have employed formulae measuring population and crime rates to arrive at 
standard budget estimates, but these are fairly crude indicators of actual need, given 
the high variation in factors such as complexity of crime, police activities, judicial 
policies, availability of alternative settlement opportunities, and prosecutorial policy. 
As a result, some prosecution services in the United States have tried to develop more 
detailed workload assessments.
Even more important than a particular, technical model, however, is cultivation of a 
culture in which use of budgetary authority to affect individual decisions of the pros-
ecutor or alter institutional policy is discouraged. Many of the systems examined in 
these Reports demonstrate such a cultural commitment.
Whatever model is employed, it is possible, and consistent with international stan-
dards, to incorporate transparent budgeting processes. Although there are certain 
expenditures (in connection with ongoing organized crime investigations, for exam-
ple) which may have to be kept secret, in general there is little reason why the regular 
allocations for the prosecution services—and the deliberations leading to those al-
locations—cannot be highly transparent.
However, some of the services examined exhibit low levels of transparency in their 
deliberative and allocative processes. Chile’s Ministerio Público negotiates its budget 
proposal directly with the Treasury, but does not make the process public. Bulgaria’s 
Supreme Judicial Council reports on its spending to Parliament, but as noted above, 
Parliament’s own budget process is not made public. More generally, the lack of regu-
larization in the budgeting process tends to reduce transparency. Arguably, more 
transparent and regularized allocative processes could actually reduce the level of 
contestation over budgeting, by removing the deliberations from the level of daily 
politics or by providing agreed benchmarks for allocation that would only have to be 
revised occasionally rather than every year.68
67 Independent funding schemes carry their own risks to neutrality. For example, autonomous fund-
ing—such as allocation of monetary judgments to the prosecutorial budget, like the forfeiture pro-
grams common in the United States—can create incentives for prosecutors to make decisions on 
the basis of a potential suspect’s wealth rather than culpability. 
68 In Germany, for example, it is not uncommon that prosecutors will go public with complaints 
about inadequate funding or staffing levels, as a way of pressuring the Ministry of Justice.
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Few prosecutorial budget processes incorporate clear performance goals and indica-
tors for their achievement—England and Wales is one that does—and this is arguably 
linked to the relatively low level of transparency surrounding budgeting and policy 
planning, as the lack of meaningful indicators reduces opportunities for the public, 
or even other institutional actors, to understand and involve themselves in the policy 
process. South Africa and the United States have perhaps the most advanced experi-
ments in linking resource allocation to clear performance measures, although it is 
not clear how successful these efforts have been.69 In any event, technical estimates of 
budgetary needs cannot on their own ensure accountability, which requires a politi-
cal component: determining an accurate budget is an increasingly technical process, 
but successfully getting a budget approved is still a political process.
2.3. The status of the prosecutor general
Some systems make the very highest prosecutor or the formal head of the prose-
cution service a kind of interface between the functioning prosecution system and 
the political branches; this figure rarely engages in actual prosecution or even direct 
management of working prosecutors,70 but instead manages a larger department in 
which the prosecution service is located, and he may delegate many of his formal 
powers to a lower official who effectively runs the service. In the French Parquet, for 
example, there is no single chief prosecutor, but rather some 35 Prosecutors General 
at the Courts of Appeal of equal standing under the Minister of Justice.71 In South 
Africa, the Minister of Justice and the President have considerable influence over 
general policy for the National Prosecuting Authority, but the decision to prosecute 
particular cases rests solely with the National Director.72 This model may provide 
a kind of political insulation, although this should not be overstated; many chief 
prosecutors are directly involved in the daily decisional operations of their services, 
especially in smaller jurisdictions.
Consistent with this model, most chief prosecutors are political appointees of some 
sort, in that they are appointed by the political branches in a more or less discretion-
ary process,73 and often can be removed by the political branches, although often 
69 In the United States, these efforts are not centralized and results are difficult to compare across the 
many autonomous and highly heterogeneous prosecution systems.
70 In England and Wales, the Director of Public Prosecutions reports to the Attorney General, who 
only appears in court in particularly high-profile cases or human rights cases.
71 The Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation is nominally the ranking prosecutor, but only has 
powers with regard to that Court. This is similar to the system in Austria, in which the Prosecutor 
General operates outside the framework of the prosecution service, with the sole task of appearing 
before the Supreme Court. 
72 The Minister of Justice may require the National Director to provide reasons for his decisions.
73 In South Africa the President appoints the National Director of the prosecution service largely at 
his discretion. In England and Wales the Attorney General appoints the chief prosecutor at his 
discretion. In Hungary the President nominates and Parliament approves the Prosecutor General. 
In Germany, at the federal level, the Minister of Justice nominates the Prosecutor General, subject 
to the approval of the Bundesrat, and the President appoints him. The system in Chile provides 
multiple layers of public or political input: Candidates for Fiscal Nacional enter an open public 
competition, from which the Supreme Court forwards five candidates to the President, whose ap-
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only for defined causes according to a restricted process.74 In some states, although 
initial appointment is political and discretionary, chief prosecutors have civil service 
status, and their subsequent tenure is defined and insulated from further interven-
tions by the political branches.75 In England and Wales, for example, the Director of 
Public Prosecutions is appointed by the Attorney General after an open competition 
and serves at his pleasure, but is normally appointed on a fixed, three-year contract 
with the possibility of a two-year extension.76 Consistent with this restricted political 
involvement, appointees may also be subject to restrictions on their political activity 
(Hungary). At the other end of the spectrum, the appointment of District Attor-
neys in the United States is a political process of direct election, which often requires 
considerable financial resources and political connections, and politicking skills not 
directly related to the actual work of supervising a prosecution service.
As with budgeting and legislative or executive oversight more generally,77 the direct 
involvement of the political branches in the career path of the chief prosecutor may, 
in context, represent a potentially problematic intervention in the autonomy of the 
prosecution service, especially where the internal organization of the service gives 
the chief prosecutor considerable discretion and authority, as in Hungary.78 In Bul-
garia, the three appointments of Prosecutors General that have been made under the 
current constitutional dispensation have been strongly influenced by party-political 
considerations, yet in none of these cases has there been public debate about pos-
sible candidates. Prosecutors in Germany have registered concern about the recent 
removal or forced retirement of two state Prosecutors General because of political 
disagreements with the state Ministers of Justice. 
Yet formal political control can in practice be constrained by the entrenchment of 
members of the prosecution in ministerial positions—as in Italy, where members of 
the magistracy largely compose the senior civil service within the Ministry of Jus-
tice79—and in any event, some measure of political involvement is unavoidable and 
can constitute the service’s principal channel of accountability to the political repre-
sentatives of society. No system under examination has created a truly independent 
responsible head of the prosecution service.
pointee must be confirmed by the Senate in a special session.
74 In South Africa, the President and Parliament both must approve the suspension or dismissal of the 
National Director of the prosecution service. In Hungary, the President recommends and Parlia-
ment approves the Prosecutor General’s removal, for specified reasons or on a finding of unworthi-
ness to hold office—a kind of residual catch-all category.
75 This is the case in many German states, where an appointed chief prosecutor is considered a civil 
servant and can only be removed for specific cause.
76 England and Wales provides a good example of the cultural entrenchment of a norm of non-in-
tervention: there the Director of Public Prosecution is seen as independent of the executive, and 
this view long predates the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service; indeed, the principal concern in 
England and Wales has been about independence from the police forces, not the government proper.
77 See Sections 4.2 and 4.3., below.
78 There has been considerable and heated controversy in Hungary over the appointment and alleged 
political affiliations of Prosecutors General.
79 The involvement of prosecutors in the administration of the executive raises its own issues of politi-
cal entanglement, however—the risk, not of direct control by the executive, but of cooptation.
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2.4. The status of individual prosecutors
Consistent with the prosecution service’s obligation to conduct itself neutrally, in-
ternational standards call for the career path of prosecutors—from appointment 
through promotion and retirement—to be clearly regulated80 in a manner that does 
not discriminate against any group of qualified individuals81 and would seem im-
plicitly to require that career path decisions not affect the overall service’s capacity to 
make neutral decisions about charging crimes or about conducting any other activi-
ties society assigns to it.82
Appointment: International standards concerning appointment are very general, and 
focus more on ensuring that no otherwise qualified candidate is rejected on discrimi-
natory grounds83 than on defining a minimal level of competence.84 Some civil law 
states require extensive educational preparation, examinations, and apprenticeships 
(France, Germany, Italy), and may also include probationary periods (Germany, 
Hungary) and performance reviews (Germany, Hungary); common law countries’ 
entry requirements tend to be somewhat lower, such as the bare requirement of a 
law degree, although England and Wales also has probationary periods. In Bulgaria, 
initial appointment has not been based on clear criteria, with open competition for 
entry into the system having only recently been instituted. Germany allows appeals 
of rejected appointment applications; even though such appeals are rarely filed, the 
80 See UN Guidelines, Art. 6 (“Reasonable conditions of service of prosecutors, adequate remunera-
tion and, where applicable, tenure, pension and age of retirement shall be set out by law or pub-
lished rules or regulations[]”).
81 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 5(a) (“States should take measures to ensure that: . . . the 
recruitment, the promotion and the transfer of public prosecutors are carried out according to fair 
and impartial procedures embodying safeguards against any approach which favours the interests 
of specific groups, and excluding discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth, or other status[]”).
82 Cf. Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 25 (“Public prosecutors should abstain from discrimina-
tion on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth, health, handicaps or other 
status[]”).
83 UN Guidelines, Art. 2(a) (“States shall ensure that:. . [s]election criteria for prosecutors embody 
safeguards against appointments based on partiality or prejudice, excluding any discrimination 
against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex. Language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, social or ethnic origin, property, birth, economic or other status, except that it shall not 
be considered discriminatory to require a candidate for prosecutorial office to be a national of the 
country concerned[]”); see also Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 5(a). Compare the process in 
Germany, in which the head of an office with a vacancy proposes a specific candidate (from among 
those who have completed a standard examination) to the Prosecutor General and to the represen-
tatives of female prosecutors and prosecutors with disabilities, who make a recommendation to the 
Minister of Justice. South Africa’s law regulating appointments provides that the National Prosecut-
ing Authority’s staffing should “reflect broadly the racial and gender composition” of the country 
(National Prosecuting Authority Act, 32/1998, Sec. 8), but leaves the specific qualifications to the 
National Director to determine. Some 70 percent of the Authority’s employees are from “previously 
disadvantaged” racial population groups (Annual Report 2005/6, National Prosecuting Authority, 
2007, at 74); Indian/Asian and white racial groups are still considerably over-represented, however.
84 UN Guidelines, Art. 1 (“Persons selected as prosecutors shall be individuals of integrity and ability, 
with appropriate training and qualifications[]”).
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opportunity increases the transparency of the process and is a disincentive for per-
sonal or political favoritism.85
Tenure: Most systems provide some form of tenure protection for regular or line 
prosecutors, although they may exempt leading supervisors and top appointees from 
such protection, subjecting them instead to more direct political discretion.86 This is 
generally consistent with international standards, which call for prosecutors’ career 
path to be insulated from improper pressure.87 In some countries, prosecutors are 
civil servants with very secure positions (Italy, Germany, Hungary, South Africa), 
while in others supervisors (Chile88) or the chief prosecutor (United States) have con-
siderable discretion to remove subordinates.
Extended probationary or training periods (up to five years in Bulgaria,89 three to 
five in Germany, four in Hungary,90 two in England and Wales, 12 months in South 
Africa) prior to initial full appointment can limit an individual prosecutor’s practical 
autonomy, as his decisions may be influenced by knowledge that superiors can refuse 
to tenure him. Some German states have moved towards longer probation: Hesse, 
for example, recently introduced a five-year probationary period for each newly ap-
pointed prosecutor; although justified as a move to improve efficiency, this arrange-
ment may in fact increase the susceptibility of individual prosecutors to political or 
institutional pressure. Similarly, unrestricted discretionary power to fire prosecutors 
(Chile, United States) may affect prosecutors’ judgment in individual case decisions. 
However, inasmuch as there is no defined right or requirement that individual pros-
ecutors exercise any given quantum of decisional independence, the effects of long 
probation are not necessarily problematic so long as the service’s overall decisional 
autonomy is respected.
85 In one sense, influence on appointment is less problematic than influence on ongoing aspects of 
prosecutors’ careers, since that influence cannot be exercised beyond the initial appointment; at the 
same time, in practice, patronage through appointment often does create forms of obligation that 
might allow improper influence, and a systematic bias towards certain kinds of candidates can cre-
ate an institutional culture in which certain kinds of outcomes and decisions are favored without 
any need for direct, ongoing intervention in individual cases.
86 In many jurisdictions in the United States, prosecutors serve at the pleasure of the District Attor-
ney, although in some line prosecutors have some civil service protections. In practice, only senior 
officials are usually replaced when a new District Attorney is elected. In Hungary, tenure in leader-
ship positions is at the discretion of the Prosecutor General, although in practice such prosecutors 
are rarely removed.
87 UN Guidelines, Art. 6; Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 5(a),(c)-(d) (“States should take mea-
sures to ensure that: a. . . .the transfer of public prosecutors are carried out according to fair and 
impartial procedures. . .; . . .c. the mobility of public prosecutors is governed also by the needs of the 
service; d. public prosecutors have reasonable conditions of service such as remuneration, tenure 
and pension commensurate with their crucial role as well as an appropriate age of retirement and 
that these conditions are governed by law[]”).
88 Formally, Assistant Prosecutors have life tenure until age 75, but may be removed for negligence, 
and in practice superiors have considerable discretion.
89 In 2003, the probationary period was extended to five years and final appointment made subject 
to a positive evaluation of performance, following criticisms about a lack of effective disciplinary 
responses to abuses of power, corruption, and poor performance.
90 This includes three years as a trainee and one year as a prosecutorial law secretary (titkár), prior to 
the initial appointment.
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Promotion: International standards provide that promotion systems—where they 
exist91—should be based on objective, but not necessarily quantitative, factors.92 
In practice, evaluation for promotion is usually either a bureaucratized process 
based entirely on seniority (Italy in practice, where promotion is almost entirely 
automatic93) or on a combination of personal “office dynamics” and quantitative 
measures of performance. In either case, promotion often bears little relationship 
to meaningful evaluation of the prosecution system’s overall effectiveness or an 
individual prosecutor’s competence.94 In Chile, for example, many prosecutors and 
several chief assistant prosecutors have complained about extreme subjectivity in 
the promotion evaluation process.
Restriction on Activities: Because society has an interest in ensuring that prosecu-
tors exercise their functions neutrally, states not only restrict outside actors’ ability 
to involve themselves in the service, but also often place restrictions on prosecutors’ 
outside professional or personal activities. This is because prosecutors’ personal in-
terests may affect their neutrality every bit as much as external incursions on their 
independence. International standards do not expressly require or recommend re-
strictions on activity, but (with the exceptions noted below), nothing in their terms 
would prevent restrictions otherwise justified on policy grounds.
States frequently bar prosecutors from holding elected or appointed political office 
(Bulgaria95) or governance and civil service positions (France) but this is not a uni-
form practice.96 In Chile, prosecutors’ personal political liberty is considerably cir-
cumscribed; they are prohibited from engaging in any political activity, such as union 
membership or participation in political rallies, other than voting. In South Africa, 
prosecutors may join unions but are prohibited from striking, as they perform an “es-
sential service[;]”97they may belong to political parties but may not preside or speak 
at public political meetings, nor prepare or publish any text or speech to promote or 
prejudice the interests of any political party. There are relatively few restrictions on 
outside activity by prosecutors in the United States98—where there is also considerable 
91 The standards clearly contemplate the possibility that prosecution services may not have a promo-
tion system. See UN Guidelines, Art. 7 (“Promotion of prosecutors, wherever such a system exists. . 
.”)(emphasis added).
92 UN Guidelines, Art. 7 (“Promotion of prosecutors. . .shall be based on objective factors, in particu-
lar professional qualifications, ability, integrity and experience, and decided upon in accordance 
with fair and impartial procedures[]”); Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 5(b) (“States should 
take measures to ensure that:. . .the careers of public prosecutors, their promotions and their mobil-
ity are governed by known and objective criteria, such as competence and experience[]”).
93 See discussion of evaluation, below.
94 The right of prosecutors in Germany to appeal a supervisor’s negative evaluation has tended to pro-
duce uniformly positive evaluations and reduced their practical value in the promotion process.
95 Magistrates may suspend their duties in order to take elected or appointed positions and are guar-
anteed their posts upon return, and time spent in certain public positions requiring legal skills 
counts towards promotion. Nonetheless, this kind of career switching is relatively rare.
96 In the United States, most District Attorneys are themselves directly elected officials. In Italy several 
prosecutors have been elected to offices while on leave from their official duties, to which they have 
returned upon completing their electoral mandate.
97 Government Gazette (South Africa), GNR.1216 of Sept. 12, 1997. Prosecutors have nonetheless 
participated in broader public servants’ strikes in 2001 and 2007; it is unclear whether any dismiss-
als followed these strikes.
98 Far from forbidding political activity, in the United States, it is not uncommon for assistant pros-
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discretion for the District Attorney in firing prosecutors—or in England and Wales. 
Italy places very few restrictions on the activities of its prosecutors, allowing them to 
work actively in other government positions on a full- or part-time basis, as well as 
to switch. This has led to a blurring of the boundaries between the prosecution ser-
vice and the political class through the engagement of members of the prosecution 
service in partisan politics. At the end of their political mandate, prosecutors usually 
return to their previous activities and may even find themselves in a position to pros-
ecute (or judge) politicians with whom they interacted.99  
Some states bar prosecutors from earning money from outside activity—sometimes 
only of a legal nature, but sometimes without regard to the kind of activity: in France 
and South Africa prosecutors must receive their superior’s permission to earn any 
outside income;100 in Germany outside legal work is prohibited,101 and a supervisor’s 
permission is required for other forms of outside income (and is rarely granted); Hun-
gary limits outside economic activity and requires prosecutors to make a public decla-
ration of their property prior to their initial appointment and every three years.
In addition to these specific restrictions, many systems at least notionally aspire to 
some vague measure of restraint—in Germany, for example, prosecutors are required 
to exercise “restraint” (Zurückhaltung) and “moderation” (Mässigung) in the extent 
of their political activism—but such standards are generally difficult to enforce.102 In 
any event, there is no necessary reason to restrict all outside activity, even remunera-
tive activity, and indeed international standards suggest that certain kinds of out-
side activity or affiliation—such as membership in unions, professional associations, 
or academic institutions—may actually contribute to prosecutors’ effectiveness and 
independence.103 Certainly in some systems, trade unions or associations are quite 
ecutors to be asked to actively support the re-election of the District Attorney.
99 One member of the magistracy noted that “political parties are convinced, more or less correctly, 
that the magistracy is a seat of real, heavy, often brutal power . . .  and that therefore it is convenient 
to have personalized channels of communication with it.”  A. Beria d’Argentine, “Perch�� a tanti      
magiostrati non piace il ‘giudice candidato,” Corriere della Sera, Apr. 28, 1979, at 1. 
100 In South Africa, the National Director must approve such a request.
101 Prosecutors may publish books and articles, give lectures at universities and conferences, and par-
ticipate in giving exams to law students.
102 Vague regulations carry risk as well. In particular, prohibitions on political activity should be de-
fined with some degree of precision since a vaguely formulated prohibition can more easily be 
applied in an abusive manner to suppress internal criticism of the prosecution service.  
103 See, e.g., UN Guidelines, Art. 8 (“Prosecutors like other citizens are entitled to freedom of. . .asso-
ciation and assembly. In particular, they shall have the right to take part in public discussion of mat-
ters concerning the law, the administration of justice and the promotion and protection of human 
rights and to join or form. . .organizations. . .without suffering professional disadvantage by reason 
of. . .their membership in a lawful organization. In exercising these rights, prosecutors shall always 
conduct themselves in accordance with the law and the recognized standards and ethics of their 
profession[]”) and 9 (“Prosecutors shall be free to form and join professional associations or other 
organizations to represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect 
their status[]”); Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 6 (mirroring the UN Guidelines, and adding 
that “[t]he rights mentioned above can only be limited in so far as this is prescribed by law and is 
necessary to preserve the constitutional position of the public prosecutors. In cases where the rights 
mentioned above are violated, an effective remedy should be available[]”);IAP Standards, Std. 6 
(prosecutors “should be entitled. . .to form and join professional associations or other organisations 
to represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect their status”).
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effective in representing the institutional interests of prosecutors (France). The core 
reservation would appear to be that restrictions on outside activity ought not limit 
prosecutors’ collective ability to ensure their own effective operation or interaction 
with other social and political actors; in other words, restrictions ought not isolate 
prosecutors from the broad process of policy formation.
2.5. Individual accountability of prosecutors
Evaluation: International standards concerning evaluation are highly general, not-
ing only that prosecutors should be evaluated according to objective criteria104—and 
indeed, it would be difficult to impose a single evaluation standard given the broad 
range of models for administrative oversight of individual prosecutors, ranging from 
near total autonomy to strong centralization. However, there is no conceptual or legal 
bar to evaluation, which if properly designed can increase effectiveness, and can also 
promote accountability.
Recurrent evaluations of prosecutors and judges during the course of their long ser-
vice is a basic organizational feature of the systems of continental Europe that recruit 
from among law graduates with no previous professional experience. These evalu-
ations serve a variety of functions: first, to verify that the young magistrates have 
actually acquired the necessary professional competence, and thereafter to choose 
the most qualified among them to fill vacancies at the higher levels of jurisdiction. 
In France, the performance of each prosecutor is evaluated every two years in addi-
tion to evaluations for promotion, and Hungary conducts a fairly extensive, if heavily 
quantitative, measurement of prosecutors’ performance.
However, very few countries surveyed have developed effective systems for evaluating 
the performance of prosecutors, whether as part of a promotion process or not. Many 
prosecutors and several Chief Assistant Prosecutors in Chile have complained about 
extreme subjectivity in the performance evaluation process and a lack of relationship 
between evaluation measures and meaningful outcomes. Because prosecutors can 
be dismissed for low evaluations, some observers have expressed concern that this 
system might encourage subservience; however, while procedures for removal create 
a potential for individual dependency, the possibility of such manifest corruption is 
probably mitigated by the strength of civil society, the legal profession, and indepen-
dent media, which are generally seen as vigilant in reporting on personnel changes 
within the prosecution service.
Italy is perhaps an extreme example of the failure to develop an effective system for 
evaluating institutional or individual performance: General inspections of prosecu-
tors’ performance are conducted every four years, but are largely formalities. Indeed, 
performance evaluation is considered an infringement of prosecutors’ indepen-
dence—in large part due to the institutional and political independence of the Supe-
rior Council of the Magistracy, which was responsible for interpreting the require-
104 IAP Standards, Std. 6 (fifth sub-para.).
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ment to evaluate its own members—with the effect that almost all prosecutors are 
promoted progressively to the highest rank, even if there are no positions available.
Practice in common-law countries is varied. England and Wales has a long-estab-
lished tradition of quarterly and annual appraisals. Each grade and function has a 
set of qualities and behaviors, covering legal and managerial ability, against which 
prosecutors are evaluated, as well as personal targets set by supervisors; these reports 
are important factors in the promotion process. In the United States, on the other 
hand, evaluation is not well established and focuses on overall behavior and attitudes, 
such as conviction rates, rather than specific office goals and objectives. This may be 
partly due to the extremely decentralized nature of the system and the discretionary 
authority of directly elected District Attorneys. In addition, traditional measures of 
performance—such as conviction, dismissal, and incarceration rates—vary consid-
erably depending on office policies and are not a good measure of individual perfor-
mance, especially if a prosecution service also engages in non-litigation programs, 
such as victim services. (At the federal level there are considerably more developed 
performance indicators.)
Disciplinary Procedures: Because of the risk that disciplinary procedures can be used 
to punish prosecutors for personal reasons or for making unpopular or disfavored 
decisions in individual cases, the standards are clearer and more emphatic in defin-
ing acceptable processes for disciplining prosecutors, although they are still highly 
general.105 However, one might also extrapolate logical limits on discretion in disciplin-
ary procedures from the general prescription that prosecutors shall be neutral in their 
decision-making, as any procedure that even indirectly punished prosecutors for their 
decisions might create a chilling effect counter to the intent of the standards.106
All states have some processes for disciplining prosecutors. Most provide for infor-
mal cautions or sanctions that may not result in a written notation in the prosecutor’s 
record. Formal disciplinary proceedings can be brought for an enumerated list of 
violations,107 although in some instances these lists are extremely vague and general 
105 UN Guidelines, Art. 21 (“Disciplinary offences of prosecutors shall be based on law or lawful regu-
lations. Complaints against prosecutors which allege that they acted in a manner clearly out of 
the range of professional standards shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under appropriate 
procedures. Prosecutors shall have the right to a fair hearing. The decision shall be subject to inde-
pendent review[]”), and Art 22 (“Disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors shall guarantee an 
objective evaluation and decision. They shall be determined in accordance with the law, the code 
of professional conduct and other established standards and ethics and in the light of the present 
Guidelines[]”); Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 5 (“States should take measures to ensure that:. 
. .e. disciplinary proceedings against public prosecutors are governed by law and should guarantee 
a fair and objective evaluation and decision which should be subject to independent and impartial 
review; f. public prosecutors have access to a satisfactory grievance procedure, including where ap-
propriate access to a tribunal, if their legal status is affected[]”). See also IAP Standards, Std. 6 (fifth 
sub-para.)(prosecutors are entitled “to objective. . .decisions in disciplinary hearings[]”).
106 In an unusual case on appeal in England and Wales in which a dismissed member of staff instituted 
proceedings for judicial review, the Court of Appeal indicated that that the Crown Prosecution Ser-
vice’s right to dismiss a prosecutor would not extend to disciplinary actions that interfered with a 
prosecutor’s decisional independence. Regina v Crown Prosecution Service ex parte Hogg (1994).
107 Cf. Draft ICC Code of Professional Conduct for Prosecutors, Art. 14 (noting various “offenses 
against the administration of justice”), and 15 (providing for disciplinary proceedings under gen-
eral United Nations staff rules or under the Rules of the Court).
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(in Italy, for example108). Most commonly, the process includes an initiation phase, 
a hearing or trial, and designated sanctions. The authority to initiate disciplinary 
proceedings and the authority to decide them may be divided between two offi-
cials—mirroring the division between prosecutorial power and adjudicative power 
in the regular court system (as in Germany, for example109 and, in part, in Bulgaria110). 
Although the process usually is internal to the prosecution service, appeals are some-
times made to the regular courts (England and Wales, Germany); in Italy, one third 
of the members who sit in special disciplinary sessions of the Superior Council of 
the Magistracy must be members of Parliament. In the United States in particular, 
disciplinary proceedings by the state bar associations can sometimes substitute for or 
parallel internal disciplinary hearings, as a prosecutor who is sanctioned and loses his 
license to practice law can generally no longer work as a prosecutor. In practice, initia-
tion of disciplinary proceedings is restricted either to the prosecution service’s internal 
processes or to other branches of the state; opportunities for private individuals to initi-
ate or report complaints are not formalized or readily available in many states.111
In practice, disciplinary proceedings do not appear to be commonly used in many 
jurisdictions112—and indeed, it may be that the greater risk is not to prosecutors’ 
independence from intrusive punishments but to robust accountability of an insular, 
self-protective guild disinclined to police itself. In Bulgaria, for example, the media 
have reported significant instances of prosecutorial misconduct, including reports 
that some prosecutors have links to organized crime, and sociological research indi-
cates there is corruption within the Prosecution Service; yet despite this, there have 
been only a few cases of prosecutors being disciplined for major omissions in their 
professional duties.
108 In Italy magistrates are subject to disciplinary proceedings and sanctions when they “fail to ac-
complish their duties and conduct themselves, either in their office or outside, in a way that makes 
them unworthy  of the trust and consideration that a judge must enjoy, or when they jeopardize the 
prestige of the magistracy.” Royal Decree of May 1946, no.511, Art. 18.
109 In Italy, for example, the Minister of Justice or the General Prosecutor for the Supreme Court can 
initiate disciplinary hearings, which are adjudicated before the Disciplinary Section of the Superior 
Council of Magistracy. However, in Chile, a supervisor both appoints the investigator and adjudi-
cates the case. In France, the Minister of Justice largely retains both powers, although he must consult 
(in a non-binding fashion) with the Supreme Magistrates’ Council. In Hungary, superiors can largely 
conduct the whole process on their own, although they may also appoint an investigator.
110 Disciplinary proceedings can be initiated by the relevant head of office, the Minister of Justice, 
or five members of the Supreme Judicial Council; proceedings are conducted by a select panel of 
Supreme Judicial Council members chosen by lot, who report to the full Council. Thus it is possible 
for the Council, as a corporate body, to both initiate and adjudicate a disciplinary matter.
111 In South Africa, the National Prosecuting Authority’s Integrity Management Unit launched a dedi-
cated toll-free telephone hotline in 2005 to provide both Authority employees and the public with 
a mechanism to report concerns about the work of prosecutors.
112 In France, fewer than 50 disciplinary proceedings are instituted each year; in Hungary such pro-
ceedings are also rare. In Germany, the great majority of infractions by prosecutors are handled 
through informal written sanctions by their superiors, without disciplinary proceedings.
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Civil and Criminal Liability: International standards proscribe “unjustified” civil or 
criminal penalties,113 but impliedly, therefore, there is no absolute bar on imposition 
of such penalties so long as they are otherwise justified. States provide a range of im-
munities: most provide some measure of immunity for the filing of charges (United 
States), statements in court (France, United States to some degree), or for official ac-
tions (Hungary, South Africa, United States to some degree). In states with a legality 
or mandatory prosecution principle, prosecutors may be liable for failing to initiate 
an investigation or for investigating an innocent person (as in Germany). In some 
states, politically appointed or other highly ranked prosecutors can only be charged 
with crimes if their standing immunity is lifted by the chief prosecutor or the legis-
lature (Hungary). Some states indemnify prosecutors (France, Italy; Germany and 
Hungary for intentional acts), while others subsidize liability insurance (Germany, 
United States). In any event, in most jurisdictions, actual judgments against prosecu-
tors for civil damages are quite unusual.
2.6. Training
International standards consider ongoing training to be an obligation for prosecutors.114 
To the degree that the positive aspects of independence, accountability, and neutral-
ity can be achieved through an ethic of professionalism (that is, not solely through 
institutional arrangements), initial and continuing training of prosecutors could 
make an important contribution to the prosecution service’s effective capacity.
All systems require prosecutors to have a university degree in law in almost all cir-
cumstances; many civil law systems have substantial initial training periods, either 
in specialized facilities (France—two years; South Africa—six months) or through 
on-the-job internships (Germany—two years; Hungary—three years). In England 
and Wales, on the other hand, induction programs are tailored to the background of 
new prosecutors. 
Other systems, such as the United States, require little or no initial training apart 
from law school; Bulgaria only instituted a significant training program in 2002.115 
113 UN Guidelines, Art. 4 (“States shall ensure that prosecutors are able to perform their professional 
functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment, improper interference or unjustified expo-
sure to civil, penal or other liability[]”).
114 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 7 (“Training is both a duty and a right for all public prosecutors, 
before their appointment as well as on a permanent basis[]” and calling “in particular” for training in:
a.  the principles and ethical duties of their office; 
b.  the constitutional and legal protection of suspects, victims and witnesses; 
c.  human rights and freedoms as laid down by the Convention for the Protection 
 of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. . .; [and]
d.  principles and practices of organisation of work, management and human resources 
 in a judicial context[]).
 In addition, Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 8 suggests that training for specialization should 
be preferred.
115 Bulgaria instituted a National Institute of Justice in 2002, as part of the Supreme Judicial Council, 
providing for a mandatory six month training program for all newly appointed prosecutors.
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Until recently, Chile had only rudimentary training programs that lasted a few weeks 
and often did not even involve face-to-face interaction, although now formal aca-
demic courses, on-the-job training, and refresher courses are offered through the 
Judicial Academy or through the Center for the Study of Justice in the Americas.
Relatively few states have systematic training for prosecutors after the initial intake 
period, and few make such training mandatory. Such continuing training facilities 
and requirements as exist vary widely, from systems with mandatory advanced train-
ing directly related to promotion prospects (England and Wales), to systems in which 
all training is optional (France and Germany116) and there are few career consequenc-
es for participation (United States).117 In South Africa, yearly training is organized for 
all prosecutors, including refresher courses in general criminal procedure, evidence 
and trial advocacy; dedicated training in the latest legal developments occurs via a 
selection process, as places in such courses are limited. In Italy, continuing training is 
for magistrates in general, not only prosecutors.
III. Functions and Powers of Prosecutors
This section considers the substantive and procedural powers of the prosecution service, 
especially in the level of discretion prosecutors exercise in initiating, continuing, discon-
tinuing, or controlling investigation and charging, and their relationship to the courts in 
the pre-trial process.118 Most systems accord the prosecution a near total monopoly on 
pursuing criminal offenses before the courts.
Most systems evince a mixture of the opportunity and legality principles in practice. 
Prosecutors in both systems appear equally susceptible to political pressure to coordi-
nate their efforts with anti-crime campaigns. Even a pure legality principle can increase 
prosecutors’ power relative to other social and institutional actors when coupled with 
strong norms of prosecutorial independence. What seems essential is to ensure trans-
parency of decision-making and opportunities for evaluation.
116 In France, the School of the Magistracy offers optional trainings that are well-attended by prosecu-
tors, who appreciate their quality and diversity, especially if they are hoping to specialize more 
deeply or to change positions. Similarly, in Germany, prosecutors wishing to specialize greatly in-
crease their chances of advancement by participating in continuing training; for all prosecutors, 
although training is voluntary, failure to keep up with new developments can lead to a charge of 
gross negligence.
117 The United States has mandatory but fairly minimal and unfocused CLE (Continuing Legal Edu-
cation) requirements organized by the state bar; prosecution services as such normally offer no 
training, and there is little relationship between CLE and evaluation or advancement. In Hungary, 
most training is optional, although there are occasional mandatory courses in new developments; 
in addition, prosecutors may pursue post-graduate studies partly subsidized by the prosecution 
service, and this additional education may be considered in evaluation and promotion.
118 The prosecution service’s relationship to police and the courts is addressed here as it relates to the 
core functions of the service, but is considered more fully in Section IV, below.
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In practice, it is quite rare under either an adversarial or inquisitorial model for a 
court to compel a prosecution service to pursue a case against its will or in a man-
ner not of the prosecution’s choosing. Most investigative actions that might impinge 
upon core rights require the approval of a judge, although there are narrow circum-
stances in which the prosecution may undertake such measures on its own authority. 
In most jurisdictions, there is a clear functional and organizational division between 
criminal law divisions—generally identified as the defining, core competence of the 
prosecution—and civil or administrative law divisions.
3.1. Prosecutorial functions in criminal justice
Most systems accord the public prosecution service a near total monopoly on charg-
ing and prosecution of criminal offenses. Some states retain a residual right of pri-
vate prosecution (especially England and Wales,119 but also Bulgaria, Chile, France, 
Germany, Hungary, and South Africa), but such rights are often quite limited and, 
in practice, private prosecution is difficult and disfavored.120 International standards 
clearly assume that public prosecutors will be the principal vehicle for initiating and 
pursuing criminal processes.121
Discretion to Initiate Prosecution: The choice between a system based on opportunity 
or legality—that is, between discretionary or obligatory investigation and prosecu-
tion—is one of the fundamental distinctions among legal systems.122 Bulgaria, Chile, 
Germany, Hungary, and Italy employ the legality principle, while England and Wales, 
France, South Africa, and the United States employ the opportunity principle, in which 
courts—in their passive role—cannot criticize or sanction the prosecution for failing 
to pursue a charge. It is clearly a choice of policy, as international standards anticipate 
both variants;123 both approaches can yield normatively acceptable prosecution systems. 
119 In England and Wales, a number of other state agencies and authorities besides the Crown Pros-
ecution Service have powers to bring cases before the courts and to prosecute at the local level. 
Although neither the Report nor this Overview discuss these in detail, the general arguments con-
cerning the role of a prosecution service and its relationship to other institutions and to society 
apply to them as well inasmuch as they exercise functionally similar powers.
120 In Hungary, for example, the prosecution service may take over a private prosecution at its discre-
tion, and private appeals of the prosecution service’s decisions in cases under its control are rarely 
successful.
121 See, e.g., Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Recs. 1-3.
122 See, e.g., Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Explanatory Memorandum (General Considerations) (“It 
is a fact that European legal systems are still divided between two cultures—the split being evident 
both in the organisation of criminal procedure (which is either accusatorial or inquisitorial) and in 
the initiation of prosecutions (under either “mandatory” or “discretionary” systems). However, the 
traditional distinction is tending to blur as the different member states bring their laws and regula-
tions more closely into line with what are now common European principles, in particular those 
laid down in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights[,]” and noting the distinction 
between the traditional “French” and “Anglo-Saxon” models). Note that the traditional division is 
not always clear-cut, as today both France and England and Wales—the classical exemplars of the 
two models—employ the principle of opportunity.
123 UN Guidelines, Art. 17 (“In countries where prosecutors are vested with discretionary functions, 
the law or published rules or regulations shall provide guidelines to enhance fairness and consis-
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In practice, most systems are mixed. Even systems operating under the legality prin-
ciple invariably have some pragmatic mechanisms to allow discretionary prosecu-
tion, acknowledging both the practical impossibility of actually investigating and 
prosecuting every crime and the phenomenon of attention—that the very decision 
diligently to pursue a possible crime makes it more likely that one will find it, and not 
something else. Since laws are generally written in quite abstract terms to fit a broad 
range of situations, prosecutors in all countries use some amount of discretion in their 
decisions to file a case, in selecting charges, and in recommending a sentence. This is a 
reality even in countries that do not formally recognize prosecutorial discretion.
In Germany, for example, successive reforms have gradually introduced elements of 
opportunity, allowing prosecutors to treat different categories of crime differently, or 
to divert cases in favor of alternative sanctions, such as monetary payments or com-
munity service. In Chile, recent reforms have radically reduced the legality principle; 
for example, prosecutors now have a right to divert cases under defined circumstanc-
es, and the legality principle now only applies to cases in which the potential penalty 
is two years’ imprisonment or more—and even then this obligation only obtains if 
prosecutors decide to bring such charges rather than lesser ones or none at all.124 The 
standard turn in such countries is to exercise effective opportunity by avoiding inves-
tigation or charges in the first place, often through definitional means.125
tency of approach in taking decisions in the prosecution process, including institution or waiver 
of prosecution[]”). Standards do seem to favor a limited application of discretion in particular 
circumstances. See, e.g., UN Guidelines, Art. 18 (“In accordance with national law, prosecutors 
shall give due consideration to waiving prosecution, discontinuing proceedings conditionally or 
unconditionally, or diverting criminal cases from the formal justice system, with full respect for the 
rights of suspect(s) and the victim(s). For this purpose, States should fully explore the possibility of 
adopting diversion schemes not only to alleviate excessive court loads, but also to avoid the stigma-
tization of pre-trial detention, indictment and conviction, as well as the possible adverse effects of 
imprisonment[]”), and Art. 19 (“In countries where prosecutors are vested with discretionary func-
tions as to the decision whether or not to prosecute a juvenile, special considerations shall be given 
to the nature and gravity of the offence, protection of society and the personality and background of 
the juvenile. In making that decision, prosecutors shall particularly consider available alternatives 
to prosecution under the relevant juvenile justice laws and procedures. Prosecutors shall use their 
best efforts to take prosecutory action against juveniles only to the extent strictly necessary[]”). 
See also IAP Standards, Std. 4.3 (encouraging prosecutors to waive, discontinue or divert charges, 
especially for young defendants).
124 Similarly, in Hungary if an offense is punishable by less than three years’ imprisonment, the pros-
ecutor may postpone bringing charges for one year, or two years if he considers that the offense was 
not grave, there are extraordinary mitigating circumstances, and there is a favorable change in the 
offender’s behavior.
125 The structure of the Bulgarian criminal justice system, involving separate, autonomous agencies, 
and the rule of mandatory prosecution (the legality principle) have resulted in a system that estab-
lishes priorities and copes with excessive workload by delaying investigations. It is not unusual for 
a trivial or commonplace offense, such as a minor theft, to be brought for trial seven or eight years 
after the fact; many investigations are left pending for years, with definitive decision delayed again 
and again. Thus, discretion is effectively exercised by delaying a final determination on charging. 
Efforts to resolve this have included mandatory deadlines for finishing investigations and proce-
dures for criminal defendants to petition the court either to compel the prosecutor to file charges 
or terminate proceedings if the prosecutor has not filed charges after two years, but these reforms 
do not address the underlying problem of prioritization.
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On the other hand, systems operating under the opportunity principle demonstrate 
normative commitments to professionalism, non-partisan neutrality, and non-arbi-
trariness that tend to produce results similar to those in systems using the legality 
principle: it is difficult for prosecutors in opportunity-based systems simply to ignore 
clear evidence of a serious crime—or to prosecute in the absence of any compelling 
evidence.126 
In England and Wales, in deciding whether or not to prosecute, the prosecutor con-
siders an evidentiary test and a public interest test; if the case fails either test, it may 
not be pursued.127 In South Africa, a prosecutor has a duty to pursue charges if there 
is a prima facie case and there is no compelling reason for a refusal to prosecute; how-
ever, charging policy has been broadly interpreted, making a decision to prosecute 
the exception rather than the rule, with prosecutors declining to press charges in 
fully 60 percent of dockets received from the police and referring another 26 percent 
for further investigation.128 In the United States, although prosecutors have almost 
total formal discretion, as a practical matter they often have to provide reasons for 
non-prosecution to victims, police, and the public, and often District Attorneys re-
quire subordinates to justify decisions not to prosecute in writing.
Prosecutors in both kinds of systems appear to be more or less equally susceptible to 
public and political pressure to coordinate prosecutorial efforts with anti-crime cam-
paigns or particular sources of social outrage—an example not only of potentially 
improper influence, but of the attention phenomenon. And even though, in both civil 
and common law systems, prosecutors have obligations to the court and to the truth,129 
it is evident that in practice prosecutors are principally focused—institutionally, pro-
fessionally, and even personally—on securing conviction,130 which tends to reduce the 
theoretical differences between discretionary and non-discretionary systems.
The risks inherent in affording prosecutors unregulated discretion in their decisions 
about investigation and charging are fairly obvious. However, the legality principle 
can also increase prosecutors’ power relative to other social and institutional actors, 
126 Cf. UN Guidelines, Art. 14 (“Prosecutors shall not initiate or continue prosecution, or shall make 
every effort to stay proceedings, when an impartial investigation shows the charge to be unfound-
ed[]”); IAP Standards, Std. 2.1 (“The use of prosecutorial discretion, when permitted in a particular 
jurisdiction, should be exercised independently and be free from political interference[]”).
127 The evidentiary test aims at establishing whether sufficient evidence has been collected to allow 
a realistic prospect of conviction. The public interest test is a contextual assessment, based on an 
exemplary list of factors favoring or opposing prosecution. These factors were initially very gener-
ally defined and caused some confusion among prosecutors, the police, and the public; subsequent 
editions have sought to provide more detail.
128 In South Africa, prosecutors have the further option of directing a preparatory examination in 
magistrates court—a lower instance—to determine if the evidence warrants a proper trial in su-
perior court. The accused pleads at the end of the proceeding, rather than the beginning, and the 
prosecutor may decide to proceed to trial with any charges—whether a plea of innocent or guilty 
has been entered—or to decline prosecution.
129 These obligations are more extensive and explicit in classically inquisitorial civil law systems than 
in adversarial systems.
130 In Italy, for example, 13 percent of lawyers in one survey reported that prosecutors had hidden 
exculpatory evidence. G. Di Federico �� M. Sapignoli,      Processo penale e diritti della difesa: la testi-  
monianza di 100 avvocati penalisti (2002), at 16, 102 (table 4.3).   
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especially when coupled with strong norms of prosecutorial independence. Italy is an 
example of this: Because prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to investigate 
all possible acts of criminality, it is relatively difficult for other actors to oppose any 
action a prosecutor undertakes, regardless of expense or intrusiveness. The broad 
scope of action Italian prosecutors enjoy in criminal proceedings and the coercive 
measures at their disposal have progressively afforded them de facto influence over 
public policy in the criminal sector; their power restricts the role of the defense and 
renders the protection of their clients’ civil rights during the lengthy phase preceding 
trial dependent on the good will of prosecutors. At the same time, prosecutors have 
taken on an ever more visible role as “problem solvers” for a considerable number of 
current political, social, and economic issues, including workplace safety, pollution, 
tax evasion, bank fraud and similar economic crimes, terrorism, organized crime, and 
public corruption (where their successful initiatives have caused substantial changes 
in the political leadership and party structure of the country). The net effect, in a 
system that combines a constitutional obligation to investigate with strong norms of 
independence, is to afford prosecutors nearly unrestricted and unaccountable discre-
tion in practice—the “personalization of prosecutorial functions” (personalizzazione 
delle funzioni del pubblico ministero).
Rather than maintaining a pure policy of legality or opportunity, therefore, what 
seems essential is to ensure transparency of decision-making,131 and internal and 
external opportunities for re-evaluation, appeal or alteration. Requiring written ac-
counts of decisions on initiating and terminating investigation, review by courts,132 
regular reporting to political actors, and encouragement of a vigorous investigative 
media can ensure that prosecutors do not abuse the practical exercise of discretion in 
either system. Private prosecution (Bulgaria,133 Chile, England and Wales, Germany) 
or other rights to appeal prosecutorial decisions (Bulgaria,134 Chile, Germany), for 
example, though rarely invoked in most systems, can act as a reserve check on a pros-
ecution service that ignores socially serious crimes, and can ensure that prosecutors 
do not abuse their effective discretion, at least as regards failure diligently to pursue 
evidence of crime.135 Stronger internal or external disciplinary norms would address 
131 In France the Parquet’s application of the discretionary principle has been systematized through the 
use of statistics to identify the different situations in which it has been implemented.
132 In France, a victim dissatisfied with a prosecutor’s decision to terminate an investigation can re-
quest an examining magistrate to conduct an investigation. Such requests constitute a significant 
percentage of cases submitted to examining magistrates (often cases of fraud related to commercial 
interests or private issues). The magistrate must consider whether any criminal offense exists, even 
if the prosecutor previously dropped the case. At the end of the investigation, the examining mag-
istrate decides whether the case will go to trial and the victim will be authorized to attend the trial 
to request civil compensation. This provides a guarantee against prosecutors’ abuse of discretion.
133 Victims have standing to bring charges for minor bodily injuries, certain injuries between close 
relatives, and criminal libel.
134 Judicial review of decisions to terminate criminal proceedings was introduced for the first time in 
1999, but the procedure has been amended several times since then: at first review was automatic 
and in camera; this was changed to appeal by interested parties to all three levels of courts, up to the 
Court of Cassation; and the most recent amendments made those decisions subject to one level of 
appeal by a single judge. However, there are no studies of decisions not to prosecute and no studies 
of how successful judicial review of those decisions has been.
135 The courts are not an effective check on prosecutorial under-investigation. In France, for example, 
the criminal courts are prohibited from criticizing the Parquet’s decisions about whether or not to 
Overview: Design and Reform of Public Prosecution Services
57
the risks of abusive or persecutory investigation prior to the charging phase, when 
judicial oversight becomes more effective. However, at present no state has a compre-
hensive, systematic method of policing abuses of prosecutorial discretion, whether 
they involve over- or under-investigation.136
Control of Ongoing Prosecution: In the adversarial model, the trial is the focal point of 
the whole process; at trial, the parties have to build the case before the hearing judge. 
In some adversarial jurisdictions (Italy, United States), prosecutors have some discre-
tion in requesting expedited hearings: in addition to full trial proceedings—that is, 
ordinary proceedings—there are also alternative proceedings aimed at speeding up 
the process or encouraging an agreement between the parties. Judges have ultimate 
control over the course of trial, but the prosecution service’s initiating role gives it 
considerable ability to influence the course of events. 
For example, in England and Wales, once an indictment has been issued in the Crown 
Court, the prosecution must petition the court to discontinue a case; however, while 
this formally gives the court decisional power, the prosecution may simply refuse 
to submit sufficient evidence, thus effectively compelling the court to acquit. In the 
United States, prosecutors can engage in extensive plea bargaining during the trial 
(subject to judicial approval, although this is only very rarely withheld), creating a 
somewhat broader range of strategic options for the prosecution. In South Africa, 
both the accused and the prosecution have an opportunity to withdraw from a plea 
agreement upon being informed of the actual sentence the court intends to impose 
pursuant to the agreement; if either withdraws, the trial proceeds de novo before a 
different presiding judge.137
In the inquisitorial model, the investigative phase is relatively more important. In 
Hungary, for example, the prosecution service has the predominant role in this phase, 
directing the investigative work of the police or, more rarely, conducting its own in-
vestigations. The prosecution service makes the ultimate determination on commit-
tal, or bringing charges; the courts may request additional information during the 
investigation phase but cannot order it, and this serves only to indicate the judge’s 
likely disposition towards the case, control of which remains with the prosecution. At 
court, the prosecutor must be present in first instance courts at the county level and 
for certain cases carrying a significant penalty, and may take part in any trial. 
However, since the trial phase plays a relatively smaller role in the inquisitorial model, 
the prosecution retains considerable strategic room for maneuver in deciding when 
and how to proceed with a case,138 although there are often specific investigatory acts 
that require judicial approval, such as seizures and pre-trial detention (Germany).139 
institute criminal proceedings in a given case, and even in states in which there is no such formal 
prohibition, review of decisions not to charge is almost unheard of (United States). 
136 See Sec. 2.5, above.
137 Some form of bargaining, however informal, is in practice found in almost all systems.
138 In many inquisitorial systems, such as Hungary, there are statutory limits on the time available for a 
prosecution service to decide on the disposition of a case once it has been received from the inves-
tigatory agency; within those limits, however, discretion lies with the prosecution, not the court.
139 See next section.
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The prosecutor retains the power to initiate and direct the investigation; the powers 
of the court in the pre-trial process serve instead to guarantee basic rights, by acting 
as an external monitor not directly involved in the investigation.
In practice, it is quite rare under either an adversarial or inquisitorial model for a 
court to compel a prosecution service to pursue a case against its will or in a manner 
not of the prosecution’s choosing.
Post-Sentencing Functions: Some states accord prosecutors supervisory responsibility 
over enforcement of sentences, as well as a representative role in parole and clemency 
hearings. In Germany, special officers in each Prosecution Office enforce final ver-
dicts, including the collection of fines and confinement of individuals, and monitor 
the enforcement of prison sentences. In France, Germany, and Hungary, prosecutors 
monitor the enforcement of judgments and sentences; in France, they can summon 
the assistance of special law enforcement bodies (la Force Publique) to assist in this. 
In Hungary, a special department in the prosecution service monitors the treatment 
of prisoners. All these activities may be understood as a continuing element of the 
prosecution’s responsibility, in certain states, to ensure legality. 
In France, prosecutors can suspend certain sentences of less than three months of 
their own accord—an instance of a more properly adjudicative function exercised by 
the prosecution—and can propose to the court the suspension of sentences longer 
than three months. In Germany, South Africa, and some states in the United States, 
prosecutors appear in hearings on clemency, probation, and parole or early release. 
In other states, the prosecution’s authority to advise on or request adjustment of sen-
tences is limited to the actual trial phase (as in Hungary).
3.2. Relationship with the judge at the pre-trial stage
Prosecutors have initiatory powers, judges have adjudicatory powers; this core func-
tional distinction also gives judges marginally greater power in relation to prosecu-
tors in many circumstances, especially once a particular case has advanced to the 
trial stage. This imbalance in power logically follows from judges’ role as the final 
line of protection for individual and social rights and interests, and is consistent 
with—indeed, a principal justification for—the typically greater independence that 
individual judges and the judiciary as a whole are afforded compared to prosecu-
tors and the prosecution service. Accordingly, most investigative actions that might 
impinge upon core rights or fundamental freedoms require the approval of a judge, 
although there are circumstances in which the prosecution—or other agencies with 
responsibility for investigation—may undertake such measures on their own author-
ity. Although these circumstances are formally narrow, in practice prosecutors have 
considerable latitude to judge for themselves whether or not circumstances consti-
tute an emergency that allows them to act on their own initiative, and they rarely face 
censure after the fact.
Pre-Trial Detention: Deprivation of liberty prior to final adjudication is widely rec-
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ognized as a practical social necessity in various circumstances, such as risk of flight, 
risk of further violation or harm to other individuals, risk that evidence might be 
destroyed, or compelling need to secure an individual’s testimony. At the same time, 
any deprivation of liberty potentially constitutes one of the most serious violations 
of human and civil rights.140 Most states require prosecutors to seek judicial approval 
for all forms of pre-trial detention, generally within a defined time period (for ex-
ample, 48 hours in South Africa, 72 hours in Bulgaria and Hungary). In France, a 
prosecutor must seek judicial approval to detain a suspect only for periods greater 
than 48 hours.141 In Chile, the previously considerable discretion afforded prosecu-
tors has been greatly reduced by the introduction of a presumption against detention 
and review by the judiciary. 
Surveillance Warrants: Similarly, effective investigation often requires covert or in-
trusive monitoring of individuals’ activity and communications or their private 
premises. Yet such actions risk infringement of individuals’ core rights of privacy and 
physical or bodily integrity. Most states require prosecutors to seek judicial approval 
for all or most forms of surveillance. In some defined exigent cases, prosecutors may 
authorize surveillance and only later seek judicial approval (Hungary—approval up 
to 72 hours).
3.3. Powers outside the criminal justice system
In most jurisdictions, there is a clear functional and organizational separation be-
tween criminal law divisions—generally identified as the defining, core competence 
of the prosecution142—and civil or administrative law divisions; international stan-
dards, while identifying a range of possible functions for a prosecution service,143 also 
favor specialization,144 which in practice tends to maintain the separateness of the core 
criminal prosecution functions. In effect, therefore, we may productively speak about 
a functionally separate, identifiable criminal prosecution service in many countries, 
even where other functions are formally cabined within the same organization.
In some states, the prosecution service has extensive authority to represent state or-
gans in civil suits, to take over civil suits for or otherwise represent the interests of 
designated classes of individuals, and to generally supervise the legality of actions by 
140 Cf. Asenov and Others v. Bulgaria, ECHR judgment of Oct. 28, 1998; Nikolova v. Bulgaria, ECHR 
judgment of Mar. 25, 1999.
141 In practice, many of these rules can converge: requiring the prosecution to secure judicial approval 
within 48 hours, or allowing the prosecution to detain a suspect for 48 hours without judicial ap-
proval can amount to the same thing, although in the former instance the prosecution is under a 
continuing obligation during that time. Much of the difference—and the substantive level of pro-
tection—depends on how these rules are regulated and enforced.
142 Cf. Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 1 (“Public prosecutors” are public authorities who, on 
behalf of society and in the public interest, ensure the application of the law where the breach of 
the law carries a criminal sanction, taking into account both the rights of the individual and the 
necessary effectiveness of the criminal justice system[]”).
143 See Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Recs. 2 and 3.
144 See Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 8.
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individuals and state organs.145 In France, the Parquet takes part in civil and com-
mercial proceedings,146 and also maintains cooperative relationships with local and 
administrative authorities on matters of public order; a special prosecutor dealing 
with minors works at each Court of Appeals. In Bulgaria, the powers of the Prosecu-
tion Service extend to administrative and civil proceedings (such as representing the 
state in civil trials and pursuing commitment hearings) as well as criminal cases. 
In Hungary, the legal operation of the public administration is considered to be a 
public concern, and thus the Prosecution Service supervises the legality of regula-
tions issued by sources below the level of the government (that is, ministerial ordi-
nances and local self-government ordinances), and decisions of non-judicial organs 
dealing with labor and service relationships. This review does not, as a rule, involve 
individual cases; rather, prosecution offices, including those at the local and country 
level, are expected to carry out general reviews every half year, and legal and disci-
plinary proceedings are a normal consequence of this activity.147 The Prosecution 
Service also has certain powers in civil litigation concerning personal status (such as 
establishment of parenthood) and is entitled to act as plaintiff in cases regarding the 
validity of marriage or an individual’s mental status, or on behalf of persons who are 
unable to enforce their own claims. 
In the United States, roughly half of all District Attorney’s offices also represent their 
local government in civil cases; in addition, prosecutors’ offices have increasingly 
been creating and implementing victim assistance programs. Victim advocates act 
as liaisons between the victim and prosecutor, relaying information between parties 
and insuring that victims and witnesses appear at trial, which frees the prosecutor 
to focus on core investigative and trial functions, while also promoting community 
support for and satisfaction with the work of the service.
In other states, the prosecution service has no other powers outside the criminal 
justice system (Chile, England and Wales, South Africa148).
145 In many legal systems in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, however, the prosecution 
authority has authority in matters besides just criminal prosecution. In many states in Brazil, for 
example, the Ministerio Publico is responsible not only for protecting public interest in matters of 
civil and administrative law, but also for the role of criminal defense as well as prosecution. Called 
promotores, these officials are administratively but not professionally distinct from prosecutors. See 
Rosangela Batista Cavalcanti, Cidadania e Acesso à Justiça: Promotorias de Justiça da Comunidade, 
IDESP, São Paulo, 1999.
146 This includes intervention in bankruptcy and violations by corporations. The civil unit in each 
prosecution office can offer legal opinions to the civil courts on behalf of the general interest of 
society, in order to avoid leaving issues of public importance purely to private interests.
147 The Prosecution Service may annul minor administrative punishments, without recourse to the 
judiciary.
148 The National Director can institute civil proceedings for the forfeiture of assets in the High Courts; 
the property being targeted must be either an instrumentality of an offense, the proceeds of unlaw-
ful activities, or associated with terrorist activities.
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IV. Relationship of the Public Prosecution Service 
to Other Organs of the State
This section considers how the relationship of the prosecution service to other state in-
stitutions affects its ability to provide efficient, non-political decision-making relating to 
its core functions in the justice system.
The prosecution should be functionally independent of the political branches in its core 
decision-making and, in turn, should not unduly influence those branches. Beyond this 
minimum, the possibilities for constitutional design are very broad; the relevant ques-
tion is whether a particular arrangement, in context, contributes to the realization of 
that non-political function or not.
Most legislatures exercise indirect control over prosecution services through appoint-
ment and dismissal, legislation, the budget process, and powers to require information. 
Such control is often thought of as improper interference, but it is also a form of demo-
cratic accountability. Legislative involvement becomes progressively more problematic 
as it moves towards ad hoc intervention in individual cases.
The principal threat to prosecutorial independence in most states has been seen to come 
from the executive; in practice, executive influence over the prosecution service varies 
widely. International standards aim to limit executive authority in two ways: authority 
should be transparent, and it should be regularized.
The relationship between police and prosecutors is an example of how different struc-
tures must be considered comprehensively, not in isolation. The discretion afforded pros-
ecutors in common law states traditionally co-exists with an independent police force 
and a powerful judiciary. In civil law systems, by contrast, there has been less need for 
independent review of acts that were not discretionary.
There are patterned differences in the level of autonomy and the direction of control 
between judges and prosecutors, even in systems that treat both as members of a com-
mon magistracy. Any conflation of the initiating and adjudicating roles creates risks for 
society as a whole; it is bad principle and bad policy to allow prosecutors to be either 
subordinated to, or overly identified with, the very judges with whom they must work.
4.1. The constitutional location of the public prosecution service
International standards do not prescribe a single constitutional or institutional ar-
rangement for prosecution services—and indeed expressly acknowledge that widely 
divergent models are possible—but broadly considered, they suggest that whatever 
arrangement is adopted, the prosecution should be functionally independent of the 
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political branches in its core decision-making149—and, in turn, should not unduly 
influence those branches.150 Beyond this minimum, the possibilities for structural 
reform are very broad, and there is no necessary or theoretical reason why in a given 
system or tradition any of the major models must be excluded.
Some prosecution services are constitutionally or conventionally identified as part 
of the executive (England and Wales, Germany,151 South Africa), others as part of 
the judiciary or magistracy (Bulgaria, France,152 Italy), and still others are largely or 
wholly independent (Chile, Hungary, United States153); in many states, the prosecu-
tion service has an effective monopoly, while in some cases (England and Wales), 
other institutions have prosecutorial powers. All, however, share a measure of profes-
sional autonomy and an expectation that prosecution services’ decisions and conduct 
will be “non-political,” in the sense that individual investigative and charging deci-
sions ought not be directly affected by the interests and agendas of outside political 
actors, but only by general, pre-existing goals legitimately determined in the political 
process.154 This seems the most important, defining element in their functional con-
stitutional relationships: whether or not they have formal independence from an-
149 See, e.g., Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 13 (providing that “[w]here the public prosecution is 
part of or subordinate to the government, states should take effective measures to guarantee that. . .a. 
the nature and the scope of the powers of the government with respect to the public prosecution are 
established by law;  b. government exercises its powers in a transparent way. . .; c. where government 
gives instructions of a general nature, such instructions must be in writing. . .;  d. where the govern-
ment has the power to give instructions to prosecute a specific case, such instructions must carry with 
them adequate guarantees that transparency and equity are respected. . . .”); IAP Standards, Std. 2.2 (“If 
non-prosecutorial authorities have the right to give general or specific instructions to prosecutors, 
such instructions should be: transparent; consistent with lawful authority; subject to established 
guidelines to safeguard the actuality and the perception of prosecutorial independence[]”).
150 See, e.g., Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 12 (“Public prosecutors should not interfere with the 
competence of the legislative and the executive powers[]”).
151 There is some theoretical debate in Germany as to the institutional identity of the prosecution 
services. The federal and state constitutions do not discuss the prosecution services. The author-
ity exercised by federal and state Ministers of Justice over prosecutors, the hierarchical nature of 
prosecution offices, and the ability of senior prosecutors to give instructions to lower-ranking pros-
ecutors lead some scholars to describe the service as part of the executive. At the same time, the 
existence of statutory limitations on the ability of political officials and senior prosecutors to instruct 
lower-ranking prosecutors, prosecutors’ duty of objectivity, and their ability to terminate criminal 
proceedings lead others to describe the prosecution as a separate organ of the criminal justice system 
(Organ der Rechtspflege). Some scholars believe that the prosecution occupies an intermediate posi-
tion between the executive and judiciary; however, the Constitution does not envisage the existence of 
any intermediate branch of the state. The dominant view is that the prosecution services are authori-
ties within the executive whose individual agents exercise their power in a non-political fashion.
152 The Parquet is not explicitly defined as belonging to the judicial or executive branch, but the domi-
nant view is that the Parquet belongs to the judiciary. The Constitutional Court has frequently 
emphasized that prosecutors have special powers to protect human rights, individual freedoms, 
and property, which in turn implies that prosecutors should possess important guarantees of inde-
pendence in their decision-making and career paths similar to those of judges, and indeed pros-
ecutors and judges are both represented in the Superior Council of the Magistracy. However, its 
hierarchical structure and its subordination to the Minister of Justice lead certain authors to refer 
to the “attachment” of the Parquet to the executive.
153 At the county level, where most District Attorneys are directly elected officials; the (much smaller) 
federal prosecution service is clearly part of the executive.
154 Consistent with the standards noted above, prosecution services’ decisions themselves ought not 
aim to give effect to specific political goals or directly affect that legitimate political process.
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other branch, prosecution services are expected to behave as if they are not beholden 
to political actors in their individual decisions. 
This would also imply that the prosecution service should itself not undertake to 
play a direct role in the political process apart from the institutional defense of its 
prerogatives and operational freedom; this is a difficult definitional line—prosecu-
tion services have legitimate political and institutional interests, and thus a stake in 
particular political programs—but a prosecution service would definitely cross it if 
it alters the selection and pursuit of particular prosecutions to favor or punish actors 
in the political process.155
Thus there is no quantum of independence or accountability, nor any particular con-
stitutional or institutional arrangement, that is necessary or appropriate for its own 
sake. The relevant question is whether a particular arrangement, in context, contrib-
utes to the greater realization of that non-political function or not.
4.2. Relations with the legislature
Most legislatures156 only exercise indirect influence on the prosecution service.157 
Nonetheless, legislatures exercise control over prosecution services in four ways: 
through direct powers of appointment,158 discipline and dismissal;159 through legis-
155 In Bulgaria, for example, the prosecution service has reportedly engaged actively in tacit alliances 
with political parties or individual politicians, with the purpose of influencing legislation to pre-
serve prosecutors’ powers and autonomy. These alliances have evidenced themselves in investiga-
tions and prosecutions which have demonstrated clear political motivation: the service has re-
frained from investigating members of the cabinet or the majority in exchange for preservation 
of its institutional powers, while it has investigated and charged opposition and majority figures 
who pursued policies perceived to be antithetical to the interests of the service. In South Africa, 
the prosecution service has become involved in political battles within the ruling African National 
Congress, with the National Director intervening in particular cases that exhibit political sensitivi-
ties. In one case the Director intervened in favor of ANC members in a bail question, while in 2003, 
the Director announced that no charges would be sought against the sitting Deputy President, also 
a member of the ANC, in a major corruption investigation despite evidence of a prima facie case 
against him, which as noted above normally triggers a duty to prosecute. (A subsequent Director 
announced plans to charge the Deputy President, but the matter is still pending.)
156 In the United States, the more relevant units are the county governments, which are the principal 
source of funding for prosecution services. State legislatures generally define the criminal law and 
criminal policy in broad terms, however, and some funding comes from the state level.
157 In France, Germany, and Italy, for example, legislators must direct inquiries about the prosecution 
service to the Minister of Justice, rather than posing them directly. The British Parliament may not 
conduct independent investigations into the activities of the Crown Prosecution Service or indi-
vidual prosecutors, and it receives the Service’s annual report from the Attorney General.
158 Hungary’s Parliament appoints the Prosecutor General; in Chile and the United States (at the feder-
al level), the Senate approves the President’s appointment for Fiscal Nacional and Attorney General, 
respectively; in the United States the Senate must also approve the President’s nominees of the chief 
Attorneys for each region, who are usually only nominated after informal approval by the Senators 
from the state in which they will serve.
159 For example, Chile’s legislature can initiate impeachment proceedings against senior prosecutors 
for a defined list of offenses, which the Supreme Court must then adjudicate. There is little reason 
to believe that this power serves as an effective accountability check on the Ministerio Público, 
however: the range of offenses for which such a proceeding is authorized is highly general and ill-
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lation;160 through the budget process;161 and through mechanisms for requesting or 
requiring regular or ad hoc information about general policy or individual cases.162 
Even when this influence is indirect, it can be considerable, both at the level of broad 
strategy and in individual charging decisions. In Bulgaria, for example, Parliament 
has few direct formal powers over the Prosecution Service, yet it has demonstrated a 
clear tendency to make assertive use of its legislative powers to influence the conduct 
of law enforcement—including highly contested attempts to use amendment of key 
legislation as a pretext for altering the membership of the institutions governing the 
magistracy—because of public pressure for more results in the fight against crime, 
and because of the executive’s relative lack of authority in investigation and prosecu-
tion.163 On the other hand, in South Africa, the legislature’s formally extensive powers 
of oversight have been little used, apparently in deference to the power of the execu-
tive and a lack of expertise and resources. 
Considering the explicitly political nature of its functions, a legislature on its own has 
few incentives to avoid politicizing the work of the prosecution. This control is often 
thought of as, at least potentially, a form of improper interference, but it is also a form of 
democratic accountability, as the legislature is in some states the only body directly ac-
countable to the electorate; its involvement in the operation of the prosecution service 
is a way of ensuring that the service does not become self-justifying and self-serving. 
For example, legislatures often introduce new laws to alter or even circumvent the au-
thority and discretion of prosecutors and judges, especially when their decisions arouse 
public consternation;164 depending on one’s perspective—more precisely, depending on 
the purposes society has assigned to the prosecution—this may constitute interference 
with prosecutorial independence or a democratic exercise in accountability.
defined; also, the members of the Court themselves create the original list of candidates from which 
the President makes a nomination, and thus may already have approved the particular prosecutor 
whose proposed removal is before them.
160 See, e.g., UN Guidelines, Art. 11 (noting that a prosecution service’s functions are “authorized by 
law[,]” although also implying that the prosecution service’s core role in instituting prosecutions 
and its “active role in criminal proceedings” are givens, not ultimately subject to legislative fiat). 
South Africa’s Parliament has enacted legislation on performance measures that should create the 
environment for more effective oversight and increased accountability (although, as noted, Parlia-
ment’s oversight has not necessarily been effective).
161 Cf. Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 4 (noting an obligation on the budgetary authority to 
ensure adequate material means to the prosecution service consistent with its functions).
162 In 2004 Bulgaria’s legislature obliged the Prosecution Service to supply an annual report, for ex-
ample. It is not clear that annual reports necessarily act as an effective mechanism of accountabil-
ity and control, however; in Hungary, for example, the Prosecutor General must give a report to 
Parliament on the performance of the Prosecution Service, but the form and content of the report 
are ill-defined (and defined by the Service itself), and since 1990 only one annual report has been 
examined, discussed, and approved by Parliament. There are no clear instances in the countries 
surveyed in which the annual report is seen as a particularly important means of accountability, 
rather than routine obligation.
163 As noted, owing at least in part to the high level of autonomy afforded the magistracy, the Supreme 
Judicial Council, which has formal oversight, has demonstrated a low level of responsiveness to 
public concerns about the effectiveness of prosecution services.
164 This pattern has been visible especially in matters of sentencing in the United States, where legis-
latures have introduced sentencing guidelines to curb judicial discretion—although these in turn 
have been criticized for producing rigid and unjust results.  See, e.g., Jon Wool and Don Stemen, 
“Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington—Practical Implications for State Sentencing Sys-
tems,” at www.vera.org.
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There are few clear red lines in this continuum. The clearest consensus from state 
practice and the standards might be that legislative involvement in prosecutorial de-
cision-making becomes progressively more problematic as it moves on a continuum 
from regularized, routine interventions (such as the annual budget process or occa-
sional legislative reforms) towards ad hoc intervention in response to (or anticipation 
of) individual actions by prosecutors, or as it moves from seeking information about 
completed cases towards giving instructions in pending cases.165 
In any event, legislative interventions in the prosecutorial process must themselves 
be consistent with standards on neutrality; that is, neutrality is not one of the poli-
cies or goals that may be adopted, altered, or abandoned by the legislature, like the 
criminalization of a particular act, but rather a process norm essential to the very 
operation of a prosecution service as such.
Some systems also provide institutionalized channels to ensure prosecutorial in-
volvement in the legislative process. In Italy, for example, the Superior Council of the 
Magistracy, the self-governing body of the judiciary, may participate in legislative 
proceedings concerning justice or the judiciary.
4.3. Relations with the executive
Traditionally, many prosecution services have been under the direct control of ex-
ecutive branch agencies or the government, despite the frequent theoretical identi-
fication of prosecutors as judicial officers. Thus the principal threat to prosecutorial 
independence in most states has been seen to come from the executive, rather than, 
say, the legislature, and international standards focus more on the executive than the 
legislature; nonetheless, it is clear that extensive executive control of the prosecution 
service is fully anticipated by and entirely consistent with international standards.166
In practice, executive influence over the prosecution service varies widely. In some 
states, the executive has considerable direct influence (England and Wales, France, 
Germany, South Africa), including over the career path of prosecutors and the bud-
get of the service. Often Ministers of Justice have the authority to issue general policy 
instructions (France, Germany, South Africa), or even instructions in particular cas-
165 A recent constitutional court case in Hungary clarified that parliamentary interpellations could not 
in any way affect the status of the Prosecutor General, even when parliament specifically voted to 
reject the Prosecutor General’s response; the Court viewed this as an element of the prosecution’s 
political independence from the legislature. 3/2004 (II.17) AB, Decision of the Constitutional Court 
of Hungary: Az Alkotmánybíróság határozata a legfőbb ügyésznek az Alkotmány értelmezése tárgyá-
ban előterjesztett indítványára [Decision of the Constitutional Court on the Prosecutor General’s 
Motion Regarding the Interpretation of the Constitution]. Cf. Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 
11 (“States should take appropriate measures to ensure that public prosecutors are able to perform 
their professional duties and responsibilities without unjustified interference or unjustified expo-
sure to civil, penal or other liability. However, the public prosecution should account periodically 
and publicly for its activities as a whole and, in particular, the way in which its priorities were car-
ried out[]”).
166 See, e.g., Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Recs. 11-16 (section entitled “Relationship between pub-
lic prosecutors and the executive and legislative powers”).
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es (England and Wales,167 France,168 Germany169). In South Africa, for example, ex-
ecutive (both ministerial and presidential) control of the prosecution service extends 
to appointments, management, and general strategy, and even to ordering reports 
on high profile cases or contentious issues. At the opposite end of the spectrum, in 
Chile, Hungary, and the United States (at the county level170) the executive has very 
limited authority over the highly independent prosecution services.
Even when direct or formal influence is limited, the executive may have considerable 
informal resources for influence. In Bulgaria, the Minister of Justice has very limited 
formal influence over the prosecution’s management, yet the government’s involve-
ment in the budgeting and legislative processes gives it considerable informal influ-
ence over prosecution activity. The Bulgarian executive’s lack of formal authority to 
give policy instruction has been the source of constant tension in its relations with 
the prosecution services, with the government complaining that it is prevented from 
influencing policy and setting priorities in the fight against crime, while the Prosecu-
tion Service complains of a lack of cooperation.171
In several countries, the Minister of Justice retains a coordinating (Chile, Italy) or 
supervising (France, South Africa) role, especially in the prosecution’s relationship to 
the legislature.172 It is common that the prosecution service has to report to executive 
agencies (South Africa, Germany), even if this is purely informational (Chile), and 
some Ministries engage in ongoing discussions or conferences with the prosecution 
services that in effect act as instructive policy guidance (France,173 Germany, South 
Africa). It is also common that members of the executive have an ex officio role in 
supervisory or coordinating bodies that administer or monitor the prosecution ser-
vice (France—Superior Council of the Magistracy; Chile—Coordinating Committee 
for Reform).
167 Certain prosecutions require the express approval (fiat) of the Attorney General, who also has the 
power to terminate prosecutions (nolle prosequi), although in general, prosecutors are independent 
in making decisions relating to criminal proceedings.
168 The Minister of Justice can instruct the Prosecutor General of the Court of Appeals in writing to 
institute and reopen proceedings concerning any offense; however, the Minister cannot order pro-
ceedings to be dropped or dictate the particular course of a specific investigation.
169 There have been only a few isolated cases of a Minister providing mandatory instructions to a Pros-
ecutor General, and no known cases of abuse for political reasons—in part a product, perhaps, of 
strong democratic traditions and the public’s high level of sensitivity towards any abuse of power
170 At the federal level, there is considerable and direct control by the executive.
171 The relationship between Bulgaria’s Prosecution Service and political branches is marked by the 
Service’s problematic political role, a result of its extreme independence: The Service has become 
a political factor in its own right, building cooperation with or confronting politicians, includ-
ing members of Parliament and the executive. Some politicians reportedly do not dare confront 
the Service publicly, as a criminal investigation against a politician—announced publicly by the 
Prosecution Service—can be very damaging to a political career, and the Prosecution Service has 
abused its power in this way
172 As noted above, in several countries (France, Germany, Italy), the legislature may only solicit infor-
mation on the prosecution service through the office of the Minister of Justice, giving the executive 
additional leverage vis-à-vis both parties.
173 In France, the Ministry of Justice holds frequent conferences with the Parquet, which regularly 
provides information to the Ministry’s Directorate in charge of criminal cases (Directeur des af-
faires criminelles et des grâces) about cases that have attracted the interest of the media; in turn, the 
Ministry uses this information in drafting its instructions and circulars.
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What practice in the countries surveyed shows in common—and what is confirmed 
by the standards—is an aim to limit executive authority in two principal ways: au-
thority should be transparent, and it should be regularized—that is, it should dis-
favor case-specific supervision. States should clearly define, in law, the scope of the 
executive’s authority,174 which the executive should exercise transparently175 in con-
sultation with the prosecution itself.176 Instructions not to prosecute in a given case 
are disfavored in the standards, which nonetheless recognize that there is no absolute 
prohibition on such powers;177 indeed, in some states the executive retains explicit 
powers of intervention,178 while in others the hierarchical nature of the prosecution’s 
relationship to the executive implies such instructions (South Africa’s executive regu-
larly discusses individual cases with the National Director of Prosecutions).
These limits on executive authority are largely negative; they do not identify any af-
firmative or discretionary power in the prosecution service to compel the executive 
to act.179 International standards suggest that prosecution services should actively 
cooperate with executive agencies with an eye towards promoting effective and fair 
crime policy.180
174 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 13(a) (“Where the public prosecution is part of or subordi-
nate to the government, states should take effective measures to guarantee that. . .the nature and 
the scope of the powers of the government with respect to the public prosecution are established 
by law[]”). Even in countries in which the prosecution service is independent of the executive, 
the standards call for that independence to be clearly established in law. Council of Europe Rec. 
2000/19, Rec. 14.
175 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 13(d)(also noting, at second sub-para., an obligation to 
transmit instructions “through hierarchical channels”). The executive should publish any instruc-
tions it gives the service. Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 13(b)-(c), and (d)(second sub-
para.)(obliging the executive to explain any written instructions that deviate from the prosecution’s 
own advice to the executive).
176 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 13(d)(first sub-para.). This can implicitly position the legisla-
ture as arbiter or mediator between the executive and the prosecution service, even when the latter 
is formally subordinated to the former.
177 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 13(f)(saying “such instructions must remain exceptional and 
be subjected. . .to an appropriate specific control with a view in particular to guaranteeing transpar-
ency[]”); see also IAP Standards, Std. 2.3.
178 These powers are often the source of friction between the political branches and the prosecution 
service proper. In Germany, representatives of the Prosecution Services have been arguing for many 
years, unsuccessfully but persistently, for the abolition of the Ministers’ power to issue instructions 
in individual cases.
179 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 12 (“Public prosecutors should not interfere with the com-
petence of the. . .executive powers[]”). One specifically reserved authority is for the prosecution 
to be able to investigate offenses by executive officials, whether or not the service itself is formally 
independent. See UN Guidelines, Art. 15 (“Prosecutors shall give due attention to the prosecution 
of crimes committed by public officials, particularly corruption, abuse of power, grave violations 
of human rights and other crimes recognized by international law and, where authorized by law 
or consistent with local practice, the investigation of such offences[]”); Council of Europe Rec. 
2000/19, Rec. 16 (saying that prosecutors “should be in a position to prosecute [such officials] 
without obstruction”).
180 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 15. In preparing draft legislation on behalf of the Govern-
ment in Hungary, the Ministry of Justice must invite comments and the opinion of the Prosecutor 
General’s office; conversely, the Prosecutor General may initiate legislation, but only through the 
Minister of Justice.
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4.4. Relations with the police and other investigative organs
In most civil law countries, the prosecution service tends to have a supervisory (Chile, 
France, Germany, Hungary) or coordinating role in relation to the investigative func-
tion vested in the police. In some states, this relationship is with the police in general, 
while in others (Bulgaria,181 France, Italy), there are special parts of the general police 
forces that are in effect permanently at the disposal of the prosecution service. 
Although the constitutional or institutional arrangements for the police and prosecu-
tion services are clearly separate—in all countries surveyed the police have a separate 
administrative identity, including bureaucracies, budgeting, and career paths that are 
separate—the formal functional arrangement tends to give prosecutors the dominant 
position,182 at least insofar as they are willing and able to assert ongoing supervision. 
Where civil law prosecutors do not exercise active, ongoing oversight,183 police tend 
to become increasingly powerful in the relationship, engaging in low-level de facto 
decision-making about investigation and cases.184 In any event, the apparent institu-
tional differences are often somewhat less in practice; in fact, the better indicator of 
when the prosecution will in fact have a leading role in investigation is probably the 
gravity of the crime, rather than any structural indicators (France).185 
In common law countries, prosecutors’ formal authority over the police is far less—
in England and Wales, for example, the Crown Prosecution Service has no authority 
over police in any context—but at the same time, prosecutors have greater discretion 
over which cases to pursue once the police have completed their investigations (Eng-
181 Bulgaria formerly had a separate investigation service. However, in 2006 this was largely subsumed 
in the police, who are subordinated to prosecutors in their investigatory work. Investigators now 
only handle limited classes of cases, such as those involving Police officers or people with prosecu-
torial immunity.
182 In Germany, for example, the prosecution service is formally identified as the master of pre-trial 
proceedings, including investigation.
183 Prosecutors often have discretion about whether they will directly supervise an investigation them-
selves or delegate it to the police. Thus in France, a prosecutor (or an examining magistrate) may 
delegate a large number of investigative actions to the judicial police by letters rogatory (commis-
sions rogatoires), allowing them to conduct investigative actions without undue delay, but also in 
practice conferring significant power on them; nonetheless, the prosecutor or the examining judge 
retains formal control over the investigation.
184 This appears to be the case in Germany, for example, where prosecutors rarely participate in inves-
tigation, and the police have considerably more investigative resources at their disposal. In Chile, 
the police are formally an “auxiliary” to the Ministerio Público, and prosecutors can “directly exer-
cise the functions of investigation” as well as instruct the police. In practice, however, most inves-
tigative work is completed by the time a prosecutor is apprised of a case, as the police are obliged 
to undertake swift action upon receipt of a complaint. In cases with few leads, prosecutors merely 
formalize the absence of evidence or the possibility of proceeding with an administrative decision 
to suspend work.
185 In France, for example, the judicial police have powers to conduct limited investigations on their own, 
but these generally concern lesser offenses or the preliminary stages of more serious investigations.
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land and Wales,186 United States187); the mixed South African system generally fol-
lows this model as well, although—consistent with the more common pattern in civil 
law systems—prosecutors retain authority to direct police officers’ work in relation to 
specific investigations.188 The result, in general terms, is that prosecution services and 
police forces have developed extensive contacts and working relationships; prosecu-
tors need competent investigations in order to prosecute successfully, while police 
want their cases prosecuted. Still, there is often tension between these agencies.189
Likewise, many civil law jurisdictions report roughly similar problems with coor-
dination between police and prosecutors, as well as professional tension between 
the two groups. Although in systems employing the legality principle neither police 
nor prosecutors have discretion in dropping or pursuing cases—which theoretically 
should reduce opportunities for disagreement—frictions between prosecutors and 
police often also undermine interdepartmental cooperation and effectiveness.
Indeed, the relationship between police and prosecutors seems an example of how 
different constitutional, institutional, and functional structures must be considered 
comprehensively, not in isolation. The greater discretion afforded prosecutors in 
common law countries has traditionally co-existed with an equally independent po-
lice force possessed of considerable discretion, and a powerful, autonomous judicia-
ry—different and competing discretionary authorities acting as multiple gatekeepers 
and checks on the actions of independent actors below.190 In civil law systems, by 
contrast, there has traditionally been less need for independent review of acts that 
were not discretionary in nature—instead, the stricter requirement of legality has 
often been sufficient to ensure the integrity of the process.
186 Although an entirely separate institution, the Crown Prosecution Service was established in part 
to provide an impartial evaluation of investigations by the police, whose own powers had been 
increased; thus even in this common law system, the sense clearly exists that the prosecution is to 
exercise a kind of monitoring role over police investigations.
187 Police forces in the United States are organized into very many, extremely autonomous, and often 
overlapping jurisdictions; with few exceptions, prosecution services have no authority whatsoever 
over them, although they often have extensively coordinated working relationships; coordinated 
working groups of law enforcement, investigative, and prosecuting agencies are quite common.
188 Directors of National Prosecuting Authority offices at the seat of a High Court may “give written 
directions or furnish guidelines” to the Provincial Commissioner of Police or any police officer 
conducting investigations into offenses in the Director’s area of jurisdiction (National Prosecuting 
Authority Act 32/1998, Sec. 24(4)(c)), and can “supervise, direct and co-ordinate specific investi-
gations” by the police in their area (National Prosecuting Authority Act 32/1998, Sec. 24(1)(c)). 
The prosecution service also has its own investigative units, focused on organized crime or areas 
designated by the President, and with most of the same procedural powers as police investigators, 
and certain enhanced powers in relation to search and seizure.
189 In the United States, this endemic tension may be particularly exacerbated at election time, as 
policy differences between the independent District Attorney and the executive branch, of which 
the police are a part, may create polarization. (In many counties the chief law enforcement officer, 
the sheriff, is also an elected official).
190 Although the police have no obligation to consult with the Crown Prosecution Service, in prac-
tice this is quite frequent, and prosecution requests for further investigation are rarely rejected, 
especially as the prosecution has discretion to continue with a case or not. Prosecutors have been 
placed in police stations in order to give early and immediate advice; for out-of-hours consultation, 
a telephone advice service known as CPS Direct has been established with a single national num-
ber, which any police force can use when it requires urgent advice. In general, the prosecution has 
tended to become involved at a much earlier stage in the charging process.
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International standards reflect this major division, developing approaches that ac-
count for either an equal and independent or a hierarchical relationship between 
prosecution and police.191 In systems in which the police are subordinated, the pros-
ecution should be able to instruct the police in the conduct, staffing, and prioritiza-
tion of investigation and the release of information to the public.192 In systems with 
independent police, the state ought nonetheless ensure “appropriate and functional 
co-operation[.]”193 In either relationship, the prosecution should have the author-
ity to ensure the legality of police investigative behavior, as a function of its general 
authority to bring criminal charges,194 which inevitably gives prosecution services at 
least some marginal leverage over the police.
The aspiration that prosecution services ought to be able to instruct police “with 
a view to an effective implementation of crime policy priorities”195 seems inconsis-
tent with the view, held in certain prosecution services (such as in Chile), that the 
prosecution service is not responsible for or involved with crime policy. Yet it seems 
logical that the prosecution should have an interest in crime policy if it has supervi-
sory authority over the police, assuming the police are thought to be involved with 
implementing crime policy (which is universally the case).
4.5. Relations with the judiciary
There are two principal variants in the relationship of prosecutors to judges: either 
prosecutors are considered members of the judiciary (being called, together with 
judges, “magistrates”), or they are a separate service, whether entirely autonomous 
or within the executive. In Bulgaria, France, and Italy, prosecutors and judges share a 
common administrative body, while in other countries (such as Chile, England and 
Wales, and Hungary), they are entirely separate;196 in South Africa, the two institu-
tions are considered separate, although they share some administrative and support 
services.197 In Germany prosecutors and judges are under the supervision of the Min-
ister of Justice, but the administration of the two institutions is largely kept separate.
The international standards appear to contemplate a formal and functional divi-
sion—a “strict separation”198—which is much greater than actual practice in states 
191 See generally Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 21-23 (section entitled “Relationship between 
public prosecutors and the police”).
192 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 22(a)-(b).
193 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 23. See also UN Guidelines, Art. 20 (“In order to ensure the 
fairness and effectiveness of prosecution, prosecutors shall strive to cooperate with the police. . .”).
194 Cf. UN Guidelines, Art. 15-16; Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 21. This logically is a general 
standard, applicable even in those systems that do not expressly assign the prosecution service the 
role of “ensuring the legality of administrative actions.”
195 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 22(a).
196 In the United States, many judges at the state and local level are directly elected.
197 In some German states, too, the state Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General’s office may share 
administrative staff and costs.
198 UN Guidelines, Art. 10 (“The office of prosecutors shall be strictly separated from judicial func-
tions[]”); Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 17 (“[S]tates should guarantee that a person cannot 
at the same time perform duties as a public prosecutor and as a court judge[]”).
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that consider prosecutors to be judicial officers. The close professional interconnec-
tions in these joint governance structures can raise concerns about potential risks to 
the independence of both judges and prosecutors. In Bulgaria, for example, the joint 
management of magistrates has not been considered successful and has created sub-
stantial tensions between judges and prosecutors, leading to a rather difficult work-
ing environment for the Council and reducing its efficiency.199
Even in those states with a common magistracy, however, the notional common iden-
tity of judges and prosecutors is tempered by internal institutional divisions ensuring 
each body of judicial officers some autonomy. In France, for example, the common 
Superior Council of the Magistracy has separate panels for judges and prosecutors, 
such that most administrative decisions are in fact made by a body in which prosecu-
tors or judges respectively are a decisive majority—in effect, a largely self-governing 
body within the larger common administrative structure. In the French context, the 
magistracy is not seen as dangerously co-mingling prosecutors and judges, but rather 
ensuring that the two groups have equal status: the fact that judges and prosecutors 
share magistracy status implies a level of professional equality rather than hierar-
chical subordination,200 which in turn may tend to reinforce the independence and 
autonomy of prosecutors.
On the other hand, even when judges and prosecutors are clearly institutionally sepa-
rate, there are often close professional and career path relationships between judges 
and prosecutors. In many states, judges and prosecutors have identical initial train-
ing (Italy and Hungary201), and can change from one career path to the other (Hun-
gary,202 France, Germany,203 Italy204), although it is more common for prosecutors 
to become judges than the reverse.205 International standards actually call for states 
199 This is in part a function of the high levels of independence afforded to magistrates in Bulgaria: 
Even in the face of mounting public criticism, the Supreme Judicial Council felt no pressure to 
exercise meaningful control or pursue policies to guarantee non-corrupt, effective criminal inves-
tigation and prosecution. Instead, a culture of nepotism and institutional loyalties became evident 
in the work of the Council.
200 Judges in France cannot give instructions to prosecutors (other than as pertain to courtroom pro-
cess), nor vice versa.
201 However, training for judges and prosecutors is organized separately.
202 This rarely occurs, however.
203 In several southern German states, judges and prosecutors are required to move regularly back 
and forth between prosecutorial and judicial offices, even at the highest levels of both professions. 
Promotions depend on familiarity with both career paths. Judges and prosecutors generally enjoy 
close social and professional contacts.
204 In Italy, the former provision barring magistrates from switching between prosecutorial and judi-
cial positions after five years of service has recently been abolished; now the only restriction is that 
such changes can occur no more that four times during each magistrate’s service, and that, in such 
cases, the magistrate must move to a court or prosecution office situated in a different location.
205 This is especially the case in common law systems, where judges traditionally have high social 
status. In England and Wales, for instance, where in practice only lawyers with current experience 
in the higher courts are eligible for judgeships, prosecutors—with their limited rights of audience—
are far less likely to become judges than are defense solicitors. Judges themselves seldom apply to 
become prosecutors, as prosecutors enjoy lower social and professional status and lower pay. This 
is also true in Chile, where judges tend to be considerably older than prosecutors and the prestige 
of the new Ministerio has yet to equal the cultural authority of judges.
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that allow switches in career path to facilitate this process206—presumably to ensure 
that prosecutors have real career parity with judges, as in practice few judges tend 
to become prosecutors in either civil or common law countries. Some jurisdictions 
attempt to create status equivalence between judges and prosecutors, for example by 
ensuring their salaries are equal (France, Germany,207 Italy).
Yet there are patterned differences in the level of autonomy and the direction of 
control between judges and prosecutors, even across different types of system. In 
both principal types of system, prosecutors are officers of the court with certain pro-
fessional obligations208 that may, in practice, give judges power over them during 
proceedings, in a manner that can indirectly but meaningfully affect prosecutorial 
decision-making.209 More generally, prosecutors have obligations towards judges 
and the courts that are not reciprocal,210 Regardless of similarities in training, salary, 
or administration, in most countries that do not have a magistracy system judges 
have greater prestige than prosecutors—in common law systems such as England 
and Wales or the United States, this imbalance is considerable, and judges have very 
high status.211 Where the prosecution service and the judiciary have different levels of 
independence, it is invariably the prosecution that has less independence—especially 
individual prosecutors—not the judiciary or individual judges,212 and judges’ greater 
measure of core independence tends to place judges in a marginally more secure and 
powerful position than prosecutors occupy.
206 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 18 (“[I]f the legal system so permits, states should take mea-
sures in order to make it possible for the same person to perform successively the functions of 
public prosecutor and those of judge or vice versa[]”).
207 Salary equivalence is found even in countries, such as Germany, that clearly do not identify judges 
and prosecutors as belonging to a single corporate body.
208 Cf. Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 20 (“Public prosecutors must be objective and fair during 
court proceedings. In particular, they should ensure that the court is provided with all relevant facts 
and legal arguments necessary for the fair administration of justice[]”).
209 In Chile, despite the formal independence of the Ministerio Público, the judiciary has considerable 
power to shape the Ministerio and the conduct of prosecutions: the Supreme Court plays an im-
portant role in selecting the Fiscal Nacional; judges also routinely chastise prosecutors in court for 
shortcomings in their work. The relationship between the judiciary and the Ministerio is at times 
strained. Cf. ICC Draft Code of Professional Conduct for Prosecutors, Preamble (final para.)(noting 
that the Code is to be promulgated by the Presidency of the Court, the judiciary organ).
210 Cf. Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 17 (“States should take appropriate measures to ensure 
that the legal status, the competencies and the procedural role of public prosecutors are established 
by law in a way that there can be no legitimate doubt about the independence and impartiality of 
the court judges[]”), and 19 (“Public prosecutors must strictly respect the independence and the 
impartiality of judges; in particular they shall neither cast doubts on judicial decisions nor hinder 
their execution, save where exercising their rights of appeal or invoking some other declaratory 
procedure[]”); UN Guidelines, Art. 20 (“In order to ensure the fairness and effectiveness of pros-
ecution, prosecutors shall strive to cooperate with. . .the courts, the legal profession, [and] public 
defenders. . .”).
211 This is also true of South Africa, where judicial officers have greater prestige than all but the most 
senior members of the prosecution service. Judicial officers generally receive higher salaries than pros-
ecutors, and appointments to the judiciary are made from the ranks of senior private attorneys and from 
among magistrates of lower courts, who in turn are often appointed from among prosecutors.
212 Cf. EUMAP, Monitoring the European Union Accession Process: Judicial Independence (Budapest: 
Open Society Institute 2001), at 16-32 and especially 28 (discussing standards of judicial indepen-
dence).
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Most explanations of why prosecutorial and judicial independence differ are circular: 
prosecutors have less independence because of the hierarchical nature of the pros-
ecution service. This only begs the question of why prosecution services are struc-
tured that way. Rather, the functional difference between the role of the prosecutor 
as initiator and the judge as final arbiter suggests the basis for these different levels 
of independence, especially individual independence. This functional difference also 
tracks closely with the tendency for judges to have somewhat higher status, as they 
are in a position to adjudicate the decisions of prosecutors, and not the reverse.
There is not a clear minimum quantum of independence for individual prosecutors, 
and consequently joint administration (or other functional conflation of judicial and 
prosecutorial roles) probably poses more serious and immediate risks to society’s 
interest in the independence of judges than that of prosecutors. The point, however, 
is that any conflation of the initiating and adjudicating role creates risks for society as 
a whole; prosecutors may not have an absolute claim to independence, but it is bad 
principle and bad policy to allow them to be either subordinated to, or overly identi-
fied with, the very judges with whom they must work.213
V. Information Control concerning the Prosecution Service’s Activity
This section considers the restrictions and obligations under which the prosecution ser-
vice operates, as well as the rules under which the general public, and especially the 
media, has access to information about the work of the prosecution service. Only a few 
restrictions on the transparency of information or decision-making are justified; in most 
instances, other institutional actors, the media, and the general public have legitimate 
interests in getting information about the prosecution service’s activities—and such ac-
cess improves the service’s effectiveness and efficiency. The default standard should be 
towards openness.
Information restrictions and obligations: There are limited circumstances in which 
a prosecution service may legitimately be allowed or even obliged to restrict the 
free flow of information concerning its activities. Prosecutors’ responsibilities to the 
court and to the rights of defendants may require them to restrict their approaches 
to media and the general public.214 In addition, prosecution services may have legiti-
213 Certainly, there are risks to judges’ independence as well from insufficiently regulated interaction 
with prosecutors, and consequently risks to defendants and to society’s general interest in indepen-
dent, impartial adjudication.
214 See, e.g., ICC Draft Code, Art. 17 (‘Publicity and the Media’):
 Prosecutors shall :
 1. Avoid making public comments outside the courtroom, including, inter alia, speaking to the 
media about the merits of particular cases or the guilt or innocence of certain accused before judg-
ment by the Court, and making any public statements regarding the character, credibility, reputa-
tion, or record of an accused; 
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mate reasons to restrict the flow of information about individual investigations and 
cases, or even, in certain circumstances, about broader prosecution strategy (such as 
in cases of long-term organized crime or terrorism investigations). There may also 
be legitimate reasons to restrict information about ongoing internal disciplinary pro-
ceedings.
However, there are probably only very few necessary or mandatory restrictions on 
the transparency of information or decision-making beyond these limited areas. 
Moreover, access improves the service’s effectiveness and efficiency. Other branches 
of the state, media, and individual citizens have legitimate interests in securing ac-
cess to information about the prosecution service’s activities.215 There is no reason to 
believe that general strategy, budgeting, personnel decisions, and the like need to be 
subject to broad information restrictions. Prosecutors’ obligations as officers of the 
court likewise can require them to disclose information even if (particularly if) it 
is harmful to their case.216 Arguably, international norms concerning accountability 
suggest that the default should be towards informational openness;217 it is not proper 
to expansively interpret a duty of discretion—whose purpose is to protect the well-
being and reputation of individuals and the general social interest in effective inves-
tigative and judicial proceedings—so as to achieve strategic advantage in particular 
cases or to advance preferential institutional interests.
All states place some restrictions on the prosecution service’s ability to disseminate 
information. In Hungary, there is no general right of public access to investigative 
information; detailed regulations govern the Prosecution Service’s interactions with 
the media and the general public. The authority actually conducting an investigation 
(including the Prosecutorial Investigation Offices) decides which data may be made 
public and which kept confidential, and prosecutors supervising an investigation are 
not allowed to inform the public about the details of the investigation, the actual 
activity and results, or the plans of the investigative authority.218 Media access to on-
 2. Make it clear, particularly when undertaking official speaking engagements, that he or she is 
representing the [Office of the Prosecutor] and not the Court as a whole.
 See UN Guidelines, Art. 13(c) (“In the performance of their duties, prosecutors shall:. .  .[k]eep 
matters in their possession confidential, unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice 
require otherwise[]”); Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 30 (“Public prosecutors should keep 
confidential information obtained from third parties, in particular where the presumption of inno-
cence is at stake, unless disclosure is required in the interest of justice or by law[]”) and 32 (“Public 
prosecutors should take proper account of the interests of the witnesses, especially take or promote 
measures to protect their life, safety and privacy[]”).
215 French citizens have the right to information about the operation of judicial bodies; all German 
government agencies are under an obligation to provide full information to the media.
216 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 29 (“Public prosecutors should seek to safeguard the prin-
ciple of equality of arms, in particular by disclosing to the other parties—save where otherwise 
provided in the law—any information which they possess which may affect the justice of the pro-
ceedings[]”). Arguably, prosecutors in systems governed by the principle of legality have even less 
formal discretion about withholding information.
217 See, e.g., Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 36(c) (“The public must be informed of the [pros-
ecution service’s] organisation, guidelines, principles and criteria; they shall be communicated to 
any person on request[]”).
218 The supervising prosecution office limits information issued in such instances to the details of 
strictly prosecutorial activity, such as decisions on complaints against measures taken by the inves-
tigative authority or interpretation of the laws involved in the case.
Overview: Design and Reform of Public Prosecution Services
75
going proceedings in South Africa is limited by the National Prosecuting Authority’s 
confidentiality obligations: It is a criminal offense for prosecutors to disclose infor-
mation acquired in the performance of their official duties without the permission of 
the National Director or the written authorization of the affected person. These re-
strictions are typical; even states that declare a general right to information (France) 
in fact have similar restrictions.
States also place informational obligations on the prosecution services, usually with 
regard to reporting their activity to other state institutions. Certain states oblige the 
prosecution service to supply information to the political branches or to autonomous 
governing bodies, either on a scheduled basis, such as an annual report (Chile219), or 
in response to particular interpellations (Hungary220). 
Media access: Other systems include formal (Germany221) or background (United 
States222) norms obliging prosecution services to provide information to the general 
public or to media. Since 2004, Bulgaria’s Supreme Judicial Council has had an obli-
gation to make public most of its sessions as well as most reports submitted to it, and 
after initial resistance, it installed video cameras of its deliberations and normally 
holds open sessions.
At the same time, some systems place restrictions on media reporting of ongoing 
cases (England and Wales, France, Germany), or even more specifically on reporting 
of the prosecution service’s strategy and activities. Such restrictions, if too extensive, 
potentially conflict with human rights norms on freedom of information and the me-
dia, but in principle and practice it is entirely possible to balance media freedoms with 
the need for effective prosecutions and defendants’ rights to privacy and a fair trial.
Providing access to information concerning prosecution services’ budgeting, plan-
ning, strategy, and performance is in and of itself a means of ensuring transparency 
and accountability. Requirements to report to other branches of the state—even if ac-
companied by a right of interpellation—do not necessarily violate principles of inde-
pendence and neutrality, so long as the service’s decisional autonomy is not directly 
restricted.223 And, so long as protections for the rights and reputations of individuals 
are considered, there is little evidence—or reason to suppose—that increasing media 
access does anything but advance the general social interest in the administration of 
justice.224 Moreover, the risks that can arise from media access are probably a func-
219 Three reports have been issued to date under the new system. Read out loud in person by the Fiscal 
Nacional, the report is a long narrative account of legal developments; it contains few meaningful 
statistical indicators concerning practices or the outcomes of its work.
220 This is a good example of non-controlling transparency: the Prosecution Service is required to 
respond to Parliamentary interpellations, but Parliament may not refuse to accept the answers.
221 The Prosecution bears the burden of justifying any withholding of information.
222 These rules are usually contained in ethics codes rather than statutes.
223 The effects of publicity and public pressure consequent on such scrutiny do not, under most cir-
cumstances, constitute improper interference with prosecutorial independence, so long as the for-
mal right of independent action is retained.
224 In Germany, for instance, there is no evidence that the media unduly influences prosecutorial deci-
sions, at least directly. No cases have been reported of prosecutors altering their decisions because 
of media attention, in part, perhaps, because of the strong sense of professionalism in the Prosecu-
tion Service. However, media reporting can influence the atmosphere in more subtle ways. Exten-
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tion of interaction with other institutional arrangements more than a problem of 
access itself.225
Information controls may also place obligations on other actors and may serve to 
protect the service’s autonomy and effectiveness. In addition to media reporting re-
strictions, for example, the requirement that the executive put any instructions to 
the prosecution in writing226 is a form of information control aiming to ensure trans-
parency, which both protects against improper political influence and regularizes 
accountability.227 In addition, restrictions on using illegally obtained evidence228 like-
wise serve to discourage improper behavior by investigative authorities.
Public relations: Apart from questions of obligation and propriety, prosecution services 
can disseminate information in ways that improve their institutional ability to realize the 
goals society has assigned them. Yet few prosecution services have effective information 
and outreach services.229 In France, for example, the Minister of Justice develops policy 
regarding media access and public information, but the Parquet’s own informational 
outreach is not well developed; there is no specialized unit to support the Parquet’s 
relations with the media, and the level of attention given to publicizing information 
varies considerably among its different offices. In South Africa, the National Prose-
cuting Authority has a dedicated section for communications, but there are no public 
or media relations sections outside of the head office; instead the various no offices 
and the separate units within liaise with the media relations section at the head office, 
and—for the reasons noted above concerning confidentiality of information—individ-
ual prosecutors are supposed to refrain from making media statements or comments.
sive reporting on a case, for example, can lead to harsher treatment of the suspect. The media can 
also take on a positive role in guarding the Prosecution from undue political influence; when the 
media suspect such interference, they generally take the side of the Prosecution. The evidence from 
England and Wales—which has one of the most robust media cultures—is similar.
225 For example, in the United States the status of chief prosecutors as directly elected political officials 
can lead to efforts by District Attorneys to cater to popular preferences, including in pursuing 
particular cases, in ways that may affect the impartial and regularized administration of justice. 
But this, properly understood, is not a function of media access, but rather of the direct election of 
prosecutors.
226 Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 13(c)-(d).
227 This is an example of how independence and accountability are complementary rather than contra-
dictory values.
228 UN Guidelines, Art. 16; Council of Europe Rec. 2000/19, Rec. 28.
229 The United States and England and Wales constitute exceptions. As elected officials, District At-
torneys in the United States generally have strong incentives to ensure that the work of their offices 
is well (and positively) publicized and responsive to the interests of other actors, especially of im-
portant constituencies. Many offices engage with the public through a range of outreach activities 
that focus on crime prevention and reduction as well as general public education about the law. 
In England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service has a large, professional press office at its 
headquarters, which deals with press inquiries about individual cases and about the CPS in gen-
eral, as well as regional liaisons (who are, however, usually prosecutors rather than professional 
spokesmen). In part this is a response to the strong tradition of a free and active press in the United 
Kingdom; criminal cases are routinely reported in all newspapers, and press criticism undoubt-
edly puts pressure on prosecutors. Although extremes of public pressure might create the potential 
for interference with the independence of decision-making, there is no evidence of this being a 
concern in the English and Welsh context. In Germany, all prosecution offices have a press officer, 
although in smaller offices this may be the Chief Prosecutor. In Bulgaria, some prosecution offices 
have begun to appoint spokesmen.
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In Chile, public relations—shaping and responding to public expectations—is per-
haps the weakest aspect of the Ministerio Público. The Ministerio has a national De-
partment of Communications; it issues a quarterly journal containing new jurispru-
dence and essays by senior staff, as well as educational brochures and videos on how 
the new system of justice operates. However, the Department remains a primarily 
reactive organization, and the position of Director of Communications has changed 
hands several times.230 It is nearly impossible to gauge public perception of the Min-
isterio’s work, as there are no national studies of attitudes toward the reform process 
in general or the Ministerio in particular.
VI. The Use of Statistics
This section considers how prosecution services and other institutional actors use statis-
tics in measuring the performance of the service and determining its priorities. Proper 
selection of statistical indicators is not a technical exercise, but a function of social and 
political consensus about the role of the prosecution service; at present, however, few of 
the states surveyed make effective use of statistics to evaluate and improve the prosecu-
tion service’s ability to meet social goals.
There is no general or direct obligation on prosecution services to maintain statistics 
or other performance measures of any, or any particular, kind. At most, one might 
derive an ancillary obligation to measure performance so as to ensure that the service 
is indeed fulfilling its core obligations,231 but even this would provide practically no 
guidance about specific measures.
The statistical evaluation of most prosecution services’ performance is at a primitive 
stage. While all states collect statistics of some kind, most do not collect data that 
reflect a broad range of questions and concerns about what the prosecution service is 
supposed to achieve; instead, most governments collect and analyze data that focuses 
on outputs, not outcomes. Indeed, it is nearly impossible in any country to describe 
patterns in the administration of justice in meaningful terms on the basis of data col-
lected and reported by state institutions. 
In general, the countries surveyed tend to keep statistics on incidence of crime and 
on cases at various docket stages; fewer keep (or publicize) statistics on more quali-
tative measures of performance or on internal processes (such as those relating to 
230 At the regional and local levels, by contrast, innovative practices have been adopted in communica-
tions and public relations. Many of the Regional Directors of Prosecution have used one of their 
two allotted advisor positions to create a press officer and mobile public relations office. Some city 
level prosecutors have taken further steps, without additional resources, to communicate with the 
public about the significance of the Ministerio’s work.
231 Cf. Access to Justice: The Prosecution Service, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Vienna, 
2006), at 3-4.
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training and evaluation).232 In some systems, another agency—often in the execu-
tive—is responsible for maintaining statistical records.233 
It is difficult to draw inferences about the quality of justice from such data. There 
is no consensus about the definition of “quality,” or about what kinds of values are 
worth scrutiny. In Chile, for example, statistics record the number and percentage 
of victims given assistance, but not why they were given such assistance, whether 
or not it was appropriate, or what consequences, if any, it had for the goals of crimi-
nal justice.234 Data routinely collected by the prosecution service in South Africa is 
primarily to measure quantitative performance (such as the number of cases pros-
ecuted) rather than indications of qualitative effect (such as improvement in public 
confidence in the prosecution service or in the broader criminal justice system, or 
decline in public fear of crime).
In many systems, statistics are either not readily accessible by policymakers and the 
general public, or they are not available in a useful form. In Bulgaria, statistical in-
formational reports are submitted to the Supreme Judicial Council, but as there is 
no independent check on the accuracy of these reports, which derive from different 
institutions and are not readily comparable, the effect of such reporting on public 
awareness and confidence is not substantial. In the United States, detailed statistics 
that provide a solid overview of prosecutorial activities (including the many non-
case related activities) are rarely available on the local level. Offices may publish gen-
eral filing or disposition statistics for felonies and misdemeanors and provide overall 
conviction rates, but more detailed information is rarely published or even used in-
ternally to inform management about office and attorney performance.
In some situations, there can be legal or conceptual obstacles to effective data collection.
232 In France, surveys by the Ministry of Justice increasingly stress the ways in which cases are handled, 
either through prosecution in court or through other means, such as restorative justice. This in-
cludes efforts to develop an understanding of the efficiency of the prosecution service as a whole, 
taking into account both results achieved and the time taken to achieve them, in order to reduce 
undue delays. This information is then used to develop practice guidelines and determine addi-
tional support.
233 In France, each prosecution office records monthly data on the crime rate; each year, a general na-
tional directory is published with data detailing the work of judicial bodies in both civil and crimi-
nal matters. However, according to the Ministry of Justice, statistical indicators are more difficult to 
develop for criminal policy than for civil policy, owing to the poorer quality of statistics in the field 
of criminal justice and the poor harmonization of statistics from the Parquet, judiciary, police, and 
incarceration authorities.
234 In Chile, an abundance of quantitative information about the reformed justice system is available. 
The Research Division of the Ministerio Público produces quarterly unpublished reviews contain-
ing basic information about the administration of justice. These bulletins record the numbers of 
cases that enter and leave the system in a particular time frame, the types of cases, and the propor-
tion of cases that have been dealt with. Substantial attention is paid in these reports to the type of 
disposition—for example, what proportion of cases was dismissed or provisionally archived, was 
resolved upon a decision of a judicial body, or culminated in a trial. However, the compendium is 
not designed to address the quality of justice, and it does not measure data against norms or bench-
marks; it is not designed or used as a tool of assessment and accountability, and it is therefore dif-
ficult to draw conclusions from this data about the qualitative performance of the justice system.
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No efforts are made in Italy to collect reliable analytical data on the effectiveness of 
the prosecution service and of individual prosecutors; no such data is collected in the 
processes of professional career evaluation. The very use of such data to evaluate the 
effectiveness of individual prosecutors and prosecution offices would be considered 
a threat to the independence of prosecutors in the application of the constitutional 
principle of compulsory criminal action.235 Although the formal reasons for this are 
structural and constitutional, the effect is a reduced ability to evaluate the work of the 
prosecution service or hold it accountable—and with that, a likely reduction in its ef-
fectiveness and efficiency, as a low level of concern for and protection of the value of 
accountability is normally associated with lowered effectiveness.236
Analyzing statistics comparatively across different systems is generally too uncertain 
to yield confident, scientific results.237 However, it is certainly possible to make mean-
ingful internal assessments, and indeed this is the very purpose of keeping statistics. 
Logically, statistical indicators ought to measure the service’s performance in fulfill-
ing whatever tasks society has set for it, along with internal processes ancillary to 
those tasks. One can also use statistics to examine attributes of the system as a whole 
in terms of productivity—such as the speed with which prosecutors close complex 
cases—or to consider regional variations in implementing the goals set for the pros-
ecution service. The proper selection of statistical indicators is therefore not simply a 
technical exercise; it is a function of the social and political consensus about what the 
role of the prosecution service ought to be.238
235 More broadly, within the European Union there are strong objections to any data collection that 
might compromise the strong normative system of personal data protection.
236 A partial indication of the low level of effectiveness of Italy’s prosecution service can be found in the 
annual reports on the administration of justice issued by the Supreme Court of Cassation. These 
reports consistently indicate that a very high percentage of the perpetrators of crimes remain un-
identified and unpunished: some 80 percent of all reported crimes—including  95 percent of thefts, 
80 percent of robberies, and 50 percent of homicides—go unsolved,.
237 For example, German prosecutors’ offices handle many more cases in total than other European 
countries, because all cases must go through the prosecutor’s office. In other countries, if the iden-
tity of the perpetrator cannot be determined, a case will never leave the police; in Germany, even 
cases with unidentified perpetrators are sent to the prosecutor’s office for review and, if necessary, 
further investigation. This results in Germany having a much higher rate of unsolved cases per 
prosecutor, but this cannot be taken to mean that the Prosecution Services are less efficient. Instead, 
efficiency is measured internally according to the duration of cases; still, even these statistics say 
nothing about the complexity of the cases involved—and the statistics are not publicized. Similarly, 
high rates of conviction are not reliable indicators of efficiency, especially in jurisdictions (like the 
United States) in which prosecutors have considerable discretion to choose which cases they will 
pursue and in which plea-bargaining effectively weeds out less-substantiated cases.
238 See Vera Institute of Justice, Measuring Progress toward Safety and Justice: A Global Guide to the 
Design of Performance Indicators across the Justice Sector (2003), available at http://www.vera.org/
publication_pdf/207_404.pdf.
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I. General Issues1
With the adoption of a new Constitution in 1991, the Bulgarian Prosecution Service 
was granted a high level of autonomy by the Constitution, with neither the execu-
tive nor Parliament having any power over personnel decisions, prosecution priori-
ties, or individual prosecutions. Those powers rested with the Prosecutor General, 
with some limited control given to the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), a new body 
created by the Constitution to manage the careers of judges, prosecutors, and in-
vestigators (collectively considered “magistrates”).2 Significant guarantees were also 
provided to individual prosecutors to protect their independence, such as life tenure, 
limited disciplinary measures, and barriers against criminal prosecution. This high 
level of autonomy of the prosecution service and individual guarantees were created 
as a means to achieve two goals: first, to protect the public from politically motivated 
prosecutions, and second, to guarantee the service the freedom to investigate and 
prosecute those in power. The unchallenged assumption was that once the Prosecu-
tion Service and individual prosecutors were left on their own, they would follow 
only the law and would not be influenced by political or other improper consider-
ations and biases.
The authors of the new Constitution were not concerned with the accountability of 
the Prosecution Service, believing that what mattered most was the full indepen-
dence of the service. As a result, no accountability mechanisms for the Prosecutor 
General were introduced, and accountability mechanisms for individual prosecutors 
on the authority of the Supreme Judicial Council remained rather weak. Over the 
years, this basic constitutional assumption was proved wrong. The Supreme Judicial 
Council proved too weak or unwilling, because of personal and institutional loyalties, 
to exercise any meaningful control over the Prosecution Service, while evidence of 
inefficiency and abuse of power mounted. As a result of the complete independence 
of the system, the Supreme Judicial Council felt no pressure at all, no matter how 
negative the public’s perception of the system, to exercise meaningful control and 
pursue policies that would guarantee non-corrupt, effective criminal investigation 
and prosecution. Instead, a culture of nepotism, institutional loyalties, and lack of 
respect for the public interest became dominant in the work of the Supreme Judicial 
1 In discussing the structure and role of the Prosecution Service, it is important to note that there has 
been little academic literature evaluating the work of the Service, and no empirical research. This 
is true both because the institution is highly protective of information on its activities, and because 
there is no academic tradition of empirical research in this area. My sources for this report include 
legislation, judicial decisions, newspaper articles, European Union reports, and my personal expe-
rience as a lawyer. The highly political nature of the debate over the Prosecution Service adds to the 
difficulty of critiquing it in a way that would be broadly accepted. However, this report has tried to 
incorporate generally accepted public views on the issue.
2 For detailed discussion of the SJC, see Sec. 4.5 below.
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
84
Council over the years. The first Prosecutor General elected after the adoption of the 
Constitution notoriously remarked that only God was above him. There were practi-
cally no disciplinary or criminal proceedings against prosecutors.
The system also failed in both its declared goals, namely prosecution of individuals in 
power and guaranteeing against politically motivated prosecution. Despite widespread 
corruption in government, few investigations or prosecutions of politicians took place, 
and practically no investigations or prosecutions of high-level government officials. 
The dominant pattern was to investigate or prosecute politicians who were no lon-
ger in positions of power, and even in those cases, prosecutions were not effective. 
Not only did abuses of power go completely unsanctioned, but expectations that no 
political considerations would play a role in prosecution decision making, the pri-
mary goal of the new system, were proved wrong. The timing and substance of in-
vestigations and prosecutions on numerous occasions demonstrated clear political 
motivation, with the Prosecution Service changing its tacit alliances with parties or 
individual politicians depending on circumstances and personalities. The overriding 
purpose of such alliances from the Prosecution Service’s perspective was to influence 
legislation, with a view to preserving prosecutorial powers and the autonomy of the 
service. In pursuing those goals, the service proved to be an effective political actor.
The status of prosecutors, the autonomous character of the Prosecution Service, and 
the need for reform began to be publicly discussed in the mid-1990s, amidst grow-
ing discontent with the service. There was, however, no general consensus on the 
course of the reform within the academic community or among legal profession-
als or politicians, beyond agreement that the criminal justice system was not func-
tioning properly and that reform was needed. At various points, different political 
parties promoted reform proposals, but due to a lack of conceptual agreement, the 
complicated procedure for amending the Constitution, and the absence of majori-
ties in Parliament that commanded support across the political spectrum, no major 
reform of the Prosecution Service took place. Instead, the political consensus was 
one of incremental reform, with minor amendments of the rules and powers of ap-
pointment, promotion, and disciplining of prosecutors, and some amendments to 
criminal procedure. The decision of the Parliamentary majority elected in 2005 to 
take such an approach was influenced by its belief that the problems were largely 
due to a defective choice of Prosecutor General. The appointment of a new Prosecu-
tor General was forthcoming in 2006, and it was widely expected that the new person 
would change the institutional culture of the service. Parliament introduced procedural 
accountability within the criminal process. Strict time limits on the duration of investi-
gations were set. Certain powers of the Prosecution Service within the criminal process 
were transferred to the courts, and judicial review of the decision not to prosecute was 
introduced, as well as a judicial procedure to terminate excessively lengthy criminal 
investigations.
The lack of any results in investigating and prosecuting corruption in government 
and organized crime made criminal justice reform the number one issue in the EU 
accession process. Reform of the criminal justice system has also been an extreme-
ly hot political issue domestically. As a result of EU pressure, three constitutional 
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amendments have been passed in recent years, one in 2003, one in 2006 and one in 
2007. These amendments have limited the immunity of prosecutors from criminal 
prosecution, reformulated the powers of the Prosecution Service, amended the pow-
ers of the Minister of Justice, changed tenure rules, and created an oversight body 
in the Supreme Judicial Council, elected by Parliament. Numerous changes in the 
legislation regulating the justice system have also been adopted, aimed at establishing 
a more transparent Supreme Judicial Council, clear standards for the evaluation and 
competitive appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors, and effective 
disciplinary procedures. Continuous EU pressure has also resulted in the appoint-
ment of more reform minded individuals to the Supreme Judicial Council and, most 
importantly, a reform minded Prosecutor General in early 2006. This has resulted in 
some positive developments, although it is too soon to judge their long term effect.
Most notably, a genuine process of investigation and prosecution of abuses by indi-
vidual prosecutors was begun. For the first time since the establishment of the justice 
system in 1991, publicly announced inquiries into the work of individual prosecu-
tion offices have been carried out, with the result that some negative practices have 
been publicly reported and disciplinary and criminal investigations initiated against 
individual prosecutors.
II. Structure and Organization of the Prosecution Service
2.1. Internal structure
The institutional organization of the Prosecution Service is determined in part by the 
Constitution and in part by parliamentary legislation. This legislation largely repli-
cates the basic highly-centralized organizational principles of the Prosecution Ser-
vice in the communist period.3 
The Prosecution Service’s organizational structure mirrors the courts, with a pros-
3 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria; Prosecution Service Act, St. Gaz. No. 87/1980,              
amended by St. Gaz. Nos. 46/1991 and 100/1992, repealed by Judicial System Act (1994). In the 
immediate transition period, special legislation was adopted on the Prosecution Service Act; later 
the Service was regulated by the Judicial System Act, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994. The current legislation    
describes the Prosecution Service as follows: “The Prosecution Service is unified and centralized. 
Every prosecutor is subordinate to the respectively higher ranking prosecutor and all of them to the 
Prosecutor General.” Judicial System Act, Art. 112. 
 There has been much debate on the significance of this continuity. Critics of the current Service 
blame its problems on over-centralization and the power of higher-level prosecutors to intervene 
in individual cases. Others consider centralization to be crucial to the work of a prosecution service 
and fear the discrepancies decentralization would cause. The latter view has prevailed in this de-
bate, and recent reforms have not challenged the hierarchical structure of the Prosecution Service.
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ecution office attached to each court.4 Following the reforms of the 1990s,5 the courts 
were organized into a four-tier system: district trial courts (raionni), county courts 
(okruzhni) (these double as trial courts for some crimes, and function as appel-
late courts for cases tried before the district courts), appellate courts, and supreme 
courts—the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court. 
Prosecution offices are organized in a parallel system: there are 112 district (raionni) 
prosecution offices, 28 county (okruzhni) prosecution offices, 5 appellate prosecution 
offices (apelativni), 5 county military prosecution offices, one appellate military pros-
ecution office, and the Supreme Cassation Prosecution Office.6 The entire Prosecu-
tion Service is headed by a Prosecutor General nominated by the Supreme Judicial 
Council and appointed by the President for a term of seven years.7  
Prosecution offices include both administrative staff and prosecutors, but the size 
of different prosecution offices differs substantially, depending on the population of 
their respective territories. Offices at the first two levels—district and county offices—
are in direct contact with police investigators and the Investigation Service. District 
prosecutors work predominantly with police investigators, while county prosecutors 
work exclusively with the Investigation Service’s corresponding county office (okru-
zhna sledstvena ).8 As a rule, prosecutors are not specialized, although in some larger 
offices efforts are under way to increase efficiency through the creation of specialized 
units dealing with organized crime. Upon the advice of an EU-sponsored advisory 
team from the Prosecution Service of Bavaria, Germany, six separate units have been 
created within the “Investigation Department” of the Supreme Cassation Prosecu-
tion Office, three of them in response to the policy priorities “Organized Crime,” 
“Corruption,” and “Economic Crimes.”9 The new Prosecutor General has also been 
supportive of such developments and ordered the creation of a specialized unit on 
4 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 126, § 1.
5 The four levels of courts are described in the Judicial System Act, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994. Chapter IV,                  
Art. 37-100 were introduced in 1994 with a view to amendment of the procedural, civil and crimi-
nal codes. The Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court were created            
in December 1996, and appellate courts were created in April 1998. In 1998 amendments to the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, St. Gaz. No. 21/1998, and the Code of Civil Procedure, St. Gaz. No.             
127/1997, created three levels of judicial proceedings: trial, appeal on facts and law, and cassation              
appeal on issues of law only. Prior to these procedural amendments, which changed the grounds for          
appeal and the review powers of the courts on appeal, the new courts applied the old procedures. 
 Under the current system, if a case starts in the district courts, the first appeal is before the county 
court and the second before the Supreme Court of Cassation. If the case starts in the county court, 
the first appeal is before the appellate court, and the second appeal is before the Supreme Court of 
Cassation. In administrative matters, final appeal is to the Supreme Administrative Court. Prosecu-
tors are also parties to administrative cases. 
6 The Supreme Administrative Court operates as court of cassation in the area of administrative 
jurisdiction carried out by ordinary courts, and exercises original jurisdiction assigned to it by the 
Supreme Administrative Court Act. An administrative court system is currently being created.
7 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 129 § 2. The President may refuse to appoint 
an individual nominated by the Supreme Judicial Council, but if the Council nominates the same 
person a second time, the President must appoint him. 
8 There are also 28 county Investigation Services, matching the number of county courts and              
prosecution offices. For recent changes in the role of the Investigation Services, see below, Sec. 4.4.               
9 Report on the Activities of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1999 – February 2006,,< 
http://www.prb.bg/>.
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“Countering Organized Crime and Corruption” shortly after his appointment.10
The hierarchical structure of the Prosecution Service is mirrored in the powers of 
higher-ranking prosecutors in individual cases. There are no rules or procedures 
for assigning cases; the head of each respective prosecution office assigns cases11. 
A higher-ranking prosecutor in the chain of command has full power to intervene 
in any case, as well as the power to replace prosecutors on individual cases.12 Such 
interventions usually only take place on appeal of a lower-level prosecutor’s decision, 
however. Only instructions in writing from a higher prosecutor to a subordinate 
prosecutor are mandatory, oral instructions being considered a violation of an indi-
vidual prosecutor’s independence. Still, oral instructions are in fact given, although it 
is difficult to estimate how widespread this practice is.13 
Hierarchical control is also exercised through the appeal process. Prosecutors’ deci-
sions are subject to appeal to the next level; thus decisions of a prosecutor from a dis-
trict office can be appealed before the county office, appellate office and the Supreme 
Cassation Prosecution Office, providing in each instance an indirect check or control 
on prosecutors’ decisions.
2.2. Budgeting process
The Judicial Authority has a constitutionally guaranteed independent budget,14 
which includes the budgets of the Prosecution Service, the courts and the Investiga-
tion Service. Each year, the Supreme Judicial Council files a budget proposal with 
Parliament along with a financial report for the previous year,15 but Parliament rou-
tinely approves a parallel proposal drafted by the Ministry of Finance and submitted 
by the Council of Ministers, which in past years was often little more than half the 
budget proposed by the Supreme Judicial Council.16 As a result, the Judicial Author-
10 See Administrative Order 905 of Mar. 23, 2006 of the Prosecutor General, <http://www.prb.bg/>.
11 This approach has been criticized and draft legislation pending in Parliament provides for a system 
of computerized automatic assignment of cases, copying the approach taken by the courts.
12 Judicial System Act, Art. 116, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994,         last amended by St. Gaz. No. 133/1998, reads: “A 
higher ranking prosecutor may perform any action within the competency of his subordinate pros-
ecutors, and repeal or suspend in writing their rulings where provided for by law. Instructions in 
writing of a higher prosecutor are mandatory for his subordinate prosecutors.” The trend towards 
specialization among prosecutors, noted above, may introduce new complications into the system 
of superior intervention. 
13 Surveys of judges and prosecutors suggest that such informal influence does take place. As they are 
considered a violation of prosecutorial independence, such cases tend to become known only when 
a prosecutor protects himself by publicizing the incident in the media.   
14 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 117, § 3 (“[T]he judicial branch of govern-
ment shall have an independent budget.”).
15 Judicial System Act, Art. 196, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
16 For example, for 2002 the Supreme Judicial Council proposed a budget of 208 million Lev (approx.                
EUR 104 million). The Minister of Finance initially made a budget proposal to the Cabinet of 106 
million Lev (approx. EUR 53 million). After members of the Supreme Judicial Council lobbied the 
Prime Minister, he agreed to an increase of 15 million Lev, or a total of 122 million Lev (approx.            
EUR 62 million), which is the amount the Council of Ministers submitted to Parliament and which 
Parliament ultimately approved.
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ity was significantly under-funded. However, as a result of EU criticism, funding for 
the justice system has increased significantly since 2002. Thus the budget of the entire 
justice system was 97 million Lev (2 Lev = 1 EUR) for 2001 and 122 million Lev for 
2002. The justice system’s budget has since grown rapidly, to a total budget of 313 
million Lev for 2007. This represents an increase of roughly 275% over 5 years, with 
inflation for the same period roughly 25%. 
The Prosecution Service did not have a separate budget until 2002; instead, Parlia-
ment adopted a joint budget for the courts, the prosecution, and the investigative 
agencies. In 2002, Parliament voted a separate budget for the prosecution, 30 million 
Lev out of the total budget of 122 million, and has continued to do so since.17 
Parliament specifies funding levels for the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme 
Administrative Court, the Prosecution Service, and the Investigation Service in the 
Annual Budget Act; the Supreme Judicial Council then allocates these funds within 
the guidelines Parliament has specified.18  The Council’s decision-making about al-
location of resources is not public, but apparently there have been tensions over al-
location within the Council.19 There is no public review of the parliamentary budget 
process; indeed, publicly available financial reports do not itemize the expenses of 
different institutions, courts, investigative agencies, and so on, but instead provide a 
total figure for the entire justice system.20 Control over spending of the Judicial Au-
thority’s budget is exercised by the Supreme Judicial Council and the Audit Cham-
ber,21 which reports on its findings to Parliament. The Audit Chamber has found ir-
regularities with respect to the courts—though with little actual effect—but has never 
reported irregularities with respect to the Prosecution Service. 
Approximately 20 percent of the overall budget of the Judicial Authority is normally 
reserved for the Prosecution Service, with 45-50 percent for the courts and 20 per-
cent for the Investigative Services (the remainder includes investments, buildings, 
training institutes, and the like). The Prosecution Service’s budget for 2007 was 84 
17 See infra note 22.
18 Until 1998, Parliament voted separate budget guidelines for the Supreme Court, the lower courts, 
and the Prosecution and Investigation Services. Between 1999 and 2001, Parliament did not specify 
separate budget guidelines, leaving it to the Supreme Judicial Council to allocate funding to each 
institution. Beginning with the 2002 budget, Parliament again specified funding for separate insti-
tutions within the Judicial Authority. See, e.g., Annual Budget Act for the Year 2002, St. Gaz. No. 
111/2001 [hereinafter “Annual Budget”].
 Technically, the Supreme Judicial Council therefore would seem to have allocatory discretion only 
over the lower courts’ budgets. In reality, however, the SJC also possesses a degree of discretion with 
regard to the higher courts. This stems, first of all, from its discretion over common expenses such 
as capital investments and equipment, and second of all, from its power to determine additional 
salary payments. The SJC determines the salaries of judges and prosecutors, which is decisive for 
each year’s budget. It may also reconsider those decisions in light of the budget it receives from 
Parliament. Ministry of Finance reports suggest that every year, the SJC spends more than planned,              
and the government is apparently willing to cover this.
19 Information from author’s discussions with SJC members.
20 Thus the report for 2004 states expenses of 249 million, while the total budget is 230 million. This sug-
gests that the SJC has more discretion in allocating funds than indicated by the budget itself, and that a 
process of negotiation occurs both with the executive and within the SJC between the various institutions. 
21 The Audit Chamber is an independent institution that reports to Parliament and is empowered to               
audit every government institution.
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million Lev (EUR 42 millon), out of a total justice system budget of 313 million 
Lev. 22 About 70 percent of the Prosecution Service’s budget—like that of the Judicial 
Authority as a whole—is spent on personnel costs: salaries, unemployment benefits, 
health insurance, and other compensation.23 Thus decisions concerning the num-
ber of prosecutors and support personnel (which are made by the Supreme Judicial 
Council) largely determine funding priorities.24 
2.3. The status of the prosecutor general
According to the Constitution, the Prosecutor General is nominated by the Supreme 
Judicial Council in a secret vote and appointed to a seven-year term by the President, 
who may not reject a second nomination by the Council.25 Members of the Council may 
propose nominees to the Council, but five members must support the nomination.26 
There have been three Prosecutor Generals under the current constitutional dispen-
sation, and all choices appear to have been strongly influenced by political consider-
ations.27 There were several candidates for the second appointment, which was made 
in 1999. In none of the cases was there public debate, and no candidate made public 
commitments to particular policies. Transparency has not been a feature of this sys-
tem, which allows political deals that do not necessarily reflect the public interest. 
The third Prosecutor General was elected in January 2006. His election demonstrat-
ed once again that a great deal of deal-making occurred, while the public saw only 
a staged performance. Several months before the election, politicians of all stripes 
began discussing the process and supporting one or another potential candidate 
22 The Service’s budget has increased over the last few years: 2001: 30 million, 2002: 30 million, 2003:                 
27 million, 2004: 44 million, 2005: 51 million, 2006: 58 million, and 2007: 84 million. The 2007 
increase is in part a result of the expanded functions of the prosecution service under the 2006 
Criminal Procedure Code.
23 According to the financial director of the Supreme Judicial Council, although some budgets might              
suggest even higher personnel costs.     
24 See Annual Budget, supra note 18. Increases in personnel have been justified by a substantial in-
crease in the caseload since the mid-1990s, when there was a surge in the number of criminal 
charges filed with the courts:
 year     cases heard
1996 14,000
1997 18,000
1998 23,000
1999 below 25,000
2001 above 30,000
2002 above 30,000
25 The President may refuse to appoint a nominee once, but if he is re-nominated his appointment is 
automatic. Judicial System Act, Art. 27 § 1(1), St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.   
26 Judicial System Act, Art. 28, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
27 The appointment of the first two Prosecutor Generals was influenced by the Union of Democratic 
Forces, the major political opponent of the Socialist Party, which was able to influence the vote 
through the members of the Council elected by Parliament.
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for Prosecutor General, while candidates began to position themselves. The Presi-
dent gave interviews describing the background and qualities a Prosecutor General 
should have, clearly indicating which of the potential candidates he would not sup-
port. Meetings took place within the ruling coalition.28 The candidate was chosen 
Prosecutor General within a few days, after a hearing before the Supreme Judicial 
Council that lasted less than an hour and at which few questions were asked. Later, the 
President publicly admitted that appointing the ex-Prosecutor General ambassador to 
Kazakhstan, something for which he was strongly criticized, was an unavoidable com-
promise he and the government had to make to ensure the new Prosecutor General’s 
election. 29  
Thus in reality, it may be said that all three Prosecutors General have in fact been 
selected by the government in power at the time and approved by the SJC. This is 
abetted by the fact that elections have so far involved a president and Parliament of 
the same party. Since the SJC is appointed by the respective majority in Parliament 
and the Government has other mechanisms of influencing members for the SJC, it is 
willing to go along. 
The Prosecutor General heads the Prosecution Service and has very broad powers 
over its activities, in terms both of career development of individual prosecutors and 
of decision-making in individual cases. 
The Prosecutor General reports to the Supreme Judicial Council, but the Council 
has little clear authority to hold the Prosecutor General accountable in any meaning-
ful way. For example, the Supreme Judicial Council’s response to a series of allega-
tions of prosecutorial malfeasance have not been effective. In December 2002, after 
an investigation in the course of which a number of investigators and prosecutors 
were questioned, the Council attempted to censure the Prosecutor General, voting 
thirteen to nine in favor of a declaration of no confidence and calling on the Pros-
ecutor General to resign.30 The Prosecutor General ignored the entire proceedings 
before the Council: He did not attend the deliberations or comment in public on the 
Council’s declaration, and in fact simply ignored it. In fact, until recently the Council 
had no authority to remove the Prosecutor General, and there was no disciplinary, 
criminal, or administrative procedure to investigate the Prosecutor General for al-
leged wrongdoing.31 
28 The president apparently lobbied for his legal advisor, Boris Velchev, who in the end was elected.
29 For media commentary, see, for example, Velchev is the Only Nominee for Prosecutor General. The 
Opposition Appalled by the Political Interference and the Obedience of the Supreme Judicial Council, 
Mediapool, Jan. 18, 2006.
30 The Council’s vote followed a number of proceedings held by the Council examining allegations of               
improper management and abuses of power by the Prosecutor General and his immediate subor-
dinates. Allegations included withdrawing prosecutors and investigators from cases for refusing to 
follow oral instructions. 
31 The amendments to the Judicial System Act of April 2004 allow five members of the Council to 
request that the Council strip the Prosecutor General of his immunity. However, the Constitutional 
Court declared a similar provision (allowing the Presidents of the two Supreme Courts and the Min-
ister of Justice jointly to propose to the Council that a magistrate be stripped of his immunity and 
suspended) contrary to the constitutional provision that the prosecution service shall bring criminal 
charges. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 14 January 1999. In light of this ruling, it is difficult 
Report on the Bulgarian Prosecution Service
91
Even in those areas in which the Supreme Judicial Council could legitimately act to 
restrain the Prosecutor General, it has not done so. Only on a few occasions has the 
Council refused to defer to a proposal by the Prosecutor General for appointment of 
a prosecutor, for example.32 In his power to nominate, the Prosecutor General can 
occasionally be stopped, but in general he gets what he wants. 
2.4. The status of individual prosecutors
The basic constitutional and legal guarantees of prosecutors’ personal independence are 
expressed in the mechanisms determining their professional career path and in their 
permanent tenure and immunity from prosecution (considered in the next section).
A prosecutor on a standard career path begins in a district prosecution office and 
moves up the hierarchy. Prosecutors are civil servants with standard promotion sched-
ules based on seniority. As noted, prosecutors are appointed, promoted, demoted, re-
assigned, and dismissed by the Supreme Judicial Council.33 However, although there 
are certain formal criteria (such as Bulgarian citizenship, a clean criminal record, a 
university education in law, and completion of a legal traineeship34), initial appoint-
ment and later promotion have not been based on clear criteria or formal evaluation 
of performance, and to date there have been no national recruitment competitions. 
Recent amendments, however, have introduced an open competition for entry into 
the system and performance evaluation for later promotion.
Instead, heads of prosecution offices have until now selected candidates for their of-
fices and submitted them to the Supreme Judicial Council,35 which, lacking detailed 
information on candidates or independent means to evaluate them, generally follows 
the proposals. Likewise, the Prosecutor General selects candidates for all prosecutor 
positions within the Supreme Cassation Office and for heads of prosecution offices 
and submits them to the Council,36 where they are generally approved. Members of 
the Council and the Minister of Justice also have the right to nominate prosecutors, 
but in practice do not do so.37
Higher positions with the county and appellate prosecution offices or as heads of 
offices require a certain length of professional legal experience.38 After five years, a 
to see how the new procedure will function or how it could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
32 The Council has also been unable to carry out disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors without              
the approval of the Prosecutor General. In one such case, the Council opened disciplinary proceed-
ings against prosecutor Nikolay Kolev, but Kolev refused to appear before the Council, and the 
Council was not empowered to take any measures to compel or discipline him. 
33 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria , Art. 129 (1); Judicial System Act, Art. 27(1),4, St. 
Gaz. No. 59/1994.
34 The law also requires that the candidate has “necessary professional and moral integrity[.]” Judicial 
System Act, Art. 126, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
35 Judicial System Act, Art. 30 § 1 (3-7), St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.           
36 Judicial System Act, Art. 30 § 1 (3-7), St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.           
37 In May 2004, new heads were appointed for all appellate prosecution offices, all of whom were                
nominated by the Prosecutor General.     
38 Judicial System Act, Art. 132 §§ 1-7, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994. Regional Prosecutor–5 years, appellate                
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prosecutor who receives a positive evaluation by the Supreme Judicial Council is 
granted life tenure. The Constitution initially provided for a three-year probationary 
period in office, after which the prosecutor would receive automatic life tenure and 
could be removed from office only “upon retirement, resignation, upon the enforce-
ment of a prison sentence for a deliberate crime, or upon lasting actual disability to 
perform their functions over more than one year.”39 Criticisms of magistrates being 
untouchable, as it were, and concerns about a lack of effective disciplinary responses to 
abuses of power, corruption, and poor professional performance, led to a constitutional 
amendment in 2003 lengthening the probationary period and making it subject to a 
positive evaluation of the magistrate’s performance by the Supreme Judicial Council.40
While in office, prosecutors are not allowed to hold any other public office, whether 
elected or appointed, in any state or municipal agency or company. Prosecutors are 
also prohibited from practicing law as advocates or providing legal advice outside 
their official capacity.41 They are also barred from engaging in any commercial or 
other economic or profit-making activities; this includes membership of managing 
of supervisory boards of private companies or contractual services.42 
However, a prosecutor may still pursue a political career, as magistrates may suspend 
their duties while taking elected or appointed government jobs and are guaranteed 
their positions as magistrates when they return;43 time spent in public office, for 
which legal education is required, is also considered to be professional legal expe-
rience towards requirements for promotion.44 Thus it is possible for magistrates to 
serve in elected or appointed offices without necessarily jeopardizing their profes-
sional careers. Nonetheless, prosecutors may not be members of political parties, 
organizations, movements, or coalitions with political aims while serving.45 Conse-
quently, although prosecutors as well as other magistrates can run for political office, 
in reality this does not take place.
A prosecutor may be transferred to a job in a different location, either as a temporary 
measure, called “commissioning,” or as a disciplinary measure, called “reassignment.” 
Reassignment may be imposed for up to three years, and takes place in accordance 
with disciplinary procedures. A head of office may order a prosecutor to accept a 
commission in another office for up to three months within a given year, as the need 
prosecutor–8 years, Supreme Court prosecutor–12 years. 
39 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria , Art. 129(3), repealed St. Gaz. No. 79/2003 (2003).
40 The legislation bringing the Judicial System Act into conformity with the Constitution was adopted              
in April 2004.   
41 Judicial System Act, Art. 132 § 1, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.            
42 Academic research and teaching are the only exceptions to the overall ban on outside activities. A                
prosecutor may be a member of an NGO, but only if the NGO does not participate in any “economic 
activities.” Publishing and selling books would be considered an economic activity.  Judicial System 
Act, Art. 132 § 1(4), St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.       
43 The Election of Members of Parliament Act, Art. 52, stipulates that those running for Parliament               
must suspend performance of their duties in public service and, if elected, may, after the expiry of 
their term,  be reinstated in their previous position.
44 Judicial System Act, Art. 127 § 6, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994,           amended by St. Gaz. No. 39/2006.
45 Judicial System Act, Art. 12, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.        
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arises;46 longer or more frequent commissions require the prosecutor’s consent.47
While normal statutory retirement ages are 60 years of age for men and 55 ½ for 
women, a special mandatory retirement age for prosecutors of 65 years of age was in-
troduced with amendments to the Judicial System Act in 2004.48 Prosecutors may con-
tinue to work after retirement age at the discretion of the respective head of office.
Salaries and other benefits are determined by the Supreme Judicial Council.49 Salary 
levels were relatively low in the mid 1990s, but have been gradually increased to lev-
els that make prosecution jobs attractive and guarantee sufficient numbers of appli-
cants.50 For example, the entry-level salary of a regional prosecutor is set at twice the 
average salary of other civil servants.51 The Prosecutor General’s remuneration is set by 
law at 90 percent of the remuneration of the President of the Constitutional Court.52
2.5. Individual accountability of prosecutors
Prosecutors cannot be personally sued for damages resulting from actions per-
formed in their official capacity, being civilly liable only for deliberate criminal acts.53 
Prosecutors are criminally liable for any actions outside their official capacity and 
for deliberate crimes in their official capacity; for crimes committed in their official 
capacity, no charges can be brought without the approval of the Supreme Judicial 
Council.54 A prosecutor also may not be detained without the permission of the Su-
preme Judicial Council, unless arrested at the scene of the crime.55 The Prosecutor 
General or five members of the Council may file a request to the Supreme Judicial 
Council to lift the immunity of a prosecutor.
However, these provisions governing immunity have only been in effect since April 
2004, and so examples of prosecutors being held criminally liable have been very 
rare, as previously it was practically impossible to investigate and charge a prosecutor.56 
46 Judicial System Act, Art. 130, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
47 The Union of Bulgarian Jurists and several individual prosecutors have raised concerns that com-             
missioning is used as a sort of disciplinary measure outside the normal procedures.
48 Judicial System Act, Art. 131 § 1, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994, amended by St. Gaz. No. 29/2004.
49 Judicial System Act, Art. 27 § 1 (5), St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.           
50 In the 1990s, many magistrates were leaving the profession for better-paid private practice. Al-             
though there is no official data, the author’s observations suggest that this trend reversed in the late 
1990s. Competition for the job of prosecutor is now quite intense. 
51 Judicial System Act, Art. 139 §§ 1-3.
52 That is, it is equal to the remuneration of a regular judge in the Constitutional Court. In the Con-
stitutional Court Act, the remuneration of the president of this Court is determined in correlation 
with the remuneration of the President of the Republic and the Speaker of Parliament. 
53 All magistrates “are exempt from civil and criminal liability for acts and omissions in the exercise 
of their judicial functions unless the act constitutes a deliberate criminal offense.” Judicial System 
Act, Art. 134, amended by St. Gaz. No. 29/2004). Lawsuits can be brought against the Prosecution       
Service, but in practice such suits have been limited almost exclusively to claims for damages for 
unsuccessful prosecution.
54 Judicial System Act, Art. 134 § 2, amended by St. Gaz. No. 29/2004.
55 Judicial System Act, Art. 134 § 3, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994,           last amended by St. Gaz. No. 86/2006.   
56 Previously, prosecutors enjoyed the same immunity as members of Parliament: they had absolute             
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Disciplinary proceedings can be initiated by the relevant head of office, the Minister 
of Justice, or five members of the Supreme Judicial Council.57 Disciplinary proceed-
ings are held by a five-member disciplinary panel established by the Council from its 
own members chosen by lot.58 Proposals for disciplinary measures are served upon 
the prosecutor concerned, who may present a written reply within two weeks; other 
written and oral evidence may also be collected and heard and the prosecutor may at-
tend the hearing of the panel and be represented by a lawyer.59 The disciplinary panel 
draws a conclusion and recommends disciplinary measures to the full Council.60 The 
decision of the Council in disciplinary proceedings may be appealed to the Supreme 
Administrative Court.61
The original disciplinary system came under sharp criticism for, among other things, 
not allowing removal of magistrates under any conditions: all had life tenure and 
faced only mild disciplinary sanctions. Meanwhile, reports surfaced of prosecuto-
rial misconduct, including possible links between prosecutors and organized crime,62 
along with sociological research indicating the existence of corruption within the 
judicial system in general and the Prosecution Service in particular.63 In April 2004, 
the laws were amended to reflect the widely accepted need for a more effective dis-
ciplinary process for magistrates. These amendments followed 2003 Constitutional 
amendments allowing tenured magistrates (including the Prosecutor General and 
the presidents of the Supreme Courts) to be removed from office by the Supreme 
Judicial Council for “serious infringement or systematic neglect of their official duties, 
as well as actions undermining the prestige of the Judiciary.”64 The Judicial System Act 
of April 2004 laid down a list of disciplinary sanctions, namely warning, reprimand, 
demotion either in rank or in office (for both prosecutors and judges, rank has an effect 
on salary, while office has an effect on the job they perform), and removal from office. 
immunity from criminal prosecution for minor offenses and could be investigated and prosecuted 
for serious offenses (a serious offense is defined as a crime punishable by imprisonment of more  
than five years, Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 93 § 7) only after the Supreme Judicial Council 
had lifted their immunity. These arrangements were the source of widespread criticism and were 
changed by Constitutional amendment in 2003.
57 Judicial System Act, Art. 172, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
58 Judicial System Act, Art. 33, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
59 Judicial System Act, Art. 178, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
60 Judicial System Act, Art. 181, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
61 Judicial System Act, Art. 184, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
62 In a presentation at a conference in Sofia on May 23, 2004 on the fight against corruption, for                  
example, the Prosecutor General expressed concerns about the influence of organized crime on            
individual prosecutors. 
63 According to the Corruption Assessment Report 2000 prepared by Coalition 2000. The European             
Commission Regular Report 2000 pointed out that “according to several surveys . . . customs, the 
police and the judicial branch are considered to be the most corrupt professions in Bulgaria.”           
64 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 129 § 3, amended by St. Gaz. No. 85/2003.. 
The full list of grounds for the removal of a magistrate according to the amendments is:
1. having reached 65 years of age;       
2. resignation;
3. entry into force of a final sentence imposing imprisonment for an intentional criminal 
offense; 
4. permanent de facto inability to perform their duties for more than a year;
5.  serious infringement or systematic neglect of their official duties, as well as actions undermining 
the prestige of the Judiciary.
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These developments removed the procedural barriers to individual accountability 
of prosecutors. However, the lack of an effective disciplinary process resulted not 
only from procedural deficiencies, but from a lack of accountability in the system 
as a whole. No matter what evidence of abuse of power arises, no matter what the 
public feels, the system does not come under any pressure, as it is completely iso-
lated from the voters. Thus corporate loyalty remains most important, and there is 
no will within the Supreme Judicial Council to investigate and enforce discipline, as 
two steps taken by the SJC following the amendments of April 2004 clearly show. In 
early 2005, it voted to deny the three-member disciplinary committee the right to 
investigate wrongdoing on the part of magistrates when there is evidence of a crime, 
reasoning that, under the Constitution, only the Prosecution Service has such pow-
ers. It also decided to keep confidential any information about disciplinary sanctions 
until a final decision of the appeals court.
Two cases underscore the climate of corporate loyalty and disregard for the public 
interest that are the primary reason for lack of accountability. In one case, in the fall 
of 2004, an investigator was arrested by the police for allegedly receiving cash from a 
suspect in return for closing the investigation. The arrest was organized by the police, 
who were apparently tipped off by subordinates of the investigator. The two subordi-
nates publicly accused their boss and high ranking investigators and prosecutors of 
corruption. The SJC took up the case, but then came to the above-mentioned conclu-
sion that it could not investigate. Still, the investigator’s immunity from prosecution 
was lifted, and he was charged. The criminal case went nowhere. No investigation 
was ever initiated into the allegations of widespread corruption. Instead, the two 
subordinates were heavily pressured by the prosecution service and the investigative 
service, forcing one of them to resign. 
In January 2006, apparently on the instructions of the then-acting Prosecutor Gen-
eral, the five prosecutor members of the SJC submitted a report to the Council alleg-
ing that the President of the Supreme Court had intervened in individual cases and 
pressured judges to decide in favor of his friends and business contacts. He was also 
alleged to have received perks from private companies. The prosecutors presented a 
file of wiretaps, allegedly of the President of the Supreme Court discussing cases and 
promising assistance. On the same day, the President of the Supreme Court presented 
to the media a medical document, which turned out to be forged, claiming that the 
Prosecutor General suffered from paranoia. The five prosecutors on the SJC declared 
that by publishing a forged document, the President of the Supreme Court had com-
mitted a crime. The SJC scheduled a separate hearing on the matter for the day after 
the Prosecutor General’s term in office expired. The hearing was held behind closed 
doors, and all the information the public received was that the SJC (including the five 
prosecutors) had unanimously decided that there was no evidence of a crime and ac-
cepted the apology of the president of the Supreme Court for his mistake in releasing 
a forged document to the public. 
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2.6. Training
Efforts have recently been made to establish both initial training programs for newly 
recruited prosecutors and continuing training through a training center for all magis-
trates, and they have produced some positive results. With the help of foreign donors, 
a National Institute of Justice was created in 2002 as a government institution, estab-
lished by the Judicial System Act as part of the SJC.65 The law provides for mandatory 
six month training of all newly appointed judges and prosecutors.66 Participants in 
that training and outside observers have assessed this training very positively. 
III. Functions and Powers of Prosecutors 
3.1. Prosecutorial functions in criminal justice
The Prosecution Service plays a key role in all stages of criminal proceedings: open-
ing and controlling an investigation; deciding to indict or drop charges; presenting 
charges at trial; conducting appeals. The prosecutor is the leading authority in an 
investigation, with both the police and the Investigation Service obliged to follow 
prosecutorial instruction, while prosecutors are able to conduct investigations on 
their own.67 Although investigators may offer their own opinion as to whether or not 
a suspect should be indicted, this opinion has only advisory character; the prosecutor 
retains full authority to decide whether or not to proceed.68
Mandatory Prosecution and Discretion: Prosecutors have an effective monopoly over 
bringing charges in court. For a very limited number of crimes, the victim also has 
standing to bring charges to court.69 The overall number of such prosecutions is neg-
ligible, however, and even in these cases, the prosecutor may join the proceedings.70
This does not mean that prosecutors have unfettered formal discretion, however. On 
the contrary, the criminal justice system is governed by the principle of mandatory 
prosecution: prosecutors may refuse to prosecute only if the alleged act is not a crime, 
the statute of limitations has run, the potential defendant could not be otherwise held 
65 Judicial System Act, Art.35e, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
66 Judicial System Act, Art. 35, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
67 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 46 § 23 and Art. 196 § 1, St. Gaz. No. 86/2005, expressly states that                   
investigating authorities, i.e. police investigators and the Investigation Service, are placed under the            
authority of the relevant prosecutor. 
68 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 242 § 1, St. Gaz. No. 86/2005.
69 These are minor bodily injuries, certain injuries between close relatives, and criminal libel. Crimi-
nal Procedure Code, Art. 161 § 1, St. Gaz. No. 26/1968, last amended by St. Gaz. No. 86/2005.
70 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 45, St. Gaz. No. 89/1974, last amended by St. Gaz. No. 102/2006.
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criminally liable, or there is insufficient evidence to prove the charges.71 Prosecutors 
do have limited discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute if an act that oth-
erwise constitutes a criminal offense is of “minor importance” and presents a “minor 
threat to public order.”72 There are no guidelines on how this provision should be 
interpreted, and its interpretation in practice is not monitored. 
The rule of mandatory prosecution and the hierarchical structure of the Prosecution 
Service, with the possibility of appealing any decision of a lower-level prosecutor, are 
supposed to guarantee equality in law enforcement. In practice, however, there is al-
most no research on policies and decision-making regarding the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion within the Prosecution Service. This is in part due to the Bulgarian 
legal academy’s traditional focus on legal theory rather than sociological research, 
but it is also in part due to a lack of interest and support within the Service itself for 
more thorough research. Some tentative conclusions, however, are possible.
The structure of the criminal justice system, involving three separate, autonomous 
agencies, and the rule of mandatory prosecution have resulted in a system that estab-
lishes priorities and copes with excessive workloads by delaying investigations. 
This is not necessarily or solely a prosecutorial decision, as most investigation is car-
ried out by the police or Investigation Service, and prosecutors have no way of forc-
ing investigators to produce evidence. However, prosecutors can also delay a case 
by sending it back for additional investigation; such delays can eventually lead to 
dropping the case, as evidence loses its reliability or statutory limitations take ef-
fect. There has been no research on such delays, and there is no reliable data on 
the overall numbers of cases;73 there is a general understanding, however, that this 
71 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 23, St. Gaz. No. 86/2005. In a recent case at the European Court of                  
Human Rights, M.C. v Bulgaria, judgment of December 4, 2003, the Court had to review a refusal 
of the prosecution service to indict two men on charges of rape. The prosecution service ruled in 
that case that there was insufficient evidence to press charges, as there was no evidence that the 
victim, a few months short of 15 years of age, had physically resisted. The Court found a violation 
of the Convention, reasoning that such an evidentiary standard does not provide proper protection 
to victims of rape.
72 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 9 §2, St. Gaz. No. 26/1968,          last amended by St. Gaz. No. 88/2005. 
Under the law, “An act is not a crime, even if it formally meets the description of a crime,” if it is                    
insignificant and a minor threat to public safety and order. Because of the principle of mandatory 
prosecution, legal theory would deny that this is a discretionary power, arguing that the act is not a 
crime. In fact, it is a discretionary power not to prosecute that prosecutors do not use often.  A refusal 
to prosecute would usually be justified by lack of evidence that a crime was committed, without 
specifying legal grounds. There is no available statistical data on how often or on what grounds the 
prosecution drops cases. No publicly accessible data even exists on the number of decisions not to 
prosecute. The data that the Prosecution Service does publish lists the overall number of pretrial 
proceedings decided. These are most likely dropped cases, but it does not clearly say so, let alone on 
what grounds they were dropped. The overall figure for such pretrial proceedings that were decided 
was, for example, 175,627 for 2005 and 186,892 for 2004. The Prosecution Service provides these 
figures to prove how much work it does, but does not indicate what it means by “deciding pretrial 
proceedings” (other figures suggest that cases in which they decide to prosecute are not included), 
or the grounds on which cases were dropped. Data from Report on the Activities of the Prosecution 
Service of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1999 – February 2006, <http://www.prb.bg/>. 
73 The police, the Investigation Service and the Prosecution Service each only publish data on the               
numbers of cases decided in their respective institutions over limited periods of time. The number            
of cases sent back from one institution to another is not well covered, and even when covered, the 
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is a significant problem. The Prosecution Service does not provide statistics on the 
number of pending investigations, but legal practitioners often report investigations 
pending over many years.74 It is not unusual for a trivial or commonplace offense, 
such as a minor theft, to be brought to trial seven or eight years after the fact. Efforts 
to resolve this have been limited to introducing mandatory deadlines for finishing 
investigations (see below);75 however, this will not address the underlying problems 
of workload and prioritization.
Control and Accountability: As the Prosecution Service’s institutional organization 
does not allow external, political control over its operations, Parliament has sought 
to increase the Service’s procedural accountability by introducing procedural safe-
guards with respect to both suspects and victims, allowing for appeals of a decision 
not to prosecute.76 Increased accountability of the Service was first sought through 
the introduction of judicial review of the decision to terminate criminal proceed-
ings.77 Judicial review of these decisions was introduced for the first time in 1999, 
but the procedure has been amended several times since then: at first, review was 
automatic and in camera; this was changed to appeal by interested parties to all three 
levels of courts, up to the Court of Cassation; and the most recent amendments made 
these decisions subject to one level of appeal by a judge sitting in camera.78 However, 
there are no studies of decisions not to prosecute or of how successful judicial review 
of these decisions has been.
To protect the rights of suspects in cases subject to substantial delay, who might be 
tied up in legal limbo for years, neither prosecuted nor cleared of charges, Parliament 
in 2003 adopted a procedure allowing a criminal defendant to petition the court, if 
the prosecutor has not filed charges after two years, to require him to file an indict-
ment within two months; if the prosecutor fails to file an indictment by that deadline, 
the court may terminate proceedings in an in camera hearing.79
data from these institutions are not comparable.
74 One example is the case of a defendant charged with theft from a car that allegedly took place in              
1993. The investigation had been pending since then, until eventually charges were dropped in 
2005 because there was no evidence of a crime. Practicing lawyers share similar experiences. The 
problem of investigations being “forgotten” in someone’s desk drawer for years was admitted in 
2000 when, according to information provided by the police, the Investigation Services transferred 
30,000 pending investigations to the police.
75 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 222, St. Gaz. No. 79/1974, last amended by 86/2005.
76 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 237 §§ 3,4, St. Gaz. No. 79/1974, last amended by 86/2005.
77 The grounds for terminating criminal proceedings are related to the evidence and the criminal              
liability of the suspect. Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 21. Grounds for termination of proceed-             
ings include “when no crime was committed,” statutes of limitations, amnesty, and the criminal 
defendant’s unfitness to stand trial. There is no available statistical data on the grounds on which           
criminal proceedings were terminated.
78 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 237, St. Gaz. No. 79/1974, last amended by St. Gaz. No. 86/2005.
79 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 239(a) §§ 1-7,       last amended by St. Gaz. No. 50/2003). 
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3.2. Relationship with the judge at the pre-trial stage
One of the central controversies related to the powers of the Prosecution Service has 
been the issue of pre-trial detention. In 1999, following judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights in which the Court held that pre-trial detention ordered by 
a prosecutor violated the Convention,80 Parliament adopted legislative amendments 
shifting this power from prosecutors to judges. Since 1999, a prosecutor may order 
the detention of a suspect for up to 72 hours and must file a request for pre-trial 
detention with the competent court. An appeal from the court’s decision granting or 
refusing bail is available to both the prosecutor and the defendant.81 The procedure 
has since been the subject of several legislative amendments82 and is the subject of 
heated public debates.
The Prosecution Service has been lobbying to have its power to order pre-trial deten-
tion restored,83 arguing that the procedure introduced in 1999 allowed many crimi-
nals with pending investigations “to walk free.” The police have also complained that 
courts have been too lenient towards suspects in deciding on pre-trial detention. 
However, no statistical evidence has been offered to support these complaints. 
Likewise, since 1999 wiretaps and searches and seizures have been subject to prior 
judicial approval, except for emergency cases.84 Prior to the 1999  amendments, pros-
ecutors were empowered to issue search, seizure, and electronic surveillance war-
rants of their own accord. The Prosecution Service has been particularly critical of 
the current procedure on wiretap warrants, as the police may request such warrants 
directly from the courts, without informing the relevant prosecution office.85 Ac-
cording to the Prosecution Service, this also renders much of the evidence collected 
through wiretaps inadmissible due to police failure to follow proper procedures. As 
with other issues involving cross-institutional cooperation, however, diverging insti-
tutional interests and lack of trust make it difficult to overcome such lack of proper 
coordination.
80 Asenov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of Oct. 28, 1998; Nikolova v. Bulgaria, judgment of Mar. 
25, 1999.
81 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 152(a) § 11 Criminal Procedure Code, St. Gaz. No. 79/1974,              last 
amended by St. Gaz. No. 86/2005). The procedure has been amended several times, allowing for          
appeals to the Supreme Court of Cassation but later reducing it to only one level of appeal.
82 The Procedure has been amended four times: twice in 1997, in 1999 and in 2003. See Criminal 
Procedure Code, St. Gaz. No. 79/1974, last amended by St. Gaz. No. 86/2005, previously amended 
by St. Gaz. Nos. 64/1997, 95/1997, 70/1999, and 50/2003.
83 The Prosecution Service rallied significant cross-party support for amendments to the Criminal            
Procedure Code, which were approved in the last session of the outgoing Parliament in 2001. Still,        
the suggested amendment to shift the power of pre-trial detention back to prosecutors, which 
would have violated the European Convention on Human Rights, did not pass. 
84 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 111a, St. Gaz. No. 79/1974,         last amended by St. Gaz. No. 86/2005; 
Surveillance Act, Art. 18, St. Gaz. No. 95/1997, last amended by 86/2005. 
85 Surveillance Act, Art. 13, St. Gaz. No. 95/1997, last amended by 86/2005.
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3.3. Powers outside the criminal justice system
The powers of the Prosecution Service extend to administrative and civil proceedings 
as well as criminal cases. This is a legacy of the system under the communist regime, 
in which the Prosecution Service was considered a tool of law enforcement in all 
fields of law. Prosecutors take part in judicial review proceedings of administrative 
acts along with the government agency affected, and may adopt an independent posi-
tion on the dispute.86 Prosecutors also take part in some civil proceedings in which a 
government agency is sued for damages.87 Until the late 1990s, the Service also had 
the power to challenge privatization deals.88
Prosecutors also initiate proceedings for committing individuals to hospital for 
mandatory treatment and participate in proceedings for placing individuals under 
guardianship.89
IV. Relationship of the Prosecution Service  
to Other Organs of the State
4.1. The constitutional location of the prosecution service
The Republic of Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic90 that became a member of the 
European Union on January 1, 2007. Parliament consists of a single chamber whose 
members are elected to four-year terms. Parliament elects the Prime Minister and the 
other members of the Council of Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister. The 
President is head of state and is popularly elected, but has limited powers.91
86 This power derives from the fact that the prosecution service is completely independent of the 
government, and under procedural laws they have standing in the procedure on their own, not as 
representatives of government. It is quite common for the prosecution to argue that certain acts of 
government are unlawful, contrary to the government’s position.
87 State Liability for Damages Act, Art. 10 § 1, St. Gaz. No. 60/1988, last amended by 105/2005.
88 This power was taken away from the prosecution in order to ensure more efficient privatization 
procedures and because of concerns about abuse. This withdrawal of powers was criticized by some 
politicians and observers. One case demonstrating the risk of abuse was the subject of a recent 
judgment at the European Court of Human Rights, Zlínsat, spol. s r.o.v. Bulgaria, judgment of June 15, 
2006, where the Court held that such interference by the prosecutor violated the right to a fair trial.
89 Health Act, Art. 157, St. Gaz. No. 70/2004;        Civ. P. Code, Art. 275 § 1, St. Gaz. No. 12/1952.
90 The present state system dates from the adoption of a new Constitution by a special parliamentary 
Constituent Assembly specifically convened for that purpose in 1991, shortly after the collapse of 
the communist regime at the end of 1989. 
91 The President is also Commander-in-Chief and has the power to appoint a caretaker government              
if Parliament fails to elect a government, limited veto powers over parliamentary legislation, and 
the power to appoint heads of certain government services. With respect to the judicial system, the 
President appoints the presidents of the highest courts and the Prosecutor General.
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The Constitution provides for a Judicial Authority (sadebna vlast) consisting of the 
courts, the Prosecution Service (prokuratura), and the Investigation Service  (sledst-
veni organi).92 The prosecution and investigation services are thus equal parts of the 
judicial system, along with the courts; judges, prosecutors, and investigators are all 
considered members of the judiciary, referred to as magistrates, with the same con-
stitutional and statutory guarantees of independence both in their individual status 
and in the autonomous management of the courts, prosecution and investigation 
service respectively.93 The Constitution vests overall management authority with re-
spect to these three institutions in a single management body, the Supreme Judicial 
Council, which oversees the career development of magistrates and the management 
of all three institutions’ finances.94
These arrangements were influenced by the desire of the Constitution’s drafters, in 
the wake of the abuses of the Communist regime, to guarantee the independent, 
unbiased and fair administration of justice; concerns about possible abuses of 
power in opening investigations, bringing charges, and prosecuting, for example, 
led to the Constitutional provision granting the prosecution equal tenure and equal 
independence with judges. 
Concerns about the politically motivated administration of justice were not abstract, 
but quite real and immediate. Elections for a special parliamentary Constituent As-
sembly in the fall of 1990 produced a majority for the ex-communist Bulgarian So-
cialist Party, which was nonetheless expected to lose the scheduled regular parlia-
mentary elections. Those elections were to be held a year later, in the fall of 1991, 
following the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly after the adoption of the Consti-
tution. The Constituent Assembly adopted legislation establishing the procedure for 
the election of the Supreme Judicial Council shortly after the adoption of the Con-
stitution,95 and immediately elected the first Supreme Judicial Council. This should 
have ruled out significant replacements of magistrates, keeping in place magistrates 
believed to be loyal to the Socialist Party. Shortly after the October 1991 parliamen-
tary elections, however, the new majority in Parliament, led by the Union of Demo-
cratic Forces, amended the Supreme Judicial Council Act;96 this was then used as 
a pretext for holding new elections to the Supreme Judicial Council, replacing the 
members elected by the previous, Socialist-dominated Parliament. This was done de-
spite the Constitutional provision that Council members serve a five-year term. The 
new Council in turn appointed a Prosecutor General and a President of the Supreme 
Court loyal to the Union of the Democratic Forces. The Constitutional Court upheld 
the validity of the legislation, thus allowing significant replacements of judges and 
92 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria , Arts. 117-130, ch. 6.
93 “The judicial branch shall be independent. In the performance of their functions, all judges, pros-
ecutors and investigators shall be subservient only to the law.” Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic     
of Bulgaria, Art. 117§ 2.
94 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria , Art. 129. For detailed information on the Su-
preme Judicial Council, see below, Sec. 4.5.
95 Judicial System Act, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
96 The Amendments to the Supreme Judicial Council Act, St. Gaz. No. 106/1991, allowed private at-               
torneys to be members of the Supreme Judicial Council. This amendment was used as grounds for 
dismissing the existing Supreme Judicial Council and electing a new one.
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prosecutors.97 Fears of politically motivated prosecution were later proved justified, 
with the newly established autonomous Prosecution and Investigation Services not 
acting as a check, but actually carrying out such prosecutions.98  
Subsequent governments repeated the pattern, amending the legislative require-
ments for the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council and using this as grounds 
to terminate the Council elected by the previous Parliament and to elect a new one. 
The government attempted to do this again in July 1994, through legislative amend-
ments99 and calls for the election of a new Supreme Judicial Council. This time, how-
ever, the Constitutional Court declared the premature termination of the SJC’s term 
in office unconstitutional.100 The next Parliament, elected in 1997, also introduced 
new rules on the composition of the SJC and called for the election of a new SJC. 
Now the Constitutional Court refused to declare the termination of the SJC uncon-
stitutional.101 Since then, there have been no attempts to change the membership of 
the SJC prematurely.
4.2. Relationship with the legislature
Parliament has few direct formal powers over the Prosecution Service, and therefore 
has little control over the functioning of the Prosecution Service (or the Investiga-
tion Service). The only direct power it does have is authority to determine the budget 
of the Prosecution Service,102 which Parliament passes as part of the overall budget 
of the Judicial Authority. In 2004, legislation was adopted requiring the Prosecution 
Service to submit a report to Parliament, but this remained a formality, as Parlia-
ment did not review or vote on this report. The Prosecution does not submit its 
report directly to Parliament, but to the Supreme Judicial Council, which submits it 
to Parliament along with reports from the courts and the Investigation Services.103 
This legal obligation was included in the amendments to the Constitution of Febru-
ary 6, 2007,104 and the new constitutional provision states that Parliament must vote 
to approve the reports. It is not yet clear what consequences a refusal to approve 
would have, but as Parliament has no direct powers over the Prosecution Service and 
cannot conduct independent investigations of the Service’s activities or of individual 
97 Judgment No. 3 of Apr. 3, 1992, case No. 30/91 of the Constitutional Court, St. Gaz. No. 30/1992.                 
98 The most visible example of such politically motivated prosecution was the criminal proceeding             
against Andrey Lukanov, member of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and Prime Minister between           
1990 and 1991. In 1992 Lukanov was charged with embezzlement for having voted for state aid for 
developing countries as a member of the Communist government. He was stripped of his parlia-
mentary immunity upon the request of the Prosecutor General and later detained for more than 
one hundred days. Following his complaint of unlawful detention, the European Court of Human 
Rights ruled that there was no probable cause to justify Lukanov’s arrest and found a violation of 
Article 5. See European Court of Human Rights, Lukanov v. Bulgaria, judgment of Mar. 20, 1997.  
99 St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
100 Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 8 of Sept. 27, 1994, St. Gaz. No. 78/1994.
101 Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 1 of Jan. 14, 1999, St. Gaz. No. 6/1999.  
102 See Section 2.2 above.
103 Judicial System Act, Art. 27 § 1(10), St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.
104 Act on the Amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, §§ 5, 6, St. Gaz. No.      
12/2007. 
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prosecutors, nor request information on individual cases, even if Parliament refuses 
to approve its reports, this is not likely to have any significance.
However, Parliament has demonstrated a clear tendency to make assertive use of its 
legislative powers to influence the conduct of law enforcement, because of public 
pressure on the legislature and the executive for better results in the fight against 
crime and because the executive has no formal powers over investigation and pros-
ecution (see below). Since 1990, Parliament has made numerous amendments to the 
two major pieces of legislation regulating criminal law in an effort to redefine the 
powers of the Prosecution and Investigation Services and introduce more efficient 
procedural accountability, passing 41 legislative acts amending the Criminal Code 
and 28 legislative acts amending the Criminal Procedure Code.       105 A new Criminal 
Procedure Code was adopted in 2005, effective as of April 2006.106 The procedure 
for appealing a prosecutorial decision to terminate criminal proceedings has been 
amended three times since 1999 and 2002. (See Section 3.1 above.) However, these 
numerous amendments have not always produced the desired effects, and more often 
than not have been a sign of frustration on the part of Parliament and the govern-
ment that they lack control over investigation and prosecution. Efforts aimed at mak-
ing the investigative stage more effective, such as the introduction of strict deadlines, 
have had no positive effect.
4.3. Relationship with the executive
The executive has few direct powers with respect to the Prosecution Service. He has 
no power to issue general instructions as to priorities and policies, or to instruct in 
individual cases. As the executive is supported by Parliament,107 however, the powers 
of Parliament (namely adopting the budget and amending legislation in the field of 
criminal law and procedure) are in effect exercised by the executive. For example, 
proposals to amend the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code are as a rule 
initiated by the Council of Ministers.
The Judicial Authority is supposed to have budgetary independence,108 and the Con-
stitutional Court had held that the executive should submit to Parliament the bud-
get proposal approved by the Supreme Judicial Council.109 In practice, however, the 
Judicial Authority’s budget is decided by the executive. The Council of Ministers, 
which is allowed to make its own proposals and objections,110 has regularly submitted 
105 Criminal Procedure Code, St. Gaz. No. 89/1974,       last amended by St. Gaz. No. 86/2005.   
106 Criminal Procedure Code, St. Gaz. No. 86/2005.
107 Because the leaders of the political parties with a majority in Parliament normally become mem-
bers of the Council of Ministers, decision-making normally takes place to a large extent within the 
executive, with the majority in Parliament following the decisions of the Council of Ministers.
108 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 117 § 3, St. Gaz. No. 56/1991 (“the judicial      
branch of government shall have an independent budget”).
109 Constitutional Court Judgment of Dec. 16, 1993, St. Gaz. No. 1/1994.   
110 Formation of the State Budget Act, Art. 15,16,19, St. Gaz. No. 67/1996.           
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a separate, parallel draft budget prepared by the Ministry of Finance.111 Parliament 
has always, without hesitation or discussion, approved the budget submitted by the 
Council of Ministers. While this gives the government some control over the judi-
ciary, it has little control over actual budget management, and budgeting is not linked 
to any targets or plans of action. 
The Minister of Justice has some limited powers with respect to the decision-making 
process at the Supreme Judicial Council. The Minister calls and chairs sessions of the 
Council. However, he has no voting rights on the decisions and may only influence 
the agenda of the sessions.112 Sessions of the Council may also be called upon the 
request of at least one-fifth of its members, and the Council must meet at least once 
every three months.113 Sessions of the Council may be held without the Minister, if he 
is unable or unwilling to attend, with the presidents of the two Supreme Courts and 
the Prosecutor General taking turns serving as chairman. In addition, the Minister 
of Justice has recently been given the authority to recommend prosecutors for pro-
motion,114 while the Ministry also includes a department that may review the work 
of magistrates (except for magistrates at the highest levels) as well as organize the 
evaluation of magistrates’ work.115
In fact, however, the influence of the Minister of Justice over the management of the 
Judicial Authority, and the Prosecution Service in particular, is limited. In fact, all de-
cisions as to appointment, promotion, and demotion of prosecutors are made by the 
Prosecutor General, or the respective head of a prosecution office. Only rarely have            
judges and investigators on the Supreme Judicial Council blocked the Prosecutor 
General’s proposals; even in those cases, the Minister of Justice played no role.116 The 
extension of the Minister’s powers has not substantially changed this. Throughout 
2005 and 2006, institutional pressure on individual prosecutors in practice prevented 
the Minister from using these powers, and all appointment and promotion recom-
mendations were made by prosecutors in the Prosecution Service.117 The Supreme 
Judicial Council was able to block several appointments and promotions by the new-
ly elected Prosecutor General in 2006. To achieve his aims, he was forced to use his 
authority to temporarily commission prosecutors to fill positions.
111 Formation of the State Budget Act, Art. 19, St. Gaz. No. 67/1996.           
112 Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria      , Art. 130 §5, St. Gaz. No. 56/1991.     
113 Supreme Judicial Council Act, Art. 26, St. Gaz. No. 74/1991,          
114 Judicial System Act, art. 30 §4, amended by St. Gaz. No. 29/2004. These powers relate to all three      
categories of magistrates.
115 Judicial System Act, art. 35b, amended by St. Gaz. No. 61/2003.
116 During a particularly bitter standoff from 2001 to 2003 between the judges and prosecutors on the                
Supreme Judicial Council, the judges and investigators voted on occasion to block proposals to 
appoint prosecutors nominated by the Prosecutor General, because of a perception that nomina-          
tions were driven by personal loyalties rather than by professional standards.
117 Indeed, prosecutors gained even more power in the process. As judges are more independent of the 
judicial hierarchy, they were nominated by the Minister or other members of the Council. For each 
vacant judicial position, there was more than one candidate, and votes in the Council were divided. 
This gave greater power to the prosecutors on the Council to promote one or another judge. At the 
same time, judges on the Council, despite being more numerous, did not have much influence in 
the promotion of prosecutors, as for every vacancy there was always only one candidate.
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The executive’s lack of authority to give policy instruction has been a source of con-
stant tension between the executive and the Prosecution and Investigation Services. 
Successive governments have complained that they are prevented from influencing 
policy and setting priorities in the fight against crime, while the Prosecution Service 
complains of a lack of cooperation by those investigative authorities, such as the po-
lice, that are within the executive (see below, Sec. 4.4).
In those limited areas in which the Prosecution Service has relationships with other 
government authorities, there has been no lack of cooperation (with the notable ex-
ception of the budgetary process, see above). The Prosecution Service receives secu-
rity protection from a special government service within the Ministry of Justice that 
also provides security for other government agencies.118 Prosecutors have the power 
to carry out investigations, though they rarely utilize it,119 and to order government 
agencies to submit information in the course of such investigations; prosecutors do 
generally receive information and assistance in such cases.120
In practice, the relationship between the Prosecution Service and the political branch-
es is marred by the Service’s problematic political role, a result of its extreme inde-
pendence. As the system has evolved, the Prosecution Service has become a political 
factor in its own right, building cooperation with or confronting politicians, includ-
ing members of Parliament and the executive. The fact that the Prosecution Service 
is so independent of other branches of government and that there are no checks on 
it has made politicians vulnerable. They do not dare confront the Prosecution Ser-
vice publicly, as such criticism has little effect on the Service; meanwhile, against a 
background of widespread corruption, as well as a public perception that politicians 
are corrupt, a criminal investigation against a politician—announced publicly by the 
Prosecution Service—can be very damaging to a political career, and the Prosecution 
Service has abused its power in this way.121 
118 The Ministry of Justice is in charge of the security of the court buildings, where prosecution offices                 
are located.
119 It is very rare for a prosecutor to directly question a witness or suspect or engage in any other fact 
gathering. This is mainly due to the Service’s organizational and institutional culture. Prosecutors 
simply do not have the time to investigate. Also, they have always been desk prosecutors, work-
ing only with documents. There is no tradition of investigation, and the service tends toward a 
bureaucratic mentality. Lack of initiative and closer control over investigations has been one of 
the principal criticisms by European Union experts; overcoming this passive approach on the part 
of the Prosecution Service was a goal of the latest amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code 
of September 2005, which placed the prosecution in charge of all investigations and required that 
every investigation be immediately reported to the Prosecution Service.  
120 There has been a dispute as to whether the Prosecution Service should have access to tax informa-                
tion in the absence of a pending investigation. The Service has argued that it should, but the law 
requires an investigation and specific request related to the investigation as a precondition for tax 
authorities to provide such information. The issue appears, however, not to be one of lack of coop-
eration, but rather of drawing the proper line between law enforcement needs and privacy rights.
121 As one of many pieces of evidence of this abuse, the head of the Sofia City Prosecution Office said                   
in an interview with the Daily Trud newspaper in January 2006 that in 2005 he was asked several 
times by the Prosecutor General’s office to initiate criminal investigations against politicians in 
order to intimidate them. He refused to do so, and was later asked to leave his position as head of 
the office. 
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Holding up investigations against politicians has also been a tool used by the Pros-
ecution Service. Under several consecutive governments, the Prosecution Service 
refrained from investigating members of the cabinet or the majority in exchange 
for preservation of the institutional powers of the Prosecution Service. At the same 
time, it investigated and charged opposition figures for privatization deals or other 
decisions made while they were in power. In some cases, even members of the party 
in power were investigated and charged when they pursued policies perceived by 
the Prosecution Service to be targeted against them. This pattern well illustrates the 
dangers of an overly independent, unchecked prosecution service.122
4.4. Relationship with the police
As the police are a centralized institution within the Ministry of the Interior, and thus 
part of the executive, the police and the Prosecution Service have completely separate 
administrations. The police and the Service are institutionally and financially inde-
pendent of each other; the Service has no authority over the appointment, training 
and professional development of police officers. With the exception of certain police 
investigative functions over which prosecutors exercise some supervision, police and 
prosecutors operate independently.
One of the problems affecting the criminal justice system has been a lack of proper 
co-operation between the police and the prosecution authorities in investigating 
crime. The autonomous character of the Prosecution Service and the sharp separa-
tion between the prosecution and the executive, without any checks and balances, 
created little incentive for co-operation between the two institutions. This was par-
ticularly evident in the investigation of organized crime.123 
122 Of course, the Prosecution Service would deny this, and there is little academic investigation of the                
issue as yet, but the circumstantial evidence is abundant. In some cases, the Prosecution has opened       
investigations against members of outgoing governments after they lost or as they were about to 
lose power, as happened before the elections in 2001. An even clearer example of such abuse was 
the opening of an investigation on charges of espionage against the outgoing Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and the Minister of Finance in July 2005. This took place shortly after the elections, during a 
period of coalition negotiations for a new government in which the two ex-ministers were actively 
pursuing ministerial positions. The accusations were clearly groundless. Despite the fact that they 
were not charged, no substantial evidence had been uncovered, and by law, investigations are confi-
dential in the early stages, the media was officially informed that an investigation had been opened 
from the very start. The investigation was widely covered by the media at a time when negotiations 
for the new cabinet were being held.
 As a further example of abuse, in 2002 the Ministry of Justice was pursuing a policy of judicial 
reform, and prosecutorial reform was clearly on the agenda. To thwart this, the Prosecution Service 
opened an investigation against the deputy Minister of Justice for a decision he made while a judge 
prior to becoming deputy minister. Inquiries were also made by the Prosecution Service into the 
Minister of Justice’s activities as a judge. Neither was ever prosecuted; the inquiries were clearly 
meant to intimidate, and in fact succeeded in diluting the reform efforts. In October of 2004, for 
example, the draft amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code introduced by the Ministry of 
Justice and the Council of Ministers were rejected by the majority in Parliament; it is very unusual 
for the majority to veto its own government’s actions.
123 Research conducted by a team from the Ministry of Justice of Bavaria implementing a joint EU 
PHARE project concluded that “the interaction between the police and the public prosecutor’s of-
fices is completely insufficient.” Second Quarterly Report, Twinning Project No BG/2000/IB/JH/01 
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Until 2004 there were open disagreements between the police and prosecution, with 
representatives of the two institutions criticizing each other in the media. The Pros- 
ecution Service’s major complaints were that it was not kept informed of investiga-
tions carried out by the police and that evidence collection was sub-standard, while 
police complained that the prosecution did not react to their investigative priorities 
and significantly delayed high-priority investigations. 
Despite continued mistrust between police and the Prosecution Service, the public 
antagonism has largely ended, as both services came to realize that such public 
confrontation was detrimental to both institutions. Most recently, the police and 
the prosecution have taken a different tack in their public statements, declaring that 
cooperation has been good. This has resulted in part from the creation of three-         
member teams, including a police officer, an investigator, and a prosecutor, to work 
together on cases under the relatively recent Guidelines on Investigation.124 There is 
wide agreement among police and prosecutors that this has been a positive experi-
ence and has improved cooperation. 
The new Criminal Procedure Code also addressed the problem of cooperation            
between the services by underlining the leading role of the prosecutor in the 
investigation. Under the new rules, he is in charge of the investigation from the start 
and gives instructions to the police. The current heads of the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Prosecution have similar backgrounds and a good personal relationship. 
There is also increased willingness to demonstrate that the system works, as a result 
of great pressure from the EU. Nevertheless, in the critical field of investigating and 
prosecuting organized crime and corruption, where cooperation between police and 
prosecution is crucial, there has been no visible improvement. 
Before the adoption of the new Criminal Procedure Code in 2006, the police had 
a dual function with respect to crime investigation: they assisted the Investigation 
Services in investigating serious crimes, and they were the principal authority com-
petent to investigate the majority of conventional crimes.125 There are at present 
about 1,100 police investigators (doznateli),126 who are responsible for all field work 
in the investigation of petty and average offenses,127 as well as for expedited criminal 
Strengthening the Public Prosecutor’s office. 
124 Guidelines on Investigation, St. Gaz. No. 31/2004. These guidelines replicate to a large extent the 
investigation procedure set forth in the Criminal Procedure Code and include some guidelines on 
cooperation between police, investigators and the prosecution.
125 Until 1999, the police did not have formal investigating powers, but instead conducted investiga-             
tions under the direction of the Investigation Services. The 1999 criminal procedure reform  trans-
ferred the majority of investigative work to the police and closed the regional investigation services, 
leaving the Investigation Service in charge of serious crimes. The 2006 Criminal Procedure Code      
made almost all investigations, including more serious crimes, the responsibility of the police.
126 The Ministry of Interior is secretive about providing figures on personnel, which are considered a 
state secret. The number 1,100 was quoted by Minister of Interior Petkanov in an interview with the 
Standard newspaper on October 20, 2005.
127 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 171 (detailing the crimes for which the police investigators are              
competent and the crimes for which the Investigation Service is competent).
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proceedings.128 In all cases, police investigators work under the guidance of the rel-
evant prosecution office. 
As of April 2006, the relationship between the Investigation Services and the po-
lice changed substantially, with the role of the investigators significantly diminish-
ing. They are now in charge of investigating only crimes committed by police and 
army personnel, people with procedural immunity from prosecution, espionage, and 
crimes against humanity.129 As there are practically no espionage crimes or crimes 
against humanity, the only real job investigators have is investigating army and police 
officers and other prosecutors, judges, and members of Parliament. All other crimes 
are now investigated by the police. The number of doznateli is expected to increase 
to more than 2,000. 
Police officers are subordinate to prosecutors in investigating criminal offenses 
(though not in their more common patrol work); the police must carry out any in-
vestigation ordered by the prosecutor, and the prosecutor may also investigate on his 
own.130 The authority of the Prosecution Service is not limited to prosecuting and 
presenting the case before court, but includes opening and directing the course of 
an investigation or indicating what evidence needs to be collected. As the decision to 
submit a case to the court is made by the prosecution, the police usually submit a file 
to the prosecution when their investigation is finalized.131 This includes a conclusion 
as to whether there is sufficient evidence of a crime or not.132 Such recommendations, 
however, are not binding on the prosecutor. 
Under the 2006 Criminal Procedure Code, police are obliged to inform the prosecu-
tor within 24 hours of any criminal investigation that is opened.133 This requirement 
was designed to overcome the lack of cooperation between prosecutors and police 
and to guarantee good quality evidence from the start. Also, the lack of sufficient 
involvement by the prosecution service in the investigative phase had been criticized 
by the EU. The number of prosecutors was increased to meet the new responsibilities. 
This reform goes against the established institutional culture, however, and it remains 
to be seen whether it will be successful.
The Investigation Service: The Investigation Service, somewhat similar to the French        
investigating magistrate, is part of the Judicial Authority and governed by the SJC. 
Investigators are lawyers with the same training as prosecutors and judges. Until re-
128 Expedited criminal proceedings are aimed at disposing of proceedings in petty crime cases; such              
proceedings can be carried out if there is sufficient evidence to proceed to trial within seven days of 
opening a criminal investigation. Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 408 (a). 
129 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 194, St. Gaz. 86/2005 (effective as of April 29, 2006).             
130 Prosecutors may issue instructions to investigators and to police investigators, Criminal Procedure  
Code, Art. 197; Criminal Procedure Code, St. Gaz. No. 86/2005 (effective as of Apr. 29, 2006). They 
may also conduct investigations alongside or instead of the police or investigators and could also             
replace the police officer or the investigator. Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 196.    
131 As police investigation was only introduced in 1999, and as there has been little research into the                 
functioning of the criminal justice system, there is no data on the involvement of the prosecution          
in police investigation prior to closure of the investigation. Anecdotal information suggests that the            
prosecution’s role is small.
132 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 222, 223, St. Gaz. No. 86/2005 (effective as of Apr. 29, 2006).               
133 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 212 § 3, St. Gaz. No. 86/2005 (effective as of Apr. 29, 2006).                
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cently, the Investigation Service had broad investigative powers, and was generally 
responsible for the more legal aspects of investigative work.
The existence of the Investigation Services was one of the main points of criticism by 
the EU, since the process of investigation went through three different institutions-
—the police, the investigation services, and the prosecution—resulting in complica-
tions and delays. One of the EU’s conditions was the streamlining of the investiga-
tion process, and the understanding was that the Investigation Services would be 
abolished. This was essentially accomplished with the adoption of a new Criminal 
Procedure Code effective in May 2006.134 The new Code transferred all investigation 
to the police, leaving the Investigation Service in charge only of crimes committed 
by military and police personnel, espionage, and crimes against humanity. The ma-
jor component of the reform is to transfer all investigative authority to the police 
and give full powers to control the investigation to the Prosecution Service. These 
amendments were not welcomed by the Prosecution Service, which had been vying 
with the police for control over investigators, but it did not object publicly. The Pros-
ecution Service’s only public comment was that it would require increased resources 
in terms of personnel and finances to perform its new role of overseeing every inves-
tigation from its start. 
Other investigative bodies: There is only one other investigative authority within the 
executive: Customs has limited investigative powers, similar to those of the police, 
with respect to some customs offenses.135 There was some discussion about giving the 
Ministry of Finance authority to investigate tax fraud, but this did not occur. As it stands, 
if the tax authorities establish evidence of a crime in the course of auditing a company, 
they must submit the case to the prosecutor, who will start an investigation.136
There is also the Financial Intelligence Agency, which receives information from 
banks and other financial institutions; if it finds certain information suspicious, it 
reports it to the Prosecution Service.137 If the Prosecution Service decides there is 
reasonable suspicion, it opens an investigation and assigns it to the police to investi-
gate. There have been complaints by the Prosecution Service that the Financial Intel-
ligence Agency submits too many groundless cases.138 The EU has been very critical 
of the fact that there are no convictions for money laundering in Bulgaria.139  
134 Criminal Procedure Code, St. Gaz. No. 86/2005 (effective as of April 29, 2006).
135 Criminal Procedure Code , Art. 48 § 2, St. Gaz. No. 89/1974, last amended by St. Gaz. No. 
86/2005.
136 Tax P. Code, Art. 35 § 2, St.Gaz. No. 105/2005.
137 Measure against Money Laundering Act, St. Gaz. No. 85/1998; St. Gaz. No. 31/2003.
138 The Prosecution will investigate the Financial Intelligence, Mediapool, January 12, 2006.
139 The EU wants convictions for money laundering, Mediapool, March 1, 2006.
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4.5. Relationship with the judiciary140
As magistrates, prosecutors, investigators, and judges are governed by the same body, 
the Supreme Judicial Council. The Supreme Judicial Council has management and 
supervisory powers over the three institutions of the Judicial Authority and over indi-
vidual magistrates.141 The Supreme Judicial Council manages the budget, determines 
the number of prosecutors, and appoints, promotes, and dismisses prosecutors, as 
well as disciplining them and determining their immunity from criminal liability.
The Supreme Judicial Council consists of twenty-five members.142 Members must be 
lawyers with high professional and moral qualities and at least fifteen years’ profes-
sional experience, of which not less than five years should be as a judge, prosecutor, 
investigator, or tenured legal academic.143 The National Assembly appoints eleven 
members of the Council, and the three institutions of the Judicial Authority elect an-
other eleven at individual delegates’ meetings: judges elect six members, prosecutors 
three members, and investigators two members, each from their own ranks.144 The 
Prosecutor General and the Presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the 
Supreme Administrative Court are members of the Council ex officio.145 Members of 
the Council may not be members of Parliament, mayors, municipal councilors, or 
members of political organizations or parties, or trade unions (except those repre-
senting the judicial system).146 Members serve single five-year terms, and may not be 
re-elected.147 The sessions of the Supreme Judicial Council are convened and chaired 
by the Minister of Justice, who, however, may not vote.148 One fifth of the members of 
the Council can also convene a session of the Council.149 The Council usually meets 
once a week.
The Supreme Judicial Council nominates the President of the Supreme Court of Cas-
sation, President of the Supreme Administrative Court, and Prosecutor General to 
the State President.150 The Council also determines territorial jurisdiction and the 
seats of courts and prosecution offices, determines the overall number of prosecutors 
140 The Prosecution Service’s relationship with the judiciary is largely mediated through their joint 
governing institution, the Supreme Judicial Council, which also has authority over investigators. 
This section consequently focuses on the Council; its contents are generally also relevant to the 
relationship between investigators and prosecutors.
141 The organization and the activities of the Supreme Judicial Council, the courts, the Prosecution              
Service, and the Investigation Service, and the status of magistrates are all regulated by the Judicial     
System Act, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.    
142 Judicial System Act, Art. 16 § 1, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.          
143 Judicial System Act, Art. 16 §1, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.         
144 Judicial System Act, Art. 17, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.        
145 Judicial System Act, Art. 16, §2, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.         
146 Judicial System Act, Art. 16 §4, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.         
147 Judicial System Act, Art. 21, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.        
148 Judicial System Act, Art. 26, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.        
149 Judicial System Act, Art. 26 § 6, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.          
150 The President may refuse to appoint an individual nominated by the Supreme Judicial Council, but               
if the Council nominates the same person a second time, the President must appoint him. Judicial  
System Act, Art. 27 §1(1), St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.    
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and judges, appoints, promotes, demotes, moves, and dismisses magistrates, and sets 
the remuneration for magistrates.151
The joint management of judges, prosecutors, and investigators has not been par-
ticularly successful. At times, there have been substantial tensions between members 
of the different institutions represented on the Supreme Judicial Council, most es-
pecially between judges and prosecutors. This had led to a rather difficult working 
environment for the Council and has reduced its efficiency. This joint governance 
of the courts, prosecution, and investigation has also been criticized as having the 
potential to compromise judicial independence.152 
An additional major defect of the current system has been the lack of any account-
ability mechanisms. The Supreme Judicial Council has no obligation to report to 
any other institution of Parliament or the executive. As the Council represents the 
institutional interests of the Prosecution Service, the judiciary, and the Investigation 
Service, it has no incentive to insist on proper reporting and public accountability of 
those institutions. Attempts by various members of the Council to promote more ef-
fective institutional accountability have usually devolved into factional infighting.
The courts, the Prosecution, and the Investigation Services are required by law to 
submit statistical information to the Minister of Justice, who in turn is expected to 
submit it to the Supreme Judicial Council.153 However, there is no independent check 
on the accuracy of these reports, which often do not even match, so that the effect 
of such reporting on public awareness and confidence is not substantial. Since April 
2004, the Council has had an obligation to make public most of its sessions, as well 
as most reports submitted to the Council.154 The Council originally resisted this re-
quirement, but a challenge by a group of journalists led the Supreme Administrative 
Court to rule that the SJC must allow access to journalists.155 Following this ruling, 
the SJC installed cameras in the meeting hall and television screens in another hall 
for journalists. On very rare occasions, the SJC will hold a closed session without 
providing a reason, but as a rule, sessions are public. 
151 Judicial System Act, Art. 27 §1(1-15), St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.    
152 Commission of the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards 
Accession, European Commission Regular Report, 2002, Brussels, Oct. 9, 2002 <http://europa.
eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/bu_en.pdf>.
153 Judicial System Act, Art. 35, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994.        
154 Judicial System Act, Art. 27 §3, St. Gaz. No. 59/1994 reads: “The sessions of the Supreme Judicial            
Council shall be public, except when deciding issues under sub-para. 6 and 7” (disciplinary pro-
ceedings and lifting immunity from criminal prosecution).
155 Judgment No. 9595 of Nov. 19, 2004 of the Supreme Administrative Court.
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V. Publicizing the Prosecution Service’s Activities
In the seventeen years since the change of system, the Prosecution Service has 
become more sophisticated in addressing the public and using the media to make 
its case. Prosecution offices have appointed spokespersons to provide information 
to the media, while individual prosecutors have also begun using the media more 
professionally to present their institutional interests to the public. There has also 
been a clear tendency towards increasing the amount of information presented to 
the public.
Besides information on its activities, the Service has consistently pressed two lines of 
argument in its public pronouncements: the need to preserve its autonomous status, 
and the need to increase or restore its powers. The Service depicts itself as fighting 
corrupt government officials and therefore needing to preserve its autonomous sta-
tus; any suggestions for increased accountability are rejected as a threat to the insti-
tution’s independence, which if carried out would undermine its ability to investigate 
government abuses. In addition, prosecutors have pressed to have certain powers 
returned to them or have argued for new powers, with the specific powers they have 
asked for changing over the years. Thus, the Service has argued for the power to order 
pre-trial detention and electronic surveillance, managerial powers over investigators, 
making investigators part of the Service, and the power to challenge the legality of 
privatization deals in civil proceedings.
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I. General Issues
In December 2000, the Republic of Chile began replacing its old system of criminal 
justice with a new one intended to be fairer and more effective. In four separate stages 
between 2000 and 2004, the government gradually and methodically introduced new 
laws, institutions, and practices throughout the country’s 13 regions. In June 2005, 
the reforms were implemented in the metropolitan region of Santiago, and the tran-
sition is now complete.
One of the chief innovations of the reforms is the establishment of the Ministerio 
Público, or National Prosecution Service. Before 2000, there was no office of the pros-
ecutor. Instead, judges presented charges, conducted investigations, and then adju-
dicated questions of law and fact in closed proceedings.1 Unlike in France and Spain, 
where a functional and professional distinction emerged between different judges 
who investigated, prosecuted, and adjudicated, the judiciary in Chile remained inte-
grally inquisitorial. Today, however, a prosecutor (fiscal) is responsible for reviewing 
complaints of crime, deciding whether or not to move forward with formal charges 
and how, and then supporting an accusation in an open proceeding whose outcome 
is decided by a judge. 
The creation of the prosecution service in Chile was part of a grand transformation 
of the system of criminal justice, a reform of a scale and significance unmatched any-
where else in Latin America today and possibly the world. In addition to the new 
prosecution service, the government established a national public defender’s office, as 
well as special judicial chambers (juzgados de garantia) that supervise all pre-trial ac-
tivities and decisions taken by the prosecution, new court proceedings for the dispo-
sition of minor offenses and uncontested criminal charges (procedimiento monitorio, 
abreviado), two types of bench trials in ordinary cases (ordinario, simplificado), and, 
most elaborately, oral trials (juicios orales) adjudicated by three professional judges for 
a small number of major crimes. The operation of these institutions is guided by a 
code of criminal procedure whose core rules and values differ greatly from those of its 
predecessor.2 It is widely agreed in Chile today that the practice of criminal justice now 
bears little resemblance to the mixed inquisitorial system in operation before 2000. 
  
1 The main features of the unreformed judiciary are described in Lisa Hilbink, An Exception to Chil-
ean Exceptionalism? The Historical Rule of Chile’s Judiciary, in What Justice, Whose Justice: 
Fighting for Fairness in Latin America (S.E. Eckstein �� Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, eds., 
2003). For an overview of Chile’s justice system as a whole, see Reporte sobre el Estado de los Siste-
mas Judiciales en las Americas, 2002-2003, available at www.cejamericas.org.
2 For an account of some of these differences, see Rafael Blanco, Richard Hutt �� Hugo Rojas, Reform 
to the Criminal Justice System in Chile: Evaluation and Challenges, 2 Loyola International Law 
Review (2005), at 253.
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The reforms in Chile have greatly influenced the contours of change in justice in 
much of Latin America, including Venezuela, Columbia, Peru, the Dominican Re-
public, and at least one state in Argentina (Cordoba). Reforms in these places drew 
heavily on Chile’s new code of criminal procedure, and yet have not produced a com-
parable political and institutional transformation of criminal justice. In these places, 
new codes have remained almost exclusively legal transitions. It is no surprise, then, 
that in Mexico today, leaders of state governments and some federal agencies look 
to Chile for inspiration and reassurance as they consider remaking their own justice 
systems.
The Reasons and Rationales for Reform in Chile
The original impulse for the reforms in Chile was to protect the rights of defendants 
and reduce the discriminatory impact of criminal justice on the poor. These reasons, 
however, are no longer prominent in public discussions. They have been overtaken 
and to some extent displaced by a very different political rationale for change. Today, 
the main goal and expectation of criminal justice in Chile is to ensure public safety.3 
Introducing the draft code of criminal procedure in 1995, then-President Eduardo 
Frei made the goals of protecting constitutional rights of defendants transparent and 
prominent:  
The sector of the State in which the abuse of power tends to manifest itself most is 
the system of criminal justice. The victims of such daily infractions of the rights of 
persons tend to be the sectors that the processes of modernization exclude, mak-
ing them extremely vulnerable. . . . [T]he number of arrests made by the police is 
greater than the number of cases that enter the jurisdiction of the judiciary, which 
means that there are forms of social criminal control at the margins of the super-
vision of judges and persons subjected to the rigor of the overall criminal justice 
system without ever having been charged.
Frei also insisted that the new system must reduce the negative impact of criminal 
justice on the poor: 
By effectively discriminating against the sectors of society that are most vulnerable 
and not employing effective forms of reinsertion, the system of criminal justice 
in Chile produces marginality. . . . each subject that is brought into the system of 
criminal justice and who suffers entry into the circuit of marginality, is an im-
mense loss of social investment and public effort. The reform to the criminal pro-
cess should correct this road to marginality, permitting, through the intervention 
3 For an example of the expectations placed on justice by the candidates in the recent presidential 
election, see the comments recorded by Paz Ciudadana, an NGO in Santiago that studies victimiza-
tion and public perceptions of crime, at www.pazciudadana.cl/comunicados.ph.  
4 For the text of the President’s message see        Mensaje de S.E. El Presidente de la Republica con el que 
inicia un projecto de ley que establece un nuevo codigo de procedimiento penal (June 9, 1995), avail-
able at www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice.
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of the Ministerio Público, the encouragement of social and economic re-incorpora-
tion of those that enter the system.
These two goals of protecting rights and reducing marginality drew strength from 
the movement that ousted the military regime of General Augusto Pinochet and 
amended the Constitution at the end of the 1980s.  But, partly because of their politi-
cal delicacy, the ongoing efforts in Chile to prosecute generals and obtain justice for 
victims of the dictatorship have been deliberately kept distinct from efforts to reform 
the criminal justice system.5 And as others have shown, the movements for justice, 
social democracy, and the rule of law in Chile have run on separate tracks.6  
In addition, the two founding hopes for the new system of criminal justice were not 
strong enough to produce the requisite political consensus for the reforms, which 
proved very expensive.7 To forge broad political support for such an investment, the 
reforms had to be marketed as a means of social “modernization,” a word used in 
nearly every paragraph of the speech of then-President Frei, and a word that is com-
monly associated in Chile today with crime.  
If to modernize the State means to submit the management of its diverse institu-
tions to criteria of efficiency in practice and design, then the modernization of 
the State requires the reform of criminal justice . . . The reform we propose will 
translate into a social gain for those who are victims of criminal behavior. . . . By 
launching this draft, we will be investing in legitimacy, in human rights, and in 
security.
Gradually, the goals of eliminating inequity and protecting defendants’ rights have 
been eclipsed by a growing preoccupation with public safety in Chile Although im-
proving public safety was an important issue in the public debate even before the 
reform,8 today, politicians demand that justice respond to public fear of crime more 
often than they praise its defense of rights and liberties.
The prosecution service initially took refuge from these countervailing pressures in 
its enviable constitutional independence and organizational autonomy. In the first 
years of the reform, the prosecution service in Chile was silent about both the origi-
nal reasons for reform and the growing public expectations that it play a leading 
5 Faviola Letelier, the sister of the Chilean Ambassador to the US, Orlando Letelier, who was mur-
dered in Washington D.C. in 1976, said after a speech in New York in October 2003 that “there is 
no relationship” between the search for justice in cases stemming from the dictatorship and the 
current efforts to reform criminal justice in Chile. Personal exchange  
6 See, e.g., Carlos Pena Gonzalez, Economic and Political Aspects of Judicial Reform: The Chilean Case, 
in Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law (Erik Jensen �� 
Thomas Heller eds., 2003), at 227. 
7 Researchers at the Center for the Study of Justice in the Americas (CEJA) estimate the cost of                 
institute the reforms at over 600 million US dollars, with an annual operating cost of approximately 
250 million. See Annual Report of Justice, 2004-2005, available at www.cejamericas.org. CEJA is  
a regional non-governmental organization supported by the Organization of American States to 
provide advice and assistance to states and societies in Latin America.  
8 Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Chile: Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: The Rule of Law 
and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 Southwestern Journal of Law and 
Trade in the Americas (1998), at 326.  
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role in strengthening public safety. For example, in an early draft of a report on the 
prosecution service that the Vera Institute of Justice in New York prepared for the 
Division of Research of the Ministerio Público in 2003, a reference to President Frei’s 
speech of 1995 was deleted, apparently at the request of the Chief Prosecutor. Only 
after the discovery of the greater punitive force of the new system of justice did the 
Director of the Prosecution Service agree to publish the report, which included the 
rate of convictions under the new regime.9  
More recently, influenced by rising concern about crime,10 and also by surveys that 
show confidence in government diminishing,11 the Ministerio Público has felt pres-
sure to be demonstrably tough on crime.12 Still, it is not clear how the Ministerio 
Público will respond. The Ministerio does not yet have a crime reduction strategy, nor 
does it have a strategy for improving public perceptions of the reform in these terms. 
It has not decided if it should accept responsibility for problems, such as crime and 
public confidence, over which it has incomplete control, or instead focus even more 
narrowly on the proper application of the law to each of the individual cases with 
which it is presented. In the meantime, prosecutions remain focused on individual 
cases rather than the accomplishment of broad outcomes or the fulfillment of the 
hopes and expectations that accompanied the reforms. 
As this report shows, the extreme degree of constitutional independence has not im-
munized the Ministerio from outside pressures. In fact, strict autonomy from other 
state agencies paradoxically makes the Ministerio susceptible to a more diffuse and 
perhaps ubiquitous set of public pressures and constraints. Increasingly, the Ministe-
rio has to answer for social outcomes beyond the narrower, traditional role of apply-
ing the law in cases presented to it. Individual citizens increasingly assess the value 
of the justice system in terms of its ability to reduce and prevent crime and fear of 
crime. Lawyers and politicians analyzing the criminal justice system routinely ask: Is 
the system cost-effective? What are the benefits from our expenditures on a modern 
system of justice? What is the quality of service from well-paid civil servants and 
public officials? What is the return on our investment?
9 See Antonio Marangunic �� Todd Foglesong, Analizando la reforma a la justicia criminal en Chile: 
un estudio empirico entre el nuevo y el antiguo sistema penal (2004), available at http://www.vera.
org/section9/section9_3.asp and www.ministeriopublico.cl. The report is also available in English,       
at the same locations, as Charting Justice Reform in Chile: A Comparison of the Old and New 
Systems of Criminal Procedure.
10 See Table 1 in Section VI below for data on crime rates in Chile.
11 See, e.g., the report by the Communications Department of the Catholic University of Chile, El 
‘Secreto del Secreto: La Confianza, Cuadernos de Información no.18 (2005), available at www.
uc.cl/fcom/p4_fcom/site/artic/20051212/pags/20051214222647.html.
12 In personal discussion with the author of this report in April 2004 at a conference in Buenos Aires, 
Pablo Alvares, the executive director of the Chilean Ministerio Público, described crime reduction 
and public safety as the “next frontier” for the Ministerio.
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II. Structure and Organization of the Prosecution Service
2.1. Internal structure
The prosecution service has three administrative levels, corresponding to the main 
territorial and administrative subdivisions of the unitary state. At the base are lo-
cal prosecution offices (fiscalia local), each directed by a Chief Assistant Prosecutor 
(fiscal adjunto jefe). Above this are 16 regional prosecution offices, each led by a Re-
gional Director of Prosecution. At the apex of the system is the Director of the Pros-
ecution Service, or Fiscal Nacional.  In all, there are 625 prosecutors, all of whom, 
except the Fiscal Nacional, work in regional or local offices.  At the national level, 
employees of the Ministerio Público are engaged in administration and management, 
not prosecution.
At both the regional and national prosecution services, daily operations are managed 
by an executive director. Typically, this person is an engineer, economist, or expert 
in human resources and management. Taking direction from the Fiscal Nacional, 
the executive director manages several administrative units, including those for As-
sistance to Victims and Witnesses, Research and Evaluation, Information Systems, 
Finance, and Internal Affairs. Line prosecutors, including those in specialized units 
for drug offenses and sex crimes, are supervised directly by the Chief Assistant Pros-
ecutor in each region.
2.2. Budgetary process
The Ministerio Público negotiates its budget with the Treasury before a proposed 
amount is forwarded to the legislature. The Ministerio Público makes its annual ex-
penditure projections based on draft budgets submitted by regional prosecution of-
fices, whose sums it may change. It is unclear if allocations to the service as a whole 
or to the regional offices are conditional upon performance or pegged to the annual 
increments received by other institutions, such as the judiciary or public defense.13 
Although this process is not public, the process by which the budget is produced 
can be openly acrimonious. Competitors for funding—such as the National Office 
of Public Defense—allege that their counterparts’ requests are “inflated” and “un-
equal.”14 It is difficult to settle these claims in the absence of common benchmarks 
and transparent information about the budget process.
13 The proposal for 2005 would give the Ministerio Público about a third of what the judiciary will 
receive, and slightly more than the sum designated for the legislature, available at www.dipres.cl.
14 Interview with Sofia Libedinsky, former chief of cabinet of the Office of Public Defense, March 30, 
2003.
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2.3. The status of the Prosecutor General and senior Regional Prosecutors
The Fiscal Nacional is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in a 
special session; the President must select someone from a list of five candidates nom-
inated by the Supreme Court and generated through an open public competition.15 
The Fiscal Nacional can also issue instructions (instructivos) and orders (oficios) to 
prosecutors on the interpretation and application of the law as well as on internal 
organizational matters.16 
The Fiscal is not answerable to any institution within the Ministerio Público.There is 
a General Council (Consejo General), composed of the Regional Directors of Pros-
ecution, which meets at least quarterly.17 The Council is an advisory and consultative 
body. There are no arrangements for voting, and the views expressed by its members 
are not binding. The Council serves as a sounding board for the Fiscal Nacional, and 
a forum at which prosecutors resolve managerial issues (such as how or whether to 
organize special units for money laundering cases), rather than a control mechanism 
for monitoring implementation and compliance with policies.18
Regional Prosecutors: Below the Fiscal Nacional are 16 Regional Directors of Prosecu-
tion, one for each of the twelve regions and four in the Metropolitan Region of San-
tiago. Regional Directors of Prosecution are appointed for a non-renewable period of 
ten years; retirement at age 75 is mandatory.19 The Fiscal Nacional appoints Regional 
Directors from a short list of five applicants forwarded by each regional Court of Ap-
peals following an open public competition.20
The competition in 2004 for the four positions of Regional Director in Santiago was 
controversial. The interviews with candidates were conducted privately by judges on 
the Court of Appeals; this was followed by a public hearing at which, reportedly, no 
questions were posed. Then, instead of holding open competitions for all four posi-
tions simultaneously, which would have maximized the pool of possible candidates, 
the Appeals Court forwarded four nominations to the Fiscal Nacional for each posi-
tion separately. For each position, the Fiscal Nacional picked one candidate, and thus 
the pool of candidates for each subsequent competition only grew by one. In the end, 
the names of no more than six candidates were actually considered.21
15 The current Fiscal was one of 20 applicants for the position, as was the present Minister of Justice.
16 See Section 3.1 below.
17 Ley Orgánica Constitucional del Ministerio Público [Constitutional Law on the   Ministerio Público], 
no.19.640 [hereinafter Law on the Ministerio Público ], Art. 24, 25.
18 See Tercera Cuenta Pública (Apr. 2002), available at www.ministeriopublico.cl (describing issues 
addressed at the Council in 2002).
19 Law on the Ministerio Público, Art. 30.  
20 Law on the Ministerio Público, Art. 29.
21 This account of the process came from a personal interview with one of the unsuccessful candi-
dates.  
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2.4. The status of individual prosecutors
Chief Assistant Prosecutors—that is, prosecutors in charge of offices below the level 
of region—as well as Assistant Prosecutors (fiscales adjuntos) are appointed by the 
Fiscal Nacional upon a motion by a Regional Director of Prosecution. These legal 
officers must be over thirty years of age and have practiced law for at least five years. 
At first glance, they appear to have greater security of tenure than their superiors; As-
sistant Prosecutors enjoy life tenure until the age of 75.22 However, prosecutors may 
be removed from office for negligence or immoral behavior, largely at the discretion 
of their superiors. There is no published information about the number of these of-
ficials who have been removed. 
Line prosecutors are evaluated (calificado) by Regional Prosecutors twice annually, 
often on the basis of a “pre-evaluation” conducted by the Chief Assistant Prosecu-
tor.23 There is no information about the criteria used in these evaluations, although 
interviews with prosecutors suggest that they are invented as they go along.24
Prosecutors may receive an annual bonus of 1.5 times their monthly salary, based 
on collective accomplishments of the office in which they work as a whole. These 
achievements are also measured in administrative terms—such as the installation 
and proper use of case management software systems and the degree of internal orga-
nization. Creating more objective and useful criteria for performance evaluations—
such as the relationship between inputs and outcomes—is an important priority for the 
Management and Research Division of the national office of the prosecution service.25 
In addition to the relatively extensive set of accountability mechanisms to which 
prosecutors’ performance is subject (see next section), prosecutors’ personal politi-
cal liberty is considerably circumscribed. They are prohibited from engaging in any 
political activity, such as union membership or participation in political rallies, other 
than voting.26 Apparently most prosecutors abide by this prohibition.
22 Although the meaning of this provision has yet to be tested in court, it would appear that a senior 
prosecutor could, in the ninth year of his appointment, request to be transferred to the position of 
assistant prosecutor, and thereby receive life tenure. 
23 This account of evaluation rests heavily on interviews conducted by Mirna Goransky, an indepen-
dent Argentinean researcher and senior prosecutor at the Federal Office of the Produraduria Gen-
eral, Argentina (on leave) studying the implementation of the reforms in Chile. Interview, March 
14, 2003. 
24 One prosecutor in a northern region relayed that his boss not only invented the test questions, 
but also established three units of measurement—“above expected performance,” “within ex-
pected performance,” and “below expectations.” Our informant was unsatisfied with the rating he 
received—within expected performance—and unimpressed with the objectivity of the exercise. 
“When I asked the chief why he had ranked me so, he said: ‘When I hired you I thought you were 
the best of the candidates, and you’ve shown that you are the best, so that’s why you’re within ex-
pectations.’” See below, Section 2.5.
25 Interview with Antonio Marangunic, Director of Research and Evaluation, Ministerio Público, San-
tiago, Chile (Nov. 2005).
26 Law on the Ministerio Público, Art. 63.
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2.5. Individual accountability of prosecutors
Prosecutors can be held accountable for their performance in a number of ways. No 
prosecutors are privileged by the special immunity from criminal prosecution en-
joyed by Congressmen or Ministers of State. The only special provision for handling 
criminal accusations made against a prosecutor is that a prosecutor of a higher level 
must direct the investigation. This appears to apply to all criminal actions, whether 
committed in the course of professional duties or outside of them. Prosecutors are 
also subject to disciplinary, civil, and criminal proceedings for actions arising out of 
their work and in their private life, just like any other member of society.27
Disciplinary Proceedings: Prosecutors may be subject to internal disciplinary pro-
ceedings. A Regional Prosecutor can appoint an investigator and then preside over a 
hearing in which he may sanction or remove a prosecutor from office for negligence 
in the execution of formal duties or for “deeply immoral” behavior in private life.28 
If an accusation is made against an assistant prosecutor by a member of the public 
or another official of the Ministerio Público, the supervising Regional Director of 
Prosecution must designate an investigator from among his colleagues and then ad-
judicate the dispute.29 Grounds for dismissal include: physical incapacity; bad behavior 
or manifest incapacity in the exercise of his duties; lack of probity, insults, or grave im-
moral conduct; unjustified absence from work or leave without appropriate prior no-
tification, if it caused grave damage or delay in the administration of justice.30 Possible 
sanctions include private admonition, written censure or reprimand, a fine equivalent 
to half a month’s salary, suspension for up to two months at half pay, and dismissal.
Performance Evaluation: Assistant Prosecutors can be removed from office by a Region-
al Prosecutor for poor performance evaluations. Performance evaluation consists of an 
individual report by the Regional Director, with the collaboration of the Chief Assis-
tant Prosecutor with direct supervisory responsibility. In this report, each prosecutor 
receives a grade on a scale of one to seven in different categories, such as oral and writ-
ten skills, leadership, commitment, punctuality, and professional comportment; the 
grade received greatly influences a prosecutor’s possibilities for career advancement.31 
27 Law on the Ministerio Público, Art. 45–46.
28 Law on the Ministerio Público, Art. 49.
29 Law on the Ministerio Público, Art. 51.
30 The grounds for dismissal of the Regional Directors of Prosecution or the Fiscal Nacional are more 
limited (incapacity, bad behavior or manifest negligence in the exercise of their duties), and the 
procedures by which charges are investigated and adjudicated differ. In the case of an accusation 
against the Fiscal Nacional, a Regional Director of Prosecution is chosen by lottery to oversee the 
proceedings; in the case of an accusation against a Regional Director of Prosecution, another Re-
gional Director is designated by the Fiscal Nacional to oversee the proceedings after prior consulta-
tion with the General Counsel.
31 Interviews with line prosecutors in Temuco and Antofagasta, Chile (May 2003).
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Many prosecutors and several Chief Assistant Prosecutors have complained about 
extreme subjectivity in the performance evaluation process.32 The scale used to as-
sign grades incorporates categories such as “above expected performance” or “below 
expectation.”33 One Chief Assistant Prosecutor alleged that there is “no relationship” 
between the evaluation of administrative performance in these terms and the “out-
comes.” His office ranked first in the country in terms of many critical performance 
indicators, such as speed of disposition, rate of conviction, and incidence of oral tri-
als—aspects of work for which the region was commended by the Fiscal Nacional; 
yet on the individual performance evaluations, his staff was ranked somewhere in 
the middle. 
There is no official data about the incidence of criminal, civil, or disciplinary proceed-
ings against prosecutors, but it appears they are rare. In one case in the 9th Region, 
an assistant prosecutor was dismissed because his annual qualification grade was 
sufficiently low to recommend dismissal; his grade was based on several complaints 
presented by defense attorneys due to his handling of cases.34 This assistant prosecu-
tor filed a constitutional claim against the decision (recurso de protección) because of 
the absence of a prior disciplinary proceeding.
The possibility that this accountability regime and procedures for appointing pros-
ecutors would encourage subservience aroused concern when the Ministerio Público 
was established. For example, a former President of the Supreme Court worried about 
the ability of the state to investigate the Fiscal Nacional for possible criminal behavior 
because one of his direct subordinates would be responsible for deciding whether or 
not to open a case and how to proceed.35 However, while the procedures for removal 
(and appointment) create a potential for individual dependency, the possibility of 
such manifest corruption is probably mitigated by the strength of civil society, the 
legal profession, and the independent media. As many of the original legal scholars 
who backed the reforms now observe, the press is vigilant in reporting on all manner 
of personnel changes within the prosecution service.
2.6. Training
There are no mandatory training (capacitación) requirements for prosecutors. Before 
the introduction of the reforms, the Ministerio Público organized a series of short 
trainings, two to three weeks long, for each prospective prosecutor. Reportedly, the 
instruction was formulaic and didactic, which is typical of the system of legal in-
struction;36 much of this training consisted of the exchange of documents rather than 
in-person communication.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See supra note 30. 
36 See Andres Baytelman, Capacitación como futbol, in IX Apuntes de Derecho (2002), at 22–31, 
also available at http://www.cejamericas.org/doc/documentos/DocCap.Futbol-A.Baytelman.pdf#s
earch=%22Capacitaci%C3%B3n%20como%20futbol%22.
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This is an issue on which the Director of Human Resources of the Ministerio Pú-
blico acknowledges there is “room for improvement,”37 and there are now a host 
of formal academic courses, on-the-job trainings, and refresher courses offered to 
improve the training of prosecutors; some of these are offered through the Judicial 
Academy, and some are offered through seminars organized by CEJA.38 Some con-
tinuing education is mandatory.
III. Functions and Powers of Prosecutors
3.1. Prosecutorial functions in criminal justice
Prosecutors have a near monopoly on bringing charges in court. There are certain 
instances in which the Ministerio Público cannot commence investigations or pros-
ecutions without a victim’s consent and formal complaint,39 and there is also a small 
class of cases in which the participation of the Ministerio in criminal proceedings is 
prohibited.40 In all other circumstances, however, the Ministerio’s control over pros-
ecution is nearly complete.41
The Ministerio Público is required diligently to prosecute all cases it has commenced. 
However, this “compulsory principle” (“obligatoreidad” or “legalidad”) functions 
more as a recommendation than a rule,42 and prosecutors routinely exercise consid-
erable discretion on whether or not and how to proceed with cases. Prosecution is 
compulsory only for offenses punishable by more than two years in jail, and even this 
obligation only obtains if prosecutors decide to bring such charges, rather than lesser 
ones or none at all. Indeed, the most contentious aspect of the reforms was the power 
conferred on prosecutors to dispose of criminal complaints in a variety of adminis-
trative ways without judicial review.
Administrative disposition: Prosecutors use three main types of decisions to dispose 
of cases without charges: conditional dismissal (archivo provisional), the expediency 
37 Interview with the Director of Human Resources,       Ministerio Público, in Santiago, Chile (May 2003).
38 See examples of course curricula at the website of the Center for the Study of Justice in the Ameri-
cas, at www.cejamericas.org.
39 These include cases of domestic violence, revelation of industrial or commercial secrets, and a lim-
ited category of injuries (lesiones). See Código Penal [Penal Code] [hereinafter Penal Code], Art. 399, 
494. Withdrawal of a complaint in these cases only also results in the termination of prosecution.
40 For example, only private citizens can launch prosecutions in cases of slander (calumnia), insult 
(injuria), and forced marriages of minors, as well as certain bank-related crimes (the issuance of a 
check without sufficient cash).
41 This is balanced by the rarely used right of victims in all cases, and of organizations acting in the 
“public interest” in some cases, to act as private prosecutors (querellante y acusador particular) in 
parallel with the Ministerio or even replacing the state prosecutor, with the autorization of the judge.
42 See Mauricio Duce �� Cristián Riego, Introducción al nuevo sistema procesal penal, Volumen 1 (2002), 
at 171–194. See also Julia Fonda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A Comparative Study (1995).
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principle (principio de oportunidad), and a decision not to initiate an investigation 
(facultad de no iniciar investigación).43 Called “administrative outcomes,”44 these 
measures are used when there is insufficient information to proceed or insufficient 
evidence to warrant a charge or expect successful further investigation or prosecu-
tion, when the conduct is not a criminal offense, or when prosecution is not in the 
public interest. The principio de oportunidad and the facultad de no investigar are final 
decisions, and the facultad de no investigar requires judicial approval.45 Victims can 
ask the prosecutor to review a conditional dismissal, although such requests are not 
binding, and prosecutors can later reopen cases.  Courts can also overturn these deci-
sions upon the petition of a victim. However, it appears to be rare for victims to make 
such appeals, and even rarer for prosecutors to reverse their decisions.46 Between 
two-thirds and three-quarters of all cases terminate in one of these three ways.47
Initially, much of this discretion was rigidly controlled through national-level in-
structivos, and prosecutors were uncertain about how to use their authority. There 
was considerable volatility in the portfolio of dispositions, and also a substantial in-
crease in the share of administrative dispositions between the first and second year 
of the reforms.48 Measured as a proportion of all closed cases, the proportion of these 
outcomes among all dispositions rose from 70 percent in 2001 to 78 percent in 2002. 
Proportionally, the greatest rate of growth was in the disposition that required con-
sent from a judicial authority—the decision not to initiate an investigation.49 These 
and other data suggest that it took at least a year for prosecutors to gain the confi-
dence to make decisions that involved judicial review.
Diversion: Prosecutors can also elect not to file charges and divert cases that in their 
judgment do not warrant formal prosecution. Prosecutors may dispose of a case fol-
lowing a restorative agreement concerning restitution to the victim (acuerdo repara-
torio), or may conditionally suspend proceedings upon a suspect’s promise to fulfill 
certain requirements over a period of time (suspension condicional); in the latter case, 
judicial authorization is required. Yet while penalties can be imposed for non-com-
pliance, there is no affirmative obligation on the prosecutor to secure or monitor 
compliance, and few resources or other means by which to do it. 
43 There is also the “decision not to continue” (facultad de no perseverar), which resembles the deci-
sion to archive a case after a judicial authority has intervened. See Código de Procedimiento Penal 
[Code of Criminal Procedure] [hereinafter Code of Criminal Procedure], Art. 249.
44 In Andr�s Baytelman �� Mauricio Duce,     Evaluación de la Reforma Procesal Penal. Estado de una 
reforma en marcha (2003) these dispositions are called “     desestimaciones” (“non-prosecutions”). The 
Ministerio Público uses the terms “administrative outcome” (salida administrativa) or “prerogative 
dispositions” (terminos faculativos).
45 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 168.
46 No data on the frequency with which victims object to these decisions either formally or informally 
is available; interviews with prosecutors suggest it is uncommon.
47 Baytelman �� Duce, supra note 44, at 244. Because these outcomes are the norm, it is odd to refer to 
them as “exceptions” to the legality principle. See Duce �� Riego, supra note 42, at 195
48 See Table 2 in Section VI below.
49 For example, in the 4th Region, between the third quarters of 2001 and 2002, there was a 370 per-
cent growth in the use of archive provisional and a 505 percent increase in the use of facultad de 
no iniciar investigacion. See Ministerio Público, Tercer Trimestre, 2002: Información Estadística del 
Ministerio Público (2002), at 11.
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Prosecutors do not divert a large proportion of cases, although the share is grow-
ing. One year into the reform, 1.3 percent of cases closed in the calendar year had 
been diverted, either through a conditional suspension or restorative agreements. 
Toward the end of 2001, the Fiscal Nacional issued an instruction relaxing the rules 
governing diversion and eliminating several conditions, including the requirement 
that a prosecutor obtain a report from the prison administration before approving a 
conditional suspension. By the end of 2002, 2.3 percent of all cases closed were dis-
posed of through diversionary agreements.50 This rate has grown steadily since then. 
Conditional suspension alone accounted for 3.8 percent of all dispositions in the first 
half of 2004.51 
Case Distribution and Assignment: Case distribution is largely left to the discretion 
of each Chief Assistant Prosecutor, who is encouraged to distribute cases according 
to “objective criteria” such as level of experience and specialization.52 As a conse-
quence, practice varies according to location, office composition, and the individual 
personalities involved. In offices that organize prosecutorial staff according to of-
fense type, with separate units for homicide, robbery, and sex and drug offenses, this 
distribution is straightforward; in small offices of this kind, where there is only one 
prosecutor for each type of offense, there is little room for selective distribution. In 
larger offices, however, and in units where the division of labor is not shaped by of-
fense type, there is room for selectivity. In the 9th Region, for example, the executive 
director of the regional service encourages distribution of cases according to a scale 
of “complexity” as well as the “productivity” of individual prosecutors.53
The power to reassign cases is also a potential influence on prosecutorial behavior. 
The Fiscal Nacional can assume control of a case that has initially been assigned to a 
Regional Prosecutor. It does not appear that he can reassign a case from one prosecu-
tor within a region to another, however, and even if it was legally possible to do so, this 
kind of involvement could only take place with the help of the Regional Director. 
Guided Instruction: The Fiscal Nacional can issue instructions to lower-level prosecu-
tors on the application of the law.54 Conceived of as guidance (orientación), this in-
fluence takes the form of instructions (instructivos) and orders (oficios), which cover 
specific issues regarding organization of labor inside the Ministerio Público,55 but also 
extend to general matters of legal interpretation. They are typically published and 
have both persuasive and binding authority. Prosecutors generally feel that these in-
structions are not merely guiding, but rather have been issued in response to a deci-
sion with which the Fiscal Nacional disagreed.56
50 Compendio Estadístico, Ministerio Público (Feb. 2003), at 9. 
51 See the statistical report of activities for the first half of 2004, available at www.minpublico.cl.
52 Law on the Ministerio Público, Art. 40.  
53 Interview with Antonio Marangunic, then executive director of the Prosecution Service for the 9th 
Region (Mar. 2003).
54 For a list of the “instructions” (instructivos) issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see www.ministeriopu-
blico.cl/index.asp
55 For example, the Fiscal Nacional has used instructions to clarify the rules and responsibilities of 
lower level prosecutors when they are summoned to appear in civil trials as witnesses.
56 See Duce �� Riego, supra note 42.
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For example, in one instruction from October 2000—that is, prior to the commence-
ment of any official prosecutions under the reformed system—the Fiscal Nacional 
sought to shape the conception of the prosecutorial role, telling prosecutors that, 
contrary to what “some authors” had suggested, the legal duties and obligations with 
respect to victims should not be “interpreted as converting prosecutors into lawyers 
for victims.”57 Although not considered jurisprudence or included in that section of 
the Ministerio Público’s website, this kind of instruction blurs the distinction between 
advice and command. 
The volume of such instruction is considerable. Although the exact number of these 
instructions is unclear, the orders and instructions are generally lengthy, discursive 
documents, full of exhortation, direction, and stipulation of desired behavior. It 
would take further research to determine whether this guidance is becoming more 
common, more precise, or less didactic, or to measure the impact it has on prosecu-
tors’ disposition and decisions.
3.2. Relationship with the judge at the pre-trial stage
After the period of military rule, during which many people were executed or de-
tained for long periods of time without the right to communicate with family mem-
bers, there was a strong interest in reducing the risk of abuse in pre-trial justice. One 
of the centerpieces of the reform therefore concerned a “shift in the paradigm” of 
preventive detention.58
The new code of criminal procedure introduced a presumption against detention 
that can be rebutted by a prosecutor upon a showing that alternative measures are 
insufficient to “assure a completion of proceedings” or to protect “the victim and so-
ciety” from further danger, or that detention is “indispensable” to conducting certain 
aspects of the investigation. A judge may order pretrial detention if the information 
presented confirms the existence of a crime and “allows a grounded presumption” 
that the accused committed the offense.59 However, such detention is restricted to 
serious crimes through a “proportionality” requirement, although there is no clearly 
defined penal threshold.60 The new code also introduced a wide array of non-custo-
dial measures of restraint (medidas cautelares) that would ensure the completion of 
proceedings, the safety of victims and society, and the proper conduct of investiga-
tions without detention. 
These measures should reduce the discretion available to prosecutors in the suspect’s 
favor and give judges relatively more power in the decision-making process. Two 
57 See Oficio of Oct. 12, 2000, no.143, available at www.minpublico.cl.
58 See Duce �� Riego, supra note 42, at 244–245; Cristián Riego, The Chilean Criminal Procedure 
Reform (1997) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison) (on file with the Law 
Library, University of Wisconsin, Madison), at 8, 36–40 (analyzing legislation under the old pretrial 
detention system).
59 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 140. 
60 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 141. 
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recent studies both concluded that there has been a “diminution” in the incidence of 
pre-trial detention as well as a “substantial rationalization” in its use; however, nei-
ther study has a sufficient empirical basis to allow a confident interpretation of trends 
in pre-trial detention.61 Without a more clearly defined methodology, the Ministerio 
Público’s data will not contribute to meaningful assessment of the reforms’ effects.62 
3.3. Powers outside the criminal justice system
The Ministerio Público has authority only in matters of criminal prosecution; the only 
role of the Ministerio is to assist victims of crime and to investigate and prosecute of-
fenders. Some of the functions performed by a procuracy in other states are delegated 
to a council for the “defense of the state,” and to attorneys in municipal governments. 
 
IV. Relationship of the Prosecution Service  
to Other Organs of the State
4.1. The constitutional location of the prosecution service
Chile is a presidential republic. The President serves as both chief of state and head 
of the government for a period of six years and has considerable direct authority. The 
president appoints ministers to serve in a government to which he or she condition-
ally and partially delegates the administration of the affairs of state. Of the officials 
appointed by the President, only the members of the Supreme Court and the Direc-
tor of the Prosecution Service must be confirmed by the legislature.
Despite its name, the Ministerio Público it is not a cabinet ministry. Nor is it part of 
the executive. Instead, it is a separate state institution with a distinct constitutional 
identity.63 This arrangement has given the Ministerio Público considerable autonomy, 
61 The first study found that, depending on the region, the total number of detainees in 2002 was 
between 23 and 38 percent less than in 2000. See Patricia Arias Barriga �� Gabriel Rios Escobar, 
Libertad Provisional y Prisión Preventiva, in 5 Revista de Estudios Criminológicas y Peniten-
ciarios  (November 2002), at 120. The second study found that prosecutors requested pre-trial 
detention in approximately one-third of all cases in which a suspect had been identified, and that 
about 15 percent of all accused are actually placed in pre-trial detention. Baytelman �� Duce, supra 
note 44, at 190–191. Judges granted orders of detention in 90 percent of the applications, although 
this rate varied from a low of 41 percent to 100 percent. See Anuario Estadístico 2004, available at 
www.ministeriopublico.cl.
62 See Vera Institute of Justice, Measuring Progress toward Safety and Justice: A Global Guide to the 
Design of Performance Indicators across the Justice Sector (2003), available at http://www.vera.org/ 
publication_pdf/207_404.pdf.
63 The legislature created the Ministerio Público by constitutional law (Law on the Ministerio Público) 
on October 15, 1999. The Constitution now has a separate chapter for the Ministerio Público (6a), 
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but, as this report shows, has also limited its influence in the justice system overall, as 
well as its operational capacity to some degree.
The institutional isolation of the Ministerio Público was not part of the original con-
stitutional design. In the first proposal presented to the legislature, the Ministerio Pú-
blico was to be a part of the judiciary, as it is in Columbia and Paraguay, for example. 
But there was substantial concern that the influence of the judiciary might itself com-
promise the autonomy of the prosecution service.64 One example of this influence is 
that, both in the original plan and in reality, the Supreme Court today produces a list 
of the candidates from which the President nominates the Fiscal Nacional. Another 
contaminant that reformers wanted to avoid was the bureaucratic administration of 
the courts, widely perceived as lethargic and inflexible institutions. Yet there was 
equal concern that the administration of the laws would be too vulnerable to political 
direction if the Chief Prosecutor were to report to and receive instructions from the 
Minister of Justice. The resolution of these concerns was to insulate the prosecution 
service from the powers of both the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice.
4.2. Relationship with the legislature
The constitutional provisions regarding the Ministerio Público largely insulate it from in-
terference by the legislature. Only the upper house, the Senate, has any direct influence, 
through its power to approve or reject the President’s nomination of the Fiscal Nacional, 
and even this influence is only momentary. The Fiscal is appointed for a non-renewable 
period of eight years,65 and during his tenure is not otherwise directly accountable.
The lower house, the Congress of Deputies, has some indirect statutory authority 
over the Ministerio Público in four ways: legislation; the budget; solicitation of in-
formation about current practices; and the initiation of impeachment proceedings 
against its National or Regional Directors.
Legislation:  There are only a few examples of the legislature introducing new laws 
that limit or circumvent the authority and discretion of prosecutors or judges. One 
early proposal, for example, which surfaced in 2004, would have eliminated the re-
quirement that prosecutors obtain prior authorization from the owner of a house or 
the “control judge” (juez de garantía) to search houses when in pursuit of a suspect.66 
More recently, concerns about what some scholars called “automatism” in the ap-
plication of the law on pretrial detention caused the legislature to consider a contro-
versial draft bill, originally submitted by the government, that would simplify and 
shoe-horned in between the Judiciary (chapter 6) and the Constitutional Court (chapter 7).
64 See Mauricio Duce, ¿Qué significa un Ministerio Público Autónomo?: Problemas y perspectivas en el 
caso chileno, IX Apuntes de Derecho 10 (2001), at 9.
65 The original term of appointment was 10 years. See Law on the   Ministerio Público, Art. 16. A revi-  
sion of this law in November 2005 reduced the term to 8 years. 
66 See the description of draft laws recommended by the Commission of Experts established by the 
legislature in November 2003 in Documento de la Comision nombrada para revisar y evaluar la 
marcha y funcionamento del nuevo sustema de enjuiciamento criminal (2003), available at http://
www.cejamericas.org/doc/documentos/cl-expertos-rpp.pdf [hereinafter Documento].
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expedite searches and seizures and obviate judicial control of law enforcement.
Budget: Every year, the Ministerio Público receives a “preliminary framework” budget 
from the Treasury, or Ministerio Hacienda, from which it develops a more specific re-
quest and justification for planned expenditures. The Fiscal Nacional and his execu-
tive director then negotiate directly with the Treasury before submitting a proposal 
to the legislature, which may make changes to the budget before it is introduced into 
law.  According to the Deputy Director of the Budget Department in the Ministerio 
Público, for none of the past five years has the total sum been reduced from previous 
years, even though within the budget, some items were cut because certain expendi-
tures were not made.67  
Impeachment: The legislature can initiate impeachment proceedings against senior 
prosecutors. Upon a motion of ten of its 120 members, the Chamber of Deputies 
(lower house of the Congress) can request the Supreme Court to consider removing 
the National or Regional Directors of the prosecution service for “incompetence, bad 
behavior, or negligence.”68 The Court must convene specially for such a proceeding, 
and may order a removal by a vote of 12 of its 21 judges. This arrangement appears 
to be an adequate remedy against gross injustice or manifestly arbitrary behavior 
on the part of prosecutors, but it has limited ability to prospectively influence the 
work of the Fiscal Nacional. First, the range of offenses for which such a proceeding 
is authorized is short but broad and general, and their meaning is not explained in 
greater detail in jurisprudence.  Second, the members of the Court themselves create 
the original list of candidates from which the President makes a nomination, and 
thus may already have approved the particular prosecutor whose proposed removal 
is before them. The impeachment provision, in short, is not an intimidating check on 
the power of the prosecutor.
Soliciting Information: The Ministerio Público is not required to submit an annual 
report to the legislature. Instead, it produces an annual report (cuenta publica) for the 
general public. The report must include “relevant statistics” and information on ex-
penditures, but there is no other Congressional guidance as to its contents.69 The leg-
islature can also solicit information about the Ministerio Público’s work; state agencies 
such as the Ministerio Público are obliged to respond to such requests, and Congress 
can also establish special investigative commissions for this purpose.70 However, the 
legislature has apparently never used this authority, and it is not clear what type of 
information the legislature can subpoena: whether, for example, it can obtain records 
of directions given by prosecutors to investigators or investigation notes.71
67 Interview with Paulina Salineras, Deputy Director of the Budget Department of the Ministerio Pú-
blico, November 30, 2005.
68 Constituciones Politicás de Chile [Political Constitution of Chile] [hereinafter         Constitution of the 
Republic of Chile], Art. 80.
69 Law on the   Ministerio Público, Art. 21.
70 Ley Orgánica Constitucional del Congreso Nacional [Constitutional Law on the National Congress], 
no.18.918, Sec. 1, Art. 9; Reglamento Cámara de Diputados [Rules on the Chamber of Deputies] 
[hereinafter Rules of the Chamber of Deputies], Sec. 3, Art. 293, 299. 
71 Rules of the Chamber of Deputies, Sec. 3, Art. 293, 299.
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The legislature may also influence the Ministerio Público indirectly, such as by shap-
ing public opinion. For example, in October 2003, the President of the Senate’s Com-
mission on the Constitution, Legislation, and Justice suggested that the reform was 
not adequately “responding to the expectations it created.”72 Statements such as these, 
associated with public insecurity and fear of crime, can trigger substantial political 
reaction. In this case, the comments coincided with the creation of a public com-
mission to review the reforms, which, among other things, chastised the Ministerio 
Público for an absence of “leadership.”73 While this complaint did not result in any 
specific action, it may have had a general effect: the prosecution service has more 
recently tried to articulate a role for itself in discussions of public safety.74 
4.3. Relationship with the executive
The executive has very little direct authority over the Ministerio Público. The Presi-
dent nominates the Fiscal Nacional from a list of five candidates prepared by the 
Supreme Court.75 However, the President does not have any continuing authority 
over the Fiscal, and has few formal or public means by which to convey his views to 
the prosecution service.
There is a National Commission for the Coordination of the Reform, in which repre-
sentatives from all legal institutions participate and which the President has chaired 
on one occasion. But the President cannot instruct the Fiscal Nacional, and since the 
Commission’s meetings are public, the forum is a venue for resolving institutional 
disputes. The Commission is neither designed nor used to shape binding policy, and 
any guidance that emerges from meetings at this forum is political and persuasive.
A more regular forum for communicating the interests of the executive is the Coor-
dinating Committee (unidad coordinadora) for the Reform located within the Minis-
try of Justice. The Fiscal Nacional is, ex officio, a member of this Committee and the 
Ministerio Público is regularly invited to deliver reports and share information. But 
the Fiscal is under no legal obligation to attend these meetings, and no repercussions 
result if the Ministerio does not share information. The Ministerio has at times been 
reluctant to share information with the Committee; it took several years for a statis-
tical annex (anuario) to be produced,76 and reportedly, it was easier to obtain data 
from the police than from the Ministerio.
The Ministerio Público in turn has only limited formal authority over executive agen-
cies. All government agencies are obliged to provide information solicited by the Minis-
72 Diez juristas integran comision de la reforma, El Mercurio, Oct. 23, 2003, at 1.
73 The report considered the Ministerio Público to have confused the concepts of independence and 
passivity and urged it to play a “decisive and protagonistic” (protagónico y decidido) role in the 
future. See Documento, supra note 66, at 18, 60.
74 In November 2004, the Ministerio Público created an internal commission for the elaboration of 
public policies in the sphere of public safety.
75 Constitution of the Republic of Chile, Art. 32; Law on the Ministerio Público, Art. 1.
76 The compendium is available on the website of Paz Ciudadana at www.pazciudadana.cl.
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terio “without delay.”77 If an agency deems the documents secret, and thus not subject to 
subpoena, a senior prosecutor can ask the Court of Appeals to resolve the dispute. If the 
government argues that release or publication of the information might compromise 
national security, the Supreme Court may intervene and settle the dispute. Without a 
constitutional crisis or other test of the relationships between judiciary, prosecution, 
and executive, it is difficult to measure the extent of this authority in practice.  
4.4. Relationship with the police
There are two main policing institutions in Chile, the Military Police (Carabineros) 
and the Civil Police (Policia Civil or Investigaciones). The Carabineros are part of the 
Ministry of Defense, but report to the Ministry of the Interior on matters of public 
safety78 and, with the exception of crimes and offenses observed directly by police 
officers, must be authorized by the prosecution service prior to conducting inves-
tigations. The Civil Police are responsible for conducting investigations into major 
criminal cases and are directed in this capacity by the Ministerio Público. The Civil 
Police can also be directed by the Ministerio Público to collect additional information 
in cases of lesser crimes, such as public order offenses, on which the Ministerio Pú-
blico proceeds to trial. The Ministerio Público has no authority over the appointment, 
training, and professional advancement of police officers or investigators. These 
agencies largely operate independently from one another.
Still, prosecutors have substantial powers in the investigation of cases and thus over 
the conduct of the police in individual cases. The police are formally an “auxiliary” 
to the Ministerio Público, and police investigators must comply with all instructions 
and guidance given by prosecutors.79 Furthermore, the police are required to forward 
all reports of crime to the Ministerio;80 this usually takes place within 24 hours, and 
there is little reason to believe that cases are not reported.81 Prosecutors can also initi-
ate cases directly upon receipt of a victim complaint, and they can “directly exercise the 
functions of investigation” in some cases, interviewing witnesses, seizing documents, 
and securing information. In practice, however, most investigative work is completed 
by the time a prosecutor is apprised of a case, as the police are obliged to undertake 
swift action upon receipt of a complaint of a crime. In cases with few leads, prosecutors 
merely formalize the absence of evidence or the possibility of proceeding further in an 
administrative decision to suspend work on the case, or archive it provisionally.
Other organs of the state also have investigative powers. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has both investigative and quasi-judicial authority in certain areas. In cases of 
administrative infractions (faltas), the IRS works inquisitorially, much as an admin-
istrative agency, first investigating and then adjudicating its own findings, and, where 
77 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 19.
78 A proposed constitutional amendment would place the Carabineros directly under the Ministry of 
the Interior. See Diez juristas integran comision de la reforma, El Mercurio, Oct. 23, 2003, at 1.
79 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 79.
80 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 84.
81 Interviews with prosecutors in Antofagasta and Temuco, Chile (May 2003).
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expedient, applying monetary penalties. In cases involving allegations of tax crime, 
where the applicable sanction might involve a period of deprivation of liberty, the di-
rector of the service must first file a complaint (denuncia or querella) with the police; 
the agency then exercises the “rights and roles” that the Code of Criminal Procedure 
assigns to a victim. In deciding whether or not to proceed with a criminal complaint, 
the service has the power to search and seize accounting books and related docu-
ments of juridical entities. Such invasive measures can be appealed to a court, but only 
if a prior decision has been made that the offense under investigation is a crime.82 
4.5. Relationship with the judiciary
The Ministerio Público and the judiciary are completely separate. Each has its own 
budget and administrative apparatus, and prosecutors and judges have separate ca-
reer paths and distinct professional cultures. Nevertheless, the judiciary has consid-
erable power to shape the Ministerio and the conduct of prosecutions, and the rela-
tionship between the judiciary and the Ministerio Público is at times strained.83
The Supreme Court plays an important role in selecting the Fiscal Nacional. The 
Court supervises the open public competition for the Fiscal and produces a list of 
five finalists on the basis of an examination process it alone controls.84 Judges also 
routinely chastise prosecutors in court for shortcomings in their work, and some-
times they ignore the sentencing recommendations offered by prosecutors in sum-
mary proceedings, where defendants have acknowledged guilt, presumably upon the 
promise of a particular punishment.85
Senior judges and prosecutors enjoy slightly different security of tenure. Whereas 
judges serve indefinitely upon good behavior, both the Fiscal Nacional and the Fiscales 
Regionales serve ten-year non-renewable terms, and must retire at age 75. Also, unlike 
judges, prosecutors’ work is reviewed annually by their superiors. Compensation levels 
are, however, virtually identical: The Fiscal Nacional receives the same remuneration as 
the President of the Supreme Court, and all other prosecutors’ salaries are equivalent to 
those of judges at the same level of administrative hierarchy and service grade.
There is no formal prohibition against prosecutors becoming judges or vice versa, 
but a candidate for a judgeship must first complete a semester of study in the judicial 
academy, a requirement that discourages most prosecutors from such a transfer.86 
82 See Código Tributario [Tax Code], Art. 161(10). 
83 A former President of the Supreme Court has criticized the Ministerio for combining too many 
powers within one agency, noting that “there are no analogues anywhere in the world.” See Presi-
dente de la Corte Suprema reitera críticas a Fiscalía Nacional, La Segunda, July 26, 2002. This 
may have been as much a personal and institutional as a constitutional critique: before 2000, the 
Supreme Court was first without equals, and its pre-eminent position has been marginally reduced 
by the strengthening of an autonomous prosecution service. 
84 As noted, the President then selects the Fiscal, and the Senate approves the candidate.
85 Interview with Francesco Ljubetic, then Chief Prosecutor of the City of Villarica, currently Chief 
Prosecutor for the 9th Region (Mar. 2003).
86 There have been several instances of judges being appointed Fiscales Regionales, but apparently no 
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There are also informal barriers to such transfers: At lower levels of the justice sys-
tem, prosecutors and judges have professional but rarely cordial relationships; most 
judges are much older than line prosecutors, and there appear to be very different 
cultures in these two institutions. The prestige of the new prosecution service has yet 
to equal the cultural authority of the judge.
V. Publicizing the Prosecution Service’s Activities
At the national level, public relations—shaping and responding to public expecta-
tions—is perhaps the weakest aspect of the Ministerio Público. It is nearly impossible 
to gauge the public’s perception of the work of the Ministerio Público. There are no 
national studies of people’s attitudes toward the reform or the Ministerio in particu-
lar.87 There are also no studies of the public’s expectations of the reforms;88 evaluation 
of the reforms remains the province of experts, whose criteria of evaluation may not 
coincide with the concerns and interests of the general public.89
The reputation of the Ministerio Público among many legal professionals today is as 
a capable but isolated institution: skilled, technocratic, and aloof. This reputation 
may be a reflection of the personality and politics of the current Fiscal Nacional, 
Guillermo Piedrabuena Richard, as much as a consequence of constitutional design: 
Piedrabuena Richard is described by people who know and work with him as a per-
son who does not like public attention or criticism.90
Internal reviews of the work of subdivisions of the Ministerio Público—such as the 
unit for assisting victims and witnesses—have generally found high levels of satis-
faction, but these studies have not probed the reasons that victims are satisfied.91 
For example, they have not discovered whether victim satisfaction is linked to the 
treatment they received or how the offender was punished. Also, these studies did 
not investigate the extent to which positive victim experiences are reported to others 
and what effect, if any, they have on perceptions of public safety and justice among 
instances of prosecutors joining the judiciary.
87 The legislature’s blue ribbon commission reported findings only on public knowledge of the existence 
of the reforms and whether or not the public “agrees” with them. See Documento, supra note 66.
88 On popular perceptions of justice before the reforms, see Luis Barros Lezaeta, Opiniones y experi-
enceias de los sectores populares urbanos en torno a la justicia (1997).
89 Most studies by local researchers as well as international observers have judged the reforms in posi-
tive terms. See Baytelman �� Duce, supra note 44, at 233, 243; Documento, supra note 66, at 10. See 
also Cristián Riego, Informe comparativo: Proyecto seguimiento de los procesos de feforma judicial 
en América Latina (Oct. 2004), available at www.cejamericas.org/proyectos/inf_comp.pdf; Andres 
Ritter �� Detlev Achhammer, Evaluación de la Reforma Procesal Penal Chilena: Desde la perspective 
del sistema Alemán (2003) (study financed by the German Society for Technical Cooperation).
90 See Duce, supra note 64.
91 The author had an opportunity to study these unpublished reports by the Division of Research and 
Division of Attention to Victims during his visits to the Ministerio Público.
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citizens more broadly.92 Just as some prosecution services conceive of the task of 
delivering justice in narrow terms of detection and incapacitation, the notion of the 
“public” served by the Ministerio Público has remained quite limited.
In the first years of the reform, the Ministerio had only a spokesman, who conceived 
of the role as projecting the voice and views of the Fiscal Nacional rather than absorb-
ing public concerns and relaying them to the service. The spokesman was often put in 
awkward positions, since the press had critical questions, especially upon discovery 
of acquittals in cases of homicides.93
The Ministerio Público now has a national Department of Communications. Together 
with the library and Office of Documentation, it issues a quarterly with new juris-
prudence—certain decisions by lower and higher courts are published in full—along 
with essays by senior staff of the Ministerio and results of studies completed by the 
Division of Research.94 It also issues other periodic publications, as well as educa-
tional brochures and videos on how the new system of justice operates, and handles 
most requests from the media for information. However, the Department remains a 
primarily reactive organization,95 and the position of Director of Communications 
has changed hands several times.
The Ministerio Público is obliged to deliver an annual report (cuenta publica) to the 
general public each April.96 To date, there have been three annual reports, the most 
recent released in April 2004. Read out loud in person by the Fiscal Nacional, the 
report is a long narrative account of legal developments: it contains few meaningful 
statistical indicators concerning practices or the outcomes of its work,97 although it is 
supposed to include “relevant statistics” and information on expenditures.98
At the regional and local levels, by contrast, innovative practices have been adopted 
in communications and public relations. Many of the Regional Directors of Prosecu-
tion have used one of their two allotted advisor positions to create a press officer and 
mobile public relations office. Some city level prosecutors have taken further steps, 
without additional resources, to communicate to the public the significance of the 
work of the Ministerio. For example, the Chief Assistant Prosecutor in the city of An-
tofagasta issues regular bulletins to community organizations about crime patterns; 
sometimes, as the author had an opportunity to observe personally during a visit to 
this prosecutor’s office, the information is based on analysis of cases the Ministerio 
dismissed without charges, a fact that many prosecutors prefer not to discuss.
92 See Ministerio Público, Percepción y satisfacción de los usuarios de las unidades regionales de aten-
ción de víctimas y testigos, sobre la atención entregada en la IV y IX regiones(Sept. 2002) (unpub-
lished study); Ministerio Público, Percepción y opinión de victimas sobre la atención y protección 
brindada por el Ministerio Público (Dec. 2002) (unpublished study by SUR, a non-governmental 
research organization).
93 See Duce, supra note 64.
94 See Anuario Estadístico 2004, available at www.ministeriopublico.cl.
95 Interview with first director of Department of Communications at the Ministerio Público.
96 Law on the Ministerio Público, Art. 21.
97 See, e.g., Anuario Estadístidico del Ministerio Público 2005, available at www.ministeriopublico.cl. 
98 Law on the Ministerio Público, Art. 21.
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VI. Statistics and Appendices
An abundance of quantitative information about the reformed system of justice is 
available to the researcher. The Research Division of the Ministerio Público produces 
quarterly unpublished reviews containing basic information about the administra-
tion of justice. These bulletins record the numbers of cases that enter and leave the 
system in a particular time frame, the types of cases and character of reported of-
fenses (homicide, robbery, rape, etc.), and the proportion of cases that have been 
dealt with. Substantial attention is paid in these reports also to the type of disposi-
tion—for example, what proportion of cases was dismissed or provisionally archived, 
was resolved upon a decision of a judicial body, or culminated in a trial. These bul-
letins also report the incidence of the use of restrictive measures prior to adjudica-
tion, the number of preventive detentions ordered, and the number of oral trials and 
their outcomes. Much of this information is reported by region, which, deliberately 
or not, invites comparisons and some competition between Regional Directors of 
Prosecution.
The Ministry of Justice also produces an annual compendium (anuario) of justice 
statistics,99 which collates data gathered and reported by the various justice agencies 
(police, prisons, prosecution, and other auxiliary services). However, like the bulle-
tins published by the Ministerio Público, the compendium is not designed to address 
the quality of justice, and it does not measure data against norms or benchmarks; it 
is not designed or used as a tool of assessment and accountability, and it is therefore 
difficult to draw conclusions from this data about the qualitative performance of the 
justice system.
Crime, Victimization, and Public Safety
Crime is an important public concern in Chile. Public opinion polls regularly record 
anxiety about crime as one the top three civic concerns, usually just behind health 
and education. There is an abundance of data on levels of crime, victimization, and 
fear of crime, and most data show a steady rise in the level of reported crime; the 
ability to respond to crime has become a central issue in discussions of the reforms. 
Ministry of the Interior data shows a rapid rise in the rate of reported crime and 
also in the incidence of arrests.100 Between 1997 and 2002, the number of reported 
“index” crimes increased by 77 percent, and the number of arrests for such offenses 
increased by 108 percent, as  Table 1 illustrates.
99 The compendium series, Anuario de estadisticas criminals, is available at www.pazciudadana.cl.
100 The data is published on the Ministry’s website, at www.seguridadciudadana.gob.cl.
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Table 1. Reported Index Crimes (denuncias) and Arrests (detenciones)101
Reported index offenses and arrests, in thousands and year-on-year percentage change, 
3rd quarter totals, 1997-2002
1997 1998      1999 2000 2001 2002
# # % ∆ # % ∆ # % ∆ # % ∆ # % ∆
Offenses 44.1 43.8 -0.1 50.2 14.6 57.9 15.2 67.0 15.8 78.0 16.4
Arrests 17.3 16.8 -0.3 23.7 40.9 27.0 14.3 31.9 18.3 36.1 12.8
Source: Division of Public Safety, Ministry of the Interior, Chile, www.seguridadciudadana.gob.cl
Note: Numbers in thousands rounded to nearest tenth
Levels of reported crime are not the same as levels of victimization; for example, 
61.8 percent of persons victimized in Chile in 2002 did not report the incident to the 
police.102 Fear of crime appears to be growing as well. Such indicators are of course 
volatile and are shaped by many forces, including the media; nevertheless, these and 
other studies suggest that there has been some increase in criminal conduct in Chile, 
and this plays an important role in shaping the public debate on justice reform.
Table 2. Administrative Resolutions as Share of all Dispositions, 2001-2002 
2001 2002
# cases % # cases %
All Dispositions 66,638 100.0 147,991 100.0
Conditional dismissal 19,847 29.8 70,857 47.9
Expediency pricnple 22,738 34.1 26,922 18.2
Decision not to investigate 4,573 6.9 18,167 12.3
Total administrative resolutions 47,158 70.8 115,946 78.4
Source: Ministerio Público, Aanalisis de la informacion entregada en el compendio de informacion 
estadistica (Dec. 2000); Archivo Provisional y Principio de Oportunidad: analysis de los datos estadis-
ticos (2002) (unpublished report).
101 Index crimes, or “crimes of major social significance” (delitos de mayor connotacion social), include 
homicide, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, and theft, but not motor vehicle theft.
102 See Interview with Gonzalo Garcia, Policia y Sociedad: Democratica, Mar. 2002, no.10, at 21 
(at the time of the interview, Gonzalo Garcia was director of the Division of Public Safety at the 
Ministry of the Interior).
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Productivity:103 Prosecutors speedily resolve most of the major criminal cases brought 
to them. Nearly half of all cases were resolved within two months, nearly two-thirds 
(61 percent) were concluded within three months, and more than four-fifths (81 per-
cent) were disposed of within six months of their reception. Only a very small pro-
portion of cases drag out for more than a year.
Table 3.  Disposition Rates, by Month and Region, 2002
Month of Disposition
Number of Cases Disposed of by Region
     2             3               4                7                9               ALL REGIONS
1 934 409 509 960 1190 4,002 (28.2%)
2 492 409 517 711 931 7,062 (49.7%)
3 160 141 453 489 402 8,707 (61.3%)
4 110 105 275 307 391 9,895 (69.6%)
5 76 74 245 168 266 10,724 (75.5%)
6 48 51 187 184 330 11,524 (81.1%)
7 36 83 215 144 128 12,130 (85.4%)
8 27 30 113 60 80 12,440 (87.6%)
9 14 20 75 71 57 12,677 (89.2%)
10 15 31 114 63 107 13,007 (91.6%)
11 9 17 72 35 105 13,245 (93.3%)
12 5 7 17 11 41 13,326 (96.0%)
Total Disposed 1926 1377 2792 3203 4028 13,326 (93.8%)
Total Registered 1,984 1,448 3,080 3,358 4,334 14,204 (100%)
Source:  Division of Research, Fiscalia Nacional, Chile
These data also show that there is no plateau in productivity; the percent of cases 
completed rises continuously over time. This suggests that prosecutors efficiently sort 
cases, conducting an initial assessment and completing simple cases as swiftly as pos-
sible. It also suggests that they deploy resources wisely: there is no backsliding or 
excessive delay in the disposition of more difficult cases.
103 In order to assess the productivity of the Ministerio Público, the author requested data on the time 
periods and rates at which some disposition was reached for the more than 14,000 felonies reported 
to prosecution offices in the five regions active in the reform in the month of January 2002. The pur-
pose was to determine what proportion of victims waits more than twelve months for the state to 
produce an authoritative decision in their case, and whether there was a plateau in productivity—a 
time period after which prosecutors cease to dispose of cases quickly. The data was generated by 
SAF (systema al apoyo a las fiscales), the Ministerio Público’s case-management system, in a special 
unpublished internal report, Delitos ingresados en enero 2002.
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Table 4. Cases Received and Closed, 2001-2002
Region
# Cases Received (recepcionados) / # Cases Closed (terminados), by Quarter                     
2001 2002
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  1st  2nd  3rd  4th  
II * * * 58.3% 93% 94% 93% 102%
III * * * 44.3% 82% 80% 102% 114%
IV 33.5% 54.2% 59.7% 79.1% 89% 97% 135% 127%
VII * * * 48.3% 71% 89% 89% 116%
IX 46.9% 66.1% 84.1% 91.9% 93% 119% 93% 127%
ALL 41.4% 62.5% 76.2% 73.0% 85.7% 99.2% 100.6% 118.2%
Source:  Division of Research, Fiscalia Nacional, Chile
Note:  Reforms were not introduced in the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th Regions until December 2001.
It also appears that the prosecution service has become more productive over time. 
Most offices are coping well with the sizeable caseload; in some periods in some 
regions, the number of closed cases actually exceeds the number of new cases enter-
ing the system. More impressive still is the amount of time that elapsed between the 
onset of the reform and the ability of a regional prosecution service to master its 
caseload. In the 9th Region, for example, prosecutors closed more cases than were ac-
cepted in the second trimester of 2002. In the 3rd Region, this was achieved earlier, 
after less than 12 months of operations, suggesting that new prosecutors are learning 
from their peers and colleagues in other regions.
These are not the only inferences or criteria available for judging productivity. One 
can also examine different attributes of the system as a whole in terms of productivi-
ty. One might, for example, examine the speed with which prosecutors close complex 
cases, and also consider regional variation.104 A sound and balanced justice system 
would presumably work well in all jurisdictions and on all types of offenses.
Effectiveness: The degree to which prosecutors achieve convictions in the cases they 
are brought serves as a sign of their “effectiveness.” Early indications suggest that 
the reformed system produces a higher rate of convictions over a 15-month peri-
od.105 Seven percent of all cases forwarded to prosecutors in reformed areas in these 
months culminated in a conviction, compared to less than two percent of all cases re-
ported to a court in the unreformed system in the same period.  This difference in the 
104 As internal prosecutor’s offices’ reports analyzed for this study show, in some regions it takes less 
than two weeks to dispose of half the cases of reported robbery. In the first five regions that under-
went reform, half of all robberies are closed within 45 days, and half of all homicides reported in 
January 2002 were closed within two months.
105 See Marangunic �� Foglesong, Analizando la reforma a la justicia criminal en Chile, supra note 9 
(tracking 7,000 cases begun in January and February 2002, some under the old system and some 
under the new). 
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ability of the two systems to produce convictions is even greater in cases involving an 
arrest, where there is often more information upon which to build a solid case. The 
new system produces convictions in 42 percent of such cases, while the conviction 
rate for this category of cases in the old system is just seven percent.106
Table 5. Conviction Rates—Cases with an Arrest
Old System New System
Sample Convicted % Sample Convicted %
Robbery (all kinds)* 81 13 16.0% 39 16 41%
Assault 11 0 0% 6 1 17.6%
Theft 82 1 1.2% 17 3 17.6%
Homicide 2 1 50% 4 3 75%
Drugs and Alchool 10 0 0% 14 12 85.7%
Others 89 4 4.5% 26 10 38.5%
TOTAL 275 19 6.9% 106 44 42.4%
Source:  Antonio Marangunic and Todd Foglesong, Charting Justice Reform in Chile:  A Comparison 
of the Old and New Systems of Criminal Procedure, www.vera.org
These findings complement others studies that have found torpor and ineffectiveness 
in the old system, and agility and speed in the new system.107 However, prosecutors 
have also reported that the new case-management system is burdensome, and they 
are not sure what purpose it serves other than to facilitate scrutiny of their decisions 
by superiors.
Assessing the quality of justice: As noted, it is difficult to draw inferences about the 
quality of justice from these data. There is no consensus about the definition of “qual-
ity,” about what kinds of values are worth scrutiny, or about the various weight of 
professional and public opinion in measuring them.108 The evaluation of the perfor-
mance of prosecution services is at a primitive stage. The number and percentage 
of victims given integral assistance is recorded, but not why they were given such 
assistance, whether it was appropriate or appreciated, and what consequence, if any, 
it had for the goals of criminal justice.
106 Id.
107 For example, one study, using a host of tools in innovative field research (well-structured interviews 
with justice officials at all levels, direct participant observation, and quantitative analysis), found 
that there has been substantial progress in achieving “balance” in the administration of criminal 
law, and concluded, with some reservations, that the reforms could be categorized as successful 
(exitoso). Baytelman �� Duce, supra note 44. Likewise, a commission charged by the legislature in 
2003 to return an interim evaluation found that, despite shortcomings, the reforms overall have 
been “very successful,” although it concluded that additional research was necessary to determine 
why the new system was successful and whether or not it was also more cost-effective. See Docu-
mento, supra note 66.
108 For an argument in favor of using public opinion as the main measure in such evaluations, see Jose 
Juan Toharia, Evaluating System of Justice Through Public Opinion, in Beyond Common Knowl-
edge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law (Erik Jensen �� Thomas Heller eds., 2003).  
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I. General Issues
The Crown Prosecution Service of England and Wales (the CPS), which is the na-
tional prosecution service for this jurisdiction, was only established in 1986, and 
since then has undergone a period of transition and institutional consolidation; this 
process continues, in particular with regard to the division of labor with the police 
forces. Prior to October 1, 1986, prosecutions had largely been in the hands of the 
police. Although there were prosecuting lawyers, they either worked for the former of-
fice of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), a small office dealing with a limited 
number of high level cases, or were employed by local government with the local chief 
constable as their client. The final decision on prosecution in the majority of cases was, 
therefore, made by the police, and prosecutors appeared in court as their advocates.
The reform of prosecuting originated in a report of the Royal Commission on Crimi-
nal Procedure, completed in 1981.1 The report argued that the criminal justice sys-
tem required serious reform, and that it was no longer desirable for the police to be 
in charge of both investigating offenses and prosecuting cases before the courts. The 
report recommended that the power to investigate and the decision to prosecute re-
main with the police; however, subsequent responsibility to maintain charges before 
the courts should be assigned to new, territorially organized public prosecution of-
fices, which would follow common administrative standards. The government then 
created a national service headed by a Director of Public Prosecutions under the 
Attorney General (and therefore not under local authorities). This concept was en-
shrined in the Prosecution of Offences Act of 1985.
The inception of the CPS for the first time gave to prosecutors the decision whether 
or not to continue with a prosecution. The CPS suffered a good deal of bad publicity 
in its early days, much of it unjustified. The new service was brought in very quickly, 
and with inadequate human resources. For example, it was opened with 1,250 law-
yers, despite a need, perceived at the time by existing local government prosecutors 
and subsequently confirmed by internal and external surveys of staff numbers, for 
over 2,000. Many members of the administrative staff were new and untrained. The 
service also faced stiff opposition from the police and the Bar.  The police had previ-
ously possessed the power to prosecute, and they valued it highly. The Bar, with its 
tradition of appearing for both the prosecution and the defense, nurtured a dislike of 
the very concept of a public prosecutor. In London, in particular, the inadequacies of 
the embryonic service were magnified, and the CPS received withering press cover-
age, from which it has struggled to recover. In recent years, the image and standing 
of the CPS have improved considerably, and it is now generally seen as more profes-
sional and as a central player in the criminal justice system.
1 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure: report (1981), Cmnd. 8092.
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Interestingly, independence from government has not been an issue for the CPS or 
its prosecutors. Presumably because of its particular history, for the CPS the question 
of independence relates mainly to independence from the police, and this underlies 
many of the issues to be discussed in this paper. However, the relationship with gov-
ernment is almost inevitably complex in a jurisdiction without a single constitutional 
document.2 The CPS is a relatively new institution, but even the post of Director of 
Public Prosecutions has existed only since the enactment of the Prosecution of Of-
fences Act of 1879. The post of Attorney General, however, the government’s chief 
lawyer and prosecutor, dates back to the Middle Ages.
The position of the Bar is also important. The Bar, lawyers who are specialist advo-
cates, has an eight hundred year history and has traditionally enjoyed a monopoly 
of rights to appear (rights of audience) before the higher courts. Solicitors, the other 
part of the legal profession, who have traditionally focused on commercial, family, 
and property law, are an eighteenth century creation and had rights of audience in 
the lower courts. Until recently, CPS lawyers, Crown Prosecutors who may be bar-
risters or solicitors, had no rights of audience above the magistrates’ courts (courts of 
summary jurisdiction). Rights of audience in the Crown Court (the criminal court of 
first instance in which serious cases are heard before a jury), the Court of Appeal, and 
the House of Lords were limited to barristers and, to a lesser extent, defense solici-
tors. Until relatively recently, one third of the CPS’ annual budget was being spent on 
briefing the private Bar to appear on behalf of the CPS in these higher courts.
2 The British constitution is not monolithic; indeed, it may be said that there is none. Perhaps the 
most satisfactory view is that it exists in a series of Acts, structures, and other institutions.
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II. Structure and Organization of the Crown Prosecution Service
2.1. Internal structure
The CPS is organized into a headquarters and 42 areas that parallel the territorial 
jurisdiction of the police.3 The CPS employs some 5,600 people, of which 2,500 are 
lawyers. The CPS is composed of:
▶ The Director of Public Prosecutions,
▶ six Headquarters Directors and other senior administrative officers with func-
tional responsibilities,
▶ a Chief Executive, responsible for management, 
▶ Chief Crown Prosecutors (chief prosecutors), who manage the territorial divi-
sions,
▶ Crown Prosecutors (prosecutors),
▶ caseworkers (paralegals), and
▶ administrative staff.
The CPS is headed by the Director of Public Prosecutions. In 1998, the position of the 
Chief Executive was also created to allow the DPP to focus on very serious casework, 
policy development, and leadership of the CPS. The DPP and the Chief Executive 
are aided by six Headquarters Directors whose powers are organized on a functional 
basis: casework, policy, finance, human resources, and business information systems. 
The heads of the Communications Division and Internal Audit also have their spe-
cific remit of operation.
The CPS is managed by a Board, which assists the DPP and the Chief Executive; it 
provides strategic direction and monitors performance and resources. The Board is 
composed of the DPP, the Chief Executive, the six Headquarters Directors, ten of the 
42 Chief Crown Prosecutors (CCPs) nominated in rotation by the DPP, the Head of 
the Communications Division, and the Head of the Equality and Diversity Division. 
The Chief Inspector of Her Majesty’s CPS Inspectorate (HMCPSI) attends Board ses-
sions but does not participate in decision-making.
3 Initially the CPS was organized into 31 territorial units (Areas), each headed by a Chief Crown Pros-
ecutor, but a number of reorganizations have since been undertaken. Areas were reduced to 13 in 
1993, in order to establish the CPS as a more centralized, national service. However, the CPS was 
criticized for becoming over-centralized and bureaucratic and missing the correct balance between 
the national character of the operation and a reasonable degree of local autonomy. See the critique by 
High Court Judge Sir Iain Glidewell,  The Review of the Crown Prosecution Service, Cm 3960 (1998). In      
1998 the number of areas was increased and made contiguous with the 42 police areas, and the CPS 
was decentralized by delegating more powers and responsibilities to local chief prosecutors.
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The HMCPSI is independent of the CPS and reports to4 the Attorney General, who 
appoints the Chief Inspector, who is in turn responsible for:
▶ inspecting CPS operations,
▶ reporting to the Attorney General at his request on issues of relevance to Ser-
vice operations,
▶ submitting an annual report to the Attorney General concerning CPS opera-
tions. The Attorney General in turn submits this report to Parliament.
The Chief Inspector appoints the inspectors and other officers of the Inspectorate. 
Parliament allocates the Chief Inspector funds for the Inspectorate in a budget sepa-
rate from that of the CPS. 
Each of the 42 Areas is headed by a Chief Crown Prosecutor, assisted by an Area 
Business Manager. Relations between the areas and headquarters are established by 
a framework document, a standard template document that applies to all CPS Areas 
and which lists their delegated authority. This envisages considerable discretion for 
the Areas in making decisions for the discharge of their assignments. 
Each CCP manages an Area’s team of prosecutors and caseworkers and is responsible 
for running criminal prosecutions in the Area. The CCP is also required to ensure 
the participation of his Area in the improvement of criminal justice and the formula-
tion of the strategy and goals of the CPS. These feed into the CPS resource accounts, 
which form the basis of the CPS’ annual bid for funding. In addition, each CCP has a 
central role in the realization of government initiatives in the field of criminal justice. 
Each of the 42 local criminal justice areas of England and Wales has a Local Crimi-
nal Justice Board (LCJB), which is chaired by one of the local chief officers and is 
composed of the Chief Crown Prosecutor, Chief Probation Officer, Chief Constable 
of Police and Director of the Court Service. The LCJB is responsible for the overall 
efficiency of the criminal justice system in the locality. Each CCP publishes an annual 
report on operations for the fiscal year.
CPS Areas have been reorganized into units that deal with all the casework for the 
Area. Many of these units are co-located with the police, so that there is a reduction 
in administrative duplication and delay in putting files together and complying with 
court orders.
CCPs are appointed by the DPP, and they in turn appoint Crown Prosecutors and 
other staff.  They are constrained in relation to numbers and grading by their bud-
gets and grading guidelines. In any given area, there are between 12 and 300 Crown 
Prosecutors.
4 Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate Act 2000 Section 1(3) re: budget.
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The role of Crown Prosecutors is to:
▶ advise the police before charge;
▶ authorize charges in criminal cases (not including traffic and minor offenses);
▶ review cases in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors;
▶ appear for the prosecution in magistrates courts;
▶ prepare cases for prosecution by the private Bar in the higher courts;
▶ increasingly, appear for the prosecution in the higher courts.
Each CCP appoints the caseworkers in his area. Ordinary caseworkers support Crown 
Prosecutors in preparing cases for court. Designated Caseworkers are appointed after 
their nomination by a special committee. Designated Caseworkers are not lawyers, 
but must have three years of service with the CPS, usually as ordinary caseworkers. 
Designated Caseworkers review limited types of case, mainly road traffic offenses, 
and present guilty plea cases in magistrates’ courts. 
Performance management: The CCP, assisted by his/her Area Business Manager and 
his/her Area Management Team, creates an Annual Business Plan setting perfor-
mance targets, which include: improving timely disposition of cases; reducing the 
number of ineffective trials and unsuccessful outcomes; increasing confiscation or-
ders concerning the proceeds of crime; and increasing the CPS’ efficiency (that is, 
staying within budget).
Each Area carries out its own quarterly area performance review process, and the 
performance of each Area is monitored by CPS Headquarters in London. A meeting 
takes place each year between the management of each Area and Headquarters man-
agement. At these meetings, the performance of the Area is examined in detail and 
actions are agreed upon to improve performance within agreed time frames. Should 
an Area be seen to be underperforming, more frequent meetings will be arranged 
until matters can be brought back on course.
2.2. Budgetary process
The CPS is allocated a three year settlement (budget) by the Treasury, following a 
round of negotiations between the Treasury and the Attorney General. The CPS must 
agree to performance measures as part of the budgetary settlement. The CPS then 
distributes the funds between the Areas and Headquarters Divisions, using an activ-
ity-based costing system, which applies a formula of apportioning funds according 
to the volume and complexity of work undertaken in the Area.
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2.3. The status of the prosecutor general
The Director of Public Prosecutions is the head of the CPS. He is responsible for the 
management of the Service and, ultimately, for every casework decision. However, he 
is “superintended” by the Attorney General, who was historically the government’s 
chief prosecutor. Traditionally he appeared as counsel for the Crown in, for example, 
high profile murder cases, such as the “Yorkshire Ripper” case in 1981.5 However, this 
practice has in the main lapsed. The current Attorney General does, however, appear 
for the government in human rights cases.
Parliament does not directly supervise the DPP’s operations. Rather, the DPP reports 
to the Attorney General,6 who serves as an intermediary in their relations and is 
accountable for the CPS before Parliament. However, the Attorney General is not 
administratively or managerially responsible for the CPS. Each year, the DPP must 
submit a general report on CPS operations in the previous year to the Attorney Gen-
eral; the Attorney General presents a copy of the report to Parliament and publishes 
it.7 The DPP must also submit reports on specific matters at the Attorney General’s 
request.8 The DPP and the Attorney General have regular weekly meetings to discuss 
CPS performance and individual cases.
The DPP is appointed by the Attorney General and serves at his pleasure. An appoin-
tee must have at least 10 years of experience as a lawyer and may be either a barrister 
or a solicitor.9  The DPP is, nowadays, generally appointed on a fixed term contract. 
The current DPP’s contract was originally for three years and has recently been ex-
tended for a further two years. His or her remuneration is fixed by the Attorney 
General, with the consent of the Treasury.10 It is in theory the same salary as that of 
permanent secretaries in government departments. However, as DPPs are recruited 
by open competition, and the last three were appointed directly from the private Bar, 
the civil service has, to a certain extent, been obliged to pay a market rate.  
The DPP is generally seen as an independent figure. In England and Wales, indepen-
dence from political interference has not really been an issue for three quarters of a 
century. When prosecutors and others talk about the independence of the CPS, they 
invariably are referring to independence from the police. This was an issue which led 
to the establishment of the CPS and to the formal separation of investigation from 
prosecution. Although the Attorney General is a government minister, it is accepted 
that he/she acts independently as the government’s senior legal adviser. As with the 
Lord Chancellor, the Attorney General has a foot in many camps. He/she is a mem-
ber of the executive, a member of the legislature, and head of one of the branches 
of the legal profession, as well as having overall responsibility for the prosecution 
5 R v Sutcliffe (1982) (unreported).
6 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 9.
7 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 9 (noting that the Director shall report as early as prac-
ticable after April 4 of each year).
8 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 9.
9 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 2.
10 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 2.
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service—along with, at the moment, the Public Prosecution Service for Northern 
Ireland—and government civil lawyers. Under the United Kingdom’s unwritten con-
stitution, this situation is not considered to cause tensions or conflicts of interest. 
However, it is difficult to see any constitutional or legislative safeguards against mis-
use of the office by the individual or the government.
2.4. The status of individual prosecutors
All prosecutors are recruited through open competition. Advertisements are pub-
lished in national newspapers and professional journals and contain detailed infor-
mation about job requirements and the competition procedure. Appointees must be 
lawyers, but may be either barristers or solicitors.11 Crown Prosecutors (CPs) are usu-
ally employed on permanent appointments under civil service terms and conditions, 
with a retirement age of 60. Although all appointments of CPs are made in the name 
of the DPP, they are in practice made by the CCP for the Area in which the vacancy 
arises. CPs serve a two-year probationary period, after which—subject to satisfactory 
performance—they are designated Senior Crown Prosecutors (SCPs). In order to cover 
short-term shortages created, for example, by maternity leave, without exceeding man-
power ceilings, the CPS also employs CPs on short-term temporary contracts. 
The Director appoints CCPs. The majority of the CCPs belong, by virtue of their 
grade, to what is known as the Senior Civil Service. All such posts across government 
must be advertised within and outside the civil service.  
Prosecutors, as civil servants, may be members of a trade union. Civil servants in the 
grades occupied by prosecutors may belong to one of two grade-based trade unions. 
In practice, almost everyone belonging to a union, or about 60%, are members of 
the First Division Association of Civil Servants (FDA). The FDA has considerable 
influence because of its position, representing as it does the most senior civil servants 
across all departments, and because of the Departmental Whitley Council System, 
which ensures active consultation between departments and the trade unions. The 
last General Secretary of the FDA is now a government minister, with a seat in the 
House of Lords. There is no national association of prosecutors, and the FDA is there-
fore the focus for staff regarding pay and conditions. It also represents prosecutors in 
disciplinary hearings and in any proceedings they may bring against the CPS.
The British civil service has a long tradition of formal staff appraisal, and the CPS 
has its own annual appraisal system. Each grade and function has a set of qualities 
and behaviors, covering legal and managerial ability, against which prosecutors are 
evaluated. Each individual prosecutor is also set personal targets by his/her line man-
ager. Quarterly meetings are held between the manager and the prosecutor to discuss 
11 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 1(3). Traditionally, barristers have rights of audience in 
the higher courts; solicitors do not. All Crown Prosecutors enjoy the same rights of audience as 
solicitors, but may pass an internal CPS assessment in order to exercise rights of audience in the 
higher courts. This was opposed by the private Bar, but CPS prosecutors now play an active, though 
as yet minor, role in the higher courts.
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progress and future targets, and at the end of the annual reporting cycle, a detailed 
report is written. This report is taken as the basis for development needs, promotion 
prospects, and performance pay. Each grade is assessed by a manager from the grade 
above, and reports are countersigned by the manager’s manager. Such appraisals are, 
of course, crucial in considering suitability for promotion.  
2.5. Individual accountability of prosecutors
The CPS has a hierarchical structure, and individual prosecutors do not normally 
prosecute a case, or refuse to prosecute a case, against the judgment of a superior. In 
principle, however, prosecutors exercise their own professional judgment in pursu-
ing a given prosecution. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has indicated that dismissing 
a prosecutor because of a decision to prosecute, or not prosecute, a given case would 
constitute interference with prosecutorial independence (see below).12  Day to day, 
all prosecutors make decisions on cases—whether to prosecute, to ask the police for 
more evidence, to stop proceedings, or to apply for pre-trial detention. The vast ma-
jority of these decisions will be made by an individual prosecutor. However, internal 
guidance seeks to ensure that certain decisions will be taken at an appropriately se-
nior level. Generally, in such cases, the first prosecutor will make a preliminary deci-
sion and pass it up the line for confirmation. Some cases must be dealt with entirely 
by a more senior lawyer; some cases, for example serious fraud cases, are referred 
to Headquarters for prosecution by specialists. Managers control the distribution of 
cases to prosecutors and also dip check the decisions they make.
All prosecutors are civil servants. Since the early 1990s, the civil service has devolved 
its human resource functions to individual departments, and the CPS has conse-
quently developed its own disciplinary code. The CPS Disciplinary Code requires 
a transparent system of discipline. If an alleged offense by a prosecutor is a minor 
infraction, the matter can be dealt with informally. The prosecutor will be spoken 
to by his/her line manager. No record is kept unless the prosecutor wishes it. The 
discussion is simply part of day to day management, and most prosecutors would 
not want a written report on their personnel record. If the matter is more serious, the 
allegation must be made in writing and a formal interview held, during which the 
prosecutor may be accompanied by a union official or a “friend,” who may be a col-
league or someone from outside the Service.13 The meeting may be chaired at a local 
level, but in very serious cases, the Head of Human Resources may chair the hearing. 
The prosecutor may call evidence in support of his case.
If the matter is sufficiently serious (and thus cannot be dealt with informally), the 
head of human resources, who is the official with the power to dismiss a member of 
staff, may indicate that the matter is one of gross misconduct, in which case the pros-
ecutor may be dismissed for a first offense.14 Offenses of gross misconduct include, 
12 R v Crown Prosecution Service ex p Hogg [1994] The Times, April 24, 1994.   
13 Crown Prosecution Service Disciplinary Code, Section 56.      
14 Crown Prosecution Service Disciplinary Code.     
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for example, the commission of a crime.15 If the offense is not one involving gross 
misconduct, the prosecutor may not be dismissed for a first offense, but only for a 
succession of offenses.16
A prosecutor who is dismissed may appeal within the CPS and/or to the Civil Ser-
vice Appeal Board, a civil service panel outside the CPS that hears appeals against 
dismissal by anyone who has been employed for at least a year. The department and 
the employee submit their cases in writing, and a hearing is addressed by both sides. 
The employee may be represented by a union official. In any event, a prosecutor who 
is dismissed may bring a case before an employment tribunal for unfair dismissal. 
This is a court that deals with unfair dismissal and cases of discrimination in employ-
ment. The Court of Appeal, in a case in which a dismissed member of staff unusually 
instituted proceedings for judicial review, has upheld the right of the CPS to dismiss 
prosecutors for disciplinary reasons,17 although in obiter dicta the Court indicated 
that this would not extend to disciplinary actions that interfered with a prosecutor’s 
decisional independence.18
2.6. Training
The CPS has a comprehensive training program to equip its prosecutors, administra-
tive staff, and managers to undertake their duties. New lawyers are given an induc-
tion program tailored to their previous experience, conducted by experienced CPS 
lawyers known as lawyer tutors. Once on the job, lawyers have a range of courses 
available to help them specialize or start taking cases in the higher courts. Training 
is also available to cover changes in the law, usually as a result of new legislation. In 
such instances, the training may be mandatory for all prosecutors. Individual train-
ing needs are identified through the appraisal process.  
All CPS vocational courses are certified as providing continuous professional de-
velopment by both of the lawyers’ professional organizations, the Bar and the Law 
Society (solicitors), the professional bodies that regulate the two branches of the legal 
profession, barristers and solicitors. Both specify a set number of hours of training 
that must be undertaken each year, and prosecutors are required to keep training logs 
to prove that they have completed the requisite number of hours. Training courses 
cover not only legal issues but also, as prosecutors progress, management skills. A 
separate training program, called Transform, trains managers to manage staff, bud-
geting, and performance. In addition, a range of computer training courses is avail-
able to all staff. The training is provided in a number of ways—through courses, 
distance learning packages, and, increasingly, through interactive means. The CPS 
has also introduced a virtual college, through which prosecutors can arrange and 
undertake distance learning online. The CPS is justifiably proud of its training. The 
15 Crown Prosecution Service Disciplinary Code.    
16 Crown Prosecution Service Disciplinary Code.    
17 R v Crown Prosecution Service ex p Hogg [1994] The Times, April 24, 1994.  
18 R v Crown Prosecution Service ex p Hogg [1994] The Times, April 24, 1994.  
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
152
main difficulty it encounters is availability of prosecutors to attend, given the pres-
sure of work.
Designated Caseworker candidates are nominated for specialized training. They are 
trained by Crown Prosecutors to undertake simple and straightforward prosecutions 
in magistrates’ courts. The training deals with the legal and evidentiary requirements 
of these cases, as well as providing practice in presenting cases to magistrates. Desig-
nated Caseworkers carry out their duties under the supervision of Crown Prosecu-
tors. A caseworker must pass the selection exercise and successfully complete the 
training course before being formally designated.  
III. Functions and Powers of Prosecutors
3.1. Prosecutorial functions in criminal justice
The CPS was established to prosecute all criminal cases investigated by the police 
(with the exception of some minor traffic offenses in which the defendant pleads 
guilty).19 The role of the CPS is to prosecute offenders in criminal cases in a fair and 
effective manner, by:
▶ providing advice to the police about charges that may be brought;
▶ authorizing charges;
▶ reviewing cases presented by the police;
▶ preparing cases to be presented to the Magistrates’ and Crown Courts;
▶ trying cases before the courts and providing instructions to private lawyers, 
where appropriate; and
▶ working with other governments to improve effectiveness in criminal justice.20
The CPS does not deal with criminal proceedings initiated by bodies other than the 
police. Charges filed by investigative bodies other than the police fall outside the 
scope of its competence, as do private prosecutions, at least initially. Once charges 
are filed, the CPS has the key role in all stages of the trial process through to final 
sentencing: maintenance of charges, strategy and presentation, and appeals. The CPS 
is not competent to monitor the enforcement of sentences.
19 Prosecution of Offenses Act Section 3(3) and Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985 (Specified Proceed-
ings) Order 1999.
20 See the CPS website, available at www.cps.gov.uk.
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Discretion to Initiate Prosecution: The conduct of prosecutions is governed by the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors (hereinafter the Code), published by the Director and 
attached here at Annex A.21 During the investigative phase, the CPS has only a con-
sultative role. It may consult the police investigation on the prospects of prosecution, 
until the case is received from the police. Once the investigation is complete and the 
case is referred to the CPS, the reviewing prosecutor may decide to maintain the 
charges brought by the police, change them, or drop them altogether. 
In deciding whether or not to prosecute, the prosecutor carries out two tests, the 
“evidentiary test” and the “public interest test.” If the case fails either test, it may not 
be pursued. The evidentiary test aims at establishing whether sufficient evidence has 
been collected to allow a realistic prospect that the magistrates or jury are more likely 
than not to convict. It involves considering the availability and reliability of evidence. 
Because of the adversarial nature of proceedings, prosecutors may only submit evi-
dence of the culpability of the defendant, which means they must also consider what 
the position of the defense might be, what exonerating evidence it might have, and 
how the consistency of prosecution across the country might be affected. This last is 
important, as one of the reasons for establishing the CPS was to improve consistency 
in decision making.
The public interest test is a contextual assessment of the pros and cons of prosecution 
in a specific case. The Code contains an exemplary list of factors favoring or opposing 
prosecution. The public interest, which is the basis of the discretion exercised by the 
CPS, was defined in very general terms in the first edition of the Code in 1986, and 
caused some confusion among prosecutors, the police, and the public. Subsequent 
editions have sought to provide more detail.22 As a general rule, the CPS pursues 
criminal proceedings unless there is a clear prevalence of factors against them. Be-
cause of the existence of the Code, the decision-making process is a reasonably trans-
parent one. The public is able to see for itself the processes and criteria that the CPS 
uses in making decisions. While it might be said that use of the Code fetters the dis-
cretion of the CPS as a whole, as well as of individual prosecutors, their knowledge, 
skill, and experience are used in balancing the various factors. Use of the Code in fact 
adds to the CPS’ accountability, in that defendants can use it to argue that procedures 
have not been followed, and complainants can use it as the basis for judicial review 
of a decision not to prosecute.
Criminal proceedings may also be initiated by parties other than the police, except 
where the law reserves that right to the CPS—with DPP consent—or the Attorney 
General. When such a private prosecution has been initiated, the DPP may allow 
the private prosecutor to continue to conduct the case, itself take over the case and 
prosecute it, or take over the case and stop it.23 
21 Code for Crown Prosecutors, adopted on October 1, 1986, pursuant to the Prosecution of Offenses 
Act of 1985, Section 10 (requiring the Director to enact such a code) and revised four times since, 
most recently in 2004. The text of the Code may be accessed at the CPS website, www.cps.gov.uk. 
22 Code for Crown Prosecutors, 2004 version.
23 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 6.
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Once a defendant has been charged by the police or a summons has been issued for 
his attendance at a magistrates’ court, the Director may notify a defendant that crimi-
nal prosecution has been discontinued.24
Control of Ongoing Prosecution:  In England and Wales, there are two courts of first 
instance, the magistrates’ court and the Crown Court.  All cases, no matter how seri-
ous, begin in the magistrates’ court. Offenses are divided into three types according 
to seriousness—summary offenses, indictable offenses, and either way offenses. Sum-
mary offenses are the least serious, typically road traffic offenses and cases involving 
minor public disorder. These are dealt with exclusively in the magistrates’ court, ei-
ther by a bench of lay magistrates or by a District Judge, who are arbiters of both law 
and fact. Indictable offenses fall on the other end of the scale and include murder, 
rape, and robbery. They are tried in the Crown Court by a judge and jury—the judge 
is in charge of legal issues and the members of the jury are the determiners of issues 
of fact. The third category is known as either way offenses. These include theft, ob-
taining by deception, and burglary, and may be tried either at the magistrates’ court 
or in the Crown Court. In a simple example, a charge of theft may relate to a simple 
taking of a small item from a shop. This would be suitable for trial at the magistrates’ 
court. Conversely, the theft might be of many millions of pounds from a bank or of 
an extremely valuable item.  Such a case would be heard at the Crown Court. The 
choice is initially up to the magistrates, who hear submissions as to venue from the 
prosecution and will inevitably send the more serious cases to the Crown Court. 
However, a defendant in an either way case has the right to be tried by a jury in the 
Crown Court and may elect this process. This can result in a number of less serious 
cases being heard in the higher court.  
At any point before a case comes before a magistrates’ court, the CPS may terminate 
criminal proceedings at its discretion. The CPS must notify the court, stating its rea-
sons, and must also inform the defendant, but need not give the defendant any rea-
sons for the termination.25 The Director must also inform the defendant of his right 
to request that the proceedings continue (so as to ensure a full acquittal and clear 
his name).26 Termination of criminal proceedings in this manner is not a barrier to 
new charges. This was a new procedure introduced by the 1985 Act and reflects the 
control of prosecutions that passed to the CPS on October 1, 1986.
Before the inception of the CPS, there were other ways in which a case could be 
terminated by the prosecution. These traditional ways are now also used by the CPS. 
Once a case has come before a magistrates’ court, the CPS may drop proceedings as a 
result of lack of evidence or its own decision that there is no public interest in pursu-
ing a prosecution. Proceedings may terminate in three ways and, depending on the 
specific option, may or may not be reopened subsequently:
1.    Disposal with notice: The CPS may drop proceedings before a magistrates’ court 
prior to the submission of evidence in summary proceedings or the transfer of 
24 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 23.      
25 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 23.      
26 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 23.      
Report on the Crown Prosecution Service of England and Wales
155
the case for trial by jury. If the case has been committed for trial by jury, the 
prosecutor may discontinue it at any time prior to submitting an indictment. 
In this situation, the defendant may request pursuance of criminal proceed-
ings in order to secure an acquittal and clear his name.  Otherwise, the CPS 
may reopen proceedings if significant new evidence is discovered.   One of the 
purposes of the CPS is to provide clarity and certainty in the criminal justice 
process. It should not act arbitrarily; therefore, dropping a case indicates some 
finality. However, it is made clear to defendants in these circumstances that the 
CPS is entitled, in any event, to reinstitute proceedings, but will do so only if 
fresh evidence comes to light.
2.    Charges dropped in the course of proceedings: The CPS may drop charges in the 
course of proceedings at the magistrates’ court. Reopening of proceedings is 
possible; however, the defendant may not request pursuance of proceedings.
3.    Failure to submit evidence: Once an indictment has been issued in the Crown 
Court, the CPS must petition the court to discontinue a case. However, the CPS 
may refuse to submit sufficient evidence, thus compelling the court to acquit.27 
Recommendations have been made to reform the procedures for discontinuing pro-
ceedings.   These include establishing a uniform procedure before all courts; allowing 
the CPS to discontinue proceedings prior to court proceedings without requiring the 
consent of the defendant or the court; allowing the CPS to reopen cases it has discon-
tinued (with the court assessing whether or not reopening would constitute abuse of 
process); and allowing a defendant to request the court to acquit him on the basis of 
materials before it. These procedures generally do not require the prosecutor to give 
reasons for his/her decision to stop a prosecution. This could become controversial if 
repeated instances occurred in which prosecution was stopped in high profile cases. 
However, this has not been the case.
The Role of Designated Caseworkers: On October 1, 1998, legislation was introduced 
permitting Crown Prosecution Service staff who are not lawyers to review and pres-
ent in magistrates’ courts a limited range of cases involving straightforward guilty 
pleas. These may include shoplifting, possession of cannabis, and non-contentious 
traffic offenses. Under the supervision of experienced Crown Prosecutors, who assist 
and advise them, these Designated Caseworkers divide their time between police sta-
tions, where they review cases, and local magistrates’ courts. Designated Casework-
ers must pass a testing training course, validated by an external body, and be formally 
designated by the DPP before they undertake this work.28 
Designated Caseworkers have limited independence in disposing of cases. They have 
some discretion to drop one of several related charges.29 If a defendant pleads not 
guilty in court, a caseworker may decide to continue the prosecution, although he/
she will not conduct the trial.  Designated Caseworkers may also make minor adjust-
27 See Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (Peter Murphy �� Eric Stockdale eds., 2004), at D 39.
28 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985, Section 7(a).
29 In cases of traffic offenses, if charges have been filed on two or more separate counts, the caseworker 
may choose to pursue only one of these, dropping the other. 
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ments to cases.30 For all significant changes, however, the CCP must consent to a 
Designated Caseworker request to terminate proceedings. 
3.2. Relationship with the judge at the pre-trial stage
Crown Prosecutors are lawyers, members of the Bar, or Solicitors of the Supreme 
Court of Judicature. They are not, as in many civil law countries, members of the same 
cadre as the judiciary. As has already been noted, judges are chosen from among the 
senior ranks of the Bar and, to a lesser extent, solicitors. They act as referees between 
the prosecuting lawyer and the defense in criminal proceedings.
In England and Wales there is a tradition of lay involvement in the criminal justice 
system. This manifests itself in both the Crown Court (the court of first instance in 
which serious cases are heard), with the use of juries to determine guilt in contested 
cases, and in the magistrates’ court (the court of first instance in which less serious 
cases are tried), by the use of lay magistrates, advised by a legally qualified clerk, who 
decide on both guilt and sentence. As mentioned above,31 Crown Prosecutors appear 
in the magistrates’ courts and, by and large, members of the private Bar appear on 
behalf of the CPS in the Crown Court and the appellate courts.
3.3. Powers outside the criminal justice system
The Crown Prosecution Service has no powers or duties outside the criminal justice 
system.
30 For example, if during hearings it becomes apparent that a minor change in a summons is needed 
(the date, location, price, description of a vehicle, etc.), a caseworker may introduce such change 
without seeking assistance from the Chief Crown Prosecutor.
31 See Section I, above.
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IV. Relationship of the public prosecution service  
to other organs of the state
4.1. The constitutional location of the Crown Prosecution Service
England and Wales constitute part of Great Britain, which also includes Scotland and 
which, together with Northern Ireland, forms the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy with a 
monarch as a hereditary head of state. In practice, its government is formed by the 
majority party in Parliament and is generally accountable to it. Parliament is not 
subject to external control by any supreme or constitutional court or any other public 
body, except in relation to the European Union; its legislative acts and decisions by 
ministers and government officials can, however, be the subject of judicial review by 
the High Court.
England does not have separate legislative and executive branches, but rather is gov-
erned directly by the institutions of the United Kingdom.32 Wales has its own Assem-
bly with a more limited remit than the Scottish Parliament or the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. All parts of the United Kingdom share an English common law heritage, 
including an adversarial system of adjudication. England and Wales have their own 
joint system for the administration of justice, however. That system’s structure and 
organization, including its public prosecution service, are different from the judicial 
systems of Scotland or Northern Ireland. The Crown Prosecution Service of Eng-
land and Wales (CPS) was established in 1986.33 The present institutional form of the 
prosecution service is therefore a relatively recent innovation.34
The CPS is the central agency responsible for public prosecution. However, it is not 
the only body with prosecutorial powers: a number of other state agencies and au-
thorities at local level have powers to bring cases before the courts and to prosecute. 
Private individuals have traditionally had the right to initiate and present cases for 
prosecution in respect of any offense not requiring the specific consent of the Attor-
ney General or the Director of Public Prosecutions.35 
32 Wales has an assembly with limited powers.
33 Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985. 
34 Before 1986, the police forces were largely responsible for charging and prosecution, and although 
most employed lawyers as prosecutors, no single institution exercised prosecutorial supervision 
over their operations. See Section I, above.
35 Prosecution of Offenses Act, Section 6(1). See Section 4.5, below.
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4.2. Relations with the legislature
The CPS has no direct relations with Parliament; rather, the Attorney General repre-
sents the CPS in Parliament and delivers its annual report to Parliament. Parliament 
may not conduct independent investigations into the activities of the CPS or indi-
vidual prosecutors. However, Parliament scrutinizes the activity of all government 
departments, including the CPS. The head of the CPS and other senior members of 
staff are called before parliamentary committees, in particular the Public Accounts 
Committee, to discuss the effectiveness and efficiency of the CPS. Other than this, 
Parliament has no control over the CPS budget or the appointment of the DPP.
4.3. Relations with the executive
The CPS is a government department that, because it has no minister of its own, 
comes under the supervision of the Attorney General, who attends Cabinet meetings 
as the government’s senior legal adviser. The Attorney General has a number of most-
ly administrative powers with respect to the CPS. He or she has regulatory authority 
over the CPS and limited powers to pass secondary legislation concerning the CPS.36 
However, this power has been exercised only once, to take some very minor offenses 
out of the hands of the CPS.
The Attorney General appoints the DPP and monitors his work.37 The DPP must 
present to the Attorney General an annual report on the activities of the CPS, which 
the Attorney General publishes and presents to Parliament.38 At the Attorney Gener-
al’s request and as part of his superintendence, the DPP also submits separate reports 
on specific matters.39 
The Attorney General, with the consent of the Treasury, allocates the budget of 
the CPS, within the broader budget Parliament determines for the Attorney Gen-
eral, taking into account the CPS’ objectives and expenditure.40 Again with the 
consent of the Treasury, the Attorney General sets salary levels, contributions in 
relation to state benefits, and pension contributions for CPS personnel, although 
a number of these benefits are in fact part of the overall civil service package of 
benefits, and salaries are determined as part of the budget in negotiation with 
the trade unions. 
36 Prosecution of Offenses Act Section 3(3) and Prosecution of Offenses Act 1985 (Specified Proceed-
ings) Order 1999.
37 Prosecution of Offenses Act, Section 2.
38 Prosecution of Offenses Act, Section 9.
39 Prosecution of Offenses Act, Section 3(1).
40 Prosecution of Offenses Act, Section 2.
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The Attorney General has certain powers to stop prosecutions (nolle prosequi), and 
some offenses still require his consent (fiat) to prosecute,41 but in general prosecutors 
are independent in making decisions relating to criminal proceedings.
Prosecutors’ decisional independence is at least theoretically threatened by the po-
litical oversight of the service. In deciding whether or not to institute criminal pro-
ceedings, prosecutors are required to consider only the quality of the evidence and 
considerations of the “public interest.”42 Yet because the CPS is located within the 
executive and superintended by a political figure, the Attorney General, there is a risk 
that prosecutors could be subjected to political influence, either directly or through 
general policy guidance, or could otherwise take political factors into account in as-
sessing the “public interest” as an argument for committing a specific case to court or 
dropping it. However, there is little statistical or anecdotal evidence of such influence. 
4.4. Relations with the police
Parliament created the CPS in part to guarantee national uniformity in law enforce-
ment and to provide an impartial evaluation of investigations by the police,43 whose 
powers had recently been increased.44 Consequently, the CPS occupies a position in 
between the police and the courts in the criminal justice system.
However, although the CPS and police are both part of the executive, they are institu-
tionally, administratively, and financially independent of each other. The CPS is one 
of the departments supervised by the Attorney General, whose small administra-
tive department is known as the Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers (the Attorney 
General and his deputy, the Solicitor General). The CPS is a government department 
without a minister and reports to the Attorney General, whereas the police, although 
mainly independent local forces, come under the general jurisdiction of the Home 
Office and report to the Home Secretary. As a result, the CPS has no powers in re-
lation to the appointment, training, and professional development of investigating 
police officers. It may informally assess their performance by reporting to senior of-
41 The Attorney General has the power to ban criminal prosecution in individual cases (nolle proesqui 
order) against police informants or representatives of foreign states. A number of offenses, tradi-
tionally and mainly those involving corruption of public officials and explosives offenses, require 
the Attorney General’s consent.  Although there have been moves by Parliament to remove this re-
quirement in relation to corruption offenses, the government has used the consent of the Attorney 
General as an assurance to the public that care is being taken in the institution of certain prosecu-
tions. Prime Minister Tony Blair gave such an assurance while answering a question on proposed 
legislation to create an offense of incitement to religious hatred during Prime Minister’s question 
time on February 9, 2005. The Attorney General also has ultimate power to direct the mounting or 
stopping of a prosecution. See Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers: Annual Report (2003). 
42 Code for Crown Prosecutors, published under the provisions of the Prosecution of Offenses Act              
1985, Section 10.
43 There are 42 regional police forces, known by the names of their geographical areas, such as the 
Sussex Police and the Kent Constabulary, and a number of jurisdictional forces, such as the British 
Transport Police.
44 See Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984; as mentioned earlier, there were concerns about 
miscarriages of justice and the referral of minor cases to the Crown Court.
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ficers on the good or bad performance of an officer in a particular case, but it cannot 
nominate them for promotion, demotion, or other discipline. 
The CPS and the police are also independent of each other in their law enforcement 
work.  The police are solely responsible for investigation, while the CPS is respon-
sible for prosecuting cases before the courts—and thus also for determining whether 
and how charges should be presented to a court. In carrying out their law enforce-
ment work, the police act solely under the operational management of the local Chief 
Constable. The CPS may not order the police to conduct an investigation, direct the 
course of an investigation, or dictate what evidence needs to be gathered. Similarly, 
the police are not obliged to report to the CPS every offense on which information is 
available to them, or even those on which they have started working. When the CPS 
determines that additional investigative action is required, the police are not bound 
to comply with its views. In practice, it is rare for such a request to be refused, as the 
CPS has the ultimate power to refuse to continue with a prosecution if it considers 
that there is insufficient evidence. The police may seek the CPS’ advice at their discre-
tion,45 and such consultations with the CPS are becoming more common in the wake 
of recent initiatives.46
The institutional separation of prosecution and the police is reflected in their roles in 
pre-trial procedure. Unlike prosecutors on the continent, English prosecutors are ex-
cluded from the investigation by law. The police act independently of the CPS when 
they receive information about an offense. If a suspect is identified, the police have 
traditionally decided whether or not to bring charges.47 More recent developments 
have required the police to seek the approval of a prosecutor before charging a sus-
pect with a criminal offense. If the police do not bring charges, they may nonetheless 
formally or informally caution the suspect.48 The CPS has no involvement in this 
process, but on reading a file marked by the police for prosecution, a prosecutor may 
return it with a recommendation that a caution be administered.
45 One of the duties of the CPS is to provide appropriate advice and guidance to the police on matters 
related to offenses committed prior to the completion of the police investigation. Prosecution of 
Offenses Act 1985, Section 3(1)(c). The CPS is consulted by the police mainly in order to determine 
whether a pre-trial (police) investigation should be carried out and/or charges should be brought 
against the suspect. 
46 Indeed, in recent months prosecutors have been placed in police stations in order to give early and 
immediate advice. For out-of-hours consultation, a telephone advice service known as CPS Direct 
has been established. This service operates at night and during weekends and public holidays. There 
is one national number, and any police force can use the service when it requires urgent advice. On 
a human resources note, CPS Direct uses many staff members who are on maternity leave or taking 
career breaks, as the prosecutors involved work from home.  
47 Charges must normally be brought within 24 hours of a suspect’s detention. The police may detain 
a suspect for further investigation prior to charging for up to a total of 96 hours with the authoriza-
tion of a magistrate’s court. In these proceedings before a magistrates’ court, the police may appear 
themselves in straightforward cases. The CPS appears in more complex cases.
48 A formal caution may be issued by a high-ranking police officer if the offender has admitted his/her 
guilt to the police. This creates a criminal record for the offender but is not a conviction by a court. 
Ironically, although convictions may be expunged from a person’s record over time (Rehabilitation 
of Offenders Act 1974), this does not apply to cautions. 
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Once a defendant has been charged, the police usually conduct further investigations 
in order to prepare the case for presentation to the CPS. They submit an initial file 
to the CPS that is sufficient for a remand/bail hearing. Only upon conclusion of the 
investigation and submission of the investigation file to the CPS can a prosecutor for-
mally review the file. The CPS then examines cases submitted by the police, assesses 
the evidence, and decides on that basis whether to prosecute. If the examining pros-
ecutor decides that the evidence is insufficient, he may drop the proceedings or file 
a lesser charge. If the case is dropped, it can be reinstated should further compelling 
evidence be found. It is the CPS practice in such cases to inform the defendant that 
this could be the case. If, in the prosecutor’s view, the case is weak, he/she can ask, but 
not direct, the police to continue inquiries in order to obtain further evidence. 
In recent years, the division of labor between the police and the CPS has been further 
rationalized, focusing the police exclusively on investigation and involving the CPS 
much earlier in the charging process.49 The DPP has issued guidance in accordance 
with the new rules, and Crown Prosecutors determine in all criminal cases whether a 
person is to be charged, except for minor or straightforward offenses specified in the 
DPP’s guidance, which the police may continue to charge. The DPP’s guidance will be 
issued to all 42 police forces in England and Wales by the end of March 2007.
Police are not the only bodies to initiate criminal prosecutions. Other public bodies, 
such as Customs and Excise and the Serious Fraud Office, are empowered to conduct 
pre-trial investigation of offenses in their field, bring charges, and prosecute them 
before the court. The CPS has no responsibility for or control over these bodies; its 
authority is confined to cases initiated by the police. However, because of failures in 
investigation and prosecution, particularly in Customs and Excise prosecutions, cer-
tain control mechanisms have been put in place for investigative bodies other than 
the police, such as Customs Officers; but they have never been exercised in respect of 
another prosecuting authority.50 
In addition, private individuals can initiate and present cases for prosecution (private 
prosecutions).51 The CPS may take over a private prosecution.52 Once the CPS has 
taken over such a case, the prosecutor may drop the charges if there are no grounds 
for prosecution. Should a private prosecutor feel aggrieved at the CPS’ decision, the 
only course of action open to him/her would be to initiate proceedings for judicial 
review. If a private person unjustifiably and repeatedly pursues prosecutions, civil 
proceedings could be initiated for malicious prosecution or to have the private pros-
ecutor declared a vexatious litigant.
Private prosecution has a long history in English criminal law, and its retention after 
the formation of the CPS was in part intended to ensure that improper political in-
fluences would not prevent an otherwise justifiable prosecution.53 However, research 
49 The new charging provisions are contained in Section 37(A)(1)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evi-
dence Act 1984, as inserted by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
50 Prosecution of  Offenses Act Section 3(2)(b).
51 Prosecution of Offenses Act, Section 6.
52 Prosecution of Offenses Act, Section 6.
53 Private prosecutions are most often instituted by relatives of crime victims whose cases the CPS has 
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conducted following the creation of the CPS indicates that private prosecution by 
individuals is often frivolous and results, in most instances, in unjustified public ex-
pense. The available data suggests that a very large number of private prosecutions 
fail to meet the burden of proof, while the number of cases in which the CPS has 
erred in refusing to bring a case before the courts is extremely low. As mentioned 
above, judicial review may be used to challenge the refusal or unwillingness of the 
competent authorities to initiate and conduct criminal proceedings. 
4.5. Relations with the judiciary
The judiciary consists only of the courts. The CPS and the courts are administratively 
separate and have separate budgets. The CPS’ budget, as described above, is pro-
vided directly by the Treasury in consultation with the Attorney General. The courts’ 
budget is provided through the Department for Constitutional Affairs (formerly the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department), headed by the Lord Chancellor, who is a Cabinet 
minister, speaker of the House of Lords, a judge on the Judicial Committee of the 
House of Lords, and head of the judiciary.  He is thus a member of the executive, the 
legislature, and the judiciary. 
No legal obstacles exist to prosecutors becoming judges and vice versa; in practice, 
however, this rarely occurs. Although judicial vacancies are filled through an open 
competition,54 in practice only lawyers with current experience in the higher courts 
are eligible for consideration. Prosecutors are, therefore, hampered by their limited 
rights of audience and an enduring aversion, mainly on the part of the Bar, to lawyers 
who prosecute but do not defend. This aversion does not work in reverse, so that de-
fense solicitors can readily apply to become judges. Judges themselves seldom apply 
to become prosecutors, as prosecutors enjoy lower social and professional status and 
lower pay.55 These differences stem naturally from the common law system. Judges are 
senior lawyers who sit in criminal courts as referees of the proceedings and guardians 
of the law; they are not part of a parallel profession, as in civil law systems.
In the discharge of their duties and the organization of their professions, judges and 
prosecutors enjoy an equal overall level of autonomy and independence from each 
other. The independence of judges and prosecutors serves different purposes. The 
purpose of prosecutorial independence is to ensure prosecutors’ ability to establish 
the offender’s guilt without influence, while the purpose of judges’ independence 
is more balanced between the general public interest and the rights of the accused 
individual—itself a guarantee of legality and equity for all members of the public. 
Consequently, judges have no power to institute criminal proceedings or file charges. 
Judges may not rule on refusals to open pre-trial proceedings, nor may they refer 
decided not to prosecute.
54 The only exceptions are the members of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, who are 
political appointees.
55 Judges receive between £ 86,000 and £190,000 a year, whereas prosecutors receive between £26,000 
and £130,000 a year.
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cases to the CPS or police for further investigation. These matters entirely fall within 
the competence of the CPS or the police, respectively.
Early expectations following the creation of the CPS in 1986 predicted a negative 
impact on the workload of the courts; these expectations have not been borne out.56  
V. Publicizing the Prosecution Service’s Activity
The CPS has a large, professional press office situated at its headquarters, which deals 
with press inquiries about individual cases and about the CPS in general. The press 
office also puts out press releases when the CPS wishes to publicize its policies or ac-
tivities and arranges radio and television interviews for the Director. The head of the 
press office is usually a member of the central Government Information Service.
Each CPS area also has a member of staff who is responsible for press liaison for the 
area locally and for liaising with the main press office. However, this person is not a 
professional press officer, but is usually one of the local prosecutors.  
The press in the United Kingdom is free and very active, to the point of intrusiveness. 
Criminal cases are routinely reported in all newspapers, both national and local. 
Press criticism undoubtedly puts pressure on prosecutors, with the potential for in-
terference with the independence of decision-making. However, there is no evidence 
of this being a concern at present.
VI. Statistics
Budget Allocations (millions of Pounds Sterling)
2001 – 02 2002 – 03
Administrative expenses *** 336
Criminal prosecution expenses *** 105
Total 392 441
56 One reason there has been no significant impact on the courts is that, although the CPS has filtered 
out many cases, the rise in crime generally has more than compensated for this.
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Outcomes of Magistrates’ Courts operations
1999 – 00 2000 – 01 2001 – 02
Cases examined by court 73.0% 72.8% 72.5%
Cases dropped by CPS 12.2% 13.0% 13.1%
Cases committed to Crown Courts 6.4% 6.4% 6.7%
Others (charges dropped by the court after 
hearing evidence, defendant deceased, fail-
ure to identify offender)
8.3% 7.7% 7.7%
Outcomes of Crown Courts operations
1999 – 00 2000 – 01 2001 – 02
Cases examined by court 85.5% 84.4% 82.4%
Cases that were not examined* 11.1% 12.3% 14%
The court obligates defendant to comply 
with public order without examining the 
case
1.8% 1.7% 1.7%
Others (defendant deceased, failure to iden-
tify offender) 1.6% 1.6% 1.9%
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Annex A
The Code for Crown Prosecutors
1. Introduction
1. The decision to prosecute an individual is a serious step. Fair and effective pros-
ecution is essential to the maintenance of law and order. Even in a small case 
a prosecution has serious implications for all involved—victims, witnesses and 
defendants. The Crown Prosecution Service applies the Code for Crown Pros-
ecutors so that it can make fair and consistent decisions about prosecutions. 
2. The Code helps the Crown Prosecution Service to play its part in making sure 
that justice is done. It contains information that is important to police officers 
and others who work in the criminal justice system and to the general public. 
Police officers should apply the provisions of this Code whenever they are re-
sponsible for deciding whether to charge a person with an offense. 
3. The Code is also designed to make sure that everyone knows the principles that 
the Crown Prosecution Service applies when carrying out its work. By applying 
the same principles, everyone involved in the system is helping to treat victims, 
witnesses and defendants fairly, while prosecuting cases effectively. 
2. General Principles
1. Each case is unique and must be considered on its own facts and merits. How-
ever, there are general principles that apply to the way in which Crown Prosecu-
tors must approach every case. 
2. Crown Prosecutors must be fair, independent and objective. They must not let 
any personal views about ethnic or national origin, disability, sex, religious be-
liefs, political views or the sexual orientation of the suspect, victim or witness 
influence their decisions. They must not be affected by improper or undue pres-
sure from any source. 
3. It is the duty of Crown Prosecutors to make sure that the right person is pros-
ecuted for the right offense. In doing so, Crown Prosecutors must always act in 
the interests of justice and not solely for the purpose of obtaining a conviction. 
4. Crown Prosecutors should provide guidance and advice to investigators 
throughout the investigative and prosecuting process. This may include lines of 
inquiry, evidential requirements and assistance in any pre-charge procedures. 
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Crown Prosecutors will be proactive in identifying and, where possible, rectify-
ing evidential deficiencies and in bringing to an early conclusion those cases 
that cannot be strengthened by further investigation. 
5. It is the duty of Crown Prosecutors to review, advise on and prosecute cases, 
ensuring that the law is properly applied, that all relevant evidence is put before 
the court and that obligations of disclosure are complied with, in accordance 
with the principles set out in this Code. 
6. The Crown Prosecution Service is a public authority for the purposes of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. Crown Prosecutors must apply the principles of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in accordance with the Act. 
3. The Decision To Prosecute
1. In most cases, Crown Prosecutors are responsible for deciding whether a person 
should be charged with a criminal offense, and if so, what that offense should 
be. Crown Prosecutors make these decisions in accordance with this Code and 
the Director’s Guidance on Charging. In those cases where the police determine 
the charge, which are usually more minor and routine cases, they apply the 
same provisions. 
2. Crown Prosecutors make charging decisions in accordance with the Full Code 
Test (see section 5 below), other than in those limited circumstances where the 
Threshold Test applies (see section 6 below). 
3. The Threshold Test applies where the case is one in which it is proposed to keep 
the suspect in custody after charge, but the evidence required to apply the Full 
Code Test is not yet available. 
4. Where a Crown Prosecutor makes a charging decision in accordance with the 
Threshold Test, the case must be reviewed in accordance with the Full Code 
Test as soon as reasonably practicable, taking into account the progress of the 
investigation.
4. Review 
1. Each case the Crown Prosecution Service receives from the police is reviewed 
to make sure that it is right to proceed with a prosecution. Unless the Threshold 
Test applies, the Crown Prosecution Service will only start or continue with a 
prosecution when the case has passed both stages of the Full Code Test. 
2. Review is a continuing process and Crown Prosecutors must take account of 
any change in circumstances. Wherever possible, they should talk to the police 
first if they are thinking about changing the charges or stopping the case. Crown 
Prosecutors should also tell the police if they believe that some additional evi-
dence may strengthen the case. This gives the police the chance to provide more 
information that may affect the decision. 
3. The Crown Prosecution Service and the police work closely together, but the 
final responsibility for the decision whether or not a charge or a case should go 
ahead rests with the Crown Prosecution Service. 
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5. The Full Code Test
1. The Full Code Test has two stages. The first stage is consideration of the evi-
dence. If the case does not pass the evidential stage it must not go ahead no 
matter how important or serious it may be. If the case does pass the eviden-
tial stage, Crown Prosecutors must proceed to the second stage and decide if a 
prosecution is needed in the public interest. The evidential and public interest 
stages are explained below. 
 The Evidential Stage
2. Crown Prosecutors must be satisfied that there is enough evidence to provide a 
“realistic prospect of conviction” against each defendant on each charge. They 
must consider what the defense case may be, and how that is likely to affect the 
prosecution case. 
3. A realistic prospect of conviction is an objective test. It means that a jury or 
bench of magistrates or judge hearing a case alone, properly directed in ac-
cordance with the law, is more likely than not to convict the defendant of the 
charge alleged. This is a separate test from the one that the criminal courts 
themselves must apply. A court should only convict if satisfied so that it is sure 
of a defendant’s guilt. 
4. When deciding whether there is enough evidence to prosecute, Crown Pros-
ecutors must consider whether the evidence can be used and is reliable. There 
will be many cases in which the evidence does not give any cause for concern. 
But there will also be cases in which the evidence may not be as strong as it first 
appears. Crown Prosecutors must ask themselves the following questions: 
 Can the evidence be used in court?
a. Is it likely that the evidence will be excluded by the court? There are cer-
tain legal rules which might mean that evidence which seems relevant 
cannot be given at a trial. For example, is it likely that the evidence will 
be excluded because of the way in which it was gathered? If so, is there 
enough other evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction? 
 Is the evidence reliable?
b. Is there evidence which might support or detract from the reliability of a 
confession? Is the reliability affected by factors such as the defendant’s age, 
intelligence or level of understanding? 
c. What explanation has the defendant given? Is a court likely to find it cred-
ible in the light of the evidence as a whole? Does it support an innocent 
explanation? 
d. If the identity of the defendant is likely to be questioned, is the evidence 
about this strong enough? 
e. Is the witness’s background likely to weaken the prosecution case? For ex-
ample, does the witness have any motive that may affect his or her attitude 
to the case, or a relevant previous conviction? 
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f. Are there concerns over the accuracy or credibility of a witness? Are these 
concerns based on evidence or simply information with nothing to sup-
port it? Is there further evidence which the police should be asked to seek 
out which may support or detract from the account of the witness? 
5. Crown Prosecutors should not ignore evidence because they are not sure that 
it can be used or is reliable. But they should look closely at it when deciding if 
there is a realistic prospect of conviction. 
 The Public Interest Stage
6. In 1951, Lord Shawcross, who was Attorney General, made the classic state-
ment on public interest, which has been supported by Attorneys General ever 
since: “It has never been the rule in this country—I hope it never will be—that 
suspected criminal offenses must automatically be the subject of prosecution.” 
(House of Commons Debates, volume 483, column 681, 29 January1951.) 
7. The public interest must be considered in each case where there is enough evi-
dence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction. Although there may be pub-
lic interest factors against prosecution in a particular case, often the prosecution 
should go ahead and those factors should be put to the court for consideration 
when sentence is being passed. A prosecution will usually take place unless 
there are public interest factors tending against prosecution which clearly out-
weigh those tending in favour, or it appears more appropriate in all the circum-
stances of the case to divert the person from prosecution (see section 8 below). 
8. Crown Prosecutors must balance factors for and against prosecution carefully 
and fairly. Public interest factors that can affect the decision to prosecute usu-
ally depend on the seriousness of the offense or the circumstances of the sus-
pect. Some factors may increase the need to prosecute but others may suggest 
that another course of action would be better. 
The following lists of some common public interest factors, both for and against prosecu-
tion, are not exhaustive. The factors that apply will depend on the facts in each case.
 Some common public interest factors in favor of prosecution
9. The more serious the offense, the more likely it is that a prosecution will be 
needed in the public interest. A prosecution is likely to be needed if: 
a. a conviction is likely to result in a significant sentence; 
b. a conviction is likely to result in a confiscation or any other order; 
c. a weapon was used or violence was threatened during the commission of 
the offense; 
d. the offense was committed against a person serving the public (for ex-
ample, a police or prison officer, or a nurse); 
e. the defendant was in a position of authority or trust; 
f. the evidence shows that the defendant was a ringleader or an organizer of 
the offense; 
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g. there is evidence that the offense was premeditated; 
h. there is evidence that the offense was carried out by a group; 
i. the victim of the offense was vulnerable, has been put in considerable fear, 
or suffered personal attack, damage or disturbance; 
j. the offense was committed in the presence of, or in close proximity to, a 
child; 
k. the offense was motivated by any form of discrimination against the vic-
tim’s ethnic or national origin, disability, sex, religious beliefs, political 
views or sexual orientation, or the suspect demonstrated hostility towards 
the victim based on any of those characteristics; 
l. there is a marked difference between the actual or mental ages of the de-
fendant and the victim, or if there is any element of corruption; 
m. the defendant’s previous convictions or cautions are relevant to the pres-
ent offense; 
n. the defendant is alleged to have committed the offense while under an 
order of the court; 
o. there are grounds for believing that the offense is likely to be continued or 
repeated , for example, by a history of recurring conduct; 
p. the offense, although not serious in itself, is widespread in the area where 
it was committed; or 
q. a prosecution would have a significant positive impact on maintaining 
community confidence. 
 Some common public interest factors against prosecution
10. A prosecution is less likely to be needed if: 
a. the court is likely to impose a nominal penalty; 
b. the defendant has already been made the subject of a sentence and any 
further conviction would be unlikely to result in the imposition of an 
additional sentence or order, unless the nature of the particular offense 
requires a prosecution or the defendant withdraws consent to have an of-
fense taken into consideration; 
c. the offense was committed as a result of a genuine mistake or misunder-
standing (these factors must be balanced against the seriousness of the 
offense); 
d. the loss or harm can be described as minor and was the result of a single 
incident, particularly if it was caused by a misjudgment; 
e. there has been a long delay between the offense taking place and the date 
of the trial, unless: 
▶ the offense is serious; 
▶ the delay has been caused in part by the defendant; 
▶ the offense has only recently come to light; or 
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▶ the complexity of the offense has meant that there has been a long 
investigation; 
f. a prosecution is likely to have a bad effect on the victim’s physical or men-
tal health, always bearing in mind the seriousness of the offense; 
g. the defendant is elderly or is, or was at the time of the offense, suffering 
from significant mental or physical ill health, unless the offense is serious 
or there is real possibility that it may be repeated. The Crown Prosecution 
Service, where necessary, applies Home Office guidelines about how to deal 
with mentally disordered offenders. Crown Prosecutors must balance the 
desirability of diverting a defendant who is suffering from significant men-
tal or physical ill health with the need to safeguard the general public; 
h. the defendant has put right the loss or harm that was caused (but defen-
dants must not avoid prosecution or diversion solely because they pay 
compensation); or 
i. details may be made public that could harm sources of information, inter-
national relations or national security. 
11. Deciding on the public interest is not simply a matter of adding up the number 
of factors on each side. Crown Prosecutors must decide how important each 
factor is in the circumstances of each case and go on to make an overall assess-
ment. 
 The relationship between the victim and the public interest
12. The Crown Prosecution Service does not act for victims or the families of vic-
tims in the same way as solicitors act for their clients. Crown Prosecutors act 
on behalf of the public and not just in the interests of any particular individual. 
However, when considering the public interest, Crown Prosecutors should al-
ways take into account the consequences for the victim of whether or not to 
prosecute, and any views expressed by the victim or the victim’s family. 
13. It is important that a victim is told about a decision which makes a significant 
difference to the case in which they are involved. Crown Prosecutors should 
ensure that they follow any agreed procedures. 
6. The Threshold Test
1. The Threshold Test requires Crown Prosecutors to decide whether there is at 
least a reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed an offense, and if 
there is, whether it is in the public interest to charge that suspect. 
2. The Threshold Test is applied to those cases in which it would not be appropri-
ate to release a suspect on bail after charge, but the evidence to apply the Full 
Code Test is not yet available. 
3. There are statutory limits that restrict the time a suspect may remain in police 
custody before a decision has to be made whether to charge or release the sus-
pect. There will be cases where the suspect in custody presents a substantial bail 
risk if released, but much of the evidence may not be available at the time the 
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charging decision has to be made. Crown Prosecutors will apply the Threshold 
Test to such cases for a limited period. 
4. The evidential decision in each case will require consideration of a number of 
factors including: 
▶ the evidence available at the time; 
▶ the likelihood and nature of further evidence being obtained; 
▶ the reasonableness for believing that evidence will become available; 
▶ the time it will take to gather that evidence and the steps being taken to do so; 
▶ the impact the expected evidence will have on the case; 
▶ the charges that the evidence will support. 
5. The public interest means the same as under the Full Code Test, but will be 
based on the information available at the time of charge which will often be 
limited. 
6. A decision to charge and withhold bail must be kept under review. The evidence 
gathered must be regularly assessed to ensure the charge is still appropriate and 
that continued objection to bail is justified. The Full Code Test must be applied 
as soon as reasonably practicable. 
7. Selection Of Charges
1. Crown Prosecutors should select charges which: 
a. reflect the seriousness and extent of the offending; 
b. give the court adequate powers to sentence and impose appropriate post-
conviction orders; and 
c. enable the case to be presented in a clear and simple way. 
 This means that Crown Prosecutors may not always choose or continue with 
the most serious charge where there is a choice.
2. Crown Prosecutors should never go ahead with more charges than are neces-
sary just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a few. In the same way, they 
should never go ahead with a more serious charge just to encourage a defendant 
to plead guilty to a less serious one. 
3. Crown Prosecutors should not change the charge simply because of the deci-
sion made by the court or the defendant about where the case will be heard. 
8. Diversion From Prosecution
 Adults
1. When deciding whether a case should be prosecuted in the courts, Crown Pros-
ecutors should consider the alternatives to prosecution. Where appropriate, the 
availability of suitable rehabilitative, reparative or restorative justice processes 
can be considered. 
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2. Alternatives to prosecution for adult suspects include a simple caution and a 
conditional caution. 
 Simple caution
3. A simple caution should only be given if the public interest justifies it and in 
accordance with Home Office guidelines. Where it is felt that such a caution is 
appropriate, Crown Prosecutors must inform the police so they can caution the 
suspect. If the caution is not administered, because the suspect refuses to accept 
it, a Crown Prosecutor may review the case again. 
 Conditional caution
4. A conditional caution may be appropriate where a Crown Prosecutor considers 
that while the public interest justifies a prosecution, the interests of the suspect, 
victim and community may be better served by the suspect complying with 
suitable conditions aimed at rehabilitation or reparation. These may include 
restorative processes. 
5. Crown Prosecutors must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence for a real-
istic prospect of conviction and that the public interest would justify a prosecu-
tion should the offer of a conditional caution be refused or the offender fails to 
comply with the agreed conditions of the caution. 
6. In reaching their decision, Crown Prosecutors should follow the Conditional 
Caution Code of Practice and any guidance on conditional cautioning issued or 
approved by the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
7. Where Crown Prosecutors consider a conditional caution to be appropriate, 
they must inform the police, or other authority responsible for administering 
the conditional caution, as well as providing an indication of the appropriate 
conditions so that the conditional caution can be administered. 
 Youths
8. Crown Prosecutors must consider the interests of a youth when deciding wheth-
er it is in the public interest to prosecute. However Crown Prosecutors should 
not avoid prosecuting simply because of the defendant’s age. The seriousness of 
the offense or the youth’s past behavior is very important. 
9. Cases involving youths are usually only referred to the Crown Prosecution Ser-
vice for prosecution if the youth has already received a reprimand and final 
warning, unless the offense is so serious that neither of these were appropri-
ate or the youth does not admit committing the offense. Reprimands and final 
warnings are intended to prevent re-offending and the fact that a further offense 
has occurred indicates that attempts to divert the youth from the court system 
have not been effective. So the public interest will usually require a prosecution 
in such cases, unless there are clear public interest factors against prosecution. 
9. Mode Of Trial 
1. The Crown Prosecution Service applies the current guidelines for magistrates 
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who have to decide whether cases should be tried in the Crown Court when 
the offense gives the option and the defendant does not indicate a guilty plea. 
Crown Prosecutors should recommend Crown Court trial when they are satis-
fied that the guidelines require them to do so. 
2. Speed must never be the only reason for asking for a case to stay in the mag-
istrates’ courts. But Crown Prosecutors should consider the effect of any likely 
delay if they send a case to the Crown Court, and any possible stress on victims 
and witnesses if the case is delayed. 
10. Accepting Guilty Pleas
1. Defendants may want to plead guilty to some, but not all, of the charges. Al-
ternatively, they may want to plead guilty to a different, possibly less serious, 
charge because they are admitting only part of the crime. Crown Prosecutors 
should only accept the defendant’s plea if they think the court is able to pass a 
sentence that matches the seriousness of the offending, particularly where there 
are aggravating features. Crown Prosecutors must never accept a guilty plea just 
because it is convenient. 
2. In considering whether the pleas offered are acceptable, Crown Prosecutors 
should ensure that the interests of the victim and, where possible, any views 
expressed by the victim or victim’s family, are taken into account when deciding 
whether it is in the public interest to accept the plea. However, the decision rests 
with the Crown Prosecutor. 
3. It must be made clear to the court on what basis any plea is advanced and ac-
cepted. In cases where a defendant pleads guilty to the charges but on the basis 
of facts that are different from the prosecution case, and where this may signifi-
cantly affect sentence, the court should be invited to hear evidence to determine 
what happened, and then sentence on that basis. 
4. Where a defendant has previously indicated that he or she will ask the court 
to take an offense into consideration when sentencing, but declines to admit 
that offense at court, Crown Prosecutors will consider whether a prosecution 
is required for that offense. Crown Prosecutors should explain to the defense 
advocate and the court that the prosecution of that offense may be subject to 
further review. 
5. Particular care must be taken when considering pleas which would enable the 
defendant to avoid the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. When 
pleas are offered, Crown Prosecutors must bear in mind the fact that ancillary 
orders can be made with some offenses but not with others. 
11. Prosecutors’ Role In Sentencing
1. Crown Prosecutors should draw the court’s attention to: 
▶ any aggravating or mitigating factors disclosed by the prosecution case; 
▶ any victim personal statement; 
▶ where appropriate, evidence of the impact of the offending on a commu-
nity; 
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▶ any statutory provisions or sentencing guidelines which may assist; 
▶ any relevant statutory provisions relating to ancillary orders (such as anti-
social behavior orders). 
2. Crown Prosecutors should challenge any assertion made by the defense in miti-
gation that is inaccurate, misleading or derogatory. If the defense persist in the 
assertion, and it appears relevant to the sentence, the court should be invited to 
hear evidence to determine the facts and sentence accordingly. 
12. Re-starting a Prosecution
1. People should be able to rely on decisions taken by the Crown Prosecution Ser-
vice. Normally, if the Crown Prosecution Service tells a suspect or defendant 
that there will not be a prosecution, or that the prosecution has been stopped, 
that is the end of the matter and the case will not start again. But occasionally 
there are special reasons why the Crown Prosecution Service will re-start the 
prosecution, particularly if the case is serious. 
2. These reasons include: 
a. rare cases where a new look at the original decision shows that it was 
clearly wrong and should not be allowed to stand; 
b. cases which are stopped so that more evidence which is likely to become 
available in the fairly near future can be collected and prepared. In these 
cases, the Crown Prosecutor will tell the defendant that the prosecution 
may well start again; and 
c. cases which are stopped because of a lack of evidence but where more 
significant evidence is discovered later. 
3. There may also be exceptional cases in which, following an acquittal of a serious 
offense, the Crown Prosecutor may, with the written consent of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, apply to the Court of Appeal for an order quashing the 
acquittal and requiring the defendant to be retried, in accordance with Part 10 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
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I. General Issues
The prosecution service in France has the important mission of protecting the gen-
eral interest and speaking on behalf of society in the judicial system; therefore, both 
each individual prosecutor and the institution as a whole are provided with strong 
guarantees of independence. The members of the prosecution service (also called 
le Ministère Public and commonly known as the Parquet) follow an old tradition. 
Both magistrates and judges belong to the judiciary, but the level of independence 
granted each is not the same. Thus while they do not receive the same guarantees as 
judges (the prosecution offices must have a link to the executive branch, in order to 
enforce the criminal policy set by the government in their daily work), they must be 
granted sufficient autonomy and professional protection to conduct their investiga-
tions and make their decisions within a well-functioning judicial system. This bal-
ance may be measured based on the powers they are granted in criminal proceedings 
and the guarantees attached to their appointment and career. Reforms in 1993 and 
1994 greatly improved the situation through modifications to the French Constitu-
tion, the Magistrate’s Act, and the Criminal Procedure Code. The current situation 
will be explained below. Those changes appeared necessary following important me-
dia debates about cases of political financing involving members of the government, 
other politicians, and businessmen in the early nineties; it appeared then that the link 
between prosecutors and the Ministry of Justice was not sufficiently clear. The penal 
code has therefore been modified to organize these relationships more transparently. 
At the same time, the French Constitution has been modified to grant more indepen-
dence and powers to the Superior Council of the Magistracy (Conseil Supérieur de la 
Magistrature)1 in the appointment and disciplining of judges and prosecutors.
The search for balance: Nonetheless, there has been longstanding concern about sup-
posed undue executive influence on the prosecution services. In 1997, the President 
of the Republic asked a group of experts chaired by Pierre Truche to develop recom-
mendations on reforming the relationship between the executive and the Prosecu-
tion Service; the observations and recommendations produced by the Truche Com-
mission2 address several aspects of the Parquet’s role as an independent institution.
The Commission first noted that the intervention of the executive, especially the 
Minister of Justice, in the operations of the Parquet through the use of instructions 
had created a sense of “attachment” and the Parquet’s dependency on the executive. 
In response, it proposed several reforms that would have limited the authority of the 
Ministry and other institutions, for example by limiting the Minister’s ability to give in-
structions in specific cases and granting the Superior Council of the Magistracy (SCM) 
1 See Section 4.1 below.
2 The Commission (Commission de réflexion sur la justice), established in 1997, was headed by Pierre 
Truche, a former president of the Court of Cassation. 
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greater authority to guide policy, as well as some that would have made the hierarchal 
authority of the Ministry more transparent, such as requiring the Ministry to adopt 
a national “criminal prosecution policy” (“politique d’action publique”) to promote 
uniformity in the application of law and reduce arbitrariness—in effect increasing 
central control.
Some of the recommendations of the Truche Commission were included in a Law of 
March 9, 2004 that changed a large number of provisions of the criminal code and 
the code of criminal procedure, especially concerning the organization of relation-
ships within the hierarchy of the prosecution service from the bottom to the top 
level. However, others proposals, especially those  increasing the power of the Su-
perior Council of the Magistracy and involving the appointment process, could not 
achieve sufficient parliamentary support to allow the adoption of new constitutional 
reform and other legislative changes. The debates especially highlighted the fact that 
the 1993-1994 reforms provided an effective equilibrium between the two above 
mentioned concerns: on the one hand, maintaining links between the prosecution 
office and criminal policy, and on the other hand, providing the prosecutor sufficient 
guarantees to contribute to a fully independent justice system. 
II. Structure and Organization of the Prosecution Service
2.1. Internal structure
The principal divisions of the Parquet largely mirror the organization of the courts. 
There are some 185 district level Prosecution Offices, headed by a District Prosecu-
tor (Procureur de la République) attached to the district courts, with a total of 1,500 
prosecutors 3 and 5,500 judges; there are also 35 Prosecutors General and their depu-
ties in the Courts of Appeals and the Criminal Courts for serious offenses (Cour 
d’Assises),4 and one Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court). 
The 185 district-level Prosecution Offices are organized under the supervision of the 
35 Prosecutors General of Courts of Appeals (the District Prosecutors—Procureur 
de la République–must report on their own or by request to the relevant Prosecutor 
General, who can require them to prosecute in a particular case by a written instruc-
tion that must be placed in the case file and is thus known to the Court. Each Pros-
ecutor General is also directly involved before the Court of Appeals at the second 
3 Including district prosecutors and their deputies or substitutes, Prosecutors General of Courts of Ap-
peals and their deputies, and the Prosecutor General of the Court of Cassation and his deputies.
4 The Criminal Court is a judicial body competent to act as a first and second instance in regard to 
the most serious crimes. It consists of three professional judges and a number of laymen (the jury) 
drawn by lot—nine when the court sits as a first instance, and twelve when it conducts appeal pro-
ceedings.
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level when the judgment of a district court is appealed). The Prosecutor General of 
the Court of Cassation, each prosecutor general of the Court of Appeals, and each 
District Prosecutor is supported by a team of deputies (substituts) who also belong 
to the magistracy.5 
The Parquet is headed by the Minister of Justice, to whom the Prosecutors General at 
the Court of Appeals and Court of Cassation answer directly.6 Below the Prosecutors 
General and supervised by them are District Prosecutors who represent the Parquet 
at the first-instance District Courts.7 Prosecutors may discharge prosecutorial func-
tions at all first-instance courts of the area in which they are appointed,8 such as before 
specialized courts for labor (conseil des prud’hommes) or trade (tribunal du commerce). 
A prosecutor may appear before any criminal court dealing with serious offenses or 
misdemeanors.9 More generally, each District Prosecutor and each Prosecutor General 
of a Court of Appeals plays a hierarchical role vis-à-vis his team of deputies. 
However, this supervisory power leaves to any member of the Parquet in charge of a 
case the right to speak freely about that case before the court; an old tradition allows 
them to do so even if they receive different instructions through the hierarchy that 
they are required to present to the court. In these infrequent situations, the prosecu-
tor informs the court of the instructions he has received but explains that he does 
not personally support them, based on his own opinion as a magistrate. It is then up 
to the court to form its own opinion. Even if this does not often happen, this right is 
very important to prosecutors, who are not simply civil servants, but also part of a 
magistracy with specific rules of ethics governing the search for the truth. Of course, 
it is also possible for a prosecutor in such a situation to request that the head of his 
office remove him from the case. 
The Parquet is a centralized but “non-concentrated” institution, meaning that it is 
hierarchal in organization but delegates certain powers to its territorial units; though 
they do not have full autonomy, they do have delegated powers that they may exer-
cise independently. The hierarchical structure of the Parquet means that instructions 
are passed from the higher level to the next lower level;10 thus the Minister of Justice 
gives instructions to the Prosecutor General, the latter to District Prosecutors, and 
these, in turn, to their deputies. The Minister therefore does not give instructions to 
5 In France, the magistracy includes both judges and prosecutors, for a total of more than 7,000 
people dealing with civil and criminal cases. Judges are granted full independence, while prosecu-
tors work in a hierarchical structure. Their common membership in the magistracy allows judges 
and prosecutors to spend a period of their career in either one of those functions. It is based on 
the idea that a fully independent justice system requires thorough involvement on the part of the 
prosecution offices in the strong ethical norms shared by both prosecutors and judges.
6 The position of the Prosecution Office at the Court of Cassation does not fit readily into the parallel 
structure to the court system, since the Appellate Prosecution Offices, being directly subordinate 
to the Ministry of Justice, do not receive instructions from the Prosecution Office at the Court of 
Cassation. 
7 Code de Procédure Pénale  [Criminal Procedure Code], Art. 39 (1)-(2).      
8 Code de l’Organisation Judiciaire du 18 Mars 1978 [Judicial Organization Code of March 18, 1978] 
[hereinafter Judicial Organization Code], Art. L311-15.
9 At the very bottom of the hierarchy are police commissioners who may represent the prosecutor in 
court for very minor misdemeanors.
10 Fr�d�ric Debove and François Falletti,  Droit P�nal et Proc�dure P�nale (June 2006). 
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prosecutors at the district court level directly, and could not do so. A prosecutor at a 
given level must follow the policy laid out by his hierarchal superiors; at the same time, 
because the Parquet is “non-concentrated,” a prosecutor must make decisions in apply-
ing that policy at his particular level. Individual prosecution units (for instance, those 
specializing in economic or juvenile offenses) may not disregard the guidelines and 
instructions of superiors, but must nonetheless adapt them to each specific case.
The Minister of Justice administers and enforces the criminal law at the national 
level. He is assisted by magistrates acting as civil servants, without any judicial pow-
ers, to advise him in determining criminal policy, drafting bills, administering the 
prison system, etc. At the regional level, Prosecutors General of Courts of Appeals 
supervise the decisions taken by District Prosecutors; within the area of the Court of 
Appeals to which he is attached, each Prosecutor General, like the Minister of Justice, 
can deliver instructions to prosecute a case in written form that must be placed in the 
case file. They may issue instructions to lower-ranking prosecutors,11 which must be 
in writing, just as those of the Minister of Justice must be. In order to discharge their 
functions, at their discretion Prosecutors General are entitled to convene meetings of 
the prosecution officers under their jurisdiction to encourage harmonization in law 
enforcement.12 District Prosecutors are under a duty to enforce crime policy at the 
local level; one of their key instruments is their control over the work of the judicial 
police.
The head of the Prosecution Office may change one of his deputy prosecutors in a 
given case even after the initial assignment; may nominate, by delegation, another 
Deputy; or may speak at the hearing himself.13 In practice, however, each prosecu-
tion office is organized so as to determine in advance the role of each Deputy, who 
thus knows which cases will come to him; most of the time, this organization is 
followed, and it very seldom happens that a prosecutor is transferred from a case 
against his wishes.
Because members of the Parquet notionally constitute a single body, prosecutors 
may be replaced or share assignments while acting on behalf of the office—the so-
called principle of interchangeability (indivisibilité du Ministère Public). In contrast 
to judges, who may be replaced only according to strict legal rules, prosecutors are 
more easily replaced. For example, in a given case deputies may take turns, with one 
directing the operations of the judicial police, another conducting investigations, a 
third dealing with evidentiary material, and a fourth issuing a decree closing the 
investigation. 
11 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 37.
12 Rapport au Président de la République de la commission de réflexion sur la justice (Report to the 
President of the Republic on the Commission to Consider the Justice System) (1997), available 
at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/974072100/index.shtml (hereinafter 
Report of the Truche Commission).
13 There are no statutory standards regulating case distribution and assignment. There are only inter-
nal organizational decisions made by the head of office (Prosecutor General of the Court of Appeals 
or District Prosecutor at the local level regarding their deputies). 
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Such replacement or sharing of assignments does not require any order from a supe-
rior prosecutor to distribute the workload among individual prosecutors.14 The prin-
ciple of interchangeability is absolute, and even if the act of a deputy contravenes the 
instructions of the superior prosecutor, it will be considered valid and appropriate, as 
long as it is otherwise in compliance with the laws. (In such a case, the lower-ranking 
deputy might be subject to disciplinary sanctions, but his acts may not be rescinded.) 
Thus the assignment of a deputy prosecutor to a specific case has serious legal conse-
quences and can involve the entire prosecution office. 
Performance Management: Each District Prosecutor must keep the Prosecutor Gen-
eral of the Court of Appeals informed about serious cases and about more general 
issues involving criminal policy.
2.2. Budgetary process
The budget of a prosecution office is allocated according to a technical process at the 
local, regional, and national level. The political discussion takes place before Parlia-
ment each year, based on a proposal presented by the Minister of Justice. Each court 
determines its financial resources and makes a proposal or recommendation to the 
Ministry of Justice in the spring; the general budget of the Ministry is then discussed 
in Parliament between October and December. At the beginning of the following 
year, each court and its attached prosecution service is allocated a global budget, 
whose implementation is decided on jointly by the President of the Court and the 
head of the prosecution office attached to it. Each of the 35 Courts of Appeals 
gathers the budgetary needs of the different district courts at the regional level 
and submits them, after some arbitration by both the Prosecutor General and the 
President of the Court of Appeals, to the Ministry of Justice. Prosecution offices 
thus do not have separate budgets—a function of the identification of both judges 
and prosecutors as magistrates. 
A new system for preparing the budget was introduced in 2003: A five-year budget 
was programmed, with the 2003 budget representing one-fifth of the funds available 
for the period. 
This is a special financial effort desired by the government in order to help improve 
the functioning of the courts and the entire judicial system; however, this program 
must be confirmed and updated each year by the parliament in the traditional way.
The 2003 budget for the magistracy increased by 7.43 percent over the previous year; 
since then, increases have been adopted year after year at the same level. It is not clear 
from available information what share of funds went to the Parquet as opposed to the 
judiciary, or even if any such distinction was made. 
14 Laurent Lemesle and Fr�d�ric-J�rôme Pansier, Le Procureur de la République (1998), at 43.
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2.3. The status of the Prosecutor General
There is no Prosecutor General at the national level; rather, the Minister of Justice is 
the head of the Parquet. The Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation, though 
notionally the ranking prosecutor, only has powers with regard to that Court. The 35 
regional Prosecutors General of Courts of Appeals attached to the Courts of Appeals 
are equal in standing.
The Minister of Justice is a member of the government and a political appointee. He 
is not necessarily a Member of Parliament. The Minister is assisted at the Ministry by 
civil servants specializing in criminal law, civil law, budget, and other matters relating 
to the administration of the Parquet; some of these people are traditionally appointed 
by the Ministry of Justice from within the magistracy.
2.4. The status of individual prosecutors
The Prosecutors General attached to Courts of Appeals and the District Prosecutors 
attached to first-instance District Courts, as well as their deputies (substituts), are 
all magistrates and members of the Parquet. For misdemeanor cases (lowest level 
offenses), a police officer deals with the cases, under the supervision of the relevant 
District Prosecutor. The status of Prosecutors General and of other prosecutors is 
almost identical, save for the procedure for their appointment. 
Appointment: Prosecutors General of Courts of Appeals are directly appointed by the 
Council of Ministers (government) and appointed by decree by the President of the 
Republic; thus the SCM is not involved in their appointment. The President of the 
Republic can follow or ignore the government’s recommendation. The Prosecutor 
General must be a magistrate and is nearly always a member of the Parquet. All other 
prosecutors are appointed by the President by decree following consultations with 
the SCM. The particular method of appointing Prosecutors General of Court of Ap-
peals has sometimes led to questions about undue executive influence over the career 
path of prosecutors, given the different methods of appointment; it has, however, ap-
peared important to retain a special method of appointing Prosecutors General, due 
to their responsibilities in the implementation of crime policy.
There is a hierarchy of appointed ranks within the Parquet, determined by decree of 
the Minister of Justice. There are two levels: the higher first-level rank, and the lower 
second-level rank. The lower rank is open to magistrates at the beginning of their ca-
reer. After seven years, they can apply to the higher level if they obtain the agreement 
of the promotional committee. 15 Around 10 percent of magistrates are considered to 
be above those two ranks and are classified as “hors hiérarchie.” 
15 See paragraph below on promotion.
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Since the list of prosecutors “hors hierarchie” was considerably extended in 2002,16 it 
may be assumed that one of the reform’s objectives was to provide more career op-
portunities for prosecutors, in consideration of demographic developments.
Most prosecutors begin their career following university graduation through a com-
petition for a two-year training program at the National School of the Magistracy 
(Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature). They can then choose to work as either a judge 
or a prosecutor. This is the main way of recruiting prosecutors. In addition, specific 
competitions may also provide access to the training program at the National School 
of the Magistracy to people with some professional experience.17 
It is also possible to enter the magistracy directly; however, this track is limited to a 
small percentage of recruitment (5 to 10 percent).18 In order to be appointed directly 
to the second level, individuals must be at least 35 years of age, meet the general eli-
gibility requirements (hold a diploma in legal studies, have French nationality, etc.), 
and have accumulated seven years of “professional experience that qualifies them as 
exceptionally fit to discharge judicial functions.” For first-level appointments, can-
didates need to satisfy the same general eligibility requirements, save that the mini-
mum length of service is 17 years.
Appointments through this procedure occur following mandatory consultations with 
the Promotions Committee sitting as a selection committee; its opinion is binding.19 
The Committee determines the rank and official position to which candidates may 
be appointed; at its discretion, a candidate may be obliged to undergo preliminary 
training for a set period of time or take an internship prior to assuming office.
Special competitions may also be organized, open to experienced people whose 
number depends on the need for new magistrates.
For all forms of appointment, candidates must be resident within the area of the of-
fice to which they will be appointed, unless the Minister of Justice makes an exception 
following consultation with the Prosecutor General of the Court of Appeals.20 A candi-
date’s marital status may also be taken into account with regard to appointment.21 
Tenure:  Magistrates in the Parquet are appointed to permanent terms, even if, un-
like judges, they can in theory be removed from their position due to the needs of 
the Prosecution Service. 22 Judges can never have their position changed—meaning 
16 Décret pris en Conseil des Ministres—1er janvier 2002 [Council of Ministers decree n°2001-1380 of 
January 1, 2002 (modifying Decree n° 93-21 of January 1993)], January 1, 2002.
17 Candidates need to meet general eligibility requirements: a recognized four-year degree in legal stud-
ies; French nationality; civil capacity; completion of military service; and good physical condition. 
18 Ordonnance n°58-1270 du 22.12.1958 portant loi organique relative au statut de la magistrature [Act 
of Dec. 22, 1958 on the Status of the Magistracy] [hereinafter Magistrates Status Act], Art. 22.    
19 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 25, Sec. 2 (1).
20 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 13. 
21 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 29.
22 This can happen if there is an urgent need for additional support in another prosecution office. 
In practice, very few examples of this have arisen in the last 50 years. The Superior Council of the 
Magistracy would also strictly monitor such a decision to ensure that it is not, in fact, a concealed 
disciplinary measure.
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either the city in which they serve or their field of activity—without their consent. 
In practice, prosecutors change their positions only if they wish to do so, and more 
generally when they request promotion.
Since 2002, a new rule applies to heads of courts and heads of prosecution offices: 
they are appointed for a term of seven years without the possibility of reappointment 
to the same position and the same city. This rule stems from the desire to improve the 
exchange of experience at the national level, and also to avoid bureaucratic habits. 
When their mandate expires, District Prosecutors are automatically appointed to the 
prosecution service of the Appeals Court where they have been prosecutor at the lo-
cal level; however, at the end of his or her seven-year term, the District Prosecutor 
may be appointed elsewhere, and in particular may be promoted to higher office.
At the end of their seven-year terms, Prosecutors General may be appointed to any 
position at their rank, though they are most often appointed to the Court of Cassa-
tion (Supreme Court). As explained above, members of the Parquet who are neither 
Prosecutors General nor District Prosecutors have no set term of office and are more 
likely to move due to promotional issues. 
The Parquet may transfer individual prosecutors to different positions to ensure the 
proper functioning of the prosecution service as a whole.23 Transfers, which hap-
pen in exceptional cases, are always decided upon by the Minister of Justice. In 
practice, this does not occur often, and prosecutors usually transfer at their own 
request. Prosecutors can also appeal involuntary transfers to the relevant admin-
istrative court, a process that helps ensure that transfer is not used as a form of 
hidden disciplinary measure. 
Other Protections: While in office, prosecutors enjoy certain protections in regard to 
their professional conduct. A prosecutor is allowed to speak before the court accord-
ing to the dictates of his own conscience, even if he has been given different instruc-
tions by his superiors; he is obliged to present the written instructions he has received 
to avoid disciplinary measures, but beyond that he may present his own views. Pros-
ecutors consider this rule a very important defense of their professional autonomy.24 
In addition to the normal rules in the Criminal Code ensuring physical integrity, 
magistrates also enjoy protection against threat and any kind of attack which may 
be directed against them in the exercise of their functions.25 The state is responsible 
for compensating any harm inflicted directly, in all cases not otherwise covered by 
retirement legislation.
Promotion: Salary increases are not considered promotions, but rather administrative 
measures; promotions in rank come about through the three levels explained above 
(second rank, first rank and “hors hiérarchie”). Even within a given rank, appoint-
23 This contrasts with judges, who are protected against involuntary transfers.
24 Despite its importance to the profession, this rule is seldom explicitly referred to, in part because it 
is a particularly ancient rule, first elaborated several centuries ago.
25 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 11.
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ment as head of office (District Prosecutor or Prosecutor General) is also considered 
a promotion. The same promotion rules apply to prosecutors and judges. Rules of 
promotion do not apply to magistrates out of hierarchy (hors hiérarchie).26 Transition 
to a higher rank is possible only after a magistrate has served a set period of time at 
the lower rank.27 A magistrate must be put on a special list of promotions prepared by 
the Committee on Promotions.28 That Committee is composed of the President of the 
Court of Cassation (acting as chairperson of the committee); the Prosecutor General 
at the Court of Cassation; the Chief Inspector of Judicial Services; two Magistrates 
from the Court of Cassation possessing the highest rank and elected by all magis-
trates out of hierarchy of the Court of Cassation; two presidents of Courts of Appeals 
and two Prosecutors General from the Courts of Appeals; and ten other magistrates. 
The Committee meets behind closed doors. 
The list the Committee produces is submitted formally to the President of the Repub-
lic for signature. 
With the exception of magistrates at the Court of Cassation, no magistrate may be 
promoted to the first level of service at a court in which he has served for more than 
five years.29 Magistrates may not be promoted to the position of a District Prosecutor 
head of office at the court to which they are appointed.30 These rules were established 
in order to encourage mobility within the country. 
Magistrates passed over for promotion remain in the same position.
Promotions are effected by virtue of a Presidential decree. A decision for promotion 
is made at the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, following consultation with 
the SCM body  concerned with prosecutors.31 The Minister of Justice is not bound 
by the opinion of the SCM. As explained above, the SCM must be consulted before 
the appointment of any member of the Parquet at the same level or in the course of 
a promotion, except in regard to the appointment of a new Prosecutor General. The 
role of the promotion committee is only to prepare an annual list of magistrates eli-
gible for promotion from the lowest to the highest rank due to their length of service 
and competence.
Restrictions on Activities: Prosecutors and judges have identical restrictions on their 
external activities and affiliations. The position of magistrate is incompatible with 
the following:32 a position in the civil service; any professional or other remuner-
ated activity;33 national or European parliamentary office; representative office on the 
26 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 39 (1).
27 Décret n°93-21 du 7 janvier 1993 pris pour l’application de l’ordonnance n°58-1270 du 22.12.1958 
portant loi organique relative au statut de la magistrature [Council of Ministers Decree no. 93-21 of       
January 7, 1993 on the Implementation of the Magistrates Status Act] [hereinafter Decree on the 
Implementation of the Magistrates Status Act], Art. 12. 
28 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 2. There is a single Committee for both prosecutors and judges.
29 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 2(2).
30 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 2(5) 
31 On the SCM, see Section 4.1. below.
32 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 8.
33 Individual leave may be allowed, at the discretion of the court chairperson, if the activity does not 
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Economic and Social Council;34 position as a Regional or Municipal Councilor; or 
service as a lawyer, notary public, bailiff, registrar at a commercial tribunal35 or judi-
cial administrator in the same area of the court in which they have served more than 
five years. Magistrates may be appointed ministerial counselors with the approval of 
the Minister of Justice and with the magistrate’s own consent.36
Prosecutors are prohibited from taking part in political demonstrations or from ex-
pressing views against the republican form of government, or otherwise taking part 
in demonstrations incompatible with the obligations required of their position, or 
any form of activity that would hinder the normal operation of judicial bodies.37 
Magistrates are allowed to be members of trade union organizations, however.38 
There are several magistrates’ trade unions that include both judges and members 
of the Parquet that work to protect and promote the general interests of the profes-
sion. Their respective influence can be measured when elections to the SCM and to 
the promotion committee take place; participation in these elections is usually high 
because of their importance to the magistracy’s membership.
2.5. Individual accountability of prosecutors
Evaluation: The performance of each prosecutor is evaluated every two years,39 in ad-
dition to evaluations for promotion. The performance of Prosecutors General is not 
subject to evaluation.40
Prosecutors General evaluate the work of prosecutors at the courts in their area and 
also evaluate the work of their own and the District Prosecutor’s deputies. The Dis-
trict Prosecutor makes recommendations concerning his deputies to the Prosecu-
tor General. The evaluation consists of a report drafted by the Prosecutor General, 
taking into account the information he holds himself or receives from the District 
Prosecutors. The evaluation contains a description of the position, accompanied by 
general comments concerning the prosecutor’s performance and the possible need 
for additional training. The Minister of Justice receives a copy of the evaluation.
If a member of the Parquet disagrees with the evaluation, he can ask for a review of 
it by the Prosecutor General of a Court of Appeal. If his request is not granted, he can ap-
undermine the dignity or independence of magistrates, or if it has a training purpose.
34 The Economic and Social Council is a consultative assembly composed of representatives of the 
main economic and social areas of activity, with which the Government is required to consult on 
certain issues; the Council may also act of its own accord on certain matters within its compe-
tence.
35 A judicial body composed of judges elected by merchants and competent to rule on disputes among 
merchants, as well as in cases concerning commercial transactions and corporate bankruptcy.
36 Council of Ministers Decree on the Implementation of the Magistrates Status Act, Art. 6. 
37 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 10.
38 Décret n°82-7 du 28.05.1982 relatif à l’exercice du droit syndical dans la fonction publique [Decree 
Concerning the Right of Participation of Civil Servants in Trade Union Organization, May 28, 
1982] [hereinafter Decree on Civil Servant Participation in Trade Unions].
39 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 12, (1).
40 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 39.
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peal to the promotion committee. This happens in a limited number of cases each year.
Disciplinary Procedures: Prosecutors are subject to discipline for omissions in the dis-
charge of official duties or breaches of the duty of honor, good standing and dignity. 
This applies both to their professional and private life; ethics rules have been estab-
lished to ensure citizens’ confidence in their prosecutors.41 A prosecutor’s position in 
the Parquet’s hierarchy may also affect the assessment of his conduct. A Prosecutor 
General of a Court of Appeals may approach the Ministry of Justice with information 
concerning inappropriate conduct or misdemeanors by prosecutors.42 
Disciplinary measures may include formal proceedings and sanctions or informal 
warnings. The Chief Inspector of Judicial Services, the Presidents of Courts, Pros-
ecutors General and Heads of Directorates within the Ministry of Justice may issue 
a warning to any subordinate prosecutor.  The Prosecutor General of a Court of Ap-
peals may address such a warning to any member of the Parquet belonging to his 
Court of Appeals. The warning must be motivated; no definite guidelines have been 
established, but the Ministry of Justice disseminates information to heads of offices 
regarding sanctions to be imposed for breaches of discipline, in order to establish 
a common practice. A warning will be deleted from a prosecutor’s official file after 
three years, provided no new warnings have been issued or formal disciplinary pun-
ishments imposed.43
The Minister of Justice conducts formal disciplinary proceedings against prosecu-
tors.44 Where grounds for the institution of disciplinary proceedings exist, the Min-
ister of Justice must approach the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation as 
Chairman of the Superior Council of the Magistracy’s prosecutorial panel. The Min-
ister may, at the recommendation of higher-ranking Prosecutors and following con-
sultations with the SCM, prohibit a prosecutor from discharging his duties until a 
final decision has been made.45
The competent panel for the Parquet is chaired by the Prosecutor General of the 
Court of Cassation. The panel holds meetings and hearings behind closed doors; 
the accused member of the Parquet can be assisted by a lawyer and has access to 
the file of evidence against him. After the sentence, an appeal is possible before the 
State Council.46
The Minister may not impose a disciplinary sanction without first consulting the Su-
perior Council of the Magistracy’s prosecutorial panel,47 and if he intends to impose 
a more serious sanction than the Council, he must consult with the Council a second 
41 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 43. 
42 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 63 (1-2).
43 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 44 ( 2).
44 In contrast, judges are disciplined by the Superior Council of the Magistracy.
45 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 58 (1). If the Superior Council of the Magistracy is not consulted within 
two months, however, the provisional ban is lifted. Magistrates Status Act, Art. 58 (2).
46 The State Council (Conseil d’Etat) is an administrative court in charge of judging any breach of 
administrative rules by executive or administrative authorities.
47 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 59.
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time.48 Apart from this, the decision of the SCM is not binding on the Minister. Most 
of the time, the Minister follows the advice of the SCM. The Truche Commission 
recommended that the Minister of Justice be required to submit all disciplinary pro-
posals to the Council and be bound by the SCM’s decision.49 This proposal was based 
primarily on the belief that it is better to have two separate deciding and reviewing 
authorities. In practice, Ministers are very careful in their use of this disciplinary 
power. 
Disciplinary sanctions include: reprimand recorded in the official file; reappointment 
or transfer; withdrawal of functions; demotion in rank; demotion in position; provi-
sional suspension from office for one year with partial or full withdrawal of payment; 
early retirement; or removal from office with or without retirement pension.50 Only 
one of these sanctions may be imposed on a prosecutor, even if he has committed 
multiple violations.51 However, certain sanctions—withdrawal of functions, demo-
tion in rank, provisional suspension from office for a term of one year with partial or 
full withdrawal of payment—may be combined with a reappointment or transfer.52
Disciplinary proceedings do not happen very often (less than 50 per year); heads of 
offices are, however, very careful to monitor wrongful conduct by prosecutors, as 
defined by the disciplinary code.
Civil and Criminal Liability: Prosecutors are subject to general civil liability for errors 
made in their professional capacity, although only for “personal omissions and errors.”53 
The state, however, “is obliged to repair damages caused by the improper functioning of 
the judicial system. Liability may be enforced only for the gravest errors or incidences 
of denial of justice”;54 this includes harms committed by individual prosecutors in their 
professional capacity, and the state may enforce civil liability against prosecutors.
Magistrates have the same responsibilities and liabilities before the criminal law as 
ordinary citizens; they have no special immunity. However, prosecutors have civil 
and criminal immunity for their utterances in court.55
No code of ethics for prosecutors or for their administrative structures, including the 
Superior Council of the Magistracy, has ever been enacted, although in 2003 the Min-
ister of Justice assembled a task force to consider this issue and make recommendations 
concerning the clarification and enactment of ethical rules in response to recent epi-
sodes involving prosecutors accused of fraud and internet child pornography.56 
48 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 66.
49 Report of the Truche Commission, supra note 12.
50 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 45.
51 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 46(1).
52 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 46 (2). 
53 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 11, (1).
54 Judicial Organization Code, Art. L. 781, Sec. 1.
55 See Magistrates Status Act, Art. 5. The Judicial Organization Code specifies that “the Parquet is 
free to give opinions that it considers appropriate for the proper administration of justice.” In this 
respect, prosecutors enjoy greater immunity than judges.
56 The task force was chaired by President Jean Cabanne, a former official at the Court of Cassation.
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The Superior Council of the Magistracy considers itself responsible for ongoing re-
view of prosecutors’ ethical behavior, as it has access to magistrates’ files in the ap-
pointments process and in disciplinary proceedings; however, it has no formal man-
date to implement a code of ethics.
2.6. Training
Prospective prosecutors and judges train at the National School of the Magistracy 
(“Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature”).57 Students are called “judicial auditors” (audit-
eurs de justice) and are considered part of the judicial body.58 Judicial auditors already 
take an oath to serve justice and to keep confidential the information they receive; 
they are paid and are involved in the various activities of the prosecution service and 
of the Courts; and they are subject to all kinds of liability.
Students are admitted to the limited number of available positions based on a com-
petition or through direct selection by the Minister of Justice.59 
The competition consists of a written and an oral examination, and candidates60 are 
graded separately in one of three categories based on age and experience.61 The Min-
ister of Justice may also directly appoint students with certain professional or legal 
experience to the School of the Magistracy on the basis of a binding recommenda-
tion by the promotion committee.62 
Training at the School of the Magistracy takes two years. During training, judicial 
auditors have internships in their area of specialization. Supervised by magistrates, 
interns take part in judicial activities, but have no delegated powers. Thus they can 
assist examining magistrates; assist prosecutors in various actions in criminal pro-
ceedings; participate in judicial deliberations (with a consultative vote) in civil and 
correctional courts (dealing with serious offenses other than felonies); and partici-
pate in deliberations of the Criminal Court.63
57 The School also trains magistrates from other countries with which France has entered Agreements 
for Cooperation in the Field of Justice (Accord de cooperation en matière de Justice).
58 Magistrates Status Act. 
59 Magistrates Status Act, Art 15.
60 All applicants must have French nationality, a higher education degree, have completed their mili-
tary service, and be in good physical condition. Magistrates Status Act, Art. 16. 
61 The three categories are: candidates under age 27 with a degree from an institute of higher educa-
tion; civil servants below age 40; and candidates aged 40 or above with at least eight years’ profes-
sional experience with a territorial administrative body or other professional legal experience.
62 Three categories are eligible for direct ministerial appointment: individuals aged between 27 and 
40 years old who, beside meeting general eligibility requirements for the competition, also have 
four years of professional experience in the legal, economic or social fields; individuals holding a 
doctoral degree in legal studies and another diploma in higher education; and individuals with a 
degree in legal studies who have been conducting research in the area of law within a higher educa-
tion institution for at least three years. Magistrates Status Act, Art. 18-I.
63 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 19.
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At the end of their training, judicial auditors are examined by an independent jury, 
on the basis of which the examining panel prepares a binding list of nominations for 
specific positions, which is presented to the Minister of Justice for publication. 
The School of the Magistracy also offers optional ongoing training for magistrates. 
Such training is provided in the form of seminars, internships, meetings, and dis-
cussions. These trainings are well-attended by prosecutors, who appreciate their 
quality and diversity, especially if they are hoping to specialize more deeply or to 
change positions.
The School of the Magistracy is autonomously administered under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Justice, which allocates its budget. 
The School of the Magistracy has wide autonomy in organizing its trainings, 
guaranteed by the President of the Court of Cassation, who chairs the adminis-
trative board.
    
III. Functions and Powers of Prosecutors
3.1. Prosecutorial functions in criminal justice
The Parquet institutes criminal proceedings and monitors the application of the law.64 
It is competent in respect to all offenses and violations of the criminal law and crimes 
committed by the President or members of the Government;65 specialized prosecu-
tors deal with military offenses judged by military court in times of peace as well as 
in wartime. In all other respects, the Parquet has a monopoly over the institution of 
criminal proceedings.66
64 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 31.
65 These are tried by courts established for this purpose: the High Court of Justice (Haute Cour de 
justice) for the President and the Court of Justice of the Republic (Cour de justice de la République) 
for members of the government. 
66 The possibility of a victim appearing before the examining magistrate or the court as a civil party 
to press a claim for damages is often seen as an exception to the Parquet’s monopoly over criminal 
proceedings. See Fr�d�ric Debove and François Falletti, Droit Pénal et Procédure Pénale (2006). It is 
true that a civil claim may be filed at any time and may accompany criminal proceedings instituted 
by the Prosecutor, Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 85. The civil party is empowered to require the 
examining magistrate to take certain actions, exhaustively listed by the law: to interview and hear 
the civil party, hear witnesses, and convene all parties and witnesses in the case to be heard together 
by the examining magistrate. This, however, does not actually constitute an independent authority 
to initiate prosecutions, and in any event it in no way limits the Parquet’s scope for independent ac-
tion, since the conduct of the civil party is not binding on the prosecution. See Lemesle and Pansier, 
supra note 14, at 48. 
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The Parquet receives complaints and information of specific offenses and decides 
what action needs to be taken.67 Prior to making a decision whether to prosecute or 
not, the Parquet is obliged to collect the necessary evidence that a crime has been 
committed and its perpetrator is known.
Investigative actions are taken by prosecutors or by examining magistrates, depend-
ing on the nature and gravity of the offense.68 Examining magistrates do not always 
take part in investigative action, since their participation is only mandatory in the 
investigation of more serious crimes, whereas with regard to less serious offenses 
they will only intervene upon express request of the prosecution office. Both institu-
tions are entitled to give instructions to the judicial police in the course of investi-
gation. In practice, a large part of the investigation is often delegated to the judicial 
police; however, the police must keep the prosecutor or the examining magistrate 
informed of the ongoing investigations, especially if arrests are needed, and make 
a detailed report to them at the end of the inquiries. The targets of investigation 
are determined by the magistrates, who must review the results and determine the 
schedule of those investigations.
Discretion to Initiate Prosecution: Regardless of which body supervises the initial in-
vestigation, however, it is the Parquet that decides whether or not to prosecute, unless 
an examining magistrate is in charge of the case (in that case, the prosecutor only of-
fers his own opinion when the examining magistrate must decide whether or not to 
send the case to a court for judgment). In deciding, prosecutors employ the principle 
of discretionary prosecution (principe d’opportunité des poursuites). This was part 
of a conscious attempt by Parliament to give prosecutors discretion to select cases, 
acknowledging that, in practice, it is not possible to prosecute every offense.69 The 
discretionary principle allows the Parquet to terminate criminal proceedings “with-
out further effect” (classement sans suite), largely at its own discretion; the criminal 
courts are prohibited from criticizing the Parquet’s decisions about whether or not to 
institute criminal proceedings in a given case.70
Approximately one-third of all investigations are terminated “without further ef-
fect.”71 This includes cases in which no offender was ever identified, the judicial 
police initially pursued investigation that was then dropped because of insufficient 
evidence, or other courses of action were pursued (mediation, compensation to the 
victim, warning), as well as complaints involving conduct that does not constitute a 
criminal offense or for which the statute of limitations has expired.72
67 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 40.
68 French criminal law distinguishes among three grades of criminal offenses: crimes (crimes), of-
fenses (délits), and petty offenses (contraventions).
69 See Report of the Truche Commission, supra note 12.  
70 Judgment of the Court of Cassation, May 21,1979. See also Judgment of the Court of Cassation 
Court, September 21, 1993  (finding that the discretionary principle does not violate the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 6).
71 “Les chiffres-clés de la justice,” statistical information on the website of the French Ministry of Jus-
tice, available at www.justice.gouv.fr.
72 Lemesle and Pansier, supra note 14, at 65-66.
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There are only limited means to compel a prosecution if the responsible prosecutor 
is unwilling. A victim dissatisfied with a prosecutor’s decision to terminate proceed-
ings can file an appeal with the Prosecutor General of the Court of Appeals, who may 
issue a written instruction to prosecute to the relevant District Prosecutor. In addi-
tion, one of the main guarantees against arbitrary decisions is the ability of victims 
to request an examining magistrate to conduct an investigation into the case. An 
important percentage of cases submitted to examining magistrates are the result of 
such requests by victims (often cases of fraud related to commercial interests or those 
involving private issues). In such a situation, the examining magistrate must consider 
whether any criminal offense exists, even if the prosecutor previously dropped the 
case. This is a very strong guarantee against prosecutors’ abuse of discretion. At the end 
of the investigation, the examining magistrate decides whether the case will go to trial 
and the victim will be authorized to attend the trial to request civil compensation. 
The Parquet’s application of the discretionary principle has been systematized in re-
cent years in order to ensure transparency; statistical forms are now filled out by head 
prosecutors to identify the different situations in which it has been implemented and 
methods that have been used. 
Control of Ongoing Proceedings: During court proceedings, the Parquet plays a cen-
tral role. It can call witnesses and experts to testify, and is allowed to ask questions 
of the defendant, witnesses and experts taking part in the hearing. The prosecution 
“must be heard,”73 and any judgment that does not register the presence of the Par-
quet must be overturned.74 The prosecutor is also allowed to make formal requests 
and representations to the court regarding sentencing.
Post-Sentencing: The Parquet retains certain powers even after sentence has been 
imposed. It monitors the enforcement of judgments75 and sentences, and can sum-
mon the assistance of law enforcement bodies (la Force Publique)76 to this effect. The 
prosecutor has the authority to ask the police to search for sentenced persons and 
to review their arrest before they are jailed. He also forwards necessary information 
to the treasury in case a fine is to be recovered. The Parquet enforces the sentences 
imposed by the competent judge where such sentences involve, for example, commu-
nity service orders or expulsion from France. The Parquet has no authority to enforce 
judgments of a civil, financial, or customs nature, however. In addition, the institu-
tion of a special judgeship for the enforcement of sentences77 has tended to reduce 
the involvement of the Parquet in enforcement issues: administrative boards work 
more and more directly under the supervision of such specialized judges in order 
to enforce the sentences imposed by the criminal courts. This has been a significant 
change.
73 Judgment of the Court of Cassation, July 8, 1972.
74 Judgment of the Court of Cassation, February 14, 1991.
75 Judicial Organization Code, Art. 32.
76 Police and Army officers placed at the disposal of the government; their role mainly consists in the 
maintenance of public order, the observance of the law, and enforcement of judgments.
77 This is a judge with the first instance court, with a term of office of three years, subject to renewal.
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The Parquet (and other institutions) can suspend certain sentences of less than three 
months of its own accord, and can propose to the court the suspension of sentences 
longer than three months.78
3.2. Relationship with the judge at the pre-trial stage
A prosecutor may order detention of a suspect for 24 or 48 hours at his own discre-
tion; longer periods of detention require a decision by a judge for certain classes of 
cases.79 Similarly, a judge’s approval is required for bail or use of electronic monitor-
ing devices for suspects. Decisions may be immediately appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for expedited review.
Prosecutors can order searches and seizures only pursuant to court order, apart from 
emergency needs in case of a manifest offense (flagrant délit),80 and such actions are 
governed by rules protecting privacy. Information or evidence acquired in contra-
vention of such rules is not normally admissible at trial. As an officer responsible 
for overseeing the application of the law, a prosecutor may review the investigative 
methods used to acquire evidence.
As noted, at the end of the pre-trial period, the prosecutor decides whether or not to 
bring a case before the court. When an examining magistrate has been designated, as 
is the practice for more serious cases (affaires sérieuses et complexes), that magistrate 
alone has the power to decide to take the case to trial. However, in such situations, 
the prosecutor must be asked for his opinion before the examining judge comes to a 
decision. The court must then decide whether or not to convict, taking account of the 
evidence gathered in the examining magistrate’s dossier.
3.3. Powers outside the criminal justice system
The Parquet also takes part in civil and commercial proceedings, and maintains 
cooperative relationships with local and administrative authorities on matters of 
public order.
In civil proceedings,81 the Parquet acts in cases set forth by law 82 (for instance regard-
ing civil status, adoption, and nationality) and may intervene in cases it considers of 
concern to public order. The Parquet must be informed of cases concerning adoption, 
custody of minors, or the institution of guardianships in respect of young persons 
78 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 708.
79 Such classes of cases include those involving organized crime or terrorism.
80 A “flagrant délit” occurs when a crime or an offense has just been committed. In such cases, the 
police have increased power to arrest suspects or conduct searches, under strict supervision by the 
prosecutor, within the framework of the law.
81 Code de procedure Civile [Civil Procedure Code], Division XIII (governing the work of the Par-
quet).
82 Judicial Organization Code, Art. L. 751-2. 
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and adults. A special prosecutor dealing with cases involving children and young 
persons is assigned to the Court of Appeals by each Prosecutor General of the Court 
of Appeals from among his deputies. The Parquet also takes part in certain special 
proceedings concerning the nationality of individuals, their civil status, adoptions, 
and parental authority. The civil unit in each prosecution office can initiate proceed-
ings or offer legal opinions to the civil courts, speaking on behalf of the general inter-
est of society, in order to avoid leaving the issue purely to private interests. 83 
In commercial law, the prosecution must be informed of, and may take part in, pro-
ceedings for bankruptcy, violations by corporations, business rehabilitation or liq-
uidation. This can occur especially when commercial problems might lead to losses 
to victims.
The Parquet is not in charge of administrative proceedings dealt with by special 
courts, but prosecutors work with administrative agencies and the local heads of 
administrative authorities, or prefects (Préfet),84 to ensure coordination on matters 
relating to public order for which both have responsibility.85 Prosecutors also com-
monly maintain contacts with local elected officials, such as mayors or presidents of 
regions, to inform them about the justice system and its actions in their areas.
The Parquet initiates and prosecutes disciplinary proceedings against professionals 
involved in the functioning of the justice system, including civil servants, lawyers, 
notaries, and experts. A prosecutor can initiate and appeal proceedings before the 
relevant disciplinary organ. Prosecutors also monitor such officials’ management and 
their use of public money.
The prosecution service may also send requests to judicial authorities abroad. Within 
the European Union, these requests are sent directly from one prosecution office to 
another abroad, not via the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
prosecutor must also implement requests for extradition or European arrest warrants.
The European Union has set up a new body called Eurojust, to which each of the 25 
member states send prosecutors to represent their judicial authorities, in order to 
facilitate and coordinate mutual legal assistance through the European region.
83 When it deals with issues such as racism or other discrimination, the prosecutor does not act under 
civil law, but in accordance with criminal law. It is up to administrative bodies to prevent or detect 
such attitudes when they do not clearly fall under the criminal law.
84 A prefect is a civil servant within the Ministry of Interior appointed by presidential decree, follow-
ing nomination by the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior.
85 See also Section 4.4 below.
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IV. Relationship of the Prosecution Office  
to Other Organs of the State
4.1. The constitutional location of the prosecution service
The French Republic is a mixed presidential and parliamentary democracy following 
the classical separation of powers model; the Constitution is the supreme and defin-
ing law.86
The legislative authority is bicameral, consisting of a National Assembly elected by 
district majority and a Senate indirectly elected by an electoral college. Parliament 
has the authority to adopt bills and oversee government policy, for instance through 
oral and written questions. The national assembly also has the power to throw the 
government out of office.
Executive power is exercised by both the President, who is head of state, and the gov-
ernment. The President is directly elected and enjoys certain personal powers that 
he exercises on his own authority, as well as other powers jointly exercised with the 
government, headed by the Prime Minister. The government administers national 
policy and allocates funds and resources;87 it is formed by the Prime Minister (who 
is appointed by the President) on the basis of recommendations from any citizen or 
Member of Parliament. The government is answerable to the National Assembly.
Judicial authority is vested in courts dealing with civil, commercial, and criminal 
cases and specialized administrative courts dealing with cases involving state li-
ability; specialized courts at the national level also examine penal claims against 
the President and members of the government. Appeals variously terminate in the 
Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation, or the quasi-judicial State Council.88 
The Superior Council of the Magistracy—chaired by the President of the Repub-
lic and including senior legislators, members of the government, and members of 
the Council of State—administers the career paths of the magistracy, which includes 
both judges and prosecutors.89 
The hierarchical structure of the Parquet, its subordination to the Minister of Justice, 
the procedure for appointment of prosecutors, and the disciplinary rules could lead 
86 Constitution de la République française du 0 octobre 1958 [Constitution of the French Republic of      
October 4, 1958] [hereinafter Constitution], October 4, 1958.
87 Constitution, Art. 20.
88 See supra note 46.
89 Both judges and prosecutors are considered magistrates (magistrats). However, judges are identi-
fied as “bench magistrates” (magistrats du siège), while prosecutors are called “floor magistrates” 
(magistrats du Parquet).
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to the conclusion that the Parquet is “attached” to the executive.90 However, there 
is no doubt that the Parquet belongs to the judiciary. The Constitutional Court has 
frequently emphasized that prosecutors have special powers to protect human rights, 
individual freedoms, and property, which in turn requires that prosecutors possess 
important guarantees of independence in their decision-making and career paths. 
Those guarantees are also strongly linked to the existence of the Superior Council of 
the Magistracy.
The Superior Council of the Magistracy: A single body, the Superior Council of the 
Magistracy, has a say in the careers of judges and prosecutors. The SCM has power in 
the appointment, disciplining, and dismissal of magistrates.
The SCM’s membership is mixed and includes prosecutors, judges, and political ap-
pointees. The SCM consists of the President of the Republic, who acts as Chairman; 
the Minister of Justice, who acts as the Deputy Chairman ex lege;91 a member of 
the State Council; three members appointed by the President of the Republic and 
the Presidents of the National Assembly and Senate respectively, and who may not 
“belong either to Parliament or the magistracy”; 92 and professional judges and pros-
ecutors elected by their colleagues at different levels of the hierarchy.93 Appointed or 
elected members serve four-year terms with no right of “immediate” re-election.94 
During their term in office, SCM members may not be promoted and their position 
may not be changed.
The SCM has two separate panels, one for administering judges and the other for 
prosecutors. Each panel includes a greater number of members from the part of the 
magistracy that it regulates; thus the prosecutors’ panel has five members elected by 
prosecutors and only one judge; the judges’ panel similarly has five members elected 
by judges and only one prosecutor. However, the President of the Republic, the Min-
ister of Justice, a member of the State Council and the three members appointed by 
the President of the Republic and the Presidents of the National Assembly and the 
Senate are members of both panels.
4.2. Relations with the legislature
Parliament does not exercise any direct control over the Parquet or the magistracy as a 
whole. Parliament does not participate in the appointment and dismissal of prosecu-
tors. The Parquet is not answerable to Parliament for its operations; instead, the Min-
ister of Justice acts as the representative of the magistracy in dealings with Parliament.
90 See, e.g., Lemesle and Pansier, supra note 14, at  42.
91 Constitution, Art. 65. The Minister chairs the SCM when it sits as a disciplinary body.
92 Constitution, Art. 65 (3).
93 First-level magistrates, Presidents and Prosecutors of Courts, heads of Courts of Appeal, and rep-
resentatives of the Court of Cassation each elect representatives to the SCM.
94 Loi organique n°9-100 du 5 février 199 sur le Conseil supérieur de la magistrature [Superior Coun- 
cil of the Magistracy Act of February 5, 1994] [hereinafter Superior Council of the Magistracy Act], 
Art. 6 (1).
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The Minister of Justice informs Parliament about the work of the magistracy and acts 
as an interlocutor and advocate for judges and prosecutors. The Prosecutor attached 
to the Court of Cassation is empowered to draw the attention of the Minister of Jus-
tice to improvements that could contribute to the resolution of difficulties identified 
in the implementation of the law and make suggestions for reforms. It must be noted 
that any Prosecutor General of the Court of Appeals may be consulted by the Minis-
try of Justice about problems with the practical implementation of laws. In addition, 
the Court of Cassation publishes an annual report that is a reference for practitioners 
and lawmakers. All suggestions from practitioners are useful at the legislative level. 
The Minister of Justice may give general information to Parliament, especially dur-
ing the budgetary discussions; if a member of Parliament asks a question about an 
individual case by request, however, the Minister of Justice is not allowed to give 
information that would violate rules protecting the confidentiality of the investigation. 
Parliament may conduct independent investigations relating to the organization and the 
general work of the prosecution service, but never about individual cases or prosecutors.
Parliamentary committees may also hear magistrates directly, but may not solicit in-
formation about individual cases; during such hearings, magistrates appear as experts 
to give general information, especially when new bills are under consideration. 
Parliament can influence the Parquet through legislation, and in particular through 
the budgetary process. Parliament is informed of the results of the activities of the ju-
dicial system, including the Prosecution Service, and can support new good practices 
with financial subsidies. Parliament adopts a single budget for the entire magistracy; 
the Ministry of Justice proposes a budget, including the needs of the Prosecution 
Service, after gathering the requests of each court and mediating among them. The 
general budget has greatly increased in recent years; since the budget for justice in 
France is considered low in comparison to other countries, there has been a strong 
trend to increase it and to provide more money to support the activities of the judi-
cial system, including the prosecution office. 
Parliament may not impeach prosecutors.
4.3. Relations with the executive
The various elements of the Ministry of Justice have regular links to the policy, per-
sonnel, and work of the Parquet.
The Minister of Justice proposes the Parquet’s budget to Parliament, and the Ministry 
administers and distributes funds allocated to the magistracy. This power is intended 
only to improve general functioning, without interference in specific cases. 
Executive Influence on Prosecutorial Career Path: The President appoints prosecu-
tors and their deputies by decree to every level of the courts, at the recommenda-
tion of the Minister of Justice. The SCM gives an opinion on these nominations, but 
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the Minister of Justice (who also sits on the SCM) is not bound by it;95 in practice, 
however, the Minister almost always follows the recommendation of the SCM. Each 
Prosecutor General of the Court of Appeals is himself appointed from among pros-
ecutors or judges and thus belongs to the magistrates’ body. Prosecutors General of 
the Courts of Appeals are appointed by presidential decree at the advice of the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the government, without consultation with the Superior Council 
of the Magistracy.96
In recent years there has been discussion about reforming the procedure for appoint-
ment of prosecutors and Prosecutors General of the Courts of Appeals, but no re-
form has yet taken place. Concern remains about possible political influence on the 
process, although it was much improved by the constitutional reforms of 1994; on 
the other hand, there is some hesitation about having a prosecution office complete-
ly separate from the general interests for which the government is responsible. The 
most frequent criticism focuses on the control the executive exercises over the ap-
pointment of the Prosecutor General of Court of Appeals and the prosecutors. Some 
would like to see the Prosecutor General of the Court of Appeals and all prosecutors 
appointed on the basis of a binding recommendation by the SCM, or even through 
its nomination. Such a reform would bring the rules of appointment of prosecutors 
into line with those for judges. The existing procedure for appointment of Prosecu-
tors General—that is, without the involvement of the SCM—is usually defended by 
the need for more efficient enforcement of the policy priorities set by the government 
in the area of criminal law.
The Ministry of Justice plays an important role in the promotion of prosecutors. The 
Ministry of Justice issues recommendations for appointment to specific positions; 
these recommendations are then disseminated to any member of the prosecution 
service for observations and comments. SCM’s prosecutors’ panel then considers 
each nominee, along with any comments from members of the Parquet, and may 
give a negative advisory opinion to the Minister of Justice. However, the Minister is 
not bound by the Council’s opinion, although he generally follows the advice of the 
SCM. The President of the Republic decides among the recommendations made by 
the Minister of Justice.
The Minister of Justice decides matters of prosecutorial discipline, based on recom-
mendations by the SCM. The Minister may reconvene the SCM to consider addition-
al sanctions if he considers its original recommendations insufficient.97 In general, 
the Minister follows the recommendations of the Disciplinary Council of the SCM.
Executive Instruction of Prosecutors: The Minister of Justice can instruct the Prosecu-
tor General of a Court of Appeals in writing to institute or reopen proceedings con-
cerning any offense;98 however, the Minister cannot order proceedings to be dropped 
95 By contrast, the Superior Council of the Magistracy also provides an opinion on the appointment 
of judges. In such cases, judges may only be appointed if the Council approves the nominations by 
the Minister of Justice; otherwise, the Minister is obligated to make new nominations.
96 Magistrates Status Act, Art 59.
97 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 48.
98 “The Minister of Justice can inform the Prosecutor General of the Court of Appeals of any offense 
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or dictate the particular course of a specific investigation.99 Ministerial instructions 
to open an investigation must be in writing, and must be placed in the case file open 
to all parties, in order to increase the transparency of relations between the Parquet 
and the Ministry.100 Instructions, recommendations, direct or indirect pressure and 
decisions based on personal relations, animosity, and economic or political interests 
that could lead to a failure to prosecute any specific case are also prohibited.101 Such 
instructions do not occur in practice, but the establishment of such rules is impor-
tant to prevent possible abuses. The requirement that instructions be in writing was 
added to the law in 1993 in response to concerns that the Parquet was too dependent 
on the executive.  
The Minister of Justice may also intervene in prosecutorial decision-making by issu-
ing circulars,102 instructions of a general nature not related to any specific case; these 
circulars give guidance to the heads of general prosecution offices, who may none-
theless also take into account the circumstances and context in their own areas.
The Ministry of Justice holds frequent conferences with the Parquet, and the Parquet 
regularly provides information to the Ministry of Justice Directorate in charge of 
criminal cases (Directeur des affaires criminelles et des grâces) about cases that have 
attracted the interest of the media; the Ministry uses these information sources in 
drafting its instructions and circulars.103
The scope of laws covering offenses involving the economic and social fields has been 
broadened over the last thirty years; this has given rise to increasing links between 
the Ministry of Justice and other executive departments on matters of interest to the 
Parquet, as well as direct contacts between the Parquet and other agencies charged 
with enforcing the law. Links now exist on a regular basis with agencies in charge of 
customs, competition rules, labor, and health.
The Truche Report on Reform: In 1997, the President of the Republic asked a group of 
experts known as the Truche Commission to develop recommendations on reform-
ing the relationship between the executive and the Parquet. The Commission first 
noted that the intervention of the executive, especially the Minister of Justice, in the 
operations of the Parquet through the use of instructions had created a sense of “at-
tachment” and dependency of the Parquet on the executive. 
In response, the Commission proposed several reforms. As regards the appoint-
ment of magistrates of the Parquet, it recommended that the opinion of the Superior 
Council of the Magistracy be binding on the Minister of Justice, since practice has 
he has become aware of and give instructions in writing for the institution of proceedings or for 
referral to competent bodies.” Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 36.  
99 Debove and Falletti, supra note 10.
100 See Lemesle and Pansier, supra note 14, at 35.
101 Report of the Truche Commission, supra note 12, Chapter I, I-3.3 Government Intervention in Indi-
vidual Cases. 
102 Circulars are instructions in writing, which may be issued either by individual Ministers or by 
administrative bodies. Their purpose is to clarify a specific legal provision and provide guidance on 
its application. Circulars have no binding force.
103 See Lemesle and  Pansier, supra note 14, at 36.
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shown that almost without exception, he follows the recommendations of the Coun-
cil in any event, and codifying this rule would simply entrench existing practice.104 
Similarly, the Commission recommended that the Minister of Justice be prohibited 
from ordering the initiation of proceedings or giving instructions to magistrates in 
specific cases.105 In general, it recommended a more transparent relationship be-
tween the executive and the Parquet. The Commission did not recommend severing 
the relationship between the Minister of Justice and Parquet altogether, however; for 
example, it proposed allowing the Minister to reopen proceedings that have been 
closed by prosecutors.106 
Lastly, the Commission recommended that the Ministry of Justice be required to 
adopt a “criminal prosecution policy” (politique d’action publique), reasoning that a 
uniform law enforcement policy would allow uniform application of the law by all 
prosecution offices.107 This would prevent differing prosecutions of similar crimes 
depending solely on where the offense took place. The Commission noted that, in 
the absence of coordinated policy, there is a risk of arbitrariness and a real risk that 
each judicial body will carry out a policy of its own. Such a coordinated policy would 
be implemented in the form of law enforcement guidelines of a general nature and 
instructions relating to specific cases; Prosecutors General of Courts of Appeals and 
office heads would then implement the national priorities in their respective regions, 
and prosecutors would be required to provide full details of their operations to the 
Minister of Justice in periodic reports and individual reports on important cases.108 
If a District Prosecutor developed new practices, they would have to be clearly ex-
plained and in harmony with national and regional guidelines. Guidelines could ad-
dress offenses committed by drivers and drug addicts, as well as actions taken against 
organized crime and terrorism. They could also establish a common policy on coun-
terfeiting that could involve individual practices as well as organized trafficking. Uni-
form policy could also be implemented through more temporary instructions, for 
example in case of offenses linked to demonstrations.
Some of the Truche Commission’s recommendations were enacted into law in March 
2004; they clarify the relationship within the hierarchy of the Parquet by allowing the 
Minister of Justice, Prosecutors General, and District Prosecutors to issue general 
circulars to establish general guidelines expressing national, regional and local prior-
ities. This clarifies current practice and gives it legislative support. Thus, for example, 
special activity reports are now drafted every year by each prosecution office at the 
local and regional level. These reports are useful to the Ministry in providing infor-
mation to Parliament and the public. They are also a good way of assessing the effec-
tiveness of the guidelines, especially with the support of statistics and other data.
104 Report of the Truche Commission, supra note 12, Chapter I, I-3.7 Superior Council of the Magis-
tracy.
105 Id. See also Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 30.
106 Report of the Truche Commission, supra note 12, Chapter I, I-3.3 Government Intervention in Indi-
vidual Cases. 
107 Id. 
108 Id., Chapter I, I-3.2 Criminal Prosecution Policy.
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Some of the Truche Commission’s recommendations have not been followed, howev-
er, such as giving the Superior Council of the Magistracy the power to issue binding 
opinions to the Minister of Justice. It was thought that this might create an imbalance 
of power between the Minister and the Council. 
In addition, the 2004 law does not modify the basic hierarchal structure of the Par-
quet. Recent reforms seem to have favored greater transparency and clarification of 
the hierarchical nature of the Parquet. 
4.4. Relations with the police and with investigative organs  
other than the police
The Parquet has functional administrative authority over special police forces that 
conduct criminal investigation, called the judicial police.109 The main aims of the 
judicial police are to detect offenses, collect evidence, arrest offenders and com-
mit them to court. Those aims are different from those of the administrative police, 
which are to protect the public order, or prevention, which is in the hands of various 
administrative authorities charged with general responsibilities (such as the Préfet) 
or more specific tasks (regarding health or labor).
The judicial police are administratively part of either the National Police, under the 
Ministry of the Interior, or the Gendarmerie, part of the Ministry of Defense,110 but 
they are functionally separate from the administrative police. The judicial police are 
organized in a centralized, hierarchical fashion, with both functional units—dealing 
with organized crime or terrorism, for example—and territorial units attached to the 
National Police or to the Gendarmerie at the regional and local level.
Interaction between the Parquet and the judicial police occurs on several levels, relat-
ing to investigation and administrative supervision. All police officers are appointed 
by administrative decree;111 to become a judicial police officer, however, an officer 
must obtain an additional authorization from the relevant Prosecutor General. Such 
an authorization is valid as long as the officer is involved in judicial police work, and 
can be revoked by the Prosecutor General in case of abuse. A judicial police offi-
cers’ career path is determined by the respective Ministry, not the Parquet. However, 
Prosecutors General maintain a separate file on each judicial police officer and take 
part in the evaluation of judicial police officers’ performance, which affects officers’ 
promotion prospects.
Judicial police officers remain administratively part of the police forces, but when 
they are engaged in a judicial inquiry they are subject to the authority of the District 
Prosecutor or of the examining magistrate in charge of the case; they must obey 
109 The judicial police are composed of civil servants authorized to conduct investigations under the 
direction of the prosecutor or of the examining magistrate.
110 The National Police work mainly in cities and towns, while the Gendarmerie works mainly outside 
urban areas.
111 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 16. 
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the magistrate’s orders and supply him with all relevant information. The judicial 
police act “under the direction of the District Prosecutors” and “on the territory of 
each Court of Appeals, they act under the supervision of the Prosecutor General 
of the Court of Appeals and the control of the Investigative Chamber (Chambre de 
l’instruction)112 at the Court of Appeals.”113 
Prosecutors and examining magistrates each supervise the judicial police, depending 
on the type of investigation. Examining magistrates supervise in investigations of se-
rious offenses (délits graves), while prosecutors supervise their work on investigations 
of manifest offenses (flagrant délit) and preliminary investigation (enquête prélimi-
naire). The prosecutor and examining magistrate “enjoy discretion in the selection 
of the judicial police unit” that carries out an investigation.114 The Prosecutor may 
also name another judicial police unit if he considers it necessary. There are different 
kinds of judicial police units on the national, regional, and local levels; some of these 
units specialize, for instance, in economic offenses, computer crime, or drug traffick-
ing;. This is why it may seem opportune to the prosecutor to choose the most efficient 
unit to deal with each specific case. Often a prosecutor (or an examining magistrate) 
delegates a large number of investigative actions to the judicial police by virtue of 
letters rogatory (commissions rogatoires), thus allowing them to conduct investigative 
actions without undue delay, but also in practice conferring significant power on them; 
nonetheless, the prosecutor or the examining judge retains control over the investigation, 
both to ensure that the laws are fully respected and to provide directives.
Prosecutors may oblige the judicial police to collect any and all information that in 
their view is necessary for the proper administration of justice. The judicial police are 
obliged to notify the prosecutor of the course of the investigation; under exceptional 
circumstances, the Prosecution Office may itself take over the investigation. Depend-
ing on the nature of the investigation, the powers of the judicial police may vary. In 
the event of a manifest offense, judicial police officers may proceed with the inves-
tigation on their own initiative, but must immediately notify the prosecutor; upon 
the prosecutor’s arrival at the scene, the judicial police must hand over control of the 
investigation to the prosecutor, who may of course also give instructions to the judi-
cial police officers.115 In all other cases, called preliminary investigations, the judicial 
police operate on their own initiative, but with lesser powers, or on the instructions 
of the prosecutor. Judicial police officers must inform prosecutors of serious crimes 
“as soon as possible”;116 for less serious offenses, officers may conduct some investiga-
tions before reporting. When an arrest occurs, however, the relevant prosecutor must 
be informed “at the very beginning.”117 This requirement of early notification means 
that prosecutors can monitor and control all significant stages of investigation; in 
practice, however, this also gives the judicial police considerable latitude to deter-
mine the disposition of less serious cases. For such smaller cases, the judicial police 
112 The Investigative Chamber is a chamber of the Court of Appeals that hears appeals from decisions 
of the examining magistrate. Criminal Procedure Act, June 15, 2000. 
113 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 12 et seq.
114 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. D2 (3). 
115 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 41 (5).
116 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 19.
117 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 41, 63 and 77.
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officer sends a report to the relevant prosecution office, the only one able to decide to 
prosecute or not; he may also require further investigation.
Relations with the Regular Police: The Parquet has the authority to monitor the treat-
ment of arrested persons in custody (garde à vue, applied to arrested persons for a 
period of 48 hours maximum in the course of investigations). Prosecutors may visit 
judicial police stations holding arrested persons, and have certain powers to super-
vise their treatment; the judicial police are required to keep the prosecutor informed 
of the situation of any individual arrested. Prosecutors are supposed to visit the jails 
of judicial police stations in their area of operations at least once every year, and may 
visit at any time at their discretion; they maintain a register of their visits.118 Even if 
this is a difficult task, prosecutors are strongly encouraged to do it by their hierarchy, 
and must provide an assessment of it.
Prosecutors can summon special law enforcement bodies (la Force Publique)119 to en-
force judgments and sentences. They can also organize systematic checks in some 
areas at specific times to combat specific offenses (such as drug dealing or traffic 
offenses).
Prefects120 are responsible for maintaining public order, security, and the enjoyment 
of property, as well as ensuring observance of the law and enjoyment of civic free-
doms. There is a prefect in each of the 100 local districts (départements) of France. 
Because prosecutors administer the operations of the judicial police, they have cer-
tain functions that overlap with the crime prevention and security responsibilities of 
prefects. Prefects and prosecutors in each district hold regular meetings to check the 
evolution of crime patterns in the area, regarding criminality in general or specific 
crimes; there can be specialized committees (for example, on traffic offenses or the 
situation of illegal immigrants) to coordinate preventive and administrative actions 
and judicial police targets.
There are structures at the local, regional, and national levels to elaborate and coor-
dinate administrative and judicial policies. However, such coordination cannot place 
the Parquet under administrative direction or control, or limit its ability to conduct 
investigations and prosecutions in any way, as that would interfere with the indepen-
dence of the magistracy.
In general, any administrative agency must inform the Prosecution about any crimi-
nal offenses of which it is aware. However, prosecutors may not give general instruc-
tions or orders to agencies within the executive. Nonetheless, the Parquet maintains 
strong links with agencies that do not themselves conduct criminal investigations on 
matters relating to competition rules and economic behavior, and prosecution offices 
and executive agencies can and often do cooperate in preparing criminal investiga-
tions and administering crime prevention policies.
118 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 41 (3).   
119 See supra note 76.
120 See supra note 84.
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
204
4.5. Relations with the judiciary
Prosecutors and judges are both considered magistrates. They belong to the same 
corporate structure, the magistracy, and share certain common budgetary, adminis-
trative, and disciplinary institutions. Their career paths are interrelated; judges may 
become prosecutors and vice versa.121
The fact that judges and prosecutors are jointly regulated also implies a level of pro-
fessional equality rather than hierarchical subordination;122 this may tend to rein-
force the independence and autonomy of prosecutors. Prosecutors are independent 
of the judges to whose courts they are appointed; a court cannot give instructions, 
irrespective of their nature, to its attached prosecution office.123 Prosecutors enjoy 
guarantees of autonomy similar to those of judges; for example, judges and prosecu-
tors share identical protections against threats and any attacks related to their profes-
sional functions.124 Judges and prosecutors are paid on an equal basis, and there is no 
difference between their salaries at each level. Remuneration of magistrates consists 
of a monthly salary and certain additional payments,125 determined on the basis of 
government decree as part of the budget adopted by Parliament.
The examining magistrate: There is at least one examining magistrate (juge d’instruction) 
at each first-instance court. Examining magistrates belong to the judiciary, like any 
other judge, and act independently. They investigate serious offenses and supervise 
the work of judicial police officers in these investigations.126 However, they institute 
investigative proceedings only at the request of a prosecutor. Prosecutors are under 
a duty to assign investigation of the most serious crimes to an examining magistrate; 
for less serious offenses (délits and contraventions),127 the prosecutor may request an 
investigation at his discretion. Examining magistrates are assigned to cases from a 
list maintained by the President of a first-instance court, which specifies the rotation 
of examining magistrates. Thus a prosecutor in a given case cannot simply choose 
which examining magistrate will deal with that case. 
The examining magistrate is independent in his investigation “à charge et à décharge” 
(which means that he must look for evidence in favor of and against the accused per-
son), and he is obliged only to search for the truth. The Prosecutor, the defense law-
yer, and the victim’s lawyer may ask the examining magistrate to take any action that 
could be useful for truthseeking in the case; the judge is free to take those requests 
into account. His decisions may, however, be submitted for review to a specialized 
chamber of the Court of Appeals. 
121 Magistrates Status Act, Art. I-1.II.
122 Protocol states that the President of the Court comes before the prosecutor attached to his court; 
however, they are considered equals.
123 See Debove and Falletti, supra note 10. 
124 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 11.
125 Magistrates Status Act, Art. 42.
126 There are three types of investigation: investigation of a manifest offense (flagrant délit), prelimi-
nary investigation, and investigation of serious offenses (délits graves).
127 See supra note 68.
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The examining magistrate conducts all interviews with witnesses; however, the pros-
ecution and defense counsels may also ask questions or submit short explanations 
during these interviews, although these explanations are subject to the examining 
magistrate’s discretion, as he may interrupt them when he decides that he has been 
sufficiently informed.128 In the event of a manifest crime, and where an examining 
magistrate has not yet been assigned to the case, the prosecutor may order the arrest 
of a suspect129 and proceed immediately with an interview of the suspect.130
The examining magistrate may either conduct additional investigations—such as 
hearings and visits to the crime scene—himself, or may issue rogatory letters in-
structing the judicial police to do so, and may otherwise ask the police to expedite an 
investigation. The examining magistrate may also consult experts from a list main-
tained by the Court of Appeals when technical issues arise. The examining magistrate 
compiles the results of his investigations in the case file, which may be reviewed by 
the prosecutor and the parties.
Budget: Individual prosecution offices and the courts to which they are attached 
jointly administer a common budget.131
V. Information Control
Every citizen has the right to information about the operation of judicial bodies;132 
journalists have additional special rights and obligations concerning freedom of in-
formation. However, there are legal and professional limits on the Parquet’s ability 
effectively to communicate with the public. Prosecutors have a duty of discretion 
and objectivity (“devoir de réserve et d’objectivité”) that limits their ability to dissemi-
nate information about cases.133 Any person, including a prosecutor, involved with an 
investigation is obliged to protect confidential information,134 and a prosecutor who 
reveals too much information to the public risks being sanctioned.
The Parquet is nonetheless allowed “to derive from the judicial investigation any and 
all elements which it requires and make use of these in the discharge of its func-
tions.”135 This allows prosecutors to reveal information in specific cases in order to 
128 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 120. 
129 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 70 (1).
130 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 70 (2). 
131 See Section 2.2 above. 
132 Report of the Truche Commission, supra note 12. 
133 See Debove and Falletti, supra note 10.
134 Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 11.
135 Judgment of the Cassation Court, November 15, 1961. See also Loi renforçant la protection de la 
présomption d’innocence et les droits des victims,” law adopted June 15, 2000.
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inform the public and avoid misinformation.136 The recent trend towards greater 
transparency in the judicial system may, to a certain extent, increasingly oblige the 
Parquet to provide more extensive information to the public about significant cases; 
certain authors have also proposed allowing prosecutors to make information public 
about pending cases.137
The Minister of Justice develops policy regarding media access and public informa-
tion. The Ministry has a special office to deal with communication matters (Service 
de l’Information et de la Communication); each head of a prosecution office has been 
asked by the Ministry to participate in a session about communication organized 
with journalists. As yet, however, the Parquet’s own informational outreach is not 
well developed; there is no specialized unit to support the Parquet’s relations with the 
media, and the level of attention given to publicizing information varies consider-
ably among the different offices of the Parquet. The need to inform citizens about the 
operations of the judicial branch and the disposition of cases has served as an argu-
ment for the establishment of specialized public information structures. It has been 
recommended that such services be composed of selected magistrates designated by 
the chairpersons of the respective judicial bodies, and that they deal not only with 
cases of significant impact, but also with the overall operation of judicial and pros-
ecutorial bodies.
Relations between the media and judicial bodies are regulated by law.138 A respon-
sible agent in each media139 may be fined for distributing pictures of accused indi-
viduals without their consent prior to judgment or sentencing,140 or for prematurely 
publishing an indictment.141 They can also be fined for publishing information about 
non-public sessions and deliberations of the SCM.142 These rules protect the rights of 
the accused and the institutional autonomy of prosecutors and the Parquet.
136 Jean-Pierre Dintilhac, Rôle et attributions du procureur de la République, Revue de sciences crim-
inelles et de droit pénal comparé (2002), at 41.
137 Lemesle and Pansier, supra note 14, at 79.
138 Loi du 29.07.1881 sur la liberté de la presse [Law of July 29, 1881 on Freedom of the Press] [herei-
nafter Media Act] (regularly updated).   
139 The authors, directors or editors of publications, the print media, and the distributors of publica-
tions may be criminally liable.
140 Media Act, Art. 35 ter (I and II). 
141 Media Act, Art. 38(1).
142 Media Act, Art. 38 (2). Publishing information about disciplining magistrates or announcements 
concerning the Chairman or Deputy Chairman—that is, the President of the Republic or the Min-
ister of Justice—is allowed.
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VI. Statistics
Each prosecution office records monthly data to follow the evolution of the crime 
rate; each year, a general national directory is published with data detailing the work 
of judicial bodies in both civil and criminal matters. However, the Ministry of Justice 
maintains that statistical indicators on the operation of judicial bodies are more diffi-
cult to develop for criminal policy than for civil policy, owing to the poorer quality of 
statistics in the field of criminal justice and the poor harmonization of statistics from 
the Parquet, judiciary, police, and incarceration authorities. In 2003, the government 
set up a research institute charged with gathering statistical information from the 
various bodies involved (police, justice, penitentiary) and developing a common ap-
proach.143 At the same time, the Ministry of Justice itself is developing new software to 
make information about the functioning of the criminal justice system more accurate.
There has been a proposal by parliament to collect this type of data at the national 
level, with experts from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Defense attempting to 
harmonize the criminal law statistics to allow better follow-up on cases, from initial 
investigation through sentencing.
Surveys taken at the initiative of the Ministry of Justice Research Center take into 
account, in particular, the number of cases dealt with by the prosecution offices. 
Increasingly, they stress the ways in which those cases are handled, either through 
prosecution in court or through other means, such as restorative justice. Efforts are 
being made to develop an understanding of the efficiency of the prosecution service 
as a whole, including both of those paths. The results achieved are taken into account, 
along with the time taken, in order to reduce undue delays. This information is then 
used to develop practice guidelines and determine additional support.
Public awareness and attitudes towards Prosecution Office operations have not been 
systematically researched as such; however, a growing number of studies and surveys 
have been undertaken on the public’s expectations and satisfaction with the general 
functioning of the justice system.144
143 2001 Report on the Operations of the Ministry of Justice, available at Ministry of Justice website, 
www.justice.gouv.fr.
144 See, e.g., the Ministry of Justice Research Center report L’administration de la justice en Europe et 
l’�valuation de sa qualit�, available at http://www.gip-recherche-justice.fr.
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I. General Issues
The historical and conceptual legacy of the Prosecution in Germany as an independent 
“guardian of the law”(Wächter des Gesetzes), as it is commonly described, is still very 
much alive.1 Thus the fundamental task of the Prosecution in Germany is not so much 
to represent the state in all its power as to support public order and legality; the Prosecu-
tion is the symbol of justice in a system based on the rule of law. Nonetheless, as a gen-
eral rule, the powers of the Prosecution have been limited to criminal law enforcement.
German criminal law continues to be strongly marked by the experience of the un-
democratic, dictatorial systems of the Third Reich and communist East Germany, 
which are viewed in part as a failure of the legal system. Therefore, judges and pros-
ecutors, under the watchful eye of the public, are generally very careful to ensure that 
their actions uphold the rule of law.
Very roughly, one might characterize the reforms and changes in the German crimi-
nal justice system since World War II—changes that also affected the prosecution 
service—as follows: In the first 20 years, reforms aimed at strengthening the con-
stitutional basis of criminal justice, above all improving the suspect’s legal position 
and that of his defense. Since the late 1960s, the main purpose of numerous reforms 
has been to make the criminal justice system more efficient and effective, in order 
to fight terrorism as well as new forms of organized crime without eroding the high 
legal standard that has been achieved. At the same time, the position of the victim 
has improved.
Germany’s federal and state prosecution services are characterized by a high level of 
transparency. Indeed, efficiency is sometimes sacrificed in the name of transparency; 
no other prosecution system, for example, requires so many decisions to be justified, 
generally in writing. Prosecutors and the police must document all their actions in 
writing in the files, which are very carefully kept. Prosecutors must provide grounds 
in writing, or orally at the main trial, for all their decisions and for any motions to the 
court. Defense lawyers have the right to see the entire case file, following the close of 
the investigation at the latest.
1 The Prosecution emerged as a separate office in Germany some 150 years ago as an independent 
“guardian of the law” within the state, following the French model, as an element in the rise of 
the ideal of the rule of law as a fundamental principle of governance, tracking the transition from 
a police state to a state under the rule of law. See Antoinette Perrodet, The Public Prosecutor, in 
European Criminal Procedures (Mireille Delmas-Marty �� J.R. Spencer eds., 2002), at 416; 
E. Blankenburg �� H. Treiber, The Establishment of the Public Prosecutor’s office in Germany, 12 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law (1985), at 375. The term “guardian of the 
law” was first used in reference to the newly-introduced Prosecution Service by Prussian Min-
ister of the Interior Friedrich Carl von Savigny around 1846. See Eberhardt Schmidt, Einführung 
in die Geschichte der deutschen Strafrechtspflege (1965), at 336; Peter Collin, “Wächter der Gesetze” 
oder “Organ der Staatsregierung”? Konzipierung, Einrichtung und Anleitung der Staatsanwaltschaft 
durch das preußische Justizministerium von den Anfängen bis 1860 (2000).
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Other features of the system include the following:
In regard to most crimes, the German prosecution service has a monopoly on bring-
ing charges before the court. Except for minor criminal offences, prosecutors are 
required to initiate an investigation whenever there is suspicion that a crime has been 
committed. This is true even if no definite suspect has been identified. Therefore, 
numerically, German prosecutors generally deal with more cases than do prosecu-
tors in other countries. It is a criminal offense for a prosecutor to neglect to initiate 
an investigation in such situations. It is also a criminal offense for the prosecutor to 
open an investigation without the necessary suspicion.
Prosecutors must collect not only incriminating, but also exculpatory evidence for 
the defendant; in other words, the prosecutor is not considered an actual party to the 
proceedings.  
Prosecutors must obey their superiors’ instructions (known as the “internal right of 
instruction”). The fact that state and federal prosecutors’ offices are subordinated to 
their respective Ministries of Justice means that the Minister of Justice also has the 
right to give instructions to the prosecutor (known as the “external right of instruc-
tion”). In turn, prosecutors may issue instructions to the police at any point in an 
investigation. The police are authorized and required to begin an investigation as 
soon as they suspect a crime, but regardless of their institutional independence, their 
investigation and the prosecutor’s investigation form a single entity. The police must 
submit all their files to the prosecutor, who decides whether to terminate or continue 
a case.
For certain serious invasions of freedoms or rights, including economic rights (ar-
rests, searches or seizures, electronic surveillance, etc.), the prosecutor must obtain a 
warrant from a judge. Exceptions can only be made in emergency cases. 
Prosecutors and judges share a similar legal status. Training (study of law, two state 
exams) is the same, and acceptance into the profession is based on the same strict 
criteria. Pay and pensions are at the same level.  However, unlike judges, prosecutors 
are not independent.
Prosecutors are expected to devote themselves to the important aspects of their job, 
and therefore are not expected to take care of routine business. German prosecutors’ 
offices therefore have well-trained support staff.
The weaknesses of the German prosecutorial system are essentially the flip side of 
its strengths. The system, like the entire German judicial system, is extraordinarily 
personnel-, cost-, work-, and time-intensive, a situation exacerbated by the German 
tendency toward perfectionism. Thus cases are handled by all parties with great care 
and attention, but they also take far too long. The length of investigations and trials is 
the most common public criticism of the prosecution’s work. Thus efforts at reform 
generally tend toward streamlining the system and reducing the costs, especially 
through increased use of electronic data processing and through budgeting reforms 
that allow prosecutors’ offices greater independence in administering their finances. 
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The unsettled relationship between the prosecution service and the executive (a re-
lationship that is never mentioned in the constitution) is problematic in terms of 
the political dependence it creates. Legally, the Minister of Justice has an unlimited 
right to issue instructions to the prosecutors below him, including instructions about 
how to handle specific cases. In practice, Ministers of Justice like to emphasize that 
they make very sparing use of this right. Nevertheless, the danger exists that, where 
there is significant political interest in the outcome of a case, prosecutors could be 
impermissibly influenced. Therefore, for years representatives of the prosecutorial 
service have been demanding elimination of the Ministers’ right of instruction, or at 
least that such instructions only be permitted in written form. However, at present 
legislatures seem uninterested in such reforms. Other concerns include the danger 
that a case may be taken away from a prosecutor for political reasons.
Because of the complex federal division of power in Germany, there are seventeen 
separate prosecution services—one federal service and one for each of the sixteen 
states (Länder). However, many of the issues discussed in this report relate to all of 
these services, or at least all the state services. Consequently, this report will use “the 
Prosecution” to refer to all seventeen separate prosecution services, or “state Pros-
ecution” to refer to the sixteen state prosecution services. 
Unless explicitly noted to the contrary, any reference to a state official or institution 
interacting with “a prosecutor,” “prosecutors,” or “the Prosecution” refers to that state 
official or institution’s respective jurisdiction. Thus “The Prosecution Service answers 
to the Minister of Justice” implies each Service answering to its respective Minister. 
Since the procedures of Germany’s 16 states vary to some extent, statements concern-
ing specific state practice may not apply in detail to all states; in many cases, even 
where state laws are substantially similar, actual practice may vary. However, the ba-
sic tendencies referred to apply to all the states.
Following German unification, the East German prosecution service was broken up 
and former East German prosecutors, judges, and police officers underwent strict 
vetting for secret police ties and other undemocratic behavior. Many were retired, 
particularly those in leadership positions, who were replaced with West Germans. 
Others were reintegrated into the new justice system, which was completely restruc-
tured along West German lines. Discussion of the East German prosecution service 
would go beyond the scope of this report, as East German legislation has no implica-
tions for the structure and policies of the current German Prosecution Service.
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II. Structure and Organization of the Public Prosecution Service
2.1. Internal structure
 There is a separate Prosecution Service for each state (Land) and at the federal level. 
The relationships among these services follow the federal model, with the federal 
Prosecutor General (Generalbundesanwalt) having no authority over state prosecu-
tors. Rather, each Prosecution Service answers to the Ministry of Justice of its respec-
tive state, which is politically accountable for the activities of the prosecution. 
The federal and state prosecution services are distinct from one another. The large 
majority of prosecutions take place at the state level. The jurisdiction of state and 
federal prosecutors’ offices is determined not by whether state or federal laws are 
violated (most criminal law in Germany is federal law), but by which crimes are des-
ignated federal crimes. The Federal Prosecution Service (Generalbundesanwalt) deals 
with offenses that affect the integrity of the country as a whole,2 but it has no power to 
interfere with the conduct of the state services. The sources of law for the prosecution 
services are the federal Constitution (Grundgesetz), the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Strafprozessordnung), the Law on Judicial Organization (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz), 
the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) and the legislation of each state.
Like any other executive agency, the Prosecution Service is a hierarchical institution, 
with hierarchical subordination between the different levels of offices and within 
each office.
The organization and distribution of Prosecution Service offices mirror that of the 
courts, with the seat of each prosecution office coinciding with the seat of the court 
to which it is attached.3 Thus, a Federal Public Prosecution Office functions at the 
Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof). Most states have two-tiered prosecution 
services, attached to the State Supreme Court (Oberlandesgericht) and the region-
al courts (Landgerichte); the regional prosecution services also cover district-level 
courts (Amtsgerichte).  
Higher level offices have supervisory authority over lower offices, and prosecutors 
must follow the instructions of their superiors (Weisungsrecht).4 This includes the su-
pervision of the Prosecution Service as a whole by the Minister of Justice and super-
vision within the Service of lower-ranking prosecutors by higher-ranking ones. Thus 
prosecutors at the State Supreme Court-level offices direct the work of prosecutors 
2 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [Law on Judicial Organization] [hereinafter GVG], Art. 120, 142(a).
3 Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [Introductory Act to GVG], Art. 8, 141.
4 GVG, Art. 146, 147.
Report on the Public Prosecution Service in Germany
217
attached to each regional court; these prosecutors in turn supervise those in offices 
attached to the district courts. Superior prosecutors in this hierarchy can withdraw 
cases from their subordinates, taking the case themselves (Devolutionsrecht)5 or reas-
signing them (Substitutionsrecht).6 
Prosecution offices are generally divided into departments, specialized by type of 
crime; this internal division allows prosecutors to specialize. Administration is seen 
to by an administrative maintenance unit, which is not a separate department, but 
reports directly to the head of the Prosecution Service and is directed by a manager 
who is not a lawyer. The staff of a Prosecution Service in most states is comprised of 
the following:
▶	 Prosecutor General (Generalstaatsanwalt, one or more per state)
▶	 Chief Prosecutor (Leitender Oberstaatsanwalt), who heads each prosecution office
▶	 Deputy Chief Prosecutor 
▶	 Department heads (Oberstaatsanwälte)
▶	 Line prosecutors at the regional courts (in most Länder)
▶	 Junior prosecutors (Staatsanwälte auf Probe)
▶	 Enforcement officers (Rechtspfleger)
▶	 Lower-level civil servants7 responsible for record-keeping
▶	 administrative staff
▶	 Legal secretaries 
Each office has trained enforcement officers (Rechtspfleger)8 responsible for enforcing 
criminal sentences; these officers also usually maintain the registers of final judicial 
decisions. However, more important decisions relating to enforcement must be made 
or approved by a prosecutor. The head of the administrative staff is usually a more             
experienced enforcement officer.   
The size of Prosecution Service offices may differ substantially. In city-states like Ber-
lin and Hamburg and cities like Munich and Frankfurt, the prosecution office may 
employ more than a hundred prosecutors, while in small offices the number of pros-
ecutors might not exceed 15 prosecutors. Offices generally have large administrative 
staffs, and prosecutors themselves do little administrative work.
Federal Prosecution Office: The Federal General Public Prosecution Office is divided 
into three departments: one dealing with first-instance cases, one charged with ap-
pellate review, and the third overseeing the Central Federal Registry.9  The total staff 
is about 600 people, of which approximately 400 are with the Central Federal Regis-
try. Prosecutorial functions of the Federal Prosecution Service are discharged by the 
5 GVG, Art. 145. 
6 See Rodolphe Juy-Birmann, The German System, in European Criminal Procedures (Mireille 
Delmas-Marty �� J.R. Spencer eds., 2002), at 299–300; Perrodet, supra note 1, at 437; Lutz Meyer-
Gossner, Strafprozessordnung (2007); GVG, Art. 145. 
7 In Germany there are four levels of civil servants, depending on education and position. Literally               
translated, the categories of civil servants are: higher, high, intermediate, and ordinary.
8 Enforcement officers are graduates of specialized colleges providing special legal training (jurist-
ische Fachhochschule).
9 See Section 3.1 below.
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Federal Prosecutor General, federal prosecutors, and research assistants.10 The total 
number of prosecutors in the Federal Prosecution Service is more than 70.
Performance Management: No individual prosecutor has sole and exclusive charge 
of a specific case; within the same criminal proceedings, substitution of prosecutors 
is possible and does take place. In general, however, the head of a prosecution of-
fice (Chief Prosecutor) prepares a work distribution plan (Geschäftsverteilungsplan) 
at the start of the year for the upcoming year, following meetings with department 
heads and representatives of prosecutors, female prosecutors, and prosecutors with 
disabilities.11 The plan establishes a uniform system of case assignments to prosecu-
tors. Once the plan is adopted, changes are possible only in exceptional cases, such 
as a prolonged health related absence or conflict of interest, and they require renewed 
discussion with the various parties involved. The system allows individual prosecutors 
to be involved with a case from the very start and stay on through to completion.  How-
ever, the rigidity of the work plan can reduce the office’s flexibility and make it more 
difficult to assign a case to the person best suited for it. The head of the office could in 
theory disregard the established assignment system and give a case to a different pros-
ecutor. In practice, the office head would normally discuss such a step with the parties 
and the Prosecutor’s Council (the prosecurots’ worklace representative body).  
The Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General are also bound by the plan. This 
increases transparency in the work of the prosecution office and reduces manipu-
lation. The Minister and the Prosecutor General will not directly intervene in the 
planned distribution of cases, save for recommendations in exceptional cases. In 
practice, such recommendations are a very rare occurrence. Nonetheless, the Pros-
ecutor General and the head of the Prosecution Service within his or her area are in 
constant informal contact to discuss issues concerning the staff and its work. 
2.2. Budgetary process
Each Prosecution Service drafts a budget for each year, in cooperation with local 
prosecution offices, and sends it to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry passes the 
budget on to Parliament, which decides on the overall budget and returns it to the 
Ministry for final allocation. 
In general, every Prosecution Service is in constant contact with the Prosecutor Gen-
eral and the Ministry in regard to budgetary issues. The head of a Prosecution Ser-
vice will notify his or her superiors if the Prosecution Service he or she heads suffers 
from a shortage of staff, facilities, or financial resources. If the situation becomes 
particularly problematic, he or she will even bring it to the attention of the public, 
10 Research assistants are judges or prosecutors from the states who are seconded to the Federal Gen-
eral Public Prosecution Office for a set period of time, usually three years.
11 Representatives for women and people with disabilities, found in most government offices, are 
intended to redress the underrepresentation of women and the disabled in these offices. They serve 
only in an advisory capacity; they must be consulted on hiring and promotion decisions, but have 
no right of final decision.
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which will result in conflict with the Ministry of Justice. Such public complaints are 
not uncommon.12
In the past, the respective state or federal Ministry of Justice administered the entire 
prosecution budget centrally, including allocations and expenditures. More recently, 
however, in the interests of increased economy, prosecution services have been given 
greater responsibility for their own budgets through increased flexibility to make 
savings and spending decisions. This discretion does not extend to core functions 
such as investigations, for which spending continues to be centrally administered, to 
ensure that savings do not occur at the expense of efficient completion of prosecuto-
rial tasks (such expenditures include payment for expert witnesses, travel, and the 
like). This system appears to be working well, as local offices are more aware of their 
needs and can better allocate resources.
2.3. The status of the Prosecutor General      
The Federal Prosecutor General: The Federal Prosecutor General (Generalbundesan-
walt) is the head of the Federal Public Prosecution Office, and is a public official 
within the executive branch. The German President appoints the Prosecutor General 
upon nomination by the Minister of Justice; the Minister’s nomination must first be 
approved by the Bundesrat, the upper house of the legislature.13 The Federal Prosecu-
tor General is a civil servant14 and must meet the same requirements as any other 
prosecutor. He or she is accountable to the Minister of Justice. The Minister is politi-
cally accountable to the federal government and the legislature for the activities of 
the Prosecutor General. 
The office of the Federal Prosecutor General is hierarchical and monocratic; federal 
prosecutors subordinated to the Prosecutor General act as his representatives.15 The 
Prosecutor General can give mandatory instructions to subordinate prosecutors, which 
may be general or related to individual cases. In practice, however, such instructions  
are not common and do not play an important role; the more common approach 
is to seek solutions and make decisions on a consensual basis. While this approach,         
which is the norm throughout the prosecution services in Germany, sometimes delays 
proceedings to a greater degree than a more hierarchical reliance on commands, it 
provides individual prosecutors with a sense of responsibility and confidence.
State Prosecutors General: State Prosecutors General are attached to the Supreme Court 
of each state. It is possible for a state to have more than one Supreme Court. The state 
of Hesse has only one Supreme Court, for example, while Bavaria and North Rhine-
Westphalia have more than one, and accordingly, more than one Prosecutor General.
12 See, e.g., Der Leiter der Lübecker Staatsanwaltschaft fordert dringend von der Regierung in Kiel neue 
Stellen, Die Welt, Nov. 30, 2003.
13 GVG, Art. 149.
14 GVG, Art. 148.
15 GVG, Art. 144. The Federal Prosecutor General does not exercise control over prosecutors in the 
individual state Prosecution Services.
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State Prosecutors General are civil servants16 and must meet the same requirements 
as other prosecutors; indeed, as a rule, Prosecutors General are selected from among 
active prosecutors. Prosecutors General in most states are appointed for life. Most 
can be removed from office only for violation of their official duties, though this sel-
dom happens.17 However, in some states they have the status of political appointees 
(politische Beamte) and can be removed from office at will, at a guaranteed 75% of 
their salary. In 2001 and 2003, two cases occurred in which state Prosecutors General 
were forced into retirement because of political disagreements with the state Minis-
ters of Justice. Many in the justice system find this practice quite troubling, as it can 
expose Prosecutors General—and through them, the entire hierarchical service—to 
considerable political pressure. Yet some states seem to be moving toward even great-
er dependence: Hesse, for example, has introduced a five-year probationary period 
for each newly appointed prosecutor, including the Prosecutor General. Although 
justified by a desire to improve efficiency among prosecutors, this arrangement may 
in fact increase the dangers of political pressure. 
The Prosecutor General reports to the Minister of Justice, often orally. On major 
cases, it is common practice to have the Prosecutor General, the head of the relevant 
department, and the prosecutor in charge of the case report jointly to the Minister. 
There is no data on the frequency or content of such meetings; these aspects depend 
on the management style of the Minister of Justice. 
The Prosecutor General completes an in-depth review of the work of each prosecu-
tion office every three years. The review is carried out by a team appointed by the 
Prosecutor General and covers all aspects of the Service’s work, including overall in-
dicators and inspection of randomly selected case files. The report is submitted to the 
Minister of Justice and the head of the prosecution office; as a follow-up, the Pros-
ecutor General monitors implementation of the report’s recommendations. These 
reports are not public.
2.4. The status of individual prosecutors
Like judges, prosecutors are civil servants (Beamten) whose work is regulated by the 
Federal Civil Service Act (Bundesbeamtengesetz). They enjoy secure tenure and have 
the right to a salary (higher for prosecutors than for most civil servants) and to a 
pension. Their status, including appointment and dismissal from office, is regulat-
ed accordingly.18 Unlike judges, who enjoy a high level of independence, they must 
obey instructions from their superiors;19 the prosecution service is hierarchical. A 
prosecutor’s superior may entrust a case to another prosecutor or take it over him 
or herself. Prosecutors are more independent than most civil servants, however, and 
16 GVG, Art. 148.
17 There has been no instance of a Prosecutor General being removed from office for a breach of duty 
or for committing a crime.
18 See Bundesbeamtengesetz [Federal Civil Service Act].
19 GVG, Art. 146.
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subordination is not absolute. If, for example, a prosecutor believes a crime may have 
occurred, a superior’s instruction not to proceed with the investigation is invalid, in 
line with the principle of compulsory prosecution (discussed below).
If they have doubts about the legality of certain instructions, prosecutors must take 
their concerns to their superiors.20 If they cannot convince their superiors of this il-
legality, the superior may substitute a different prosecutor. Prosecutors can also pro-
tect themselves against instructions they consider illegal or ill-founded by exercis-
ing their right to withdraw from a specific case without incurring the risk of official 
internal sanction.21 This is an additional guarantee of the lawful conduct of criminal 
proceedings and an assurance that prosecutors will act based on their own convic-
tions. Finally, prosecutors are not expected to obey orders if they require commission 
of a crime or the violation of human dignity.22 
Appointment: Selection as a prosecutor is highly competitive, with many candidates 
for each vacancy. Prosecutors are appointed by the Minister of Justice; in some states, 
this occurs from among candidates recommended by a commission for the selection          
of judges (  Richterwahlausschuss).23 The commission pays special attention to provid-      
ing equal opportunities to both sexes. The commission includes members of the state 
legislature from all represented political parties, the president of the state Supreme 
Court (Oberlandesgericht), and the president of the state bar association.24 However, 
not every state has such a commission.
20 Federal Civil Service Act, Art. 56(2). In general, the prosecutor and his or her superior will discuss 
the issue and one or the other will be convinced. 
21 Werner �eulke,  Strafprozessrecht (2006) at marginal no. 85.
22 Federal Civil Service Act, Art. 56(2).
23 The Minister of Justice is not bound by the recommendation of the commission, but may not ap-
point a candidate the commission has declared unsuitable. The most important element in the 
appointments process is the exam grade; in general, only those in the top 5–10 percent ultimately 
receive appointments. In Bavaria, for example, only candidates achieving a certain minimum grade 
on the state examinations may submit applications. The actual grade necessary for appointment is 
determined by the available vacancies, and the number and qualifications of applicants. The Minis-
try of Justice also conducts personal interviews with candidates.
24 Individual states may develop additional requirements for judicial or prosecutorial positions that 
apply both at the time of appointment and in further career development. For instance, Bavarian 
legislation contains additional requirements concerning:
 Professional qualities: In addition to exam grades, candidates are assessed for such qualities as 
decisiveness, initiative, organization, and ability to argue. Other professional experience and ca-
pacity—such as knowledge of foreign legal systems, experience as a private lawyer, or teaching 
experience—can be considered as well. Candidates must be prepared to become either judges or 
prosecutors, because of the possibility of transfer from a judicial to a prosecutorial position. (Such 
transfers are characteristic of all southern German states).
 Personal qualities: Besides professional skills, the personal qualities of candidates are also assessed 
during selection, such as commitment to democratic principles and state criminal policy, moderate 
and considerate conduct both in and outside the office, impartiality, teamwork skills, and willing-
ness to change location.
 Health status: Candidates must possess a medical certificate of fitness for occupying the relevant 
position attesting that they can withstand the mental and physical pressures.
 See website of the Bavarian Ministry of Justice, job specifications for a position as prosecutor or 
judge, under Anforderungsprofil, available at http://www.justiz.bayern.de/imperia/md/content/
stmj_internet/ministerium/ministerium/berufe_stellen/anforderungsprofil_ri_sta.pdf.
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All candidates for positions as judges or prosecutors must first successfully com-
plete the so-called second state examination in law before appointment. Approved 
candidates apply for positions to the Ministry of Justice. The head of an office with 
a vacancy then proposes a specific candidate to the Prosecutor General and to the 
representatives of female prosecutors and prosecutors with disabilities, who make a 
recommendation to the Minister of Justice based on a detailed account of the candi-
date’s abilities. The recommendations of the Prosecutor General and the representa-
tives do not bind the Minister of Justice, but in practice they are usually followed. 
A candidate who thinks that he or she has been unjustly rejected can file an appeal 
(Konkurrentenklage) to an administrative court demanding that no other candidate 
be appointed to the vacancy unless the Minister can justify his decision in court, 
proving it was well founded. This guarantees transparency of the process and is a 
strong disincentive to personal or political favoritism. However, it can also mean that 
a position remains unfilled for years while the courts deliberate. The actual frequency 
of such appeals varies from state to state.
At the federal level, the Prosecutor General is chosen based on his or her qualifica-
tions and is confirmed by Parliament. The Prosecutor General is appointed for life, 
which in practice means until the retirement age of 65. The federal prosecutor’s office 
is staffed exclusively by prosecutors with prior experience at the state level, seconded 
from state prosecutors’ offices by state Ministries of Justice. Experience at the federal 
prosecutor’s office is considered important for promotion within state prosecutors’ 
offices, and these positions are therefore desirable.
Tenure: A candidate is initially appointed as a junior prosecutor (         Anfänger)25 on a  
temporary basis for a test period of three years, after which he can be appointed to a          
permanent position, provided he meets other legal requirements.      26 Once tenured, a pros-   
ecutor can usually stay in the same position, unless he wishes to move or is promoted. 
After an additional three to five years, a prosecutor can apply for a half-year training 
period at the Prosecutor General’s office. The certificate received at the end of this 
period, while not officially necessary for promotion, is in practice crucial for it. 
Prosecutors (and judges) may also work temporarily at the Ministry of Justice. This 
movement between the Ministry and the Prosecution Services encourages fruitful 
exchange between administrative and lawmaking bodies, on the one hand, and those 
involved directly in practice, on the other. For the individual prosecutor, working for 
a time at the Ministry of Justice is often a springboard to promotion. The personal 
25 A beginning or junior prosecutor (sometimes called “Assessor”) initially has limited powers, and is 
assigned a tutor. All documents signed by the junior prosecutor must be co-signed by the tutor. In 
all other respects, however, the decisions of a junior prosecutor are in no way different from those 
of any other prosecutor and are equally valid. After a few months, the junior prosecutor is normally 
granted the right to sign documents on his own (Zeichnungsrecht), and can decide any aspect of 
the case except for the decision to indict or to terminate proceedings. After a certain time period, 
the junior prosecutor receives full rights to sign decisions (grosse Zeichnungsrecht), and receives the 
same status as any other prosecutor, except tenure.
26 Requirements include German citizenship, adherence to core constitutional principles, requisite 
educational qualifications and training, and no criminal record; for tenure, a candidate must be at 
least 27 years old. Federal Civil Service Act, Art. 7.
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connections built up during such internships may have both positive and negative 
effects on the Prosecution Services: they can make it easier for the political branch 
to exercise pressure on individual prosecutors, but they can also facilitate access to 
resources for the Prosecution Service through informal ministerial contacts.
Evaluations and Promotions: Prosecutors are evaluated every three years. These eval-
uations serve mainly to help in determining promotions. They are discussed with the 
prosecutor under evaluation, and a prosecutor may appeal a negative evaluation. For 
this reason, evaluations tend to be overly positive, which lends them somewhat less 
weight in the promotions process. Informal discussion among those familiar with 
candidates’ work provides an unofficial means of collecting more accurate informa-
tion before promotion decisions.
A prosecutor requires at least ten years’ work experience to apply for a senior posi-
tion. Every promotion must be advertised in the bulletin of the state Ministry of 
Justice. Only positions provided for in the state budget may be filled. The head of the 
prosecutor’s office that has the position reviews applicants’ files, including current 
evaluations. The evaluation must include the applicant’s prior achievements, capabil-
ities, and fitness for the position in question. The head of office then recommends a 
candidate to the Prosecutor General’s office, which consults with the representatives 
for women and the disabled before making a final decision.  
Once tenured, a prosecutor cannot be removed from office except after a final verdict 
for commission of a crime or serious breach of discipline by a disciplinary tribunal. 
In such cases, the prosecutor loses all rights as a civil servant, including retirement 
benefits.27 Such instances are quite rare, however, and any such cases are generally 
resolved by way of the early retirement option available to civil servants. 
Restrictions on Activities: Prosecutors’ conduct is restricted in ways that underscore 
the nature of the Prosecution Service as neutral civil servants. Prosecutors are obliged 
to withdraw from cases where specific conflicts of interest exist.28 They are barred 
from giving paid legal counsel or counsel not related to their official duties, or other-
wise undertaking remunerative activities in addition to their prosecution work without 
explicit permission.29 It is unusual for permission to be granted for business activities.
Prosecutors may be active, and may even take leadership roles, in churches and (in 
contrast to the situation in many other countries) in political parties. Officially, the 
law requires civil servants, including prosecutors, to exercise “restraint” (Zurückhal-
tung) and “moderation” (Mässigung) in the extent of their political activism,30 but this 
27 See Section 2.5 below.
28 These include being a party to the proceedings or a victim of the offense; being a relative of a party 
or victim; and having participated in the proceedings as a judge, police officer, or other party. Par-
ticularly in smaller jurisdictions, such conflicts of interest will arise frequently (for example, in the 
not-uncommon case in which a prosecutor’s spouse works as a private attorney and is defending a 
suspect), and will lead to substitution of the responsible prosecutor. 
29 Richtergesetz [Judicial Act], Art. 41, 122(3). As an exception, prosecutors are allowed to serve as law 
professors or evaluate state exams, provided this does not affect the exercise of their prosecutorial 
functions. Judicial Act, Art. 7.
30 Federal Civil Service Act, Art. 53.
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standard is vague and has little meaning in practice. Disciplinary proceedings against 
politically active prosecutors are unlikely, as they would bring extremely negative 
reactions from Germany’s powerful political parties. While there is little evidence 
of any overt effects of political activity on prosecutorial work, such activity can lead 
to more subtle problems. If a party member is a suspect in a case, for example, a po-
litically active prosecutor might at least appear to have a conflict of interest, which 
would require substitution of another prosecutor; conversely, prosecutors may be 
overly eager to prosecute fellow party members in order to prove lack of bias. In any 
event, political membership and activity by a judge or a prosecutor can influence the 
public’s perception of their impartiality and thus negatively affect the prosecution 
service.
2.5. Individual accountability of prosecutors
There is a strong ethic of independence and professional respect within the Prosecu-
tion Services, and in general prosecutors are given full responsibility for their own 
work.31 Prosecutors are rarely monitored by superiors except in high-profile or com-
plex cases or those involving major expenditure of resources. The ethic of indepen-
dence acts as a deterrent to arbitrary acts by superiors. In addition, the prosecutorial 
profession is characterized by a high degree of collegiality and shared responsibility, 
which also acts as a brake on hierarchical behavior by higher-ranking prosecutors 
and ensures that decisions are generally made through discussion and consensus.
If a prosecutor disagrees with a superior’s instructions or has other disputes with 
a superior,32 he or she must first discuss this with the superior. If the disagreement 
remains unresolved, the prosecutor may formally complain to the next-higher supe-
rior. If a problem involves personnel rather than legal issues, a prosecutor may also 
complain to the Prosecutor’s Council (Staatsanwaltsrat), the workplace representa-
tive body for prosecutors; non-legal staff may complain to the Personnel Council 
(Personalrat), the workplace representative for non-legal staff. Final appeal to the 
Ministry of Justice is also possible. 
Members of the Staatsanwaltsrat and the Personalrat meet at regular intervals with the 
chief prosecutor to discuss the situation in the office, including problems that may arise. 
These meetings are recorded in writing if requested by one of the participating parties. 
Disciplinary Procedures: In the absence of any special rules, prosecutors are subject 
to the same disciplinary rules and procedures (Disziplinarordnung) as other civil 
31 See, e.g., a regulation issued by the Hesse Ministry of Justice, Anordnung über Organisation und 
Dienstbetrieb der Staatsanwaltschaft [Regulation on the Organization and Operation of the Pros-
ecution Service], Justizministerial�latt f�r Hessen  , Nov. 17, 1988, at 950 [hereinafter Regula-
tion of the Hesse Ministry of Justice]. Similar regulations governing  the relationship between justice 
ministries and prosecution services exist in all states.
32 In the experience of one author of this report during many years as a chief prosecutor in Hesse, the 
most common complaints are not about differing interpretations of the law, but about overwork. 
Prosecutors complain that they cannot handle the volume of work and that trials therefore take too 
long.
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servants. In case of a disciplinary infraction, a prosecutor may be informally sanc-
tioned by a superior through a written admonition (Rüge) that does not go into the 
prosecutor’s permanent file.33 For more serious misconduct, a prosecutor may be 
subjected to disciplinary procedures before a disciplinary tribunal (Dienstgericht).34 
This three-judge court is part of the administrative court system; one of the judges on 
the disciplinary tribunal for prosecutors must be a prosecutor. Sanctions before such 
a tribunal include an official reprimand (Verweis), which must be justified in writing 
and is placed in the prosecutor’s permanent file. Other sanctions may include reduc-
tion in salary, demotion, or dismissal from office. Such sanctions are extremely rare, 
however, as prosecutors are more likely to resign before reaching this point. Deci-
sions of state disciplinary courts are subject to appeal before the Federal Disciplinary 
Court, which is attached to the Federal Supreme Court. 
Prosecutors may be held liable for damages resulting from their willful acts or gross 
negligence. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for compensating for such dam-
ages, and may then hold the individual prosecutor liable. However, this is quite rare, 
as willful or gross negligent misconduct is unusual and damages will usually be as-
cribed to the fact that prosecutors are overburdened and, as a result, make mistakes. 
Prosecutors are in any case required to have insurance for their professional activi-
ties. Premiums are paid by the prosecutor and are tax deductible. 
Prosecutors are not immune from criminal prosecution. Under the principle of com-
pulsory prosecution, for example, a prosecutor can be held criminally liable for either 
failing to open an investigation when a crime is suspected, or investigating an in-
nocent party. Prosecutors are frequently accused of such offenses by citizens, but the 
cases do not generally go beyond the investigative stage, as evidence must be shown 
of intent on the part of the prosecutor, which is rare.  
There is no official code of ethics for prosecutors. Nevertheless, prosecutors are ex-
pected to follow general ethical rules in their work. Like other civil servants, prosecu-
tors swear an oath to act in accordance with the laws and the constitution and to maintain 
their objectivity; violations of these duties can be treated as disciplinary infractions.  
2.6. Training
Preparatory Education: The education of future prosecutors is identical to that of all 
other lawyers, regardless of their subsequent choice of career path. Only an indi-
vidual meeting the requirements and holding the necessary qualifications to occupy 
a judicial position may be appointed as a prosecutor.35 In order to hold a judicial or 
prosecutorial position, a candidate must have studied law at an institution of higher 
33 In the experience of the authors, the great majority of infractions by prosecutors, about 95 percent, 
are handled through such superior sanctions, without disciplinary proceedings. Sanction by a su-
perior is not technically considered a disciplinary procedure proper.
34 Judicial Act, Art. 122(4). The disciplinary tribunals also discipline judges—another example of the 
quasi-judicial position of the Prosecution Service.
35 Judicial Act, Art. 122. 
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education, completed a mandatory two-year training internship, and passed two state 
examinations (administered by the states and somewhat different from state to state).
Professional Training: The education of prosecutors is generally of very high quality. 
Training after entry into the profession, however, is not mandatory, and depends 
largely on the individual prosecutor’s personal interest in continuing education. 
Junior prosecutors attend mandatory courses in different legal fields organized by 
the Prosecutor General on a systematic basis; these provide them with training in 
the most important aspects of their future work. Both the state and federal govern-
ments offer an abundance of non-mandatory continuing education courses for active 
prosecutors who have passed the probationary period. Ministries of Justice organize 
training courses for department heads and Chief Prosecutors, with special attention 
to management skills. For specialized state-level training courses, attendance is de-
termined by the state Minister of Justice, upon the recommendation of the Pros-
ecutor General and the Chief Prosecutors. The German Judicial Academy (Deutsche 
Richterakademie), with seats in Trier and Wustrau, as well as other institutions, 36 also 
offer legal training and continuing education for judges and prosecutors. 
Attendance at all of these continuing education courses is voluntary. However, every 
prosecutor’s office must have one or more specialists in a variety of fields (econom-
ic crimes, juvenile crime, drug and traffic crimes), and this specialization is either 
helped by, or explicitly requires, extra training. Thus participation in training and 
continuing education courses, while not mandatory, will greatly increase a prosecu-
tor’s chances of promotion. Younger prosecutors are often encouraged to seek addi-
tional training, depending on their interests.
In general, too, prosecutors are expected to keep up with recent legal developments; 
indeed, ignorance of such developments can lead to a charge of gross negligence. 
Training programs are offered to inform prosecutors of major changes in the law.
Overall, the system of continuing education and training, though rich and varied, 
is relatively disorganized, partly as a result of Germany’s federalized prosecution 
system. The lack of any mandatory continuing legal education may be considered a 
weakness in the system. 
36 These include the European Judicial Academy (Europäische Richterakademie) and the Central 
Criminology Institute (Kriminologische Zentralstelle) in Wiesbaden.
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III. Functions and Powers of Prosecutors
3.1. Prosecutorial functions in criminal justice
The criminal justice process is structured so that external monitoring exists at ev-
ery level.  The Prosecution Service supervises the police, and the courts supervise 
the Prosecution.37 
Prosecutors are not parties to criminal proceedings in the same sense as criminal 
defendants or plaintiffs are in civil proceedings. A prosecutor is expected to act only 
for the protection of legality and discovery of objective truth, as a “guardian of the 
law,”38 and therefore has only limited formal discretion in pursuing investigation and 
prosecution. He must exercise his powers, on behalf of the state, in an objective and 
impartial manner.39 
Within this structure, the Prosecution Services have a near-monopoly over the pros-
ecution of crime, as well as a key role in investigation. The Prosecution Services have 
three major functions: they are the “master of the investigation” (Herr des Ermitt-
lungsverfahren); they are responsible for criminal prosecution; and they are in charge 
of sentence enforcement (Strafvollstreckungsbehörde)40 (here Germany differs from 
many other countries in which courts or police have responsibility for enforcement 
of penalties). More broadly, prosecutors also exercise control over the legality of in-
vestigations, including monitoring for abuse of powers. 
Discretion to Initiate Prosecution: Prosecutors follow the principle of compulsory 
prosecution (Legalitätsprinzip): They are obliged to investigate all offenses as soon 
as the facts are sufficiently established (Tatverdacht), regardless of whether the identity 
of the offender has been determined.41 Failure to do so is a crime.42 For this reason, the 
number of cases initiated in Germany seems very high compared to other countries. 
However, successive reforms have weakened the impact of the principle on the sys-
tem, introducing some elements of discretionary prosecution (Opportunitätsprinzip), 
which allows a prosecutor to drop a case even if sufficient evidence exists to bring a 
37 The public can also exercise a measure of oversight through the public nature of hearings, and the 
media may also request information as long as this does not impede investigation. This guarantees 
a high level of transparency in the process as a whole.
38 See supra note 1.
39 See, e.g., B. Huber, The Office of the State Prosecutor in Europe: an Overview, in International 
Review of Penal Law, Criminal Justice and Human Rights (1993), at 559 et seq.
40 Claus Roxin, Strafverfahrensrecht (1998), at 51 et seq.; Werner Beulke, Strafprozessrecht (2006), at 
marginal no. 79. 
41 Strafprozessordnung [Code of Criminal Procedure], Art. 152(2).  
42 Strafgesetzbuch [Penal Code], Art. 258, 258a.
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charge; procedures also exist to decide cases without trial. State Ministers of Justice 
have been the driving force behind this greater prosecutorial discretion, with the 
overall aim of reducing prosecutors’ workload. 
In practice today, the principle of compulsory prosecution only fully applies to 
crimes of violence and other serious crimes; in all other cases, prosecutors enjoy 
considerable discretionary power,43 which they frequently exercise to expedite their 
heavy case-loads in a cost-efficient manner. Thus today, 60-65 percent of all cases are 
concluded without trial. Most simply, prosecutors can agree to drop the charges for 
less serious offenses involving “little guilt” and no public interest in prosecution, if a 
judge consents;44 for some minor offenses, the court’s consent is not even required.45 
Charges may also be dropped where the sentence would be inappropriate or when 
the consequences of the offense affected the accused himself. Prosecutors may also 
enter into negotiations with the accused and agree to conditionally drop charges in 
cases where the “seriousness of the offender’s guilt” does not require prosecution. In 
such cases, prosecutors generally require the accused to pay a sum of money to the 
government or to a non-profit organization or perform community service. After 
the accused has fulfilled the condition set by the prosecutor, the charge is dropped.46 
In such cases, the charge does not go on the defendant’s record, and the prosecutor 
need not justify the agreement in writing. As prosecutorial use of this method has 
increased, states are beginning to lay down guidelines to reduce disparities that are 
emerging in the treatment of similar crimes, with regard to both the infractions that 
are subject to such agreements and the fines that are levied.47
Prosecutors may also employ a more formal procedure, the penal order (Strafbefe-
hlsverfahren), at the end of the pre-trial phase of the criminal proceedings, or even 
after the start of the trial; it is available for misdemeanors punishable by a fine or sus-
pended sentence of up to one year.48 In this procedure, with the agreement of a judge, 
a defendant who admits guilt need not undergo (or complete) a trial. The prosecu-
43 See Joachim Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discre-
tion in Germany, 41 University of Chicago Law Review (1974), at 468; Joachim Hermann, 
Bargaining Justice–A Bargain for German Justice?, 53 University of Pitts�urg Law Review 
(1992), at 755; Heike Jung, Legalität oder Oportunität im Strafverfahren?, in Recht und Gesetz im 
Dialog III (H. Pruetting ed., 1986), at 55. 
 Further exceptions to the principle of compulsory prosecution include: certain offenses (insult, 
forcible entry into the home) requiring a complaint from the victim (Antragsdelikt); offenses pros-
ecuted by the victim (Privatklagedelikt); and certain political offenses requiring prior authorization 
from political authorities (Ermächtigungsdelikt). State prosecutors may drop charges for offenses 
committed abroad. Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 153(c). If a suspect faces multiple charges 
for related offenses, the prosecutor may drop less important charges if the accused has been or is 
likely to be sentenced on more serious charges. Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 154(a). Charges 
can also be dropped in cases where the accused committed the offense under duress or as a result 
of blackmail. Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 154(c). 
44 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 153.
45 Id.
46 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 153(a)(1) and (b)(1). Many Prosecution Services have estab-
lished a mandatory procedure for implementing this provision, which requires a department head 
to sign any such decision along with the prosecutor in charge of the case.
47 Perrodet, supra note 1, at 449–450. This method of dealing with cases is controversial, as by its 
nature it violates the basic principles of the system of compulsory prosecution.
48 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 407–412.
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tor drafts an order that suggests finding the defendant guilty and imposing a penalty 
and submits it to the judge along with the case file. In most cases, the judge will sign 
the order, which will then be sent to the defendant. Should the judge reject the penal 
order, the case must go to trial. In this procedure—if accepted by the judge—the 
agreement is in writing, the charge goes on the defendant’s record, and the penalty is 
in most case a fine. Prosecutors increasingly use the Strafbefehl as a means of reduc-
ing case-loads and saving resources. For the defendant whose guilt is not in doubt, it 
saves the expenditure and difficulty of a trial. 
In cases where the prosecutor is of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient for 
conviction, he or she may terminates (einstellen) proceedings during the investiga-
tive stage, and thus acts as a filter ensuring that only sufficiently grounded cases go 
to court. The prosecutor is obliged to give reasons for a decision to terminate the 
proceedings; the decision must be sent to the original complainant, who may appeal 
this decision, first to the prosecution office responsible for the decision, and then to 
the Prosecutor General. Every prosecution office has an interest in making decisions 
that will not be overturned by the Prosecutor General, and consequently decisions to 
terminate proceedings are usually made with care. 
A victim dissatisfied with the termination of criminal proceedings following complaint 
to the Prosecutor General may appeal to the state Supreme Court to require the pros-
ecutor to bring the case to trial (Klageerzwingungsverfahren).49 This constitutes a form 
of control by the courts over the powers of the prosecutor.50 However, this possibility 
is available only if the case has been dropped for lack of evidence, not if it is dropped 
because of a prosecutor’s discretionary determination that the case is minor and there 
is no public interest in prosecution, as described above. Since it has become common 
for prosecutors to drop cases for the latter reasons, with little opposition from judg-
es, in practice little control exists on prosecutorial discretion to drop charges. Even 
where such appeals would be applicable, they are rare and courts seldom grant them. 
Victims of crimes can initiate private prosecutions (Privatklageverfahren) for a num-
ber of minor crimes.51 The Prosecution is not obliged to take part in these proceed-
ings, but the court may inform the Prosecution of a private prosecution if some pub-
lic interest is at stake and the court considers the participation of the Prosecution 
necessary, and the Prosecution may join such proceedings at any point. In practice, 
private prosecution is extremely rare, as a private person bringing charges (Privat-
kläger) faces the expense of hiring a lawyer and other costs of prosecution.
In practice, the Prosecution retains an effective monopoly over bringing charges be-
fore the courts. There has recently been discussion of allowing the police to bring 
charges on their own initiative for minor crimes, in order to relieve the Prosecution 
49 See Georg Bischoff, Das Klageerzwingungsverfahren. Eine empirische Analyse mit Vorschlägen zur 
Reform (1987).
50 See F. Juetter, Sinn und Grenze des Legalitätsprinzip im Strafverfahren (1976); F. Heyden, Begriff, 
Grundlage und Verwirklichung des Legalitätsprinzip (1961); Wilfried Bottke, Zur Anklagepflicht der 
Staatsanwaltschaft, in 128 Goltdammers Archiv f�r Strafrecht (1980), at 302. 
51 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 374. Private prosecutions can be brought for violating the invio-
lability of the home, insult, minor bodily injuries, threat, and damage to personal items.
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Services’ backlogs. For certain offenses that are easy to handle, such as traffic crimes, 
police would be allowed to draw up charges and submit them to court. This would be 
permitted only in cases where penal orders are used, and as always, the judge would 
have the power to reject any such order. Prosecutorial response to this initiative has 
been largely negative. Police have no prosecutorial or legal training, and prosecutors 
see such expanded police authority as an incursion into prosecutors’ control of the 
prosecution process and their monopoly on contact with the courts. 
Control of the Investigative Pre-Trial Phase: The purpose of the investigation is to dis-
cover the objective truth and, on this basis, to decide whether to take a case to court 
or terminate proceedings. Bringing charges is a central requirement for proceedings 
to enter the trial stage. The Prosecution or its executive organs are obliged to begin an 
investigation and to preserve evidence as soon as a committed or attempted offense 
becomes known,52 regardless of source.53 If the prosecutor does not file charges, a 
victim may compel him to do so (Klageerzwingungsverfahren).54 
Prosecutors have an obligation to “ensure that no guilty perpetrator escapes sentence 
and no innocent person is prosecuted,”55 and they function in principle as lawyers for 
the defense as well as the prosecution. That is, they are expected to collect evidence 
that would exonerate the defendant as well as evidence against him.56 Indeed, if a pros-
ecutor does not present information beneficial to the defense, he would be violating his 
prosecutorial obligations and could be subject to disciplinary proceedings. 
The Prosecution Services may in theory conduct any phase of investigation,57 al-
though in practice they normally delegate these responsibilities to the police.58 Prose-
cutors generally give instructions to the police authorities, who then assign actual in-
vestigative tasks to individual police officers. Prosecutors may also be assigned more 
experienced officers, called “investigative officers,” with additional detective powers; 
prosecutors work more closely with these investigative officers and can issue orders 
to them directly. In some cases, specialized commissions made up of more experi-
enced police officers may be set up, in which case, too, prosecutors may issue orders 
directly to the officers involved. Prosecutors are supposed to directly supervise police 
investigative actions, though in practice, police usually conduct their investigations
52 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 160, 163.
53 A report (Strafanzeige) by a citizen or administrative body merely informs the Prosecution Service 
of a crime, whereas a complaint (Strafantrag) formally requests or requires the opening of proceed-
ings, in effect initiating the process. Minor offenses must be reported within a statutory time period 
to compel the initiation of proceedings.
 There is a present controversy as to whether police and prosecutors are obliged to report a crime 
they have come across in their private lives; current case law acknowledges such an obligation for 
serious crimes, such as murder.
54 See supra note 49.
55 Eric Mathias, The Balance of Power Between the Police and the Public Prosecutor, in European 
Criminal Procedures (Mireille Delmas-Marty �� J.R. Spencer eds., 2002), at 479; Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, Art. 160. 
56 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 160.
57 Id.
58 Police powers to investigate are laid out in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 163.
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independently,59 particularly in less serious cases, and prosecutorial intervention is 
limited to a final review of the file. 
The Prosecution Services have broad discretion in conducting investigations. Pros-
ecutors decide on the individual steps to be taken and their sequence on the basis of 
personal convictions and taking into account standard investigative techniques and 
procedures. The prosecutor has the authority to compel attendance of witnesses and 
the accused, select experts, close an inquiry, and drop charges. 
However, this discretion is not unlimited. Limitations on fundamental rights—such 
as pretrial detention (Untersuchungshaft), searches (Durchsuchungen), seizure of evi-
dentiary material (Beschlagnahme), and violating the confidentiality of correspon-
dence and telecommunications (Beinträchtigung des Brief- und Fernmeldegeheim-
nisses)—require mandatory judicial orders. As will be explained below, exceptions 
are made in emergency cases.
Control of Ongoing Prosecution: There are no examining magistrates in Germany, and 
judges are never responsible for the entire investigation. However, after receiving the 
charge and the case file from the prosecutor, the court may decide there is an insuffi-
cient factual or legal basis for the charge and request additional investigation by either 
the prosecutor or the police. A judge may also seek evidence on his or her own. 
In the majority of cases, the court approves the charges and sets a trial date. Should 
the court refuse to approve the charge, the Prosecution may appeal; the decision on 
appeal is final. Even if it approves the charges and opens “main proceedings” (Haupt-
verhandlung), the court retains the right to request new evidence throughout the trial.  
The prosecutor has broad powers to make motions during trial, which the court must 
decide. In the course of the trial, both prosecutor and defense may request additional 
investigation and procurement of additional evidence. They may also ask the judge 
to recuse him or herself for bias, though it is more common for a defense lawyer to 
make such a request. 
Post-Trial Functions: Prosecution Services have responsibilities even after judgment 
is rendered. A special officer (Rechtspfleger) in each Prosecution Office enforces final 
judgments, including the collection of fines and confinement of individuals; this of-
ficer also monitors the enforcement of sentences to ensure they are actually served.60 
The Prosecution also submits recommendations when courts review requests for 
early release and clemency.
Federal Prosecution Service: The office of the Federal Prosecutor General is the only 
prosecution office at the federal level in Germany. Its criminal law functions include 
participation in proceedings before the Federal Supreme Court and the state Supreme
59 See Section 4.4 below.
60 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 451. The Prosecution is only responsible for the enforcement of 
sentences against adults; enforcement of sentences concerning juveniles falls within the compe-
tence of judges specialized in dealing with youthful offenders (Jugendrichter).
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Courts; prosecuting offenses against the internal or external security of the nation; 
and keeping central criminal law enforcement registers.
The Federal Prosecution Service appears in proceedings before the Federal Supreme 
Court in appeals of judgments from the Regional Courts (Landgerichte). In such 
cases, which generally involve serious crimes, federal prosecutors take the case over 
from the state Prosecution Service. The Federal Prosecution Service also brings cases 
on appeal from proceedings brought by the Federal Prosecution Service itself. Only 
a judgment on the law may be appealed before the Federal Supreme Court; no evi-
dence is collected at this level of review, and the court is bound by the lower court’s 
findings of fact.61
The Federal Prosecution Service also prosecutes serious offenses against the state, 
such as politically motivated crimes, terrorist attacks, high treason, espionage, and 
genocide, and in such cases the Service performs the full range of prosecutorial func-
tions, including investigation. The Federal Prosecutor General may assign investiga-
tion or other specific tasks in any individual case to the Federal Office of Criminal 
Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt), or to the criminal investigation offices and police 
of the states; these agencies are under an obligation to carry out the duties assigned to 
them by the Federal Prosecutor General. In discharging the above function, the Fed-
eral Prosecution Service must first bring charges before the state Supreme Courts, 
as courts of first instance in federal cases.62 It has no power, however, to prosecute 
before Regional or District Courts.
The Federal Prosecution Service is required to maintain and administer Germany’s 
criminal law enforcement registers as part of the Central Federal Registry. These reg-
isters contain records of every conviction in German courts, both state and federal. 
The Prosecutor General has complete independence in administering the registers, 
the use of which is strictly regulated, and is responsible for determining, among other 
things, who has access to the registers under the law and for how long the names of 
convicted defendants are retained. 
Relations between the Federal and State Services: In certain circumstances, the federal 
and state Prosecution Services may transfer control of cases between themselves, or 
the Federal Prosecutor General may resolve disputes between two states.
In the event of minor offenses and of listed criminal offenses, the Federal Prosecution 
Service refers the case to state prosecutors, unless there is a significant public interest 
or the involvement of the Federal Service is required for the sake of legal consistency.
Disputes over jurisdiction between prosecutors from different localities within one 
state are resolved by the state Prosecutor General; jurisdictional disputes between 
61 Two types of appeals are possible in Germany: Revision, which is an appeal only on the law, and 
Berufung, which is an appeal on both fact and law, essentially requiring a new trial of the facts. The 
prosecution may appeal a verdict of innocence or a sentence it believes is too lenient.
62 Cases that at one time would have been brought before the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgeri-
chtshof, BGH) as the court of first instance (by federal prosecutors) are now begun before a state 
Supreme Court, to ensure the possibility of appeal. They are still federal cases and are brought by 
federal prosecutors. Such cases include treason and terrorism.
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state prosecutors are resolved by the Federal Supreme Court. In the event of a dispute 
between the Federal Prosecution Service and a state Prosecution Service as to who 
should handle criminal proceedings, the Federal Prosecutor General resolves the dis-
pute.63 In criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction of a state Supreme Court as a 
first-instance court, prosecutorial functions are performed by the Federal Prosecutor 
General. 
3.2. Relationship with the judge at the pre-trial stage
Although the prosecutor has the leading position in the pre-trial phase of criminal 
proceedings, the judge does have certain powers that limit the actions of the pros-
ecutor. The prosecutor retains the power to initiate and direct the investigation; the 
powers of the court in the pre-trial process serve instead to guarantee basic rights, as 
an external monitor not directly involved in the investigation.
Prosecutors must seek judicial permission to impose coercive measures (Eingriffs-
massnahmen) in the course of investigation; the judge ensures that a suspect’s fun-
damental rights and freedoms are not improperly infringed. Judges can authorize   
measures limiting basic constitutional rights, personal liberty, freedom of move-
ment, right to property, and inviolability of the home, under strictly defined condi-
tions. When a request for a measure limiting basic rights is made, the case file is sent                
to the court for a decision, although investigation continues. Any measure limiting 
basic rights can be appealed by those affected, whether undertaken by a prosecutor 
on his own authority or ordered by a judge.64 If submitting a request to a judge would 
risk loss of evidence through delay (Gefahr im Verzug), threatening the successful 
outcome of the investigation, the Prosecution may take necessary investigative action 
involving invasions of individual rights.  In such cases, there will be mandatory ex 
post judicial review.
Pre-Trial Detention: Pre-trial detention is possible only where certain conditions are 
met: strong suspicion that a crime was committed (dringender Tatverdacht) and risk 
that the suspect might flee, hinder the investigation, or commit another crime. In 
addition, detention must not be disproportionate to the crime involved. Prosecutors 
may order provisional detention (vorläufige Festnahme) where incontestable infor-
mation has been gathered that an offense has been committed and there is danger 
that the offender will flee.65 Under the same conditions, the police may arrest a sus-
pect on their own initiative and contact the Prosecution, normally also supplying the 
investigation file; the Prosecution then decides whether to release the suspect or to 
63 GVG, Art. 142a(1). This issue has sparked frequent debate on, for example, whether a crime is po-
litically motivated and thus concerns the entire country (in which case it would be a federal crime) 
or is a simple crime (and thus a state concern). An example in the experience of one of the authors 
of this Report involved prosecution of accomplices of the Basque terrorist group ETA. In that case, 
federal prosecutors refused to take the case, even though the author, at the time the state Chief 
Prosecutor, felt the prosecution went beyond the state’s competence.
64 Id. (granting a right to appeal pre-trial detention at any time).
65 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 127.
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file a written request, with grounds, for pre-trial detention. The detainee must imme-
diately be brought before a pre-trial judge (Haftrichter), who in a reasoned opinion 
may revoke the detention as illegal or admit the action and impose an order for pre-
trial detention (Untersuchungshaft). The Prosecution can appeal the judge’s decision, 
and the detained suspect can appeal a detention order at any time (Haftprüfung).66 
(The same approach applies to other measures limiting fundamental rights.)
In addition, the state Supreme Court checks after six months to determine whether 
continued detention is justified or not.67 The grounds for continued detention for 
more than six months are regulated and are very strictly interpreted by most state 
Supreme Courts. They are examined with particular care to ensure that the Prosecu-
tion and police are not at fault for delaying timely completion of the investigation. 
Should the court permit continued detention, it will thereafter review the detention 
every three months.68
Other Surveillance Warrants: Judges may grant warrants for electronic surveillance, 
including wiretapping and eavesdropping.69 Such warrants can be granted only for 
a list of strictly enumerated crimes (Katalogtaten).70 A warrant for surveillance may 
only last for four weeks, with possible extension. In emergency cases, the prosecu-
tor may issue a temporary order for electronic surveillance, but a warrant must be 
obtained immediately after the fact.
Judges also issue warrants for search and seizure.71 In emergency cases, either the 
prosecutor or investigative agents may carry out searches and seizures without a war-
rant, but one must be obtained immediately after the fact. Judges consider search 
and seizure measures only for their legality, not for appropriateness or necessity.72 
Prosecutors’ requests for these measures must be based on detailed reasons; however, 
in contrast to arrest warrants, warrants for these measures tend to be easily granted. 
Also, German rules of evidence are permissive, and even evidence obtained in viola-
tion of procedural rules may be introduced at trial; as a result, investigators tend to 
seize far more documents than necessary in their searches.  
As German judges are not investigating magistrates and do not conduct investigations, 
they do not grant warrants directing what evidence should be sought or indicating 
what additional information is required for a search warrant to be granted. This is en-
tirely within the authority of the Prosecution. Thus if the Prosecution does not present 
sufficient evidence in support of its request for a warrant, it will simply be refused by 
the judge as not well founded.73 A warrant does not oblige the prosecutor to take the 
steps described in it, but simply empowers the prosecutor to do so at his discretion. 
66 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 117.
67 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 121.
68 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 122.
69 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 100b, 100d.
70 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 100a, 100c.
71 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 98, 100.
72 K. Amelung, Rechtsschutz gegen strafprozessuale Grundrechtseingriffe (1976), at 28 et seq.
73 Roxin, supra note 40, at 61. 
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Other Investigative Processes: Although judges do have certain functions in the pre-
trial stage, they are not technically participants in it. The judge cannot initiate pro-
ceedings or conduct investigations. However, certain investigative processes can be 
conducted before a judge. As part of the pre-trial procedure, witnesses, expert wit-
nesses, and the accused can be questioned by a judge,74 who may also order and lead 
an inspection of a crime site.75 The purpose of this procedure is to ensure that crucial 
evidence is collected during the pre-trial procedure, if there is a risk it might be lost 
for trial, and so the judge’s powers are defined as powers to secure evidence for the 
trial (Beweissicherung).76 Such records of interrogations and site inspections by the 
judge can be introduced as documentary evidence at trial.
3.3. Powers outside the criminal justice system
The Prosecution Services have no functions or powers outside the criminal justice 
system; they do not participate in any civil or administrative proceedings.
IV. Relationship of the Public Prosecution Service  
to Other Organs of the State
4.1. The constitutional location of the public prosecution service
The Federal Republic of Germany is a constitutional parliamentary democracy, con-
sisting of 16 states (Länder), each with its own constitution, laws, and governance 
structures. The federal Constitution (Grundgesetz) has primacy, but each state has 
considerable authority over its own affairs. 
The federal President is elected by the Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung).  The 
federal government consists of the Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) and other ministers, 
elected by the lower house of Parliament (Bundestag). The states have separate ex-
ecutives. The federal parliament is bicameral, consisting of the popularly elected 
Bundestag and the upper house (Bundesrat) representing the states. State parliaments 
(Landtage) are elected by citizens of the respective states. Judicial authority is vest-    
ed in federal and state courts.  Federal courts function only as courts of last resort. 
74 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 133, 162, 169.
75 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 168.
76 Werner Beulke, Der Verteidiger im Strafverfahren (1980), at 31.
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The Federal Constitutional Court decides only constitutional questions; the Federal 
Supreme Court is a final court of appeals in criminal and civil matters.
There are Prosecution Services at both the federal and state levels. The exact location 
of the Prosecution Services within the constitutional structures of the state—whether 
as part of the executive, the judiciary, or in an intermediate position—is subject to 
debate among legal scholars. The federal and state constitutions contain no provi-
sions regarding the Prosecution Service. The authority exercised by federal and state 
Ministers of Justice over prosecutors, the hierarchical nature of prosecution offices, 
and the ability of senior prosecutors to give instructions to lower-ranking prosecu-
tors lead some scholars to describe the Prosecution Service as part of the executive.77 
At the same time, the existence of statutory limitations on the ability of political of-
ficials and senior prosecutors to instruct lower-ranking prosecutors, and prosecutors’ 
duty of objectivity78 and ability to terminate criminal proceedings,79 lead others to 
describe the prosecution as a separate organ of the criminal justice system (Organ der 
Rechtspflege).80 Some scholars believe that the prosecution occupies an intermediate 
position between the executive and judiciary;81 however, the Constitution does not 
envisage the existence of any “intermediate” branch of the state.
The prevailing view, at least among practitioners, is that the Prosecution Services 
are criminal justice authorities within the executive whose individual agents exercise 
their power in non-political fashion. 
The Prosecution Services have a monopoly on the prosecution of crime (except for 
the limited option of private prosecution, discussed above). Prosecutors also exercise 
control over the behavior of investigative authorities, including monitoring for abuse 
of powers. Prosecutors are not considered a party at trial, as the defendant is; rather, 
they present charges on behalf of the state and are expected to exercise their powers 
objectively and impartially.82
4.2. Relations with the legislature
The legislatures do not exercise direct formal control over the Prosecution Services 
and have little direct influence on their work; formally, the principle of separation of 
powers prevents them even from making recommendations concerning their perfor-
mance in specific proceedings. However, legislatures can influence the Prosecution      
Services through legislation altering their jurisdiction, competence, and working 
conditions, and through the budgetary process. They can also exercise indirect con-
trol through mechanisms for monitoring the executive, in particular the Ministers of 
77 See, e.g., Lutz Meyer-Goßner, Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (2006), note 5 to GVG, Art. 141
78 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 160.
79 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 153 et seq.
80 See, e.g., Werner Beulke, Strafprozessrecht (2006), at marginal no. 88. 
81 See, e.g., H.H. Kuehne, Strafprozesslehre (1993), marginal no.61;   Karl Peters, Strafprozess. Ein Lehr-
buch (1985), § 23II.  
82 See Huber, supra note 39. 
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Justice. Such oversight may be exerted in the form of written questions and inquiries   
to the government, which occur with relative frequency. 
Questions from legislators concerning the Prosecution Services must be addressed 
to the Ministers of Justice, not the Prosecutors General. In practice, however, it is 
possible for the legislature to investigate the work of the Prosecution Service in the 
course of considering other matters. For example, in investigating a political scan-
dal, legislatures may—and frequently do—also touch upon the performance of the 
Prosecution Service in a specific case.83 A legislative committee could interrogate the 
prosecutor directly in charge of such a case, or the Prosecutor General, as witnesses,84 
or could even review documents pertaining to an ongoing investigation. If the Pros-
ecution objects to providing such documents to the committee, the committee may 
obtain a court order giving it access to the documents. To date, no prosecutor has 
ever been ordered by a judge to appear as a witness before a commission of inquiry. 
However, there have been cases in which court orders have been obtained requiring 
prosecutors to submit case materials to such a commission.
4.3. Relations with the executive
As noted above, Prosecution Services are functionally part of the executive, answer-
ing to the Ministers of Justice. However, relations between the prosecution and the 
political executive are not always smooth. In particular, representatives of the Pros-
ecution Services have been arguing for many years, unsuccessfully, though lately very 
persistently, for the abolition of the Ministers’ power to issue instructions in indi-
vidual cases.85 
The executive has influence over the prosecution in a number of ways. The executives 
appoint the Prosecutors General. In general, Ministers of Justice can give instruc-
tions to the Prosecution Services with the purpose of achieving uniform law enforce-
ment, subject only to the limits inherent in the principle of compulsory prosecution 
(discussed above).86 Federal and state Ministers of Justice issue joint guidelines to de-
fine policies on criminal law enforcement; these guidelines are published and issued 
83 Prosecutors are frequently asked by the opposition whether the government exercised an influence 
on particular prosecutorial decisions and whether the prosecutor received written or oral instruc-
tions in regard to such decisions.  As an example of the type of influence legislatures seek to uncov-
er, in an investigation of a Minister of the Interior for passing on information from the police, one 
of the authors of this report, a state Chief Prosecutor at the time, was asked by the Justice Minister 
for information on the case. Although the Minister of Justice had the right to be informed about 
the case, it would have appeared to be undue influence, and the Minister ultimately was convinced 
to forego the information.
84 One of the authors of this report, while serving as state chief prosecutor in Hesse, was questioned 
by the Federal Parliament and the Hesse state parliament, both of which were investigating whether 
or not either the Minister of Justice of Hesse or the Prosecutor General had influenced an investiga-
tion into illegal contributions to the Christian Democratic Union.
85 See, e.g., Werner Róth,  Ein klassischer Fall von Befangenheit, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Mar. 20, 2000, at 12 (advocating replacing Minister of Justice’s right of instruction with state pros-          
ecutor generals’ right to appeal a ministerial instruction to the state Supreme Court).
86 Prosecutors can be subject to criminal liability for violating this principle. See Section 1 above.
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
238
to each prosecutor. Legally, however, Ministers of Justice may also issue instructions 
regarding individual cases. 
The power of the Ministers of Justice to give instructions to prosecutors in individual 
cases and in general has been the subject of debate in Germany. Prosecutors have  
raised concerns about the risk of abuse of such powers for political purposes and              
have demanded their repeal, or at least restriction and formal regulation.87 They have   
called at a minimum for a requirement that such instructions be made in writing, 
which would lessen the likelihood of informal government pressure on prosecutors. 
However, there have been only a few isolated cases of a Minister providing manda-
tory instructions to a Prosecutor General, and no known cases of abuse for political 
reasons—in part a product, perhaps, of strong democratic traditions and the public’s 
high level of sensitivity towards any abuse of power. 
For their part, prosecutors cannot issue instructions to any agency within the ex-
ecutive, except for internal instructions to investigative officers regarding criminal 
procedure.88 Notwithstanding, all state and federal authorities have a duty to assist           
any Prosecution Services in the exercise of their functions by, for example answer-            
ing questions or providing access to documents. Prosecutors can request a judicial            
seizure order to compel cooperation.
The Ministers of Justice can also require information from the Prosecution Services. 
The Prosecution Services must inform the Ministers of all pending proceedings,89 
and the Ministers issues guidelines specifying in what cases and in what form the 
Prosecution Services should report. In practice, such reporting mainly involves more 
significant cases, particularly those with political implications, rather than common 
crimes. Prosecutors must also submit regular activities reports to their state Ministers 
through their state Prosecutors General; the Ministers can incorporate reports from 
different offices into a joint report. Such reports inform the Ministries of problems 
and may provide them with the justification to issue new guidelines.90 In exceptional 
circumstances, a Minister of Justice may ask individual Prosecution Services directly 
for reports, which can be experienced as external political pressure. Prosecutors gener-
ally oppose this practice, preferring that inquiries be made through normal channels. 
In practice, however, the Minister of Justice seldom intervenes in individual cases. 
The executive’s involvement in the budget process is explained above. The prosecu-
tion’s dependence on the executive for financial support theoretically permits indi-
rect influence, but this is not a significant factor in the prosecution’s work.
 
87 See supra, note 85. 
88 These investigative offices are experienced police officers who are legally empowered to receive 
direct instructions from the prosecution. See Section 3 above.
89 See, e.g., Regulation of the Hesse Ministry of Justice and similar regulations in other states.            
90 For example, reports may reveal the development of a particular category of crime that requires 
new training programs or special expertise.
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4.4. Relations with the police and other investigative authorities
While the Prosecution Services and the police forces both answer to the executive, 
they are administratively separate. The police forces are subordinate to the Ministers 
of the Interior, while the Prosecution Services are under the Ministers of Justice. This 
places an institutional limit on prosecutors’ authority over the police; nonetheless, 
Prosecution Services have considerable authority over the conduct of police inves-
tigations. Prosecutors are the leaders of the investigation and pre-trial and inves-
tigative proceedings, and are also responsible for ensuring that all proceedings are 
carried out in a lawful and just manner, in full compliance with the rule of law. This 
means they have a formal and practical responsibility to both direct and monitor the 
work of the police.
The Prosecution Services can conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases;91 
prosecutors do not exercise those powers directly, however, but rather work with and 
give instructions to the police authorities (though not to individual officers, except 
to specially-determined investigative officers). Most criminal investigation is carried 
out by the state police forces or, at the federal level, by the Federal Criminal Investiga-
tion Office (Bundeskriminalamt), which is competent to investigate criminal activi-
ties covering the territories of more than one state as well as international crime.92 
In addition to their role in investigating crime, the police are also responsible for 
maintenance of public order. A prosecutor may give the police mandatory instruc-
tions only in connection with their investigative role.93 Police who are designated 
“investigative officers”94 have detective powers in the preliminary investigation of 
criminal cases95 and are under a duty to obey prosecutors’ requests related to specific 
investigations.96 In general, prosecutors do not communicate directly with individual 
91 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 160.
92 The Federal Criminal Investigation Office (FCIO) is empowered to collect and analyze all crime-re-
lated information; it is responsible for crime statistics. The FCIO prepares crime surveys, research, 
and expert assessments at the request of all Prosecution Services. In limited cases, the FCIO may 
also take over an individual investigation from the competent state police force. These powers are 
limited to cases of international crime, and offenses against members of federal bodies and foreign 
diplomatic agencies. The Federal Intelligence Agency (Bundesnachrichtendienst), created under 
Article 87 of the federal Constitution, is an intelligence service empowered to collect domestic 
and foreign intelligence, but it is not a law enforcement agency and has no power to arrest or pros-
ecute.
93 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 160; GVG, Art. 152. 
94 Investigative officers include not only police detectives, but also bailiffs and staff of other ministries 
with specific regulatory powers (over hunting or forestry, for example), who have been appointed 
to perform those functions. See, e.g., Verordnung über die Hilfsbeamten der Staatsanwaltschaft [Ba-
varian Regulations on Investigative Officers]. See also Claus Roxin, supra note 40, at 55 et seq.
95 All police officers can make arrests or carry out identity checks, but only investigative officers pos-
sess further powers to investigate. Police officers who are not investigative officers are also under a 
duty to execute prosecutorial requests, such as those related to summoning and arrest of offenders 
who must be brought before the authorities.
96 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 161. The use of the term “requests” (Ersuchen) emphasizes that 
the officers are not administratively subordinate to the prosecutor giving instructions, but rather 
are subject to a separate duty identified in the Code of Criminal Procedure to execute prosecutorial 
instructions in specific cases.
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police officers, but rather send requests to the police, who then assign individual of-
ficers to specific tasks. 
Thus although the police are administratively separate, they are functionally subor-
dinate to the Prosecution Services in matters of investigation (indeed, where the ac-
tivities of the police in crime prevention and crime investigation may overlap, these 
may also be overseen by a prosecutor if the investigative aspect is more pronounced.) 
The police are commonly described as the “extended arm of the Prosecution” (ver-
längerter Arm der Staatsanwaltschaft). The file assembled by police in the course of 
investigation must be submitted to the Prosecution. The police have no power to 
close an investigation after it has been opened; rather, they are under a duty to send 
the file to the Prosecution, which alone decides whether to file charges in court or to 
close the case.
Prosecutors may also conduct their own investigations, although this is generally 
done in coordination with the police. For example, the search of company premises, 
government offices, and banks is usually done after detailed planning with criminal 
investigators and the tax authorities97 in a procedure overseen by prosecutors. In cases 
of electronic surveillance, the role of the police is generally technical in nature. Pros-
ecutors submit their requests for authorization of wiretapping to the court, and then 
pass on the authorization to the police for technical implementation. Once again, 
it is the prosecutors who decide whether the measures in question are extended or 
terminated. At the local level, it is very common for senior members of the police              
and prosecution to hold regular in-depth discussions, with the results reported to 
the Prosecutor General.
In theory, the police have no statutory mandate to conduct extended investigations 
independent of the Prosecution Service. The police may proceed on their own ini-
tiative only during the initial stages of an investigation when urgent investigative 
actions are needed; thereafter, control over criminal proceedings should be handed 
over to the competent prosecutor, who is supposed to assume administration of the 
preliminary investigation.
In practice, however, the police often exercise considerably more control over the 
investigative process than the theory and formal rules suggest, and more than is ex-
ercised by the Prosecution Service.98 The residual power the police in fact exercise 
stems from their ability to withhold information from the Prosecution Services, and 
prosecutors’ own acquiescence in police control of investigation.99 Prosecutors rarely 
participate in viewing the crime scene100 or actively supervise the police, who have 
considerably more personnel and technical equipment at their disposal. 
97 See below, this section.
98 See, e.g., Werner Bottke,  Polizeiliche Ermittlungsarbeit und Legalitätsprinzip, in Gedächtniss-
chrift f�r Karlheinz Meyer (1990), at 37; Mathias,  supra note 55, at 471 (describing the Pros-
ecution Service as merely “the authority that registers” the work done by the police). 
99 Mathias, supra note 55, at 472.
100 K.H. Goessel, Überlegung über die Stellung der Staatsanwaltschaft im rechtsstaatlichen Strafverfahren 
und über ihr Verhältnis zur Polizei, Goltdammer`s Archiv f�r Strafrecht (1980), at 347.
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The relative roles of the police and prosecutors depend on the nature of the crime; 
the more serious a case is, the earlier the Prosecution will likely be involved. In par-
ticularly serious matters, such as political corruption, prosecutors may carry out the 
investigation entirely on their own, and will almost certainly question the key wit-
nesses and the accused. Similarly, in the investigation of economic crimes, expert 
prosecutors normally carry out the major part of the investigation, with the role of 
the police limited to their more typical tasks (interrogating suspects, examining the 
crime scene, etc.). In minor cases, however, the police normally conduct the entire 
investigation and only submit it to the Prosecution at the point at which charges 
would have to be brought; thus the Prosecution has no involvement in the investiga-
tion at all. This state of affairs has been criticized by legal scholars, who argue that it 
gives the police space for a growing number of discretionary, uncontrolled acts.101 
In the past, autonomous police investigation was confined largely to what was 
known as classic crime. In recent years, however, police have grown increasingly 
specialized in fighting more modern types of crime, such as cybercrime, and have 
set up their own investigative units.  This has further reduced the extent of pros-
ecutorial control and oversight of police work. To exercise proper oversight, pros-
ecutors would need to be trained in these areas, but this is only possible to a limited 
extent due to staffing limitations.
The police and Prosecution Services often have a difficult working relationship, 
which may result in part from their differing core functions. The police’s view of its         
role “is to find the guilty, not the innocent,”       102 while the Prosecution is expected to  
ensure that the investigation adheres to proper criminal procedure, with an eye to       
a subsequent, successful conviction. For example, the relatively limited use of pre-        
trial detention by prosecutors103 creates some tension with the police, who com-
plain that they must search for the same individuals again and again after they have 
been released.104
Because police are more likely to be interested in successful investigation than in le-
gal niceties, the increased police control of investigations has been considered prob-
lematic; in an attempt to ameliorate the problem, police today are required to receive 
far more intensive training in legal matters than was the case in the past.
Officers from other executive agencies—such as financial, tax, forestry, hunting, and 
fishery authorities—can also investigate criminal offenses, acting as investigative 
officers. Investigations are only one aspect of their assignments, usually a signifi-
cantly smaller one. 
The tax authorities (Steuerbehörden) normally take over investigations from the gen-
eral financial authorities if there is reasonable suspicion of a tax offense, although 
when the case concerns only tax violations, the tax authorities investigate on their 
101 See, e.g., Gerhard Fezer, Strafprozessrecht I und II (1986), marginal no.86;   Festschrift für Karl Schäfer 
zum 80. Geburtstag (1979).
102 J. L. Sauron, Droits penal, bilan critique (1990), at 43.
103 See Section 3.2 above.
104 Based on author’s personal experience.
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own. Upon concluding the investigation, however, they submit the investigation to 
the Prosecution for a decision on whether to prosecute or not. In cases of serious tax 
offenses, the Prosecution is normally involved in the investigation from an earlier 
stage, often from its initiation.
4.5. Relations with the judiciary
As already noted, the Prosecution Service is not part of the judicial branch. The Pros-
ecution is independent of the courts in the discharge of its functions.105 Likewise, 
prosecutors do not have powers to take action within the competence of the courts; 
it would be practically impossible for prosecutors to exercise any control over judges’ 
work. The Prosecution and the courts generally have separate career paths, admin-
istrations, and budgets, although in some states, the state Supreme Court and the 
Prosecutor General’s office may share administrative staff and costs.
There is a clear difference in the independence of judges and prosecutors from their 
respective superiors. Judges are absolutely independent from their superiors in de-
ciding cases, and cannot be transferred to other courts without their agreement.106 
Prosecutors, on the other hand, are obliged to follow instructions from their superi-
ors and, like other civil servants, can be transferred against their will to other offices. 
In practice, however, this does not often happen; most commonly, a prosecutor need 
not change offices in his entire career if he does not wish to. 
Judges and prosecutors generally enjoy close social and professional contacts. Indeed, 
in several southern German states, judges and prosecutors are required to move reg-
ularly back and forth between prosecutorial and judicial offices, even at the highest 
levels of both professions. Promotions depend on familiarity with both career paths. 
This requirement does not exist in northern German states, where such movement 
is much less common. Such a move does not always contribute to greater efficiency: 
if a prosecutor hoping for a promotion takes a position in a civil court, for example, 
his criminal law background will be of little help, and he will essentially return to the 
status of a beginner. Nevertheless, this movement between professions is considered 
important in helping judges and prosecutors better understand each others’ work. It 
also helps both services retain a degree of flexibility.
Salaries of prosecutors and judges at the same level of jurisdiction are equivalent;107 
depending on the size of the court or prosecution office, however, salaries of the 
heads of courts or prosecution offices may differ.
105 Judicial Act, Art. 150.
106 This is determined by the guarantees of judicial independence in Articles 97 and 98 of the federal 
Constitution and in the Richtergesetze [Judicial Acts] of the various states.
107 This can be found in the federal and state-level Besoldungsgesetze für Richter und Staatsanwälte 
[Acts on Salaries for Judges and Prosecutors].
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V. Information Control
Polls show that the public generally approves of the work of the Prosecution. The 
major public criticism does not concern either qualifications or charging decisions, 
but rather the length of proceedings.108 
Media Relations: Relations with the media constitutes perhaps the most difficult task 
confronting the Prosecution Services. The Prosecution has an interest in informing 
the public when it has certain, well-documented evidence of a crime, preferably at a 
later stage in the investigation. The media, by contrast, are interested in publishing 
information as soon as possible, which often leads to the publication of insufficiently 
substantiated information. In addition, the mistakes made by state authorities, in-
cluding prosecutors, police, and judicial institutions, are often emphasized, in ways 
that prosecutors feel is sensationalized.
At the same time, all government agencies are under an obligation to provide full 
information to the media,109 and as a consequence the Prosecution bears the burden 
of justifying any withholding of information. The media often complain to the Minis-
ters of Justice about lack of informational access; this can lead to conflict between the 
Ministers—who are political officials—and the Prosecution as to the way the press 
should receive certain information. 
Every prosecution office has a press officer who is in charge of press contacts. In smaller 
offices, the task is often performed by the Chief Prosecutor who heads the office, but in 
larger offices a professional usually performs this function. Prosecutors General adopt 
general instructions (Rundverfügungen) that provide internal guidelines for working 
with the media.110 For more serious cases, a press release is usually prepared, which is 
given to accredited journalists; for other cases, the press officer provides information 
orally. In very important cases, where media interest goes beyond the local region, the 
head of the Prosecution Office, the department head, and the prosecutor in charge will 
take part in the press conference along with the press officer; in some cases, the head or 
other representative of the police may also be present. Particular attention is given to 
treating all media outlets on an equal footing and not giving preference to any one.
108 See, e.g., a survey sponsored by the Berlin city government: Senatsverwaltung für Justiz Berlin, 
Bürger und Justiz–Berlin 200, Pressemitteilung, July 19, 2004, available at  http://www.berlin.
de/sen/justiz/presse/archiv/20040719.21501.html.
109 This obligation is limited to information that would not compromise an ongoing investigation. For 
example, the law on the press in Hesse provides that “Government agencies shall provide to the 
press the information requested. They can refuse to provide such information only where certain 
information might . . . hinder the completion of . . . the criminal investigation.” Hessisches Pressege-
setz [Hesse Press Act], Art. 3(1).
110 See, e.g., Rundverfügung des Generalstaatsanwalts Frankfurt über die Zusammenarbeit der Staat-
sanwaltschaften mit den Medien [General Instruction from the Frankfurt Prosecutor General on 
Cooperation between the Public Prosecutors and the Media], Oct. 1995 (internal regulation).
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Since the investigation is always controlled by the Prosecution and not by the po-
lice, the police may only make statements about an investigation with the consent of 
the Prosecution. In practice, this is one of the Prosecution’s most important powers 
with regard to the police. If the media attempt to gain information from the police, 
the police must inform the prosecutor, as they are required to keep the Prosecution 
informed of all important matters regarding the investigation. The Prosecution can 
also authorize the police to make statements about the case. If a case does not raise 
particularly complicated issues, the police have the right to inform the press without 
prior consent of the Prosecution.111 The types of crime and situations upon which 
police may comment are agreed upon between the head of the prosecution office 
(Chief Prosecutor) and the police chief.  
If the media make factual errors in reporting on a case, German press law allows the 
Prosecution to go to court to demand a retraction. This is not a common solution, as 
such a forced retraction can be couched in language that does not aid the prosecu-
tors’ cause.112 Prosecutors may also ask the German Press Council, a professional 
media organization, to reprimand or expel a member. In general, the Prosecution 
is in a relatively weak position in relation to the press. Prosecutors cannot retaliate 
against false media statements by withholding information from the media, as this is 
forbidden by state and federal media laws.
There is no evidence that the media unduly influences prosecutorial decisions, at 
least directly. No cases have been reported of prosecutors altering their decisions 
because of media attention, in part, perhaps, because of the strong sense of profes-
sionalism in the Prosecution Service. However, media reporting can influence the 
atmosphere in more subtle ways. Extensive reporting on a case, for example, can lead 
to harsher treatment of the suspect.
The media can also take on a positive role in guarding the Prosecution from undue 
political influence. When the media suspect such interference, they generally take 
the side of the Prosecution.
In general, German data protection laws forbid revealing a suspect or known per-
petrator’s full name (except for well-known public figures); children must be kept 
entirely anonymous. For the same reason, prosecutors must be cautious about reveal-
ing ethnicity and other personal details. This does not prevent media from obtaining 
such information, though they are also cautious about revealing certain details. If 
they publish false information, they may be held liable for slander under Germany’s 
relatively strict libel laws.
It is common for prosecutors to emphasize in public statements that a suspect is in-
nocent until proven guilty, and that the case has not yet been decided.
111 In most states, prosecution offices enter into agreements to this effect with the police. They can be 
rescinded at any time.
112 One of the authors, a former Chief Prosecutor, took this action only when necessary to protect the 
reputation of a prosecutor in his office.
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VI. Statistics
It is difficult to compare statistics from Germany with those of other countries. Ger-
man prosecutors’ offices handle many more cases in total than many other European 
countries, because there is no police procedure; all cases must go through the pros-
ecutor’s office. In other countries, if the identity of the perpetrator cannot be deter-
mined, a case will never leave the police. In Germany, even cases with unidentified 
perpetrators are sent to the prosecutor’s office for review and, if necessary, further 
investigation. This is a means of monitoring police behavior.
These statistics mean that Germany has a much higher rate of unsolved cases, but this 
cannot be taken to mean that the Prosecution Services are less efficient. Germany 
does not measure efficiency through such statistics. Efficiency is measured internally 
according to the duration of cases; that is, by recording how many proceedings take 
three, six or nine months. These are purely internal statistics that are kept but not 
publicized. They are useful to office heads in determining the reasons for the length 
of cases. Additional statistics kept by states measure the hours worked by prosecu-
tors, in order to make determinations regarding resource allocation. Yet these statis-
tics, too, say nothing about the complexity of the cases involved.
The Prosecutor General may decide to permit a researcher access to case files and 
statistics, as long as he agrees to keep them anonymous and comply with data protec-
tion laws.
Basic Statistics, 2003 (representative for later years as well):
Cases open at beginning of year: 649,604 
New cases: 4,794,452
Closed cases: 4,766,070
Cases open at end of year: 677,986  
Cases ending with charge: 12 %
Cases ended by penal order (Strafbefehl) : 12.7 % 
Cases ended through conditional termination: 5.6 % 
Cases closed without conditions:  21 %
By number of people:
Number of people investigated:  5,624,822
Number of people charged:  674,136
Persons for whom penal orders have been applied: 619,827 
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Persons whose cases were ended through conditional termination: 279,096
Persons whose cases were closed without conditions: approx. 900,000
Persons whose cases were closed for lack of evidence: approx.1,400,000
Length of proceedings:
Closed within a month: 61 %
Closed in more than 36 months: 1.9 %
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistik Rechtspflege, Fachbereich F10.
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I. General Issues
The strength of the Hungarian system lies in the centralized organization of the 
Prosecution Service, which can guarantee uniform interpretation of the law and a 
uniform prosecution policy. A further advantage may be seen as the Prosecution 
Service’s freedom from direct political influence. This, however, may also be viewed 
as a disadvantage. To explain this, it is necessary to refer to the history of the Prosecu-
tion Service.
The Royal Prosecution Service of Hungary was established in 1872 and resembled 
similar continental European services, following the French (Napoleonic) model; it 
was subordinated to the government via the Minister of Justice. Even during the 
parliamentary debates on the draft of that 1872 Act, however, many MPs emphasized 
that the public prosecution service should not be subordinate to the government, 
because any government is apt to misuse such an instrument.
In 1953, the Prosecution Service was changed to conform to the “socialist” model of 
a prosecution service, invented in 1936 by Stalin and described in the Constitution 
of the USSR (from which the arrangement was copied). It was a centralized hierar-
chical organization, independent of the government and subordinated to the Parlia-
ment—but both Parliament and the government were directed by the central organs 
of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party.
 It is common knowledge that between 1949 (the year of the communist take-over) 
and 1956, even local party leaders gave direct instructions to local prosecutors and 
judges. After the revolution of 1956, this possibility was eliminated, though the influ-
ence of the central Party leadership was maintained. In a “top secret” general instruc-
tion, the Prosecutor General ordered that any attempt at external influence on pros-
ecutorial matters be reported to him; at the same time, however, a sub-department of 
the Office of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party was 
charged with exerting “party direction and supervision” over the administration of 
justice, meaning courts, prosecution, and related matters.
In the late 1980s, the staff of the justice administration and the prosecution service 
consisted mainly of relatively young people. They had no personal experience of the 
1950s, when the famous show trials took place, but had heard of them, because they 
were commonly known and were at the same time overtly labeled “breaches of so-
cialist legality.” Some of the organizers of these trials were even punished for abuse 
of official power. 
Debates took place in Hungary in the late 1980s on the draft of a new constitution. 
In the course of this preparatory work, the constitutional status of the prosecution 
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service was heavily criticized as a “Stalinist invention.” A draft constitution was pub-
lished with two other proposals regarding the transformation of the prosecution ser-
vice, both of them subordinating it to the government via the Minister of Justice. The 
young staff of the service at the same time became aware of the role that direct politi-
cal influence had played in the show trials.  They believed that, were the prosecution 
service to be made answerable to the Minister of Justice (a politician), the possibil-
ity of direct political influence would be reestablished. Thus they strongly opposed 
relinquishing the Prosecution Service’s independence. The political forces discussing 
changes in the political system wanted to postpone the reorganization of the pros-
ecution, so it was maintained in its existing state. Changing the Constitution requires 
a two-thirds 3 majority in Parliament, and neither now nor in the foreseeable future 
is there likely to be such broad agreement on this issue. 
The first Prosecutor General after the change in the system in 1990 was elected with 
an overwhelming majority, so he had firm legitimacy and was able to handle prob-
lems as legal issues, without getting involved in political debates. He resigned in 2000, 
and his successor was elected with only 55 percent of the votes. He has been criticized 
by the other political forces as a “party soldier serving as prosecutor general.” In 2002, 
the former opposition took over the government. The Prosecutor General was heav-
ily attacked in Parliament as well as in the papers, because the newly elected govern-
ment initiated investigations against its predecessors for misusing official powers and 
lavishly spending public money—but all these investigations ran aground. The cases 
were dismissed either on the instructions of the prosecution or by the prosecution 
itself, decisions attributed to the Prosecutor General’s political bias. Thus a weakness 
of the Hungarian constitutional arrangement is the possibility of electing a prosecu-
tor general without broad consensus. Other officers—such as the Chief Justice and 
the Chief Auditor—are elected by a two-thirds majority; in regard to the Prosecutor 
General, this was not considered important, because politicians thought the entire 
prosecution system would soon be transformed.
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II. Structure and Organization of the Public Prosecution Service
2.1. Internal structure
The Prosecution Service consists of national, regional, county, and local prosecution 
offices on four levels;1 in general, these offices track the organization of the courts.2 
There are 148 prosecution offices, as follows, with senior staff:3
▶ a Prosecutor General’s office at the national level, with 112 prosecutors;          
▶ three Deputy Prosecutors General, including the Chief Military Prosecutor;        
▶ five Chief Appellate Prosecutors’ offices at the regional level, with 33 prosecu-           
tors;  
▶ twenty Chief Prosecutors’ offices at the county and Budapest level, with 428              
prosecutors;
▶ 116 city and district prosecutors’ offices at the local level, with 807 prosecutors             4;
▶ a Military Prosecution Service, with 60 prosecutors;      5 and
▶ senior administrative staff.  
Each prosecution office is headed by a prosecutor of the applicable rank: Prosecutor 
General, Chief Appellate Prosecutor, Chief Prosecutor, head of a division or head of a 
department, director of local prosecution office, etc.6 Office heads are included above 
in the numbers of prosecutors at each level.
1 Act V of 1972: A Magyar Köztársaság ügyészségéről [On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungar-
ian Republic] (as amended), Art. 18.
2 During the Communist period there were only three levels of courts. A regional, appellate level 
was reintroduced on October 1, 1997. After some delays, all five regional appellate courts are now 
functioning; each has jurisdiction over 3 to 5 counties.
3 See Act LXXX of 1994: Az ügyészségi szolgálati viszonyrólés az ügyészségi adatkezelésről [On Service 
Relationships in the Public Prosecution Service and on Prosecutorial Data Handling] [hereinafter 
Act LXXX On Service Relationships].
4 In Budapest, these offices are called “district prosecution offices,” while in the rest of the country 
they are known as “city prosecution offices” and referred to officially as “local prosecution offices.” 
Any reference to “local prosecution offices” refers to both city and district offices. The head of a 
local prosecution office is the  director of the district (or city) prosecution office (kerületi/városi 
vezető ügyész), but may  be referred to as the district or city prosecutor; ordinary public prosecutors 
are referred to as prosecutors in the district or city prosecution office. See Act V of 1972 On Public 
Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 18(1)(d), 21(1). 
5 Information provided by József Stauber, Head of Branch in the Prosecutor General’s Office, in his 
Letter No. Ig. 757/2004./1-I. Legf. Ü (December 21, 2004).
6 These are known as “leading positions” in the prosecution service. Some are referred to as “higher 
leading positions.” This distinction is significant when discussing appointments or promotion to 
higher ranks or disciplinary responsibility. 
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Some units in the Prosecutor General’s office as well as in the Chief Prosecutors’ 
offices are headed by other specialists, such as experts on the economy, finance, 
bookkeeping, data-processing, statistics, etc. Most such units operate within the 
framework of the Prosecutor General’s office, but at each Chief Prosecutor’s office (in 
counties and in Budapest) there is an organizational unit (usually called a group, but 
called a department in Budapest) to handle finances, procurement, and maintenance 
of buildings, cars, and the like. At each level, someone must also keep criminal statis-
tics and maintain the information system. They are usually on the Chief Prosecutor’s 
staff (in Budapest, on the Secretariat’s).
National and Appellate Offices: At the national level, the Prosecutor General’s office is 
separate and independent and includes several bureaus, divisions and independent 
departments supervised by the Prosecutor General or by one of his three deputies: 
one for criminal law, one for civil and administrative law, and the Chief Military 
Prosecutor, who is the head of the Military Prosecution Service.7 The independent 
departments are directly supervised by a Deputy Prosecutor General.
The Division for Review of (Criminal) Investigations and Preparation of Commit-
ment to Courts of Law and the Division on Trial Matters are the authorities in crimi-
nal law, and the divisions on Administrative Law and Civil Law are the authorities in 
their respective fields.  
Each of these divisions of the Prosecutor General’s office analyzes the work and ex-
perience of the prosecutorial organization to identify theoretical problems in their 
respective fields, with a view to finding ways of improving the practice of the sub-
ordinate prosecution offices. Possible measures include legislation proposed to the 
legislature by the Prosecutor General (via the Minister of Justice and government),8 
or motions to the Supreme Court in individual cases or in special matters,9 or general 
instructions, guidelines or memoranda for the Public Prosecution Service on prac-
tical matters.10 They may also concern a particular aspect of the work of a specific 
prosecutorial body or office as the result of a “general review,” discussed below.11 The 
effect of the work of these divisions is felt in the activities of the county/municipal 
and local prosecution offices. 
The Independent Department on Review of Legality in Execution of Punishments 
and Protection of Rights carries out its prosecutorial function only in the Prosecutor 
General’s office and at the county level. The overwhelming majority of its tasks occur 
nationally, because the prison administration is centralized at the national level. 
As a result of the centralized structure of the Prosecution Service, administrative 
and financial management is generally handled by the Prosecutor General’s office. 
7 See 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction by the Prosecutor General: A Magyar Köztársaság 
Ügyészsége szervezetéről és működéséről [On the Organization and Operation of the Public Prosecution 
Service of the Hungarian Republic] [hereinafter 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction], Art. 9.
8 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 5(2)(b) and (c).
9 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 5(2)(f) and (g).
10 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 27(2)(a) and (c).
11 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 28(1). On “general reviews” see id., Art. 31.
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Regional and local offices deal mainly with tasks of very local interest; otherwise, 
they submit initiatives, requests, proposals etc. concerning general administration 
and financial issues to the Prosecutor General’s office.    
The Prosecutor General or, under his authority, his deputies or other senior staff take 
the measures and make the decisions necessary to control and direct the activity of 
the entire Service. 12 Some matters are the Prosecutor General’s personal responsibil-
ity,13 although the documents concerning such decisions are prepared by his office.
In order to direct the activity of the Prosecution Service, the Prosecutor General 
must be aware of the theoretical and practical problems the Service faces. By moni-
toring actual activity, analyzing practice, identifying practical problems, and com-
paring possible solutions with the principles of the law, the office helps to familiarize 
him with these problems.
As a higher-ranking office, the Prosecutor General’s office is entitled to monitor and 
review any case in any office within the Prosecution Service, either by request or ex 
officio.1 The Prosecutor General’s office rarely, if ever, takes over a case; instead they 
may ask for it, review it, and send back to the respective office in the chain of com-
mand, with instructions on how to proceed.15  
The office must also carry out regular “general reviews” and reviews in a specific 
field or of a specific topic 16 at the regional and county offices. That is, they periodi-
cally—usually every 4 years—scrutinize the files of all cases of a certain type within a 
defined period (usually 6 months) that were dealt with by the particular prosecutor’s 
office, in order to asses the quality and quantity of the work and the quality of leader-
ship.17 This helps in evaluating the performance of individual prosecutors and select-
ing possible future leaders. The findings of such reviews are made in writing and are 
discussed at a meeting with the participation of the interested parties, such as the 
senior staff of the highest-ranking prosecution office, a representative of the Pros-
ecutor General’s office, if the review took place at a local office, the respective police 
headquarters, etc. Decisions on how to improve practice are discussed at a meeting 
with the prosecutors in the office reviewed. A further source of information is the Di-
vision of Data Processing and Information of the Prosecutor General’s office, which 
keeps crime and other statistics, as well as the Institute on Criminology, a research 
institute attached to the Prosecution Service.18
12 See 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 4, 5, 27(2).
13 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 2(2)(a)–(j).
14 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 62. This review power allows higher offices to re-
view lower offices’ files, give instructions, change or quash specific acts, and modify decisions.
15 During 40 years of prosecutorial service, the author encountered two such cases. As the deputy 
chief prosecutor of Budapest, he did not agree with the instructions, and therefore I offered the 
Prosecutor General’s office the opportunity to take over the cases, which they did. 
16 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 31.
17 The files contain drafts by the ordinary prosecutor in charge, with possible corrections and modifi-
cations added in handwriting of a different color by his superior. See 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General 
Instruction, Art. 70(5).
18 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 18(2) provides that 
“[t]he National Institute on Criminology is the scholarly and research organ of the Public Prosecu-
tion Service.”
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Chief Appellate Prosecutors’ offices function at the level of regional appellate courts. 
However, they are organizationally separate and subordinated to the Prosecutor 
General’s office. The Appellate Prosecutors’ offices handle criminal and civil or ad-
ministrative cases from the territory covered by the jurisdiction of the respective Ap-
pellate Court, appealed from county courts to the regional appellate courts.19 These 
offices are divided into criminal and civil/administrative law sections.20
County and Local Offices: Chief Prosecutors’ offices are found in each of the 19 coun-
ties and in Budapest. They operate at the level of the county courts, but are organi-
zationally separate from the courts. These offices have full authority in all phases of 
criminal proceedings, as well as in other areas, such as review of legality (discussed 
below) in public administrative organs.21 
Chief Prosecutors decide to bring criminal charges before the county courts as first 
instance courts, and represent the prosecution in trial and on appeal.22 The Chief 
Prosecutors’ offices also direct and supervise investigations conducted by county-
level police units. 
Chief Prosecutors’ offices direct and supervise the activities of the local prosecution 
offices within their territorial jurisdiction.23 In this capacity, they handle appeals 
(“complaints” [panasz], a sort of hierarchical remedy during investigations)24 by in-
terested parties, mainly victims or suspects, against decisions by lower-level pros-
ecution offices, such as suspension of an investigation or dismissal of a case.  In so 
doing, they are obliged to review and revise the lower-level prosecution office’s work 
through individual cases and decisions. If the decision is not proper, the higher-rank-
ing office is entitled to modify or nullify it.25 In court proceedings, the prosecutor of 
the first instance may appeal any decision, including acquittal. Cases appealed from 
the local courts are sent to the second instance (county) court by way of the Chief 
Prosecutor’s office, which must examine the records of the first instance proceedings 
and produce a complete motion (in writing or orally) addressed to the second in-
stance court.26  The Chief Prosecutor’s office can review the actions of the local pros-
19 Three to five counties belong to each. See supra note 2. See also Act XIX of 1998: A büntetőeljárásról 
[On Criminal Procedure Code] [hereinafter Criminal Procedure Code, 1998], Art. 341(2).
20 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 37(2).
21 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 45(2).
22 The county courts operate as both instances. They are first instance courts in cases of more seri-
ous crimes, such as murder, intentional manslaughter, kidnapping, act of terrorism, crimes that 
carry life imprisonment, etc., specified in Art.16(1)(a)–(h) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1998. 
They also operate as courts of appeals in relation to local courts. The criminal courts of general 
competence are the local (city and, in Budapest, district) courts; they are the first instance courts 
in cases of criminal offenses not included in Art.16(1)(a)–(h) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 
1998. The Chief Prosecutors’ offices proceed in both instances. They proceed at second (appeal) 
instance in cases that were handled at first instance by the local prosecution offices in the local 
courts. See Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 13(1), 13(2)(a), 15, 16, 28(7), 341(4). If they pro-
ceed in the county court as first instance court, they may appeal the court’s decision and the case 
will be reviewed by a Regional Appellate Court, with participation of the respective Chief Appellate 
Prosecutor’s office. See Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 13(2)(b), 341(4).
23 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 42(1).
24 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 228.
25 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 228(3).
26 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 341(4).
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ecution office and the prosecutor in charge of the case. The Chief Prosecutor may 
revoke the prosecution’s appeal, or, while maintaining it, may comment separately in 
an internal document on the trial actions of the first prosecutorial instance.
A separate Prosecutorial Investigations Office (PIO) is also found in each county and 
in Budapest. It is no longer part of the Chief Prosecutor’s office—as it was for many 
years—but a unit subordinate to it, like local prosecution offices. However, directors 
of local prosecution offices may proceed only in cases under the jurisdiction of the 
respective local court. In contrast, the head of the PIO may proceed in any case re-
ferred to the office if the offense occurred within the county, and may bring charges 
in any local court in the county, as well as in the county court.   
In addition, the Chief Prosecutor’s office, as a higher-ranking office, is entitled (and 
sometimes obliged) to change a decision in any case, either by request or ex officio, 
and undertakes periodic “general reviews” and “reviews of specific fields or topics,” as 
discussed below.27 Chief Prosecutors’ offices also review the legality of public admin-
istrative acts28 and have responsibilities relating to civil law and labor law.29 
The head of the office is the chief prosecutor of the county, usually with one or two 
deputies.30 Prosecutors in these offices often work in specialized organizational units 
within the criminal and civil-administrative law sections.31 Within the criminal law 
section, specially trained prosecutors are usually assigned to juvenile and traffic crime 
cases; at some county-level offices, specialized units deal with economic crimes, or-
ganized crim,e and other complex cases.32
Local prosecution offices below the county level have authority over all criminal cas-
es within the first-instance jurisdiction of the local courts in their territory.33 They are 
generally not divided into organizational units; staff usually consists of three to eight 
prosecutors, including the head of the office and a deputy, who direct and supervise 
the other prosecutors. Individual prosecutors are normally assigned to either crimi-
nal or administrative law; other specializations—such as investigative work or trial 
advocacy—are usually informal, depending on the inclination of the prosecutor and 
the discretion of the office head.
27 See supra notes 16-17.. See also 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 49.
28 See Section 3.3 below.
29 See Section 3.3 below.         
30 The Municipal Chief Prosecutor (Budapest) has four deputies—for criminal law, for civil and ad-
ministrative law, for the Metropolitan Prosecutorial Investigations Office and for the Central Pros-
ecutorial Investigations Office, which is attached to the Municipal Chief Prosecutor’s office (the 
author was chief prosecutor in this office). County offices have deputies for criminal law and for 
civil and administrative law. See 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 43(1), 46. However, 
the Prosecutor General may prefer a different organizational scheme—one deputy for criminal law 
matters and a department head for the rest, for example, depending on staff and caseload. 
31 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 45(2). It is up to the chief prosecutor to establish the 
organizational and operational regulations for his office. They should be in the form of a general 
instruction, which requires the Prosecutor General’s approval.
32 Information provided by József Stauber, Head of Branch in the Prosecutor General’s office, in his 
Letter No. Ig. 757/2004./1-I. Legf. Ü (December 21, 2004).
33 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 56.
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Central Organization between Offices: The Prosecution Service is a hierarchical and 
centralized organization. The Service is subordinated to the Prosecutor General, who 
in turn is accountable—but not subordinate—to Parliament. 
Prosecution offices at different levels are subordinated to one another in a hierar-
chy, but this reflects only the subordination of the heads of the offices involved. The 
Prosecutor General’s office is at the top of the pyramid, superior to any other office. 
However, prosecutors in the Prosecutor General’s office are not entitled to instruct 
prosecutors in lower-level offices because they are not their superiors. They may only 
advise the Prosecutor General—or another leader with delegated powers in the Pros-
ecutor General’s office—to instruct the Chief Prosecutor, and if necessary, through 
him, the head of the local prosecution office and the responsible prosecutor there, to 
take an action.34 
The Prosecutor General is superior to all prosecutors, and may intervene in any 
individual case.35 In addition, his office issued general instruction No 25/2003. 
(ÜK.12.).LÜ, frequently referred to here, which regulates the organization and opera-
tion of the Prosecutor General’s office and establishes basic rules for the organization 
and operation of other offices, as well as the distribution of authority and respon-
sibility among different ranks and leadership positions.36 The county and regional 
(Appellate) Chief Prosecutors are entitled to issue similar regulations in regard to the 
offices subordinated to them, and all heads of local prosecution offices are entitled to 
establish work rules for their offices.37
The Prosecutor General personally exercises exclusive authority over the appoint-
ment, promotion, discipline, and dismissal of prosecutors,38 except for his three dep-
uties, whom he nominates and the President appoints.39
Central Organization within Each Office: Each office has a head responsible for all its 
operations. The head of office is generally expected to direct the overall activity of the 
office and to be aware of the more important problems, significant cases, and major 
decisions relating to his territorial jurisdiction. The head of each office is superior to 
all lower ranking prosecutors in the prosecution office in question; he may instruct 
any of them, take over any case at any time from any of them, and assign another 
prosecutor to any case at any time.40 However, explicit instructions are seldom given. 
Even if they come from a higher-ranking prosecutor, references to facts, legal rules, 
and professional expectations are not considered “instructions.”  
34 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 60, 62. See also Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution 
Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 6(1).
35 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 61, 62.
36 See the specification of “leading” and “higher leading” positions in Act LXXX On Service Relation-
ships, Art. 16.
37 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 53(2)(a). They require the approval of the chief 
prosecutor.
38 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 2. See also Sections 2.3 and 2.4 below.
39 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14(3).
40 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 61, 62(1).
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Where the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to the “public prosecutor,” it means 
the prosecution office operating within the jurisdiction; but it is the head of the office 
who decides what actions should be taken. That is, the power of the office is vested 
in the head of the office; the office, and the prosecutors in it, function as a unit acting 
under the office head’s authority and representing him.41 
Consequently, documents must be signed by the head of office, or the head of the 
particular unit or individual prosecutor, as indicated by the internal regulations of 
the office in question.42 Indictments and other documents issued in criminal cases 
on behalf of the Municipal Chief Prosecutor’s offices in Budapest must normally be 
signed by the Deputy Chief Prosecutor for criminal matters, and those of local pros-
ecution offices by the local prosecutor (the head of the local office), but nearly all 
offices have experienced prosecutors authorized by the leader to sign their own, and 
in some cases other people’s, documents.43 
In general, however, an individual prosecutor, while representing the Public Prosecu-
tion Service (the head of the respective office), is considered by law to be fully em-
powered, and his statements are regarded as if they were made by the head of the of-
fice; thus individual prosecutors may represent the Prosecution Service in court, and 
may act on its behalf. Any limitations set on a prosecutor’s authority by a superior’s 
instructions concerning his procedural actions are considered internal prosecution of-
fice matters and have no impact on the validity of actions taken or statements made.44 
At the regional and county level, the head of office is the Chief Prosecutor; some 
of the chief prosecutors’ powers may be transferred to deputies or others (such as 
leaders of departments, groups, or even very experienced ordinary prosecutors), but 
certain powers must be exercised personally by the head of office.45
Case Distribution: Ordinary prosecutors are assigned to a county (municipal) pros-
ecution office, or a department of the Prosecutor General’s office, by the Prosecutor 
General, and to a local prosecution office or to a unit of the Chief Prosecutor’s office 
by the Chief Prosecutor. They are assigned to individual cases by the head of their 
unit or the head of the (local) office. In principle all ordinary prosecutors are of equal 
rank, but in practice experience, specialization, and capacity result in a de facto sys-
41 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 28(2) provides that “[t]he prosecutor may exercise the powers 
vested in the prosecution office in which he serves.”
42 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 70(1)  The heads of offices (heads of departments, 
chief appellate and chief prosecutors, heads of local prosecution offices)  may  authorize subordi-
nates to sign documents on behalf of the office. See id., Art. 5(2)(d), 34(3)(e), 42(3)(e), 52(2)(a). 
43 This has been the practice for several decades, in the author’s experience.
44 If the statements or actions of a prosecutor are in overt contravention of a limit placed on his au-
thority by his superior, but otherwise are formally legal, they are considered valid. The prosecutor 
may bear disciplinary—or even criminal—responsibility for the action, but the risk of his disobedi-
ence is borne by the Prosecution Service. If, for example, a prosecutor is instructed by his superior 
to proceed with a case, but instead drops the charge at trial, the prosecutor may be disciplined, but 
the court must cease proceedings. 
45 These responsibilities are specified in 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 42(3)(a)–(d), 
(f)–(j), (l), (n), and (p): to sign documents addressed to the Prosecutor General and MPs, general 
instructions, guidelines, and memoranda, and to decide on the tasks and (transferred) powers of 
prosecutors.
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tem of seniority, in which junior (less experienced) prosecutors solicit the advice of 
senior colleagues.
Each office includes sections (specialized public prosecutors or units) to deal with 
particular kinds of cases, such as regular review of cases under investigation by the 
police or review of case files after investigation to decide on a charge. 
Case files arriving at a prosecution office are assigned by the head of office (or in 
larger offices with specialized units, by the head of the unit) to an ordinary public 
prosecutor for scrutiny and consideration, at which time the superior may also give 
instructions concerning deadlines or reporting, or even concerning final dispensa-
tion. If he has given a definite instruction indicating a decision with which the pros-
ecutor disagrees, he may report back explaining his reasons. If they are unable to 
agree, it is up to the superior to decide on the instruction. Only if the instruction is 
in writing must the prosecutor follow it, in which case responsibility rests with the 
superior.46
Notwithstanding, a prosecutor must refuse to follow an instruction if it amounts to 
a criminal offense and may refuse if its performance would endanger his life, health, 
or bodily integrity.47 The prosecutor may request in writing to be relieved of carrying 
out instructions that he considers illegal or incompatible with his legal convictions. 
The request must include his reasons. Requests of this sort cannot be refused; the 
case must be given to another prosecutor or dealt with by the superior.48 However, 
such cases seldom occur, as formal instructions are rare, and disagreement is even 
more unusual.49 
Employee Management:  Prosecutors’ offices have several employee governing bod-
ies. Each office has a Council of Prosecutorial Employees consisting of five members 
elected for a five-year period by the prosecutors and other employees in the office.50 
At least two of the members cannot be prosecutors. These Councils delegate one 
member each to the National Council of Prosecutorial Employees.51
The Councils of Prosecutorial Employees’ agreement is needed for plans concerning 
use of funds or property earmarked for employee welfare—e.g. for maintenance of 
vacation resorts run by the Prosecutor General’s office or employers’ contributions 
to employees’ sports activities. The Councils must be consulted on such matters, and 
if they do not agree, a formal labor law procedure is necessary. The Councils do not 
deal with professional matters involving the prosecution.
46 See Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 453(2); 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, 
Art. 70(5).
47 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 43(3)(a).
48 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 43(5).
49 As the chief prosecutor of Budapest, the author knows of only one case in which a prosecutor asked 
to be relieved of a case he had been assigned. His request and reasons were accepted and another 
prosecutor was assigned, and there were no other consequences.
50 Employees in local prosecution offices vote in their respective County Prosecutor’s office, Act 
LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 3(1) and (2).
51 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 3(3) and (4).
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A Council may also give an opinion on organizational or development plans, or plans 
to change the order of the work (e.g. the official hours) if many employees or sig-
nificant employee interests are involved. The Council may also express its view if the 
Public Prosecution Service wishes to arrange contests, for example for employees or 
university students, and about work rules. In such cases, a Council’s opposition is not 
decisive and does not necessarily lead to a formal labor law procedure.52 The Council 
of Prosecutorial Employees may sue the Prosecution Service, however,53 though this 
is unlikely to occur in practice. 
Each office also holds a General Prosecutorial Meeting (GPM), a type of assembly 
attended by all the prosecutors in the office.54 These meetings are convened by the 
Chief Prosecutor and may give advice, express opinions, and make proposals on 
problems of everyday practice.55 They also elect members of the Prosecutorial Coun-
cils,56 which consist of four to five prosecutors elected to five-year terms. Unlike the 
Councils of Prosecutorial Employees, they deal with professional prosecution mat-
ters, providing advice on appointments, promotions and dismissal of prosecutors 
(but not regarding the Prosecutor General and his deputies) and on other matters, if 
requested by the Prosecutor General or specified in a general instruction.57 
Finally, in each office prosecutors assigned to the same section (criminal law, civil 
law, or administrative law) form professional “collegiums” that informally analyze 
and express views on theoretical and practical questions in the given area of law.58 
2.2. Budgetary process
The Prosecution Service has an independent chapter in the state budget voted on by 
Parliament.59  
The budget planning process begins with discussions between the head of the High 
Directorate on Management in the Prosecutor General’s office and the Ministry of 
52 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 4.
53 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 5(2).
54 Prosecutors in local prosecution offices take part in the General Prosecutorial Meeting of their 
respective County Prosecutor’s office. In author’s experience, GPMs are convened only if they are 
mandatory—that is, if the Prosecutor General requires one on some special matter, or if it is time 
to elect a Prosecutorial Council.
55 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 8(2).
56 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 10.  
57 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 9(2). Prosecutorial Councils express opinions on ap-
pointments, promotions and other matters at the request of the Chief Prosecutors; it is up to the 
Chief Prosecutor to make recommendations to the Prosecutor General. See Section 2.4 below. At 
present there is no law or general instruction that would refer specific matters to GPMs.
58 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art.13(2). These collegiums have no decision making func-
tions. 
59 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 5(2)(k). See also 
25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 3(4) and (5). Information on the budgetary process 
provided by József Stauber, Head of Branch in the Prosecutor General’s Office, in his Letter No. Ig. 
757/2004./1-I. Legf. Ü (December 21, 2004).
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Finance to obtain information on key economic indicators to act as guidelines for the 
next year’s state budget, after which Chief Prosecutors and Chief Appellate Prosecu-
tors are asked to submit draft budgets to the High Directorate on Management of the 
Prosecutor General’s office.
The High Directorate balances the draft budgets, develops options, consults with 
Chief and Chief Appellate Prosecutors and their finance experts, and then compiles 
a draft for the entire Prosecution Service. It is discussed by the leadership of the 
Prosecutor General’s office60 and submitted directly to Parliament (that is, not via the 
Ministry of Finance). It is considered an important element of prosecutorial inde-
pendence to keep the budget independent in this way and free of direct government 
influence. 
Parliament debates the bill, like any other. The government has nothing to do with 
the Prosecution Service budget proposal, but MPs from the governing coalition may 
criticize it in Parliamentary debate and offer comments and proposals.61 These delib-
erations may be political as well as technical. However, in spite of the changes in the 
political composition of the Parliament and overt criticism of the Prosecutor General 
by the Parliamentary majority after 2002, allocations for the Public Prosecution Ser-
vice rose steadily, if slowly, between 1996 and 2005.62 
Budgetary allocations for the Public Prosecution Service appear in the budgetary ac-
count of the Service. Each Chief Appellate and Chief Prosecutor’s office has its own 
account at the Hungarian National Bank, and allocations are transferred from the 
account of the Prosecutor General’s office as agreed upon between the Chief Pros-
ecutors and the High Director during the preparation of the Service’s budget.63 The 
budgetary allocations for the Prosecution Service as a whole are at the Prosecutor 
General’s disposal and are recorded at the Prosecutor General’s office. Allocations to 
lower level offices are decided upon in the process of budget preparation—and, if due 
to Parliamentary modifications it becomes necessary, afterwards—by the Prosecutor 
General.
Chief Appellate and Chief Prosecutors’ offices have allocations at their disposal ac-
cording to their “budgets,” that is, their proposals approved by the Prosecutor Gener-
al after talks with the High Director. They must keep accounts as required by law.64
60 See 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 72. This body consists of the Prosecutor Gen-
eral, his deputies, the Head of Branch on Matters of Personnel, Training, and Administration, and 
the personal secretary to the Prosecutor General. 
61 The state budget is adopted like any other law and is discussed in Parliamentary committees and in 
plenary session. Thus all MPs—including those with political motivations—have the opportunity 
to express their views.
62 The totals of the entire state budget rose in this period from HUF 2,086,832 (1996) to 6,582,893.4 
(2005) million, the totals for Chapter VIII (Public Prosecution Service) from 4,864.6 (1996) to 
29,368.9 (2005) million, but because of inflation and the lack of a firm point of reference, these 
numbers tell us little. The share of the Public Prosecution Service was 0.2331 percent in 1996, and 
grew steadily to 0.4461 percent in 2005.  
63 If Parliament modifies the proposal, the consequences of this modification in the amount of the 
allocation and its distribution should be analyzed by the High Director, and the necessary modifi-
cations in the particulars of the budget should be decided on by the Prosecutor General. 
64 Act XXXVIII of 1992: Az államháztartásról [On Public Finance]. 
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Heads of local prosecution offices have limited influence on the budgetary process. 
They may request cash for everyday expenses (stamps, cleaning supplies, etc.), but 
they have no bank accounts.
2.3. The status of the Prosecutor General
The Prosecutor General is nominated by the President and elected by Parliament.65 
Formally the nomination is at the President’s discretion. Up to now there have been 
three such elections. At the first (in 1990) and the second (in 1996), there was general 
agreement among the Parliamentary groups on whom to elect. At the third election 
(in 2000) the governing coalition proposed a nominee who was elected by the votes 
of the majority. In theory, Parliament may reject the President’s nominee, in which 
case the President must make a new nomination.66
There are no specific professional or personal qualifications for the position of Pros-
ecutor General: any Hungarian citizen with no criminal record, the right to vote, and 
a university law degree who has passed a special law examination is eligible.67 The 
Prosecutor General may not be a member of a political party or otherwise involved 
in political activity; he may not hold another political office.68
The Prosecutor General serves a six-year term,69 with the possibility of re-election. 
His tenure terminates when he turns 70,70 but he may resign at his discretion,71 and 
may also be removed from office by Parliament at the recommendation of the Presi-
dent for inability to perform his official duties,72 for commission of a crime73 or other 
incompatibility with office (such as failure to meet the basic qualifications or failure 
65 Act XX of 1949: A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic]      
(as amended), Art. 52(1).
66 As the President is also elected by Parliament, his political views often agree with those of the 
parliamentary majority; this may also hold true for other officers elected by the Parliament, such 
as the Chief Justice and the Prosecutor General. However, Parliament’s tenure is four years, while 
the President’s is five years, and the Chief Justice’s and Prosecutor General’s six years. As a result, 
these officers may serve under different parliamentary majorities than the ones that elected them. 
This has happened with both Presidents. The first Prosecutor General and the first Chief Justice had 
served three Parliaments (under the third, the Prosecutor General resigned). There were no real 
battles for the Prosecutor General’s position, as a simple majority is needed for election. However, 
the term of P�ter Polt as Prosecutor General expired on May 16, 2006. The President proposed 
an active Chief Appellate Prosecutor. The majority of the newly elected Parliament rejected the 
nominee, holding that he was a creature of Mr. Polt, whom they consider a “party soldier.” György 
Bugyinszki, Szocialista érvek a “nem” mögött, Népszabadság, July 4, 2006, at 2. At the time of this 
writing, July 2006, the President was to nominate a new candidate for the post.
67 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14(1).
68 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art 53(2). See also Act LXXX On 
Service Relationships, Art. 38–40. 
69 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14(2).
70 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 20(1)(h).
71 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 20(1)(c) and (5).
72 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 20(1)(b) and (3).
73 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 20(8). In addition, the Prosecutor General automatically 
loses his official standing if he is convicted and sentenced  by a court. See id., Art. 20(1)(g).
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to perform official duties), or if he is deemed unworthy of office by Parliament at the 
recommendation of the President.74 
The Prosecutor General is accountable to Parliament; he submits an annual report to 
Parliament on the overall performance of the Prosecution Service and answers ques-
tions and interpellations concerning the work of the Service.75 However, Parliament 
has no control over the Prosecutor General’s administration of the Service or his in-
structions concerning and interventions in the conduct of individual investigations 
and trials. By contrast, the Prosecution Service itself is a hierarchical organization, in 
which the Prosecutor General has a decisive role.
Deputy Prosecutors General: The three deputies to the Prosecutor General are nomi-
nated and appointed to permanent positions by the President.76  Dismissal rules for 
the deputies are the same as those for the Prosecutor General.77
2.4. The status of individual prosecutors
Appointment to “Assistant Public Prosecutor” (ügyészségi fogalmazó). Any Hungarian 
citizen with no criminal record and a university law degree may be appointed assis-
tant public prosecutor. The number of such jobs varies from year to year depending 
on the foreseeable needs of the Prosecution Service.78   
The Branch on Matters of Personnel, Training and Management in the Prosecu-
tor General’s office assesses the needs and invites people with law degrees to apply, 
indicating where and how many possible jobs are available. Applicants are usually 
interviewed by the Chief Prosecutors, who then recommend appointments to the 
Prosecutor General on the basis of impressions obtained at this meeting and docu-
mentation of university performance. The Prosecutor General may appoint an ap-
plicant at his discretion, but in practice he usually relies on the Chief Prosecutors’ 
recommendations. 
The appointee is an “assistant public prosecutor” for at least three years. Each Chief 
Prosecutor’s oOffice must have a unit (or at least a public prosecutor specially as-
signed to this task) in charge of Matters of Personnel and Training, under the direct 
supervision of the Chief Prosecutor.79 Assistant public prosecutors are usually as-
signed to a local prosecution office by the Chief Prosecutor. The Public Prosecution 
74 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 20(1)(f), 20(8), 20(1)(d), 39(2).  
75 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art.52(2). See infra notes 220, 222.
76 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14(3).
77 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 21. The Prosecutor General is entitled to make proposals; 
the decision rests with the President of the Republic.
78 Similar positions in the Judiciary and Advocacy are called “draftsmen at court” and “candidate 
advocate.”  These, too, are filled by young lawyers who have just earned their degrees and are gain-
ing experience by working at court or in an advocate’s office. In no branch of the legal profession 
may anyone serve as a “full-fledged” professional with only a law degree but without a satisfactory 
period (usually 3 years) of practical experience. 
79 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 45(2)(3).
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Service has a standard 3-year program for the basic training of assistant public pros-
ecutors; it includes periods spent in the main fields of prosecutorial work, at the first 
as well as the second instance, in both the penal law and the administrative and civil 
law sections. During this training period, they must serve in the local office to which 
they are assigned, but they are temporarily transferred to the Chief Prosecutor’s office 
in order to become familiar with types of cases that cannot be found at the local level. 
They must also serve a period at the Prosecutorial Investigations Office (see Section 
4.4 below).
The trainees work under the supervision of an experienced public prosecutor (“in-
structor”) who advises and helps them. They are assigned to real cases, they may 
interrogate real suspects or witnesses (under the supervision of the instructor), and 
they must produce drafts of prosecutorial documents, but they may not represent the 
Prosecution Service. All their work must be directly supervised and approved by the 
instructor.80 
The instructors are selected from prosecutors in the unit where the trainee is cur-
rently serving and are expected to provide an evaluation of the trainee’s performance. 
In addition, when the trainee completes his or her training in one field of law, he or 
she is examined by specialists in that area of law and by the Deputy Chief Prosecutor 
responsible for the section.
After completing 34 of the obligatory 36 months of practice, the assistant public 
prosecutor81 may apply to take an examination given by the Secretariat of the Com-
mittee on Special Legal Examination82 at the Ministry of Justice that qualifies them 
to be appointed prosecutorial law secretaries (titkár) At least one year of service as 
such a secretary is a prerequisite for initial appointment as a public prosecutor.83 To 
some extent, secretaries may act more independently than assistant public prosecu-
tors—e.g., they may represent the local Prosecution Office at local court trials84 and 
sign some official letters (though not those concerning the merits of a case). 
Initial public prosecutorial appointments are for a definite three year period, except for 
those who have previously served in certain specified legal positions.85
80 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 58(2).
81 The same procedure applies to draftsmen at court and candidate advocates. See supra note 78.
82 The Committee is composed of well-known judges, public prosecutors, advocates and other rep-
resentatives of the legal profession. The examination is partly in writing, partly oral and consists 
of three parts. When one part is done, the young lawyer may apply to take the next one. The entire 
examination takes about 6 months to complete. See 5/1991 (IV.4) IM, Ordinance of the Minister of 
Justice: A jogi szakvizsgáról [On Special Legal Examination].   
83 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14(5). This requirement does not apply to those who 
have already served three years as judges or public prosecutors or have earned a PhD. See id., Art. 
14(4)(a)(c).
84 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 241(2).
85 As public prosecutors, judges of the Constitutional Court, judges of a court of law, military judges, 
public notaries, advocates, or public servants of definite status in the central public administration. 
Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14(1) and (2).
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
264
Appointments are—as a rule—by competition.86 Applicants must be Hungarian citi-
zens, possess no criminal record, have the vote, have a university law degree, submit 
a property declaration and have passed health and psychological examinations. 
The jobs are publicly announced by the Branch on Matters of Personnel, Training and 
Management in the Prosecutor General’s office, indicating which Chief Prosecutor’s 
office and how many vacancies are available. Applicants are normally interviewed by 
the Chief Pprosecutor and the prosecutor in charge of personnel.  On the basis of avail-
able notes from the training period and on personal impressions, the Chief Prosecutor 
recommends one for appointment. The Prosecutorial Council of the Chief Prosecutor’s 
office gives its opinion on the Chief Prosecutor’s proposal, and both documents are 
submitted to the Prosecutor General, who decides whether to appoint the applicant for 
a three year period.87 In the not-uncommon case that the number of applicants exceeds 
the number of jobs, one—or some—of the applicants will be appointed. First appoin-
tees are generally assigned the rank of “prosecutor in a local prosecution office” by the 
Prosecutor General and are assigned by the respective Chief Prosecutor to the local 
prosecution office, where they have the full powers of ordinary prosecutors.
If the prosecutor wishes the appointment to become permanent following the initial 
three year term, his or her performance and qualifications are evaluated by the Chief 
Prosecutor, with the help of the prosecutor’s direct superiors (the head of the local 
prosecution office or the unit where actually serves).88 The summary of the evaluation 
must be supported by factual findings. If the evaluation is satisfactory, the Prosecutor 
General will appoint the candidate to a permanent position without competition.89  
A prosecutor’s professional performance should thereafter be evaluated twice every 
six years in a similar way.90 However, once two years have passed since an evalu-
ation, a prosecutor may request a new evaluation at any time, if he believes his 
performance in the last two years may result in a more favorable assessment.91 An 
evaluation may also be conducted on the superior’s initiative at any time if there is 
reason to believe the prosecutor has become “unsuitable” or if otherwise warranted 
by changes in the prosecutor’s conduct or performance.92 The prosecutor may re-
quest the professional collegium’s93 written view of the evaluation. While he or she 
is entitled to request judicial remedy in case of erroneous factual findings or insult-
ing statements in the evaluation,94 such requests are seldom found in practice.
86 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14/C(1). 
87 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14(4).
88 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14/D(1). This is the first evaluation of the prosecutor’s 
professional performance. See id., Art. 41(1). In practice, the draft of the evaluation is written by 
the direct superior of the prosecutor in question and is handed to the prosecutor in charge of 
personnel; the latter requests further data from the senior prosecutor’s (Chief Prosecutor’s) office, 
which regularly reviews cases from the respective local office (this information is based on personal 
experience).
89 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14/D(3).
90 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 41(1).
91 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 41(2)(a).
92 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 41(2)(b).
93 See supra note 58.
94 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 42(1) and (5).
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Promotion: Normally the next step for an ordinary local prosecutor is the job of dep-
uty head of a local prosecution office or that of an ordinary prosecutor at the County 
Chief Prosecutor’s office. Promotions to “higher leading” and “leading” positions95 in 
the Prosecution Service take place through competition, but the Prosecutor General 
may order any other prosecutor’s position filled by competition as well.96
Vacancies in a Chief Prosecutor’s office (which would be a promotion in rank for an 
ordinary public prosecutor at a local prosecution office) may be filled, at the Pros-
ecutor General’s discretion,97 by competition publicized in the official gazette of the 
Prosecution Service. Possible applicants are not limited to public prosecutors; the 
competition is open to other members of the legal profession—judges, advocates, 
etc.98 The head of the office (the Chief Prosecutor or the head of a branch of the Pros-
ecutor General’s office) with the vacancy reviews all applications (which may include 
previous evaluations for internal applicants), usually interviews all the applicants, 
and proposes a candidate to the Prosecutor General. The Prosecutorial Council for 
the office with the vacancy also reviews the proposal and submits its opinion to the 
Prosecutor General, but the final decision is his alone.99 
While this is a competitive process with public requirements and is open to anyone 
meeting those requirements, in practice outsiders seldom apply. 
The Prosecutor General may, in case of long-term excellent performance, exception-
ally promote a public prosecutor to a higher salary grade. This may happen to the 
same person twice during his or her prosecutorial carrier, by one grade each time. 
The Prosecutor General may also award prosecutors special titles for excellent per-
formance for at least 6 years. These titles express respect and acknowledgement of 
professional excellence, but do not bestow additional authority.  They are accompa-
nied by a monthly financial bonus.100
The promotion path for prosecutors resembles a civil service path, in that many pros-
ecutors tend to advance to higher offices as ordinary public prosecutors rather than 
taking on supervisory roles.
Tenure: As noted, prosecutors are initially appointed for three years, and only after 
review receive a permanent appointment until age 70.101 They may only be removed 
for cause.
95 See their list in the Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 16(2)(a)–(k) and (3)(a)–(j).
96 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 16(4). These are promotions in rank (promotion to a 
higher position) and in file (promotion of someone in the same position to a higher salary level). 
Higher remuneration for the same position is available automatically due to longer time of service, 
and with it higher salary grades. See id., Art. 46/F(1).
97 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 16(4).
98 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 42(4). 
99 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 9(2) and (3).
100 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 46/F, 46/H(2) and (3). For prosecutorial investigators 
and clerks, the title of “Ügyészségi főtanácsos” (chief prosecutorial adviser) or “Ügyészségi tanácsos” 
(prosecutorial adviser) may be granted for similar reasons: excellence of work for at least six years. 
See id., Art. 81/I. 
101 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 26(k).
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The Prosecutor General may dismiss a prosecutor for cause for a variety of reasons: 
failure or inability adequately to perform his duties, including for medical reasons;102 
failure to fulfill the basic requirements of service (such as clean criminal record or 
not holding political office);103 or failure to provide or maintain a truthful property 
declaration.104 In addition, the Prosecutor General may let a prosecutor go due to 
reorganization of the Service or reduction in staffing levels.105 Appointments to lead-
ership positions106 may be withdrawn by the Prosecutor General at any time at his 
discretion.107 However, in practice dismissal seldom occurs, except for disciplinary 
or medical reasons.108
Restriction on Activities: Prosecutors are obliged to refrain from activities incom-
patible with their professional responsibilities.109 Public prosecutors must not en-
gage in remunerative activity outside of their work; they are prohibited from being 
members of executive or supervisory boards or taking other leading positions in 
public companies, or even having obligations to contribute personal activity to such 
companies. They may not accept honorariums for public activity connected to their 
official standing, and they are prohibited from membership in political parties or ac-
tive engagement in politics, as well as any office or activity incompatible with their 
profession. Prosecutors may be subject to disciplinary measures for violating these 
prohibitions,110 though it is very rare in practice. 
However, prosecutors are allowed to engage in scholarship, educational activities 
(including coaching or refereeing sports), lecturing, writing, editing, and work in 
102 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 28.
103 See discussion of appointments immediately above.
104 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 26(m).
105 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 28(1)(a) and (b).
106 These are specified in Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art 16(2) and (3) and include—besides 
the Prosecutor General and his deputies—heads of  branches and departments of the Prosecutor 
General’s office, their deputies, all the Chief Prosecutors and their deputies, the heads of local pros-
ecution offices and their deputies, and the heads of organizational units (departments, groups) at 
any level prosecution office.
107 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 22(1).
108 This is based on the author’s many years of personal experience as Municipal Chief Prosecutor. 
Prosecutors prefer to resign than to be dismissed. Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art 26(c) 
and (d), distinguishes between “resignation” and “extraordinary resignation.” In case of (normal) 
resignation (which is a statement addressed to the Prosecutor General), no explanation is needed; 
the service relationship ceases three (for leaders of higher position six) months later, but the pros-
ecutor may be relieved by the Prosecutor General from official duties. Extraordinary resignation 
requires an explanation. It may take place only if the employer (the Prosecution Service) to a signifi-
cant extent, intentionally or out of gross negligence, violated any of its important duties originat-
ing from the service relationship, or made it impossible for the prosecutor to maintain his service 
relationship. In such a case, the prosecutor—who must make a statement within 6 days from the 
day he became aware of the reason—must be relieved of official duties at once and is entitled to a 
salary for the hree or six months mentioned above.
109 These are specified in Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 35, 36(1) and (2).
110 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 35–37, 39. Failure to report a possible incompatibility is 
a disciplinary offense. See id., Art. 53(1)(a). However, the authors has never heard of any such cases 
in practice. 
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the arts.111 Prosecutors are required to make a declaration concerning their property 
holdings every three years.112  
2.5. Individual accountability of prosecutors
Evaluation: The Prosecution Service measures its performance mainly by statistical 
data, including measures of the number of cases; the number and sorts of prosecuto-
rial measures taken; and the effectiveness of prosecutorial motions as reflected by 
judicial decisions (especially, though not exclusively, conviction rates and rates of 
preliminary confinement moved for and ordered).113 All investigations must be com-
pleted and charges filed, if at all, within specified time frames.114 Measurement of 
backlogs is considered an important component in the assessment of an office’s per-
formance, and that of its head.
Performance of individual prosecutors is assessed by their superiors, primarily by the 
quality and quantity of their work. Quality is defined by the complexity of the factual 
and legal problems involved in the cases handled and their proper resolution by the 
prosecutor. In addition, the prosecutor’s reliability, professional dedication, general 
behavior (accuracy, precision, and inventiveness), ability to recognize problems, ap-
pearance, ability to cooperate with officials of partner organizations, and communi-
cation with clients, colleagues, and subordinates are also taken into consideration.115 
Disciplinary Procedures: Prosecutors are subject to internal disciplinary procedures.116 
The Prosecutor General has exclusive disciplinary authority over prosecutors of 
“higher leading” position117 and general disciplinary authority over all prosecutors, 
but certain powers are transferred to heads of branches and independent depart-
ments in his office, or to heads of subsidiary prosecution offices in regard to those 
working under them.118 Prosecutors may be subject to discipline for intentionally or 
negligently violating their official duties or for behavior—even private behavior—that 
harms the reputation of the prosecutorial profession.119  
The authorized superior of a prosecutor may commence disciplinary proceedings 
against a prosecutor, or issue an oral or written warning for minor offenses. The pros-
111 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 36(1).
112 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 94/B(1)(a).
113 See Appendices.
114 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 176, 216(1) and (2).
115 For descriptions of the evaluation process, see Section 2.4 above.
116 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 52–69.
117 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 16(2)(a)–(k).
118 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 56.
119 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 53(1)(a)–(c). Some examples from the author’s experi-
ence: a prosecutor was responsible for disruptive behavior in his private (family) life, coming home 
drunk several times, loudly quarreling with and threatening his family, and making it necessary for 
neighbors to call the police. One of the author’s subordinates dropped the charge in a criminal case, 
instead of reporting his disagreement and asking to be relieved of carrying out explicit instructions 
to the contrary. Another prosecutor failed to complete his work in the time required, creating a 
backlog in casework. 
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ecutor may challenge the facts, require an oral warning to be put in writing, and 
appeal to the Prosecutor General.120 For serious offenses, the superior, or a commis-
sioner in charge of disciplinary examination appointed by him, conducts an investi-
gation.121 Proceedings must be completed and the disciplinary case must be decided 
at first instance within 30 days, with the possibility of a 30-day extension. However 
a disciplinary case lasting more than a month is rare. Sanctions may include warn-
ing, reprimand,122 loss of titles, reduction in salary, removal from a senior position or 
transfer to a lower assignment, or dismissal.123
The Prosecutor General may impose any of these sanctions. Other authorized su-
periors may only impose warnings and reprimands; if they believe the prosecutor is 
guilty and a more severe disciplinary sanction is necessary, they must submit a rec-
ommendation to the Prosecutor General. Prosecutors may appeal disciplinary find-
ings by authorized superiors to the Prosecutor General and may appeal his decision 
in court. In practice, disciplinary cases rarely occur.124
Code of Ethics: The Prosecution Service has no code of ethics; behavior is regulated 
by legal rules and the general instructions of the Prosecutor General and other heads of 
offices. There are also traditional, customary rules regulating behavior of prosecutors.
The National Association of Prosecutors—a member organization of the Interna-
tional Association of Prosecutors—has issued a Code of Conduct for public prosecu-
tors, as has the International Association itself. These codes are sanctioned by the 
organizations themselves and not the Service. However, in practice the rules of either 
code of conduct usually parallel some legal, moral, or customary prohibition, so their 
violation can result in disciplinary measures.125 
Civil and Criminal Liability: Prosecutors may not be arrested without an express lift-
ing of their immunity.126 The Prosecutor General’s immunity may only be lifted by 
120 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 54(3)–(4).  
121 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 59.
122 “Megróvás” (reprimand) is a more severe disciplinary punishment than “feddés” (warning), though 
both must be in written form. 
123 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 55(1)(a)–(f) and (2).
124 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 64(3). During 22 years as a senior prosecutor at the Mu-
nicipal Chief Prosecutor’s office (the largest in the country), the author encountered some six or 
seven disciplinary cases in total. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Prosecutor General’s office each year 
made information public within the Service on all disciplinary cases (5–8 in the whole country) for 
the current year. However, it should be noted that if a prosecutor commits a more serious disciplin-
ary offense, he or she can escape punishment and even dismissal by resorting to “extraordinary 
resignation” (see supra note 108), terminating both the service relationship and the Prosecutor 
General’s disciplinary authority over him.
125 These include, for example, the prohibition on discrimination, which is not explicitly formulated 
as a disciplinary offense in the Prosecution Service but is explicitly included in the professional 
associations’ codes of conduct (as well as in the Constitution). Prohibitions on the use of illegally 
obtained evidence are another example. Such breaches can be sanctioned by the associations them-
selves and, if they are breaches of official duty, may also be subject to criminal sanction. 
126 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 23. Lifting immunity 
is not a simple procedure, and in case of a minor infraction (“contravention”)—e.g. speeding or a 
similar traffic violation—the prosecutor may waive it instead of requiring an official procedure in-
volving, for example, police county headquarters, National Headquarters, and Prosecutor General’s 
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Parliament. For other employees of the Prosecution Service, the Chief Prosecution 
office of Prosecutorial Investigations must advise the Prosecutor General to lift im-
munity, entirely at his discretion.127 Immunity protects the prosecutor while he is 
in the Prosecution Service; it relates to official status, not to official actions only. 
Therefore there is no need for specific regulations regarding the prosecutors’ possible 
statements in court.
Prosecutors have no direct civil liability for their official actions; instead, the Pros-
ecution Service is the responsible party.128 However, if a prosecutor violates his of-
ficial duties and causes harm to a third person, the Public Prosecution Service takes 
responsibility in regard to the damaged party, but may in turn seek damages from 
the prosecutor.129 The prosecutor’s liability to the Prosecution Service for intentional 
damages is unlimited, while damages for negligence are specified by law.130 In prac-
tice, to the author’s knowledge, no prosecutor has ever been required to indemnify 
the Public Prosecution Service under these rules.
If the Prosecution Service harms a prosecutor in connection with his service, it is 
responsible regardless of intention or negligence.131 Prosecutors are entitled to take 
legal action to enforce claims connected to their service, as well as to challenge prac-
tically any action or omission of the Service that affects their service.132 
2.6. Training
Preparatory Education: All prosecutors must hold a university law degree.133 Increas-
ingly, applicants with university honors (summa cum laude or cum laude) are se-
lected.134 
The standard training of assistant prosecutors is a three-year program. Assistant pros-
ecutors serve several months in all sectors of local prosecution offices and in County 
Chief Prosecutor’s offices. Assistants work under the direct supervision of experi-
enced public prosecutors, called instructors, who supervise the assistants’ casework, 
check draft documents, and evaluate their performance.135 
Continuing Training: After the initial training period, there are no regular mandatory 
training courses in the Prosecution Service. There may be refresher courses for pros-
office. Such waivers are not recorded, so no data exists on their frequency. 
127 The Chief Prosecution office of Prosecutorial Investigations has jurisdiction over any criminal case 
where an employee of the Public Prosecution Service is suspected of having committed an offense. 
See infra note 239. 
128 Act IV of 1959: A Magyar Köztársaság polgári törvénykönyve [On Civil Code], Art. 348, 349.
129 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 70(1) and (2).
130 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 71(2).
131 Act XXII of 1992: A munka törvénykönyve [On Code of Labor Relations], Art. 174.
132 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 76.
133 Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 79(1).
134 This observation is based on personal experience as Municipal Chief Prosecutor.
135 See Section 2.4 above. 
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ecutors serving in units or fields dealing with special sorts of cases, such as juvenile 
or traffic cases, or for otherwise defined groups of prosecutors, e.g. those with under 
five years’ experience. Participation by those in the indicated group is mandatory. 
There are also occasional mandatory courses on new developments in the law.
Prosecutors can take post-graduate courses and earn a second diploma, for which the 
Prosecution Service will bear some or all of the costs if the course relates to their pro-
fessional responsibilities.136 The additional education and degree can be taken into 
consideration for evaluation and promotion.
III. Functions and Powers of Prosecutors
3.1. Prosecutorial functions in criminal justice
The Prosecution Service has responsibilities at all stages of the criminal justice pro-
cess. Prosecutors are responsible for investigation, whether conducted directly or by 
the investigative authorities they supervise; they decide on charges; in court, they 
represent the Public Prosecution Service and exercise claims and rights of appeal; 
and they supervise the legality and execution of punishments.137
Discretion to Initiate Prosecution: The criminal justice system is governed by the 
principle of legality;  prosecutors are obliged to initiate investigation of all crimes of 
which they are informed, and if, after investigation, they are satisfied that a criminal 
offense has been committed, they are required—with limited exceptions—to pros-
ecute these crimes in court.138 Prosecutors may decline to prosecute on grounds of 
lack of sufficient evidence (if there is no prospect of conviction) or on grounds of 
legal obstacles (if the act does not amount to a crime, or if there are circumstances 
that exclude criminal responsibility).139 Charges may also be postponed for one or 
two years.140 However, since this requires more administrative work than actually 
bringing the charge, it is done relatively infrequently.  
Prosecutors have a near monopoly on bringing cases to court. They have the exclu-
sive right to bring charges for serious crimes, and also for all lesser crimes, save cer-
tain specified misdemeanors, which may be prosecuted only if the victim explicitly 
so desires and where the victim’s expressed wish is legally considered a charge.
136 This observation is based on the author’s personal experience. The decision is made on a case-by-
case basis in the Prosecutor General’s office, Branch on Matters of Personnel, Training, and Man-
agement. 
137 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 3(2)(a)–(e).
138 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 6(1).
139 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 190(1)(a)–(j).
140 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 222. See in this Section below. 
Report on the Public Prosecution in Hungary
271
In this limited framework of private prosecution, citizens are entitled to bring charg-
es against adults (but not juveniles or soldiers) for minor bodily harm; breaches of 
secrecy of letters or other communications; defamation; slander; and verbal or physi-
cal insult.141 The victim may initiate criminal proceedings in such cases by submitting 
to the court, directly or through the police and/or the prosecution office, a request to 
punish the offender. If the offender is unidentified, the court orders a police investi-
gation. If the defendant has been identified, the court first attempts reconciliation; if 
that does not succeed, the normal procedure continues, with the victim acting as a 
private prosecutor. 
If the victim requests the proceeding from the prosecution service, or from the po-
lice, who passed the request to the prosecutor, and in the prosecutor’s opinion there 
is no public interest in prosecution, he may pass the victim’s request to the court, 
to proceed with private prosecution.142 However, the Prosecution Service may also 
bring charges in such cases, if there is a public interest in prosecuting the offense and 
the victim has asked for initiation of criminal action. The prosecutor may also take 
over the prosecution if the victim has already lodged it in court. 
Victims of criminal offenses may also challenge any decision of the prosecutor, thus 
initiating a mandatory review within the prosecutorial hierarchy.143 If the prosecu-
tor refuses to commence an investigation or discontinues it, or drops charges once 
in court, a victim may appeal the decision, and if the internal review upholds the 
prosecutor’s decision, which is the usual outcome, the victim may take over the pros-
ecution (subsidiary private prosecution).144 This is intended to be a final check on the 
Prosecution Service to ensure that it does not improperly fail to pursue charges.145 
In practice, the overwhelming majority of criminal offenses are reported to the police 
and investigations146 are initiated and completed by them, except in cases where the 
Prosecutorial Investigations Office has exclusive authority. However, the respective 
Prosecution Office must be informed of the commencement of an investigation, and 
the prosecutor may look at the files at any time, though this seldom occurs. If the 
case is more complicated and the investigation takes more than two months, the 
prosecutor’s permission must be obtained.  The head of the prosecution office, when 
informed of the initiation of an investigation, assigns a prosecutor to oversee the 
proceedings in the case; this prosecutor in charge of the case will from time to time 
141 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 52(1). 
142 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 496.
143 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 228.
144 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 53.
145 This institution existed in Hungarian criminal procedure law between 1900 and 1954 and was re-
established only by the Criminal Procedure Code of 1998, effective July 1, 2003. This restoration 
of private prosecution is in line with the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe No. R(2000)19 of October 6, 2000 on the Role of the Public Prosecution in the 
Criminal Justice System, Item 33. While experience is limited so far, subsidiary private prosecu-
tions seldom occur.
146 “Investigation” refers to an “examination” carried out originally by judicial authorities (“examin-
ing magistrate” or “juge d’instruction”) in continental systems, but the power to summon and hear 
witnesses and suspects is also given to the police and other investigative authorities, which—as a 
rule—compile case files and pass them to the prosecution office.
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request the files or demand oral information on developments. If the case seems 
extremely complicated or the offense is a very serious one, the prosecution office 
will intensify its oversight, and the prosecutor in charge will be present at important 
investigative actions, will take part in interrogations, etc. The prosecution may even 
take over the investigation; the head of the office in question makes this decision, 
with the advice of the prosecutor in charge of the case. 
However, an investigation is seldom, if ever, taken over. Local and county prosecu-
tion offices are not really prepared to conduct investigations. Thus investigations may 
be (and in practice frequently are) conducted for two months by the police without 
the actual involvement of the prosecutor. 
Once the investigation is completed, the police (or other investigative authority) 
passes the files to the respective prosecution office, where a prosecutor—not neces-
sarily the same one who oversaw it while the investigation took place—will be as-
signed to it. 
The Prosecution Service may dismiss the case for specified reasons147 or may post-
pone bringing charges. If the offense is not serious, carries a maximum penalty of no 
more than 3 years imprisonment, there are extraordinary mitigating circumstances, 
and there is reason to believe that postponement will have an advantageous impact 
on the behavior of the offender, a postponement may take place. The prosecutor may 
impose conditions on the defendant, observance of which is monitored by the Proba-
tion Service.148 If the probation period set by the prosecutor elapses and the condi-
tions have been met without recidivism, the prosecutor will dismiss the case. If the 
defendant violates the conditions or commits another offense, the prosecutor will 
immediately bring charges. 
Under the current provisions of the Hungarian Penal Code, an offense is an illegal act 
that is dangerous to society. If an otherwise prohibited act is not dangerous to society 
or has ceased or abated since the time of its commission, it may not be considered a 
criminal offense.149 Cases of these kinds will be dismissed by the Public Prosecution 
Service with a warning to the offenders.150 Such a decision,151  like all prosecutorial 
decisions, must be explained in detail in writing and provided to the interested parties, 
who may appeal it and, if the decision is upheld, may initiate a private prosecution. 
In practice, prosecutorial screening focuses on the prospect of conviction, based on 
147 If there is a legal or practical obstacle to continuing the proceedings. Criminal Procedure Code, 
1998, Art. 190(1)(a)–(i). 
148 Conditions may include indemnification of the victim, community service, psychological or medi-
cal treatment, etc. See Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 225.
149 Act IV of 1978: A Magyar Köztársaság büntetőtörvénykönyve [On Penal Code], Art. 28, 36.
150 Act IV of 1978 On Penal Code, Art. 71; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1998, Art. 190(1)(a), (d), and 
(f). Though this is an apparent exception to the legality principle, from the point of view of substan-
tive criminal law as understood in Hungary, it is not actually an exception, since the insignificance 
of the act means it is not an offense to begin with.
151 According to data from Egységes Rendőrségi és Ügyészségi Bűnügyi Statisztika [Uniform Police and 
Prosecutorial Statistics on Crime] (ERÜBS), the number of such dismissed cases on the national 
level in 2002 and 2003 was 9,594 and 10,423 respectively (ERÜBS is a database maintained by the 
Prosecutor General’s office).
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measured conviction rates.152 While there is a theoretical risk that prosecutors will 
bring unfounded charges, the more practical danger may be that they refrain from 
bringing charges, for fear of acquittal.153 During reviews of case files, higher-level of-
fices may examine dismissed cases to determine whether vigorous prosecution could 
have achieved conviction.154
Control of the Investigative Pre-Trial Phase: Hungarian criminal procedure follows 
the inquisitorial system. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the prosecutor, in-
stead of investigating, has the police investigate; the prosecutor takes part only in 
investigations of extraordinary importance. However, the law vests responsibility in 
the prosecution office.155 
Some compulsory measures are in the power of the “investigative judge”—a judge 
or judges of the respective local court assigned by the president of the county court 
to perform judicial review of actions specified by law156 prior to committal to the 
court. The investigative judge acts as “single judge” (egyesbíró),157 as opposed to the 
“court” (bíróság, bírói tanács), which is a three-man council.158 The link between the 
investigative authority and the investigative judge is the prosecutor. The police are 
not entitled to go before the investigative judge, and at hearings in front of that judge, 
it is the prosecutor who participates and speaks.159
If the investigative authority (in agreement with the prosecutor in charge of the case) 
considers there are sufficient grounds to identify a suspect, he must inform the sus-
pect of the factual and legal bases of the charge and of his rights and provide an op-
portunity for him to make statements regarding his view of the law and the facts. The 
authority must then investigate the suspect’s explanation of events, which may take 
several months.160 
The prosecutor must do his best to ensure the investigation is carried out expedi-
tiously. Investigative authorities are expected to put into writing how and what they 
will investigate and the means and methods to be applied, if the case promises to be 
more complicated. The prosecutor examines these written plans, comments on them, 
152 See Appendices for current data.
153 In the author’s experience during regular “general reviews” or “reviews of criminal law activity,” car-
ried out by prosecutors from the Chief  Prosecutor’s offices at district prosecution offices (see Sec-
tion 2.1 above), prosecutors regularly scrutinize whether or not charges should have been brought 
rather than a case dismissed on grounds of lack of evidence, especially if the conviction rate at the 
office under review exceeds the normal 96-97%.
154 This has been the practice in the Budapest Prosecution Office since 1979, when, as a newly appoint-
ed Deputy Chief Prosecutor in charge of criminal matters, the author directed a general review at 
a district prosecution office where the conviction rate was 99%. The point was included as one of 
the standard items to be scrutinized during such reviews, and was kept among them even after the 
author’s retirement in 2000.
155 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 28(4)(a)–(d).
156 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 207. 
157 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 14(1)(b). As to the powers of the investigative judge, see id., 
Art. 207(2).
158 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 14(1)(a) and (2).
159 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 203(1), 207(3), 211(1).
160 By law, it may take no longer than two years. Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 176(2).
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compares the actual investigation to the plans, and if necessary, issues instructions 
to the police.  
When the investigation is formally completed, the files passed to the prosecution 
office.161 If the prosecutor in charge of the case and the head of the office find no 
grounds for dismissal or postponement, the prosecutor in charge  issues an indict-
ment, and the Prosecution Office passes it—together with the files—to the court. 
This is considered “bringing charges” (sometimes referred to in this report as “com-
mittal”), and at this point, the court (not the investigating judge) will decide on the 
issues to be determined.  Prosecutors have 30 days to decide whether or not to bring 
charges; in complicated cases, this term may be prolonged by the head of the office 
to 60 days, and in extremely complicated cases, the head of the superior prosecution 
office may extend it to 90 days.162 Observation of these time frames is regularly moni-
tored, and exceeding them is considered a disciplinary offense.
Control of Ongoing Prosecution: In county courts, the prosecutor must always be pres-
ent at the first instance trial. In local courts, he must be present if the offense tried 
carries a maximum penalty of five years or more of imprisonment, if the defendant 
is deprived of liberty or his mental sanity is in doubt, or if the court so orders.163 The 
prosecutor may take part in any trial.164 The trial begins with the prosecutor’s reading 
of the charges.165 The prosecutor is entitled to bring motions on any questions to be 
decided by the court, and to state his desired outcome. He is also entitled to modify 
the charge or to change the legal basis of the charge (i.e., the Criminal Code provision 
on which it is based).166 When the Court has heard the evidence, the prosecutor sums 
up his views of the facts and the law and recommends a decision and a type of sen-
tence, with reference to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. However, he may 
not recommend a specific penalty (such as a specific prison term). He must indicate 
the legal grounds of his recommendation.167 
After the announcement of the Court’s decision, the prosecutor may immediately ap-
peal or accept the decision; he may also request three days to decide whether or not 
to appeal. He may appeal against as well as in favor of the defendant.168 
It is up to the Court to ensure the execution of its decision. The Prosecutor General’s 
office also has an Independent Department on Inspection of Legality in Execution 
of Punishments and on Protection of Rights. The Department supervises the work 
of prosecutors in the Chief Prosecutors’ offices who monitor execution of punish-
161 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 193, 194.
162 In relation to local offices, the respective Chief Prosecutor’s office, in relation to the latter, the Pros-
ecutor General’s office is the “superior prosecution office.” See 25/2003 (ÜK 12) LÜ, General In-
struction, Art. 60.
163 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 241.
164 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 241(1)(f).
165 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 284(2)(a). In the absence of the prosecutor (at local court 
trials) the judge or the recorder will read the indictment. See Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 
342(2).
166 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 310, 311.
167 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 314, 315(2).
168 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 323(1), 325(1), 324.
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ments. The prosecution offices’ responsibility is limited to regularly checking wheth-
er the county court’s Bureau on Execution of Punishments (organizational unit of 
the court) has done its duty, and to ensure that regulations regarding rights of prison 
inmates be observed. They visit prisons, hear inmates’ complaints, investigate them 
where necessary, and if necessary, take measures to correct the situation.169
Clemency may be granted by the President of the Republic. During criminal pro-
ceedings, prior to the Court’s final decision the Prosecutor General is entitled to ad-
vise him to grant clemency.170 
3.2. Relationship with the judge at the pre-trial stage
In the pre-trial phase, prosecutors decide whether or not to commence criminal pro-
ceedings; it is exclusively up to them to decide whether or not to bring charges and 
thereby commit a person to court. Courts are entitled neither to review prosecuto-
rial decisions nor to order additional or supplementary investigations, save to re-
quest that the prosecutor, either prior to or during trial, find and obtain some definite 
proof.171 However, such requests carry no sanction; rather, they warn the prosecutor 
that the Court (or the judge; in the local courts, cases are dealt with by a single judge 
if the maximum penalty is less than 8 years of imprisonment172) would like to see 
some piece of evidence that has been spoken of, but has not been obtained and ex-
amined. Such a request also tells the prosecutor that, if the proof sought by the judge 
is not presented, there is a probability of acquittal.
The only instance in which the prosecutor requires the investigating judge’s approval 
is if he wishes, upon receipt of new information, to reopen an investigation against a 
person after having discontinued it.173  
Pre-Trial Detention: Prosecutors may decide, in general, what means and measures 
to apply during an investigation, but if constitutional rights of citizens are affected, 
judicial authority is required. The investigating authority or the prosecutor may keep 
a suspect in confinement for 72 hours,174 during which period they must obtain a 
judicial arrest warrant. To do so, the investigating authority must formally ask the 
prosecutor to apply for an order of “preliminary arrest.” The prosecutor reviews the 
169 See 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, Art. 17.
170 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 597(1). See also 25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction, 
Art. 3(3)(r), 14(1)(g), 15(1)(b), 16(1)(i).
171 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 268(1), 305(2).
172 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 14(1)(b).
173 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 191(3), 207(2)(c).
174 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 126(1)–(3). Confinement may be ordered if pretrial detention 
seems likely. Pretrial detention—which requires a judicial decision after a hearing—may be ordered 
for suspects charged with crimes punishable by deprivation of liberty, if they: are thought likely to 
complete an attempted crime or other crime similarly punishable; have previously committed such 
crimes; have attempted to flee or are thought likely to do so, or will otherwise not be available at 
trial; or are thought likely to influence or intimidate witnesses or tamper with evidence. See Crimi-
nal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 129(2).
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reasons for confinement and decides whether or not to apply for the judicial order. 
He thus has effective discretion to force the suspect’s release; however, the decision 
in regard to preliminary arrest rests with the judge.175
If the prosecutor has not yet brought formal charges, pre-trial detention may be or-
dered by the investigating judge; if charges have already been brought, its imposition 
is in the hands of the court. The defense may also participate in pre-trial detention 
hearings. Instead of pre-trial detention, the judge or court—depending on whether 
or not charge has been brought—may order domestic confinement or prohibition 
on leaving the place of residence, or impose bail.176 Both prosecution and defense 
may appeal the judge’s or court’s decisions concerning pre-trial detention or other 
restraint.177
Prosecutors also may apply to courts for other measures restraining personal liberty, 
such as temporary commitment and treatment of the mentally ill, domestic confine-
ment, prohibition on leaving the place of residence, or withdrawal of passport.178 All 
apply only in criminal proceedings.
Other Surveillance Warrants: Investigations may require legal search and seizure,179 
seizure of property,180 or surveillance of private premises, including interception of 
written or electronic correspondence and wiretapping.181 
When such measures require a judicial warrant, it is the prosecutor who must apply 
for it; the investigating authority must request that the prosecutor apply for a war-
rant.182  The investigating judge must decide on the motion within 72 hours,183 and 
the judge’s decision may be appealed. In urgent cases, the head of a prosecution office 
may authorize the use of such methods for up to 72 hours on his own initiative,184 
175 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 129(1), 207(2)(a), 210(1)(a). The Prosecutorial Investigations 
Offices can apply for judicial warrants.
176 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 137, 138, 147. Bail has only been available since July 2003. 
Domestic confinement means a prohibition on leaving one’s home and its immediate environs 
without permission. Prohibition on leaving the place of residence means one may not leave a defi-
nite (administratively defined) geographic area without special permission.
177 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 215(1), 347(1).
178 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 146.
179 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 129, 137, 138, 140, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153, 158/A. Search and 
seizure in specified places requires a judicial warrant. Documents may only be seized at the deci-
sion of a prosecutor from people who cannot be forced to testify due to a privileged relationship. 
Otherwise, all the compulsory measures mentioned may be ordered by either the investigating 
authorities or by the prosecutors or courts.
180 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 159.
181 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 207(2)(a) and (b).
182 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 203(1). See also 23/2003 (VI.24) BM-IM, Joint Ordinance of 
the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Justice Agreed to by the Prosecutor: A belügyminisz-
ter irányítása alá tartozó nyomozó hatóságok nyomozásának részletes szabályairól és a nyomozási 
cselekmények jegyzőkönyv helyett más módon való rögzítésének szabályairól [On Detailed Regula-
tion of Investigations and on Documentation of Acts of Investigation Otherwise than Protocols 
at Authorities under the Direction of the Minister of Interior], Art.142(2). In case of prosecutorial 
investigations, the prosecutor will apply to the investigating judge on his own; he may also instruct 
the investigative authority to apply these search and seizure and surveillance methods. 
183 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 214.
184 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 203(6). See also 11/2003 (ÜK.7) LÜ, General Instruction by 
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applying at the same time for a judicial warrant, which may retroactively authorize 
the measure. 
3.3. Powers outside the criminal justice system
Civil Proceedings: The Prosecution Service has certain powers outside of criminal 
proceedings, including the power to take actions in civil litigation.185 Prosecutorial 
activity in areas of civil law is regulated by the Prosecutor General.186 A prosecutor 
may sue on someone’s behalf if he is authorized by law to do so, or if the person is un-
able to protect his or her rights.187 He may also be entitled by law to take civil actions 
in the public interest.
A number of special legal rules authorize the prosecutor to institute civil proceed-
ings.188 The prosecution office is entitled to take action concerning validity of mar-
riage189 and to limit a person’s power to conduct business on grounds of impaired 
capacity, or to restore it after such limitation.190 The prosecutor may sue to declare a 
contract null and void to eliminate the harm done to the public interest by an invalid 
contract,191 or in order to take immorally-earned profits for the state.192 The Prosecu-
tion Office may also sue and seek a court order of dissolution if a foundation breaks 
the law193 or a political party or other organization operates illegally.194 It may ask 
the Court to declare that a political party has ceased to operate and thus no longer 
exists.195 Similarly, the Public Prosecution Service is entitled to sue if a church acts 
illegally in spite of a prior warning.196 Other laws authorize the service to take legal 
action in the public interest concerning the Program on Part-Ownership for Em-
the Prosecutor General: A vádelőkészítéssel, a bűnügyi nyomozások törvényességi felügyeletével és a 
vádemeléssel összefüggő ügyészi feladatokról [On Prosecutorial Tasks Connected to Preparation of 
Charges, Inspection of Legality of Criminal Investigations and Commitment to Courts of Law], 
Art. 61.
185 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 10(2)(b).
186 See 7/1996 (ÜK.7) LÜ: Az ügyész magánjogi tevékenységéről [General Instruction of the Prosecutor 
General on the Civil Law Activity of the Prosecutor].
187 Act III of 1952: A polgári perrendtartásról [On Code of Civil Procedure], Art. 9(1); 7/1996 (ÜK.7)         
LÜ, General Instruction of the Prosecutor General on the Civil Law Activity of the Prosecutor, Art. 8. 
188 For details, see Sándor Nyíri, Az ügyészségről [On the Public Prosecution Service] (2004), at 135–
137.
189 Act IV of 1952: A házasságról, a családról és a gyámságról [On Marriage, Family, and Guardian-
ship], Art. 14(1).
190 Act IV of 1959 On Civil Code, Art. 14, 15, 21.
191 Act IV of 1959 On Civil Code, Art. 36.
192 Act IV of 1959 On Civil Code, Art. 594.
193 Act IV of 1959 On Civil Code, Art. 74/F.
194 Act II of 1989: Az egyesülési jogról [On Freedom to Form Associations].
195 Act XXXIII of 1989: A pártok működéséről és gazdálkodásáról [On Operation and Economization 
of Parties]. 
196 Act IV of 1990: A lelkiismereti és vallásszabadságról, valamint az egyházakról [On Freedom of Con-
science, Religion, and Churches], Art. 13(2).
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
278
ployees,197 Hungarian citizenship,198 environmental and nature protection, 199 regis-
tration of publicly trading companies,200 etc. 
Review of Legality: The Prosecution Service supervises the legality of regulations is-
sued by lower levels of government (that is, ministerial ordinances and local self-gov-
ernment ordinances), and decisions of non-judicial organs dealing with labor and 
service relationships, membership in cooperatives, and labor relationships between 
cooperatives and individuals. The scope of review covers general instructions and 
decisions in individual cases, including decisions (or omissions) by administrative 
authorities. Prosecutors may promote the legality of public administrative actions by 
commenting on draft regulations and putting questions to administrative authori-
ties. They may also, at the request of interested parties or on their own initiative, 
monitor or perform prosecutorial reviews of administrative agencies, or comment 
on final decisions by administrative authorities. 
The legal operation of the public administration is considered to be a public concern, 
and thus the Prosecution Service is entitled to review it. This review does not, as a 
rule, involve individual cases, and its main form is the prosecutorial “examination,” 
or review. Prosecution offices, including those at the local and county level, are ex-
pected to carry out such reviews every half year, and legal and disciplinary proceed-
ings are a normal consequence of this activity.
Legal reviews201  are usually designed by the Prosecutor General’s office and involve 
defined time periods and limited issues; that is, they normally do not involve ongoing 
supervision of all actions, but only discrete questions about which there is particu-
lar concern. However, Chief Pprosecutors’ and local prosecution offices may design 
and perform local reviews. Reviews usually take place at the local and county level 
administrative authorities, and each county Chief Prosecutor’s office reports its own 
finding as well as the summarized findings of its subordinate local offices, together 
with the measures taken. These reports are summarized at the Prosecutor General’s 
office. The prosecutor reviews solely the legality or constitutionality of administrative 
decisionmaking, not its political content.202 
The Public Prosecutor may also review final decisions in individual administrative 
cases at the request of an interested party, but only from the point of view of legality.
197 Act XLIV of 1992: A Munkavállalói Résztulajdonosi Programról [On Program of Employees’ Partial 
Ownership], Art. 11. This was a mechanism that allowed organizations of employees to gain owner-
ship of formerly state-owned enterprises during privatization.
198 Act LV of 1993: A magyar állampolgárságról [On Hungarian Citizenship], Art. 11(3). 
199 Act LIII of 1995: A környezet védelmének általános szabályairól [On General Rules of Environment 
Protection], Art. 109(2).
200 Act CXLV of 1997: A cégnyilvántartásról, a cégnyilvánosságról és a cégbírósági eljárásról [On Reg-
istration and on Publicity of Trading Companies and on Registration Procedure at Courts], Art. 
52(1)(a).
201 These are officially called “examinations,” during which each of a defined group or type of cases in 
a defined period at a specific public administrative office is scrutinized by the prosecutor’s office to 
determine legality.
202 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 13(1), 13(2)(a)–(b), 
16(1). See also Nyíri, supra note 188, at 125.
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If a prosecutor determines that an administrative action violates the law, he may:
▶ lodge a protest concerning an unfounded or unlawful individual decision, 
whether it is disclosed due to prosecutorial review of a specific issue or to review 
of an individual administrative case at the request of an interested party;203
▶ remonstrate against an illegal practice or a breach of legality by omission; this 
applies if the decisions are not illegal on the merits, but procedural rules are 
regularly violated, which creates the direct danger of illegal decisions in future 
cases on the merits as well;
▶ issue a warning, if there is a threat of future breach of legality;204
▶ initiate proceedings, if the prosecution office—as a result of the prosecutorial re-
view of a number of individual administrative cases—discloses that a criminal 
or disciplinary offense or violation seems to have been committed and there 
has been no proper proceeding (because the competent authority has not been 
notified). In case of a criminal offense, the prosecutor orders investigation; in 
case of a violation or a disciplinary offense, it notifies the competent authority, 
which must proceed, but is not limited in its decision by the prosecutor’s legal 
opinion.205 Such proceedings are not uncommon;  
▶ annul administrative organs’ punishments for minor infractions (“contraven-
tions”).206
IV. Relationship of the Public Prosecution Service to Other Organs 
 of the State
4.1. The constitutional location of the Public Prosecution Service
The Hungarian Republic is a constitutional parliamentary democracy. The Constitu-
tion is the supreme and defining law of the land.207 The country is administratively 
203 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 13/A.
204 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 16. 
205 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 26.
206 These are minor, administrative infractions dealt with by administrative organs (notary of the local 
self-government, police, specialized organizations of supervision and control). They may be pun-
ished by fine of between HUF 1000 and 150,000, but some are punishable by up to 60 days’ depri-
vation of liberty; other possible penalties include confiscation of property, withdrawal of licenses, 
etc. See Act LXIX of 1999: A szabálysértésekről [On Contraventions]. A decision of the competent 
authority may be appealed to the prosecutor, who in case of illegality or unfoundedness may annul 
it and instruct the competent authority to proceed  properly. 
207 The Constitution of the Hungarian Republic was first adopted by Act XX of 1949. The Constitu-
tion was modified completely following the end of the communist system in 1989; its new text 
was established by Act XXXI of 1989. See also Act XI of 1987: A jogalkotásról [On Legislation]. All   
references are to the new text.
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divided into 19 counties, a number of cities with or without county privileges, and 
townships. Budapest has a separate administrative structure of districts.208 
Legislative authority is vested in a unicameral Parliament.209 The President is elected 
by Parliament and holds a largely symbolic position.210 The Prime Minister is elected 
with the advice of the President by a majority of Parliament, and ministers are ap-
pointed by the President with the advice of the Prime Minister.211 The government 
administers national policy and answers to Parliament.212 
Judicial authority is vested in a series of courts. The Chief Justice—the President of 
the Supreme Court—is elected on the advice of the President by a two-thirds major-
ity of Parliament for a six-year term, with the possibility of re-election. Judges are 
appointed by the President, with the advice of the National Council of Justice Ad-
ministration.213 
The Public Prosecution Service is a constitutionally regulated body214 independent of 
the executive and the judiciary. It is headed by a Prosecutor General, who is elected 
by and accountable to Parliament. The Prosecution Service is charged with protect-
ing citizens’ rights and upholding the constitutional order and security of the coun-
try; prosecutors are responsible for ensuring the application of the law.215
4.2. Relations with the legislature
The Prosecutor General is constitutionally accountable to Parliament for the activity 
of the Prosecution Service. However, Parliament’s apparent influence over the highly 
autonomous Prosecution Service is actually limited, especially where individual cas-
es or decisions are concerned.
Parliament elects the Prosecutor General216 and may remove him from office on 
specified grounds (though only at the President’s recommendation).217 However, the 
Prosecutor General’s relatively long term of office218 and the limited grounds available 
208 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 41; Act XLII of 1994: A helyi 
önkormányzati képviselők és polgármesterek választásáról szóló 1990. évi LXIV tv. Módosításáról 
[Amendment to the Constitution in Regard to Local Self-Government], Art. 2 (appendices to the 
Act describe the territorial division of the cities, including Budapest).
209 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 19–28/E.
210 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 30/A.
211 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 33. 
212 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 39.
213 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 48. The National Council is de-
scribed in Section 4.6 below.
214 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 51–53.
215 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 51(1)–(3). 
216 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 52(1). 
217 See Section 2.3 above.
218 As Parliament serves no more than a four-year term, and the Prosecutor General is elected for a six-
year term, it is possible for a prosecutor to serve under a parliament with a different political com-
position. The first Prosecutor General of the post-communist Republic of Hungary was elected in 
June 1990 with 82% of the vote, and re-elected in 1996 with 94% of the vote. He resigned in March 
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for his removal tend to limit Parliament’s political influence over him. Moreover, Par-
liament has no control over the appointment or activities of any other prosecutors.
Parliament can influence the Prosecution Service through legislation, such as laws 
establishing regulations for the Service,219 and through the budgetary process.
Parliament may also solicit information from the Prosecution Service under limited 
conditions. The Prosecutor General must report to Parliament on the performance 
of the Prosecution Service, but the form, content, and status of this report are poorly 
defined.220 In the period since 1993 the Parliament in plenary session has had the 
time to examine, discuss and formally accept only one of the 13 annual reports.221 
Members of Parliament may request information from the Prosecutor General 
through questions and interpellations.222 However, the Prosecutor General is not 
politically responsible to Parliament for his individual decisions, and there are no 
2000. The former opposition took over in 1994 and again in 1998. The current Prosecutor General 
was elected with 55% of the vote and has served since May 16, 2000. The former opposition took 
over two years later, in 2002.  Because the current Prosecutor General has only a fragile majority, he 
is frequently accused of partisanship and enjoys less legitimacy than his predecessor.  
219 Act XX of 1949 on Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 53(4). See also Act V of 1972 On 
Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic and Act LXXX On Service Relationships.  
220 The form the report has taken is largely the result of an ad hoc process of development controlled 
by the Prosecution Service itself. In the transition period following the 1989 change of system, the 
Prosecutor General felt he owed Parliament a more detailed account of those stormy years than 
the former “Prosecutor General’s account,” a cursory 20-page quadrennial report. A governmental 
initiative to change the constitutional status of the Public Prosecution Service and to subordinate it 
to the government through the Ministry of Justice had failed by 1993 for lack of the necessary two-
thirds majority in Parliament. The Standing Committee on Constitutional Matters and on Prepara-
tion of Legislative Acts expressed its view that the Constitution required the Prosecutor General 
to provide a report: (a) before Parliament’s term elapsed (at least once), (b) before the Prosecutor 
General’s term elapsed (at least once) and (c) if Parliament so desired. It also said that the Prosecu-
tor General was entitled to submit a report at any time. Parliament gave no sign of any expectation 
as to a report, not to mention its content. In 1993, as the term of the first freely elected Parliament 
was about to expire, the Prosecutor General submitted a report on the Service’s performance for 
the previous three years. The structure and the content of this report were devised by the Prosecu-
tor General’s office, and all the Chief Prosecutors’ offices (in each county and the capital) provided 
input on their regions’ performances. 
221 Since 1993, reports had been submitted to the Parliament each year, and were discussed only in 
committees. The report on the year 1997 was completed and filed in Parliament in May 1998 and 
heard in committee in February 1999. It was examined in plenary session on March 5, 1999 and 
decided upon on March 23, 1999. All speakers emphasized the importance of the report and the 
necessity of discussing similar reports in plenary. The report was accepted by 297 votes with 1 
vote against and 10 abstentions. See Országgyülési jegyzőkönyv 1998-2002, tavaszi ülésszak, II. kötet 
(1999. március 1-5., 51-52. ülésnap) 7244-7484. hasáb és III. kötet (1999. március 22-26., 56-60. 
ülésnap) 7554-7555. hasáb [Record of the Parliament of 1998-2002., 1999 Spring Session. Vol. II, 
Columns 7244-7284 and Vol. III, Columns 7554-7555]. 
222 According to the Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 27, Members of 
Parliament are entitled to interpellate and put questions to various government officials, including 
the Prosecutor General, on any matter within their purview. The details are regulated in a Resolu-
tion of Parliament 46/1994 (IX.3§) OGY: A Magyar ÍKöztársaság Országgyűlésének házszabályáról 
[On the Rules of Operation of the Houses of Parliament of the Hungarian Republic]. Both interpel-
lations and questions must be answered by the addressee in person or by a deputy. In case of an 
interpellation, an MP may reject the answer, and Parliament then votes on whether it is satisfied by 
the answer. In case of a question, there is no right to rebut and no voting. 
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consequences if Parliament votes to reject his answer.223 Apart from these general in-
formational requirements, Parliament is not entitled to conduct independent inves-
tigations of either the Prosecution Service as a whole or individual prosecutors. Even 
the questions or interpellations—though they may concern individual cases—may 
not concern individual public prosecutors. They may, however, deal with the Pros-
ecutor General’s personal involvement in a case—whether or not he gave any specific 
instructions, whether he agreed with the legal resolution, and similar questions.
4.3. Relations with the executive
The executive has very limited influence over the Prosecution Service. The Prosecu-
tor General does not report to the government or to any executive agency, and no 
minister or anyone else within the executive has any power of appointment or con-
trol over him or other prosecutors. Neither individual prosecutors nor the Prosecu-
tion Service as a whole receive general instructions on law enforcement priorities or 
specific instructions in individual cases. 
Likewise, prosecutors have no power to give instructions or orders to executive agen-
cies—save those addressed to investigative authorities in individual cases concerning 
definite investigative actions. In addition, prosecutors have authority to review and 
supervise legality in public administration. 
The Ministry of Justice supervises the National Headquarters of Prison Adminis-
tration and the Probation Service, keeps registers of officially licensed experts, in-
terpreters and public notaries, organizes the technical and professional side of the 
preparatory work of legislation, and operates the Committee on Special Legal Ex-
amination.224 It has nothing to do with the Prosecution Service, except that both the 
Prosecution Service and the Ministry of Justice are professionally interested in good 
laws. In preparing draft legislation on behalf of the Government, the Ministry of 
223 In response to a motion filed by the Prosecutor General after his responses to various interpella-
tions concerning specific criminal cases were not accepted, the Constitutional Court ruled: 
“The Prosecutor General, who was elected to this office by the Parliament, shall not be con-
sidered politically responsible to Parliament for individual decisions made by him while per-
forming his duties. Accordingly, the Prosecutor General’s public law status is not affected by 
Parliament’s rejection of his answer to an interpellation. Due to his constitutional position and 
to the function of an interpellation, he must not be called to account in case his answer to the 
interpellation is not accepted. The Prosecutor General is not subordinated to the Parliament. 
Consequently, the Prosecutor General may neither directly nor indirectly be instructed to make 
any individual decision with definite content or to change an individual decision (in any definite 
way).”
 See 3/2004 (II.17) AB, Decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary: Az Alkotmánybíróság ha-
tározata a legfőbb ügyésznek az Alkotmány értelmezése tárgyában előterjesztett indítványára [On the 
Prosecutor General’s Motion Regarding the Interpretation of the Constitution].
224 See Section 2.4 above.
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Justice must invite comments and the opinion of the Prosecutor General’s office.225 
Conversely, the Prosecutor General may initiate legislation, but may do so only 
through the Minister of Justice.226 
4.4. Relations with police and investigators
The police of the Hungarian Republic (a Magyar Köztársaság Rendőrsége) conduct 
most criminal investigations. The Prosecution Service also has separate units (Pros-
ecutorial Investigation Offices) for criminal investigation.
The police are a uniformed, armed body under the direction of the government through 
the Minister of the Interior.227 The National Chief of Police, usually a police general (po-
lice have military ranks), is appointed by the Prime Minister on the advice of the Minister 
of the Interior. Within the National Police Headquarters (Országos Rendőrfőkapitányság), 
the High Directorate on Criminal Matters deals with criminal matters. 
The police and the Prosecution Service are administratively separate. The Prosecu-
tion Service has no authority over the appointment, training, evaluation, or promo-
tion of investigating police officers. However, because the Prosecution Service makes 
the final decisions on cases investigated by police officers, prosecutorial evaluations 
of an officer’s investigative abilities and performance are often informally reflected in 
prosecutorial decisions. In addition, prosecutors regularly lecture in refresher cours-
es for police officers. 
Disciplinary actions against police officers are conducted independently of the Pros-
ecution Service. However, prosecutors can compel the initiation of disciplinary pro-
ceedings if they find in the course of their official duties that a disciplinary offense 
has been committed, although the police disciplinary authority remains free to de-
cide the case.228
Investigative Authority: The police may commence a criminal investigation on their 
own initiative whenever they are aware of a crime;229 however, as discussed above, 
they must report their investigation to the prosecutor,230 who may take it over at his 
discretion.231 
The Prosecution Service may assign cases to the police for investigation to determine 
whether criminal charges are warranted.232 Investigations conducted by the police are 
225 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 5(2)(b); Act XI of 
1987 On Legislation, Art. 28.
226 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 5(2)(b).
227 Act XXXIV of 1994: A Rendõrségrõl [On Police], Art. 4(1).
228 Act V of 1972 On Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 26.
229 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 35(2).
230 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 156(2). See also Section 3.1 above.
231 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 28(4)(e).
232 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 28(3). When doing so, the Prosecution Service must observe 
the regulations in 15/1994 (VII.14) BM, Ordinance of the Minister of Interior: A rendőrség nyo-
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subject to review, supervision, and direction by the Prosecution Service.233  It may 
order the police to take specific actions relating to the investigation,234 which police 
officers are required to obey,235 and the prosecutor in charge of the case may examine 
any investigative records.236
The prosecution office corresponding to the same level of territorial organization as 
the responsible police office has supervisory authority, and no other agency has any 
right to direct or control the investigation.237 
Prosecutors may also conduct their own investigations,238 and certain offenses relat-
ing to political figures, members of the judiciary and Prosecution Service, or police 
officers may only be investigated by the Prosecution Service.239
Prosecutorial investigations are conducted by the Prosecutorial Investigations Of-
fices (PIO), which are prosecution offices at the local level in each county. There 
are also a Metropolitan Prosecutorial Investigations Office in Budapest and a Chief 
Prosecution Office of Prosecutorial Investigations (Nyomozó Főügyészség) with  ju-
risdiction over the entire country.240  The Chief Prosecution Office of Prosecutorial 
mozó hatóságainak hatásköréről és illetékességéről [On Competence and Jurisdiction of the Investi-
gative Authorities of the Police].
233 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 28(4), Art. 165(1)–(3).
234 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 165(1).
235 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 165(2). See also 23/2003 (VI.24) BM-IM, Joint Ordinance 
of the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Justice Agreed to by the Prosecutor General On 
Detailed Regulation of Investigations and on Documentation of Acts of Investigation Otherwise 
than Protocols at Authorities under the Direction of the Minister of Interior, Art. 91(1). Under this 
Ordinance, police commanders are expected to promote prosecutorial supervision, and to ensure 
obedience to prosecutorial instructions, even in cases of disagreement.  
236 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 165(1).
237 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 51(2).
238 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 28(4)–(e).
239 Offenses against public officials or committed by high ranking officials with immunity; offenses 
against foreign officials; murder, assault and other serious crimes against judges, prosecutors, or 
other employees of the justice administration, such as draftsmen at  courts (the equivalents of the 
assistant public prosecutors), assistant public prosecutors, prosecutorial investigators, secretaries 
at courts or prosecution offices, clerks at courts and at Public Prosecution Service, bailiffs, public 
notaries and  deputies to them; cases of bribery involving judges, prosecutors, or other high-rank-
ing officials; offenses committed by policemen or officers of the Civil Security Services, the National 
Security Bureau, the Information Bureau, the Special Services for National Security, or Customs 
Guards; or offenses against the administration of justice, such as false accusation or perjury. Crimi-
nal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 29.
240 See Act VII of 2006: A Magyar Köztársaság Ügyészségéről szóló 1972. évi V. törvény és az ügyész-
ségi szolgálati viszonyról szóló 199. évi LXXX.törvény módosításáról [On Modification of the Act 
V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic and Act LXXX On Service 
Relationships], Art. 1. Chief Prosecution Office of Prosecutorial Investigations conducts the in-
vestigation if the suspect or the victim is a person with immunity; in cases of murder, intentional 
manslaughter, kidnapping, assault or robbery of a judge or professional employee of the Prosecu-
tion Service; offenses committed by judges or professional employees of the Prosecution Service  in 
connection with the administration of justice; murder or intentional manslaughter of a policeman; 
bribery  of a judge or an employee of the Prosecution Service; or cases in which the suspect is a high 
ranking officer of the Police or the Customs Guard.  See 11/2003 (ÜK.7) LÜ, General Instruction by 
the Prosecutor General On Prosecutorial Tasks Connected to Preparation of Charges, Inspection 
of Legality of Criminal Investigations and Commitment to Courts of Law, Art. 49(2). The scope of 
offenses specified in Art. 49(2) of this General Instruction is much narrower than in Art. 29 of the 
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Investigations is not a coordinating organ for the offices of prosecutorial investiga-
tions, but an investigative authority in itself; it conducts investigations of the more 
serious criminal offenses listed in Article 29 of the Criminal Procedure Code and re-
ferred for investigation under that article to the Prosecution Service. The Prosecutor 
General or his deputy for criminal matters, or the head of the Division on Inspection 
of (Criminal) Investigations and Preparation of Commitment to Courts of Law in the 
Prosecutor General’s office, may assign any case to the Chief Prosecution Office for 
investigation.241 The Offices of Prosecutorial Investigations—including the CPOPI—
are part of the prosecution service. They employ prosecutors, assistant prosecutors, 
and prosecutorial investigators who are appointed by the Prosecutor General and are 
responsible to him. They follow the same rules of criminal procedure and investigate 
using the same methods as the police, but are used only in cases required by law to be 
investigated by the prosecution service. 
The media have frequently noted dissent and lack of proper cooperation between 
the police and the Prosecution Service.242 Reports have appeared of politically-moti-
vated interference by prosecutors in police investigations, but it is not clear whether 
these incidents are the result of abuse or of mere tactlessness or lack of caution on 
the part of prosecutors.243 Some cases related to this have come up, but all have been 
dismissed by the police or prosecutors.
Other Police Work Subject to Prosecutorial Oversight: The police are also responsible 
for public administrative tasks such as issuing firearms licenses, drivers’ licenses, and 
licenses to bury victims of sudden death or suicide (like a coroner).  They also have 
the authority to decide certain cases of more minor infractions, for which they may 
impose fines or jail time. In their conduct of these activities, the police are subject 
to supervision by the Prosecution Service.244 This supervision generally functions 
smoothly in practice.
In addition to the police and the Prosecution Service, both the Customs Guard and 
the Frontier Guard possess investigative powers in criminal cases.
The Customs Guard is an administrative and law enforcement agency that may con-
duct investigations involving tax and revenue fraud, smuggling, breaches of interna-
tional obligations concerning prohibited goods or technologies, trafficking in drugs, 
and forgeries of documents and trademarks.245  It is under the general supervision 
Criminal Procedure Code. Only the most serious categories of crimes are referred to the CPOPI, 
leaving the rest—e.g. murder of a public notary or bribery not committed by a judge, prosecutorial 
staff member or high ranking police officer—to the county prosecutorial investigations offices.
241 11/2003 (ÜK.7) LÜ, General Instruction by the Prosecutor General On Prosecutorial Tasks Con-
nected to Preparation of Charges, Inspection of Legality of Criminal Investigations and Commit-
ments to Courts of Law, Art. 49(2)(g).
242 Endre Babus, Ügyészség kontra rendőrség, Heti Világgazdaság, October 25, 2003, at 6–9; N. P�ter 
Nagy, Fogadjunk az igazságra?, Népszabadság, November 2, 2004, at 3.
243 On one specific case of apparent prosecutorial interference in a police investigation, see János 
Tamás Szalay, Kulcsár, az ügyész és a szökés, Népszava, September 4, 2003, at 1, 3.  See also Perel a 
Legfőbb Ügyészség, available at http://www.radio.hu, last reviewed December 7, 2005; Népszabadság 
Online, available at http://www.nol.hu, last reviewed February 22, 2006.
244 Act V of 1972 on Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 17, 17/A.
245 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 36(2).
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of the Finance Ministry,246  but answers directly to the National Commander of the 
Customs Guard, who is a customs guard general (here too, ranks track those of the 
military). The Customs Guard is organized regionally.247 A national headquarters 
with a specialized Captaincy of Central Criminal Intelligence and Investigations co-
ordinates and supervises criminal investigations performed by the investigation of-
fices in regional offices. 
The Frontier Guard is an armed and uniformed organization with a number of ad-
ministrative tasks, including powers and duties to conduct criminal intelligence and 
investigations.248 It can investigate criminal cases of illegal entry into or stay in the 
country, smuggling of human beings, damage to frontier marks, and forgery of pass-
ports. The Frontier Guard operates under the direction of the Minister of the Interior 
and is directly headed by the National Commander of the Frontier Guard, who is a 
general of the Guard.249 It is organized along regional lines. Its national headquarters 
contains a specialized unit to deal with intelligence and criminal investigations, and 
similar units are found at regional headquarters. 
The Prosecution Service’s relationship to the Frontier Guard250 and Customs Guard251 
is similar to its relationship to the police.  All belong to the executive, and each func-
tions as an investigating authority. Prosecutors are entitled to monitor and supervise 
investigations by each agency, may assign investigations to either, instruct officers 
in their investigations, and review investigative documents from both. Prosecutors 
may also take over their investigations.252 If police authority overlaps with that of the 
Customs or Frontier Guard, the respective (county) Chief Prosecutor’s office decides 
which authority should proceed.253
4.6. Relations with the judiciary    
The Prosecution Service and the judiciary are entirely separate services, with sepa-
rate administrative structures and budgets. The judiciary is a self-governing body 
246 Act XIX of 2004: A Vám- és Pénzügyőrségről [On Customs Guard], Art. 1(1).    
247 24/2004 (IV.23) PM, Ordinance of the Minister of Finance On Execution of the Act XIX of 2004 On 
Customs Guard. 
248 Act XXXII of 1997 On Surveillance of the State Border and the Frontier Guard, Art. 43, 54.
249 Act XXXII of 1997 On Surveillance of the State Border and the Frontier Guard, Art. 24.
250 See 23/2003 (VI.24) BM-IM, Joint Ordinance of the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Justice 
Agreed to by the Prosecutor General On Detailed Regulation of Investigations and on Documenta-
tion of Acts of Investigation Otherwise than Protocols at Authorities under the Direction of the 
Minister of Interior. This Ordinance relates to both the Police and the Frontier Guard, as both are 
“under the direction of the Minister of Interior.”
251 17/2003 (VII.1) PM-IM, Joint Ordinance by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice 
Agreed to by the Prosecutor General: A pénzügyminiszter irányítása alá tartozó nyomozó hatóságok 
nyomozásának részletes szabályairól és a nyomozási cselekmények jegyzőkönyv helyett más módon 
való rögzítésénak szabályairól [On Detailed Regulation of Investigations and on Documentation of 
Acts of Investigation Otherwise than Protocols at Authorities under the Direction of the Minister 
of Finance]. 
252 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 29(4)(e).
253 Criminal Procedure Code, 1998, Art. 37(2).
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under the direction and supervision of the National Council of Justice Administra-
tion.254 The Prosecutor General is a voting member of the National Council, and thus 
has some influence on the administration and career paths of judges, although he is 
only one of many members.
The organizational independence of the judiciary and the Prosecution Service are 
similar; each institution is independent of the executive and legislative branches. The 
individual independence of judges and prosecutors is somewhat different. 
Individual judges are independent and subject only to the law; they may not be in-
structed or improperly influenced from outside in regard to their decision-making.255 
However, in matters concerning purely the organization of work (assignment of of-
fices, hours worked, etc.), rather than decision-making, judges may be instructed by 
the President of the Court.256  The president’s instructions in this regard are binding. 
In contrast, while the Prosecutor General is independent of the executive and the ju-
diciary, the Prosecution Service he heads is a hierarchical organization in which he plays 
a decisive role. There is no “governing body” with participation of outsiders to direct or 
control the Public Prosecution Service. All prosecutors may be instructed by their official 
superiors through the chain of command,257 even in core decisional matters.
The career paths of judges and prosecutors are separate but very similar. The eligibil-
ity requirements concerning education, training, practical skills, and character for 
membership in the two organizations are similar.258 There is practically no difference 
in salaries for judges and prosecutors of similar standing.259
The cities in which the majority of local courts and local prosecution offices can be 
found are small townships, with 15-25,000 inhabitants and one or two judges han-
dling criminal cases in local courts. At the local prosecution offices, there are also a 
254 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 50 (4); Act LXVI of 1997: A Mag-
yar Köztársaság bírósági szervezetéről és a bíróságok igazgatásáról [On Organization and Adminis-
tration of the Courts of Law], Art. 34, 35. Ex officio members of the National Council are the Chief 
Justice (the President of the Council), the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor General, the President 
of the National Bar Association and two Members of Parliament, delegated by the Standing Com-
mittees on Constitutional and Justice Administration and on Budgetary and Financial Matters. 
Further members of the National Council are nine judges, who are elected by delegates of the judi-
ciary. The Council also has a secretariat, see Act LXVI of 1997 On Organization and Administration 
of the Courts of Law, Art. 34(3).
255 Act XX of 1949 On Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 50(3); Act LXVI of 1997 On Or-
ganization and Administration of the Courts of Law, Art. 3.
256 Each Court of Law is administered by a President of the Court who is responsible for the legally 
correct and effective operation of the organizational unit. He/she must be a judge and is appointed 
to this position (and task) for 6 years by the National Council of Justice Administration. See Act 
LXVI of 1997 On Organization and Administration of the Courts of Law, Art. 61, 63–69, 70–72.
257 Act V of 1972 On Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic, Art. 6(1).
258 The eligibility requirements for judges are Hungarian citizenship, a clean record, the right to vote, 
university law degree, special legal examination, property declaration, one year practice as court 
secretary or its equivalent as specified.  See Act LXVII of 1997: A bírák jogállásáról és javadalm-
nazásáról [On Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges], Art. 3(1)(a)–(g). The requirements for 
prosecutors are the same, see Act LXXX On Service Relationships, Art. 14(1), (4), and (5).
259 Act LXVII of 1997 On Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges, Art. 101–120; Act LXXX On 
Service Relationships, Art. 46/A–50/E.
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limited number of prosecutors (2-3) dealing with oversight of investigation, super-
vision of cases, and first instance trial advocacy. The prosecutor’s office is usually 
located in the courthouse.
Prosecutors and judges may be graduates of the same university even if they were 
not in the same course of study, so they may know each other from law school or 
college. The Union of Hungarian Judges (Magyar Bírói Egyesület) and the National 
Association of Prosecutors (Országos Ügyészi Egyesület) are organized on the basis 
of profession; the Association of Hungarian Lawyers (Magyar Jogász Egylet) is orga-
nized on the basis of the legal profession as a whole.  Other scholarly societies, such 
as the Hungarian Society on Criminology, may have both judges and prosecutors as 
members. These associations organize professional meetings and social events. 
Prosecutors and judges also may follow similar career paths. They may serve at a lo-
cal court or a prosecution office in a small town until retirement; or they may spend 
some years at the lower levels and then apply to become judges or prosecutors at a 
higher level court or prosecutor’s office; or, after having served as judges or ordinary 
prosecutors at different levels, they may apply for a leading position (presidency of 
a court or head of a prosecution office). The duration of service may entitle a judge 
to apply for a leading position in the prosecution service, or vice versa; however, it is 
very rare for a judge to transfer to prosecution or a prosecutor to the judiciary.
V. Information Control
Information Control: There is no general right of public access to investigative infor-
mation. Detailed regulations exist concerning publication and processing of statistics 
and personal data that limit the Prosecution Service’s interactions with the media and 
the general public. The authority actually conducting the investigation (including the 
Prosecutorial Investigations Offices) decides which data may be made public and 
which kept confidential.260 Prosecutors and officers of other investigative authorities, 
of course, may not release information classified as “secret” or “top secret.”
Prosecutors supervising an investigation are not allowed to inform the public about 
the details of the investigation, the actual activity and results, or the plans of the 
investigative authority (e.g. the police or the Prosecutorial Investigations Office). 
The supervising prosecution office limits information issued in such instances to 
260 At the Police Academy, “secrecy of investigations” is a subject of study, and special procedures exist 
regarding conditions and procedure for classifying information as secret. See Act LXV of 1995: Az 
államtitokról és a szolgálati titokról [On State and Service Secrecy], especially Art. 3, 4 on defini-
tions and Art. 7–9 on the procedure of qualification. The overwhelming majority of data acquired 
in investigations does not fall within any category of official secrets, however, though as a matter 
of professional practice and discretion, information often is not disclosed, so as to maintain the 
integrity of investigations.
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the details of strictly prosecutorial activity, such as decisions on complaints against 
measures taken by the investigative authority, the laws involved in the case, and the 
reasoning behind the interpretation of these legal rules. 
Once charges are brought, the duty to inform the public is transferred to the courts. 
The prosecutor’s informational activity takes place in the courtroom in the form 
of public questions, comments, motions and speeches. Consequently, prosecutors 
have nothing to impart to the news media during the trial phase. The media may, 
of course, report on the prosecution office’s (or the responsible public prosecutor’s) 
public and official actions,261 but journalists may not be informed of its strategy, so 
they may report only on the prosecution’s supposed strategy.
Public Relations: Official spokesmen are attached to the Prosecutor General’s and 
the county Chief Prosecutors’ offices.262 They are public prosecutors charged with 
handling public relations and maintaining contact with the press. However, in gen-
eral the head of each individual prosecution office is entitled to speak publicly on its 
behalf. Often the particular prosecutor in charge of an individual case will be autho-
rized by the head of office to inform the general public about that case. The Chief 
Prosecutor is expected to be aware of the more important cases in his jurisdiction, 
regardless of which office they are processed by; consequently he—or the spokesman 
for his office—may provide information on the case. However, if the case is dealt with 
by a local office, the Chief Prosecutor or his spokesman may direct the media to the 
competent local office.263 A lower level office normally may not speak on behalf of a 
superior, and an ordinary prosecutor may not speak on behalf of the office. Officials 
are authorized to speak only within the framework of their responsibilities. Superiors 
at different levels are entitled to reserve some issues exclusively to themselves.264 The 
Prosecutor General and heads of offices determine the information policy. 
General Public and Media Opinion: The media has often been very critical of, even 
hostile to, the Prosecution Service, and in particular to some prosecutors, and to 
prosecutorial actions and decisions. This began in 2000, when the new Prosecutor 
General was elected by majority vote, without any attempt to find someone for the 
post who would also be acceptable to the opposition. 
Even before the 2002 elections, many cases were publicized suggesting that the gov-
erning majority, with the help of friendly businessmen, had obtained money illegally 
261 It is considered improper for a prosecutor to make unofficial statements or remarks, in private, 
concerning a case.
262 Regional Chief Prosecutors’ offices are not large, and the media is not particularly interested in 
them.  Therefore, public relations there may be dealt with by the normal staff (the Chief Prosecutor 
or prosecutor in charge of the case).
263 Public prosecutors are not eager to be interviewed by the media. They tend to believe that jour-
nalists are after “stories” rather than facts, and are therefore inclined to yield to fantasy instead of 
proof. Behind this attitude is the experience that journalists have a point of view of their own in 
regard to what the prosecution considers “proof,” and their views are not necessarily the same as 
those of the prosecutors.    
264 When the statistics on the previous year are ready, the Prosecutor General holds a press conference 
and provides an overview of prosecutorial performance, trends in crime, etc. Prior to this press 
conference, leaders of lower level prosecution offices may not provide such information, even if the 
respective data for their jurisdictions is available to them.
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and that the truth was not disclosed as a result of the Public Prosecutor’s passivity. 
However, these reports might have been politically motivated. In the general elections 
of 2002, the former opposition took over and pressure increased on the Prosecutor 
General and the Prosecution Service, because the parliamentary majority regularly 
provided material for the media by rejecting the Prosecutor General’s answers to 
interpellations.265 Since then, the media has been even more hostile to the Prosecutor 
General and the Prosecution Service.  
Prior to 2002, the opposition succeeded in initiating several investigations of acts 
it considered to be criminal, and accused the prosecutor of inactivity due to the 
lengthy investigations. When the former opposition took over the government, they 
continued to accuse the previous government of crimes while governing, and many 
contracts were dug up as evidence of embezzlement of public money. A number of 
criminal investigations were initiated by the police. A majority of these cases were 
dismissed by either the Public Prosecutor or the police following the Prosecutor’s 
instructions.266  
The majority of the press had criticized the previous government regarding the ad-
ministration of justice and the postponement of the 1997 judicial reform,267 and 
when representatives of the Association of Hungarian Judges, the National Union of 
Prosecutors and the Bar Association issued a statement voicing their concerns that 
the independence of the administration of justice was endangered, there was a strong 
response in the press.268 
Press coverage of cases with politically-tinged backgrounds has also caused tensions 
between the police and the Prosecution Service. Publications have presented an over-
view of cases with political backgrounds that were investigated by the police and—
though the police recommended bringing charges—dismissed by the Prosecution 
Office.269 Members of the Prosecution Service and the police gave statements anony-
mously and without authorization, so that distrust developed in the everyday rela-
tionships between some officers and prosecutors. Questionable incidents occurred 
265 The Prosecutor General requested a ruling from the Constitutional Court on the issue of interpella-
tions.   When the decision was made, see supra note 223, the Prosecutor General’s sixteenth answer 
to one of interpellations had just been rejected by Parliament. See AB-döntés Poltról, Heti Világgaz-
daság, February 2, 2004, at 12. See also Endre Babus, Polt Péter a célkeresztben, Heti Világgazdaság, 
June 22, 2002, at 82, 83.  
266 Megszüntetett Országimázsügy, Heti Világgazdaság, September 9, 2003, at 13.
267 Which resulted in adoption of the Act XLVI of 1997 On Organization and Administration of the 
Courts of Law and the Act LXVII of 1997 On Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges.
268 Vita az igazságszolgáltatás függetlenségéről – A hallgatás törvénye?, Heti Világgazdaság, January 5, 
2002, at 81, 82. One of the signatories, the President of the National Union of Prosecutors—for-
merly a well-known leading prosecutor in a local prosecution office—was relieved of his position 
by the Prosecutor General within 48 hours. The article referred to the fact that he had prosecuted 
a businessman who was famous for having financed the election campaign of the leading party in 
the coalition (the person in question was convicted of smuggling and sentenced to imprisonment, 
though he had fled overseas); it also referred to other cases in which people close to the coalition 
had been investigated by police with no success and still others in which people with ties to the 
coalition—or to the government itself—suddenly won. 
269 Zoltán Simon, Közpénzek, feljelentések, ügyészségi elutasítások, Népszava, July 23, 2003, at 8.
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that, in this hostile political atmosphere, could rarely be explained satisfactorily.270 
The media began to pose constitutional questions regarding the Public Prosecutor’s 
independence from the government and whether it might not be preferable to have 
a prosecution service directed and supervised by the Ministry of Justice.  They asked 
whether the Prosecutor General is a professional officer of the law or a politician.271 
Finally, suspicions were raised that the Prosecution Service was inclined to make il-
legal bargains with suspects, such as more favorable treatment in exchange for names 
and incriminating facts concerning political opponents of the party the Prosecutor 
General is considered to favor, although plea bargaining is not permitted under Hun-
garian law.272  
While reports on the old cases are still found in the media,273 there is now a new set 
of cases. As a result, representatives of the media are now overtly challenging the 
Prosecution Service’s competence and professionalism.274 
The supposed political bias of the Prosecutor General has remained an issue.275 It was 
thought that he would resign as a result of the overt lack of political trust, but this was 
ended by the ruling of the Constitutional Court that confirmed the Prosecution Ser-
vice’s independence from Parliament.276 It was also thought that he would be elected 
a judge of the Constitutional Court so that the government could get rid of him.277 
But the problem seems broader. The constitutional independence of some officers of 
the state, including but not limited to the Prosecutor General, has led to proposals 
to change the Constitution.278 These proposed changes have included a two-thirds 
majority to elect the Prosecutor General so as to enforce broader consensus among 
politicians and limited the Prosecutor General’s independence, and a procedure to 
remove the Prosecutor General for professional failings. There has also been a pro-
posal to limit the Prosecutor General’s duty to Parliament to answering questions, 
but not interpellations, which are more likely to expose him to political attacks that 
270 Ágnes Gyenis, Forduljon ügyészéhez, Heti Világgazdaság, October 25, 2003, at 7. It is reported that 
one of the suspects in a case under investigation by the police was suddenly taken to the Municipal 
Chief Prosecutor’s office, where he was interrogated by a prosecutor. The police were informed 
neither previously nor subsequently of the content of the statement, and the suspect was kept in 
the municipal jail instead of being returned to the police. The case had serious political implica-
tions. According to press reports, the Prosecution Office’s explanation of the measures was that the 
suspect had complained that there were insects in his cell at the police station.
271 Endre Babus, Ügyészség kontra Rendőrsé, Heti Világgazdaság, October 25, 2003, at 6–9.
272 Krisztina Ferenczi, Vádalkura készülhet Rejtő E. és az ügyészség, Magyar Hírlap, November 3, 2003, 
at 1.
273 Egy fantommal kevesebb, Népszabadság, November 6, 2003, at 1; A Schlett-ügy legvége, Heti Világ-
gazdaság, January 3, 2004, at 15.
274 The challenges stem in part from hostility created by a recent incident in which a journalist was 
prosecuted for supposedly disclosing a state secret in the course of reporting on possible corrupt 
practices. See Tamás Szalai �� Krisztina Ferenczi, Vádat emelt az ügyészség egyik munkatársunk 
ellen, Népszava, November 6, 2004, at front page; Kérdések az ügyészekhez, Népszava, December 
6, 2004, at 2. See also Tamás Bod, A Legfőbb Ügyészség kormánypárti politikust perel be, Magyar 
Narancs, January 27, 2005, at 16. 
275 Vázlat a legfőbb ügyész politikai szerepvállalásáról, Népszava, June 21, 2003, at 9. See also Attila 
Buják, Vége a vadászatnak, 168 óra, March 3, 2005, at 20. 
276 See supra note 223.
277 Endre Babus, Ajánlat a legfőbb ügyésznek, Heti Világgazdaság, December 14, 2002, at 107, 108.
278 Konfliktusok a ‘függetlenekkel,’ Világgazdaság, July 1, 2003, at 4.
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encourage politicized counterattacks. Because constitutional amendment requires a 
two-thirds majority, however, such change is unlikely. 
Although there is no evidence to show that the media or public opinion have improp-
erly influenced prosecutorial actions or decisions in recent years, there is a significant 
lack of confidence in the Public Prosecutor. Political opponents always try to involve 
the Public Prosecution Service in their fights.279 Although controversial prosecutions 
have taken place, the Prosecution Service has always rejected accusations of bias, 
and no one has presented reliable evidence of such bias. Questionable incidents have 
occurred, and one may always find circumstances that may be interpreted to sug-
gest possible bias to those inclined to believe the press; both sides of the notoriously 
divided Hungarian political spectrum always prefer to believe in improper influence 
on the part of the other side. However, this is not proof of prosecutorial bias—al-
though few on either side of the political spectrum would share this view. 
VI. Use of Statistics
The statistics on the following pages were generated especially for this report, using 
data provided by József Stauber, director of the Branch on Data-Processing and In-
formation at the Prosecutor General’s office from the databases of the ERÜBS280 and 
statistics from the Prosecutor General’s office on in-court prosecutorial activity.281  
279 Kampánybomba lehet a K&H-ügy, Népszabadság, February 2, 2005, at 3. The article refers to an 
embezzlement case relating to the K��H Bank that implicates well-known persons, including, alleg-
edly, politicians from both sides. No reliable information has so far appeared, but there are sugges-
tions based on hearsay, and currently a trial in this case is under way.
280 Egys�ges Rendőrs�gi �s Ügy�szs�gi Bűnügyi Statisztika [Uniform Police and Prosecutorial Statis-
tics on Crime]. See supra note 151.
281 These are the two systems run by the Prosecutor General’s office to collect and process data on 
cases dealt with by the Public Prosecution Service since the 1960s. The first collects data on offenses 
(time, place, manner and means of commission, legal qualification of the offense, etc.), offenders 
(gender, age, place of residence, motives, previous record, etc.) and particulars of the proceedings 
prior to commital by the investigating authority (regardless of whether the investigation is con-
ducted by the police, PIOs, Customs or Frontier Guards) and at the prosecution office (dismissal, 
suspension, or commital). The second deals with the particulars of in-court prosecutorial activity 
(motions, appeals, etc.) and court decisions.
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1994 8 390 21 327 1 753 56 679 19 657 6 456 5 232 119 494
1995 8 082 20 949 2 088 59 914 17 360 7 404 5 324 121 121
1996 7 509 19 431 2 579 63 513 13 511 10 671 5 012 122 226
1997 7 902 21 225 2 876 66 151 13 291 14 589 4 932 130 966
1998 7 978 22 330 2 545 68 811 13 603 19 556 5 260 140 083
1999 7 600 21 626 2 493 61 130 13 125 20 631 5 053 131 658
2000 7 309 21 514 2 850 53 744 12 255 20 475 4 713 122 860
2001 6 830 21 851 3 112 51 099 12 133 21 236 4 322 120 583
2002 7 267 23 419 3 360 47 612 13 777 21 512 4 938 121 885
2003 7 011 23 382 3 649 44 368 13 259 21 841 4 635 118 145
Year
Committed 
to Courts  Convicted Acquitted
number number number
1994 85 629 78 328 7 255
1995 85 867 79 406 6 461
1996 82 282 81 392 6 892
1997 89 279 82 098 7 181
1998 101 025 93 434 7 591
1999 106 161 97 753 8 408
2000 99 745 90 990 8 755
2001 105 203 97 033 6 989
2002 106 843 98 169 7 225
2003 101 458 93 699 7 759
2. Offenders, identified by authorities
3.  Comprehensive data
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Appendix
1) Legislative Acts and Resolutions by Parliament:
Act XX of 1949: A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [On Constitution of the Hungar-    
ian Republic] (as amended)
Act III of 1952: A polgári perrendtartásról [On Code of Civil Procedure]    
Act IV of 1959: A Magyar Köztársaság polgári törvénykönyve [On Civil Code] (as    
amended)
Act V of 1972: A Magyar Köztársaság ügyészségéről [On Public Prosecution Service    
of the Hungarian Republic] (as amended)
Act IV of 1978: A Magyar Köztársaság büntetőtörvénykönyve [On Penal Code]   
Act XXII of 1992: A munka törvénykönyve [On Code on Labor Relations]    
Act XI of 1987: A jogalkotásról [On Legislation]  
Act LXIII of 1992: A személyes adatok védelméről és a közérdekű adatok nyil-
vánosságáról [On Protection of Personal Data and on Publicity of Data of Public            
Interest]
Act XXXIV of 1994: A Magyar Köztársaság rendőrségéről [On Police]
Act LXXX of 1994: Az ügyészségi szolgálati viszonyrólés az ügyészségi adatkezelésről 
[On Service Relationships in the Public Prosecution Service and on Prosecuto-          
rial Data Handling] 
Act XXXII of 1997: A határőrizetről és a Határőrségről [On Surveillance of the State     
Border and the Frontier Guard]
Act XLVI of 1997: A Magyar Köztársaság bírósági szervezetéről és a bíróságok 
igazgatásáról [On Organization and Administration of the Courts of Law]        
Act LXVII of 1997: A bírák jogállásáról és javadalmnazásáról [On Legal Status and    
Remuneration of Judges]
Act XIX of 1998: A büntetőeljárásról [On Criminal Procedure Code]   
Act XIX of 2004: A Vám- és Pénzügyőrségről [On Customs Guard]  
Act XXXVIII of 1992: Az államháztartásról [On Public Finance]
Act IV of 1952: A házasságról, a családról és a gyámságról [On Marriage, Family, and 
Guardianship].
Act II of 1989: Az egyesülési jogról [On Freedom to Form Associations]
Act XLIV of 1992: A Munkavállalói Résztulajdonosi Programról [On Program of Em-
ployees’ Partial Ownership]
Act LV of 1993: A magyar állampolgárságról [On Hungarian Citizenship]
Act LIII of 1995: A környezet védelmének általános szabályairól [On General Rules of 
Environment Protection]
Act LXV of 1995: Az államtitokról és a szolgálati titokról [On State and Service Se-
crecy]
Act XXXIII of 1989: A pártok működéséről és gazdálkodásáról [On Operation and 
Economization of Parties]
Act IV of 1990: A lelkiismereti és vallásszabadságról, valamint az egyházakról [On 
Freedom of Conscience, Religion, and Churches]
Act CXLV of 1997: A cégnyilvántartásról, a cégnyilvánosságról és a cégbírósági eljárás-
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ról [On Registration and on Publicity of Trading Companies and on Registra-
tion Procedure at Courts]
Act LXIX of 1999: A szabálysértésekről [On Contraventions]
Act XLII of 1994: A helyi önkormányzati képviselők és polgármesterek választásáról 
szóló 1990. évi LXIV tv. Módosításáról [Amendment to the Constitution in Re-
gard to Local Self-Government]
Act VII of 2006: A Magyar Köztársaság Ügyészségéről szóló 1972. évi V. törvény és az 
ügyészségi szolgálati viszonyról szóló 199. évi LXXX.törvény módosításáról [On 
Modification of the Act V of 1972 on Public Prosecution Service of the Hungar-
ian Republic and Act LXXX On Service Relationships]
Resolution of Parliament 46/1994 (IX.3§) OGY: A Magyar ÍKöztársaság 
Országgyűlésének házszabályáról [On the Rules of Operation of the Houses of 
Parliament of the Hungarian Republic]
2) Ministerial Ordinances:
5/1991 (IV.4) IM, Ordinance of the Minister of Justice: A jogi szakvizsgáról [On Spe- 
cial Legal Examination]
15/1994 (VII.14) BM, Ordinance of the Minister of Interior: A rendőrség nyomozó 
hatóságainak hatásköréről és illetékességéről [On Competence and Jurisdiction    
of the Investigative Authorities of the Police]
23/2003 (VI.24) BM-IM, Joint Ordinance of the Minister of Interior and the Minister 
of Justice Agreed to by the Prosecutor General: A belügyminiszter irányítása alá 
tartozó nyomozó hatóságok nyomozásának részletes szabályairól és a nyomozási 
cselekmények jegyzőkönyv helyett más módon való rögzítésének szabályairól [On 
Detailed Regulation of Investigations and on Documentation of Acts of Investi-
gation Otherwise than Protocols at Authorities under the Direction of the Min-
ister of Interior]
17/2003 (VII.1) PM-IM, Joint Ordinance by the Minister of Finance and the Minister 
of Justice Agreed to by the Prosecutor General: A pénzügyminiszter irányítása 
alá tartozó nyomozó hatóságok nyomozásának részletes szabályairól és a nyo-
mozási cselekmények jegyzőkönyv helyett más módon való rögzítésénak sza-
bályairól [On Detailed Regulation of Investigations and on Documentation of         
Acts of Investigation Otherwise than Protocols at Authorities under the Direc-
tion of the Minister of Finance]
24/2004 (IV.23) PM, Ordinance of the Minister of Finance: A Vám- és Pénzügyőrségről 
szóló 200. évi XIX. törvény végrehajtásáról [On Execution of the Act XIX of       
2004 On Customs Guard]
3) General Instructions by the Prosecutor General
7/1996 (ÜK.7) LÜ, General Instruction by the Prosecutor General: Az ügyész magán-
jogi tevékenységéről [On the Civil Law Activity of the Prosecutor]       
11/2003 (ÜK.7) LÜ, General Instruction by the Prosecutor General: A vádelőkészítéssel, 
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a bűnügyi nyomozások törvényességi felügyeletével és a vádemeléssel összefüggő 
ügyészi feladatokról [On Prosecutorial Tasks Connected to Preparation of       
Charges, Inspection of Legality of Criminal Investigations and Commitment 
to Courts of Law]
12/2003, (Ü.K.7) LÜ, General Instruction by the Prosecutor General: A büntetőbí-
róságok előtti ügyészi tevékenységről [On the Prosecutorial Activity in Proceed-     
ings of Criminal Courts]
25/2003 (ÜK.12) LÜ, General Instruction by the Prosecutor General: A Magyar Köz-
társaság Ügyészsége szervezetéről és működéséről [On the Organization and Op-    
eration of the Public Prosecution Service of the Hungarian Republic]
Prosecutorial Accountability, 
Independence,  
and Effectiveness in Italy
Giuseppe Di Federico
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can 
choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the 
prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks he should get . . . 
In such a case, it is not a question of discovering the commission of 
a crime and then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a 
question of picking the man and then searching the law books, or 
putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him.1
U. S. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, 1940  
1 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 Journal of the American Judicature Society 
(1940), at 19. 
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I. General Issues
The most distinctive, unique features of the Italian public prosecution service are the 
following:
1.  Prosecutors and judges belong to the same corps, called the “magistracy.” That 
is, they are jointly recruited; they can move from one function to the other, even 
repeatedly; they have the same career ladder and salary; and they jointly elect a 
common Superior Council of the Magistracy (SCM), which decides in total inde-
pendence on all matters concerning their status, from recruitment to retirement.1
2.  Prosecutors enjoy the same all-encompassing guaranties of external indepen-
dence as do judges. No external agency (be it Parliament, the executive or the 
Minister of Justice) can issue instructions to the prosecution service or super-
vise its activities.
3.  Prosecutors, like judges, are de facto promoted not on the basis of an assess-
ment of their professional performance, but by seniority of service. True, the 
law provides that both public prosecutors and judges be subject to recurrent 
professional evaluation in the course of the 40-45 years of their service. How-
ever, the interpretation given to those laws by the SCM is so lax that, de facto, 
all prosecutors (and judges) reach the highest level of career and salary (short 
of very grave disciplinary sanctions or criminal penalties).
4.  Prosecutors, like judges, enjoy salaries and pensions considerably higher than 
those of other state employees; furthermore, neither the executive nor the legis-
lative powers have any influence with regard to their salary increases, which are 
determined periodically on the basis of a favorable automatic mechanism (no 
other category of public employees enjoys such an advantage). 
5.  Prosecutors, like judges, can be transferred from one office to another only if 
they so wish (transfers for disciplinary violations or incompatibility are decided 
by the SCM on the basis of judicial or semi-judicial procedures).
6.  Prosecutors enjoy ample guarantees of internal independence. True, they oper-
ate within offices that, formally, are hierarchically structured, but the law and 
regulations issued by the SCM provide quite strict limitations on the exercise of 
organizational or supervisory powers on the part of the heads of prosecutorial 
offices. Furthermore, each prosecutor can challenge before the SCM (often with 
success) any decision by the head of his office that he deems to be in violation of 
those laws and regulations or of his operational independence.
1 The term “magistrate” has different meanings in different countries. In Italy as well as in France, it 
is used to refer to both judges and public prosecutors, while in Spain the term is used to refer to a 
particular level in the career of judges. In the United Kingdom and the United States, it is used to 
indicate judges having specific judicial functions. 
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7.  A public prosecutor may, even on his or her own initiative, start and conduct a 
criminal investigation whenever he or she believes any citizen may have com-
mitted a crime.
8.  The criminal code provides that in conducting a criminal investigation, police 
should operate under the exclusive, binding direction of the public prosecutor 
in charge of the case.
9.  A constitutional provision requires public prosecutors to pursue all crimes (the 
so-called principle of compulsory criminal action).  Obviously, such an obliga-
tion is not factually attainable in any country, and the activities of prosecutors 
are de facto characterized by rather wide margins of discretion.  However, the 
fact that the constitutional provision of compulsory criminal action is never-
theless formally binding has at least two major consequences worth mentioning 
at the outset of our presentation: (a) the state has the obligation to pay for all 
the expenses that public prosecutors deem necessary for the conduct of their 
investigation, without limits; any limitation would be considered a violation of 
the Constitution; (b) prosecutors bear no responsibility for whatever criminal 
investigation or initiative they undertake, even if, months or years later, their 
initiative turns out to be clearly unfounded. In any case, they can successfully 
claim that the suspicion that a crime was committed compelled them to act.
In no other country with a consolidated democracy do public prosecutors exercise 
such ample powers, with equal independence and less accountability. It must be add-
ed that some aspects of the prosecution service described above have been harshly 
criticized on the grounds that they fail to provide adequate protection of civil rights 
in criminal proceedings and impede the efficient functioning of the criminal justice 
system. Indeed, between December 2005 and April 2006, a series of laws was enacted 
that partially modified some features of the prosecutorial system summarized above, 
though at the time of this writing (mid-May 2006) it seems extremely unlikely that 
those reforms will ever be applied, and in any case not in their current form. In the 
following, I shall therefore describe the prosecution service as it has operated so far. 
At the end of this paper, I will briefly describe the content of those reforms and indi-
cate the reasons that their fate is very much in doubt. 
The issues of independence, accountability, and effectiveness of public prosecution in 
Italy cannot be dealt with in total separation from the same issues concerning judges, 
since they are jointly recruited, they can move from one function to another, and 
they share a common career path. In the following pages, after a summary descrip-
tion of the formal structure and activities of the prosecution offices, I shall first deal 
with the relationships between independence, accountability, and effectiveness that 
are common to both prosecutors and judges. I shall then deal with issues that more 
specifically concern the prosecution service. In particular, I shall address:
▶ the role of the SCM,     
▶ the recruitment, professional evaluation and career of prosecutors and judges,         
▶ salaries, pensions, and economic bonuses of prosecutors and judges,        
▶ extra-judicial activities of prosecutors and judges and their political relevance,         
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▶ the role of the Ministry of Justice,      
▶ the constitutional principle of “compulsory criminal action” and its operative          
implications,
▶ the relationships between prosecution offices and the regulations concerning         
their internal organization,
▶ the functional relationship between prosecutors and judges.       
II. Formal Structure of the Public Prosecution Service  
and Some Basic Features of the Role of Prosecutors  
in Criminal Proceedings
The role and activities of the public prosecution service and its members are regu-
lated in very detailed form: in the Constitution, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
Criminal Code, the Statute of the Magistracy (ordinamento giudiziario), and other 
special laws and regulations. In the following, the norms referred to will be those most 
directly relevant for assessing its independence, accountability, and effectiveness.
As seen in Table 1, the structure of the prosecution service mirrors the general struc-
ture of the ordinary courts:  
▶ one prosecution office (   Procura Generale presso la Corte di Cassazione), func-
tionally connected to the Supreme Court of Cassation.2 It does not have any 
investigative function, nor does it have any supervisory function over the pros-
ecutors’ offices at lower levels of jurisdiction. 
▶ 26 prosecution offices (   Procure generali presso le Corti di appello) functionally 
connected to 26 courts of appeal.  The territorial jurisdiction of the courts of 
appeals is called “distretto.”
▶ 166 prosecution offices (   Procure della Repubblica), functionally connected to an 
equal number of tribunals (Tribunali), or courts of first instance. These pros-
ecution offices are also functionally connected to 848 courts of (very) limited 
criminal jurisdiction (giudici di pace); the territorial jurisdiction of a tribunal is 
called “circondario.”
▶ 29 juvenile prosecution offices (    Procure della Repubblica presso il Tribunale peri 
i minorenni), functionally connected to an equal number of juvenile courts.3
Both the Procure generali presso le Corti d’appello and the Procure della Repubblica 
vary considerably in size. The 166 Procure della Repubblica employ from 3 to 117 
2 The main task of the Supreme Court of Cassation is to review civil and criminal proceedings on points 
of law, with the aim of guaranteeing uniform interpretation of the law throughout the nation.
3 Juvenile courts handle criminal proceedings involving young people from 14 to 18 years old. Those 
under 14 cannot be charged for criminal offenses, regardless of their gravity.
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prosecutors. All of them have a chief prosecutor (procuratore capo). Those employ-
ing more than 10 prosecutors have from one to nine vice prosecutors (procuratori 
aggiunti). Prosecutors who do not have supervisory positions are called substitute 
prosecutors, or sostituto procuratore. The 26 Procure Generali presso le Corti d’Appello 
employ from 4 to 24 prosecutors. All of them have a chief prosecutor (Procuratore 
generale di Corte d’Appello) and 18 of them also have one vice prosecutor general 
(called “avvocato generale”). The Procura generale at the Court of Cassation consists 
of a Prosecutor General, a Prosecutor General adjunct (Procuratore generale aggi-
unto), 5 vice prosecutors general (called “avvocati generali”), and 65 prosecutors.  The 
prosecutors without supervisory function at both appellate and cassation level are 
called “sostituti procuratori generali.”
In 1991, a special prosecutorial structure was created to more efficiently coordinate 
the investigation and prosecution of Mafia crimes.4 At the national level, it consists of 
a National Anti-Mafia Directorate (Direzione nazionale Antimafia) operating within 
the premises of the Procura generale presso la Corte di Cassazione.  It is composed of 
a head prosecutor (Direttore nazionale antimafia) and 20 prosecutors (sostitui procu-
ratori antimafia).  There are also 26 district anti-Mafia units (Direzioni distrettuali an-
timafia) that have been created as special sections of the 26 Procure della Repubblica, 
connected to the 26 Tribunali located in the same cities as the 26 courts of appeal.
As of July 2005, the total number of career prosecutors assigned by law to the pros-
ecution offices at various levels of jurisdiction was 2,408. Of those positions, 227 were 
vacant due to various causes, such as delays in the recruitment process or temporary 
service in other state agencies requested by prosecutors themselves. The law addi-
tionally provides for 1,865 honorary prosecutors who serve at the lowest levels of 
jurisdiction.5 The number of magistrates serving as career judges is more than three 
times that of career prosecutors (7,053 provided for by law, with 637 vacancies).
The prosecution service has a monopoly on criminal investigation. Career prosecu-
tors perform investigative and forensic functions at both the first level of jurisdiction 
and the appellate level.  Honorary prosecutors do not perform investigative functions 
and as a rule perform forensic functions only in cases of minor criminal relevance. At 
the appellate level, it is relatively rare for an investigation to be repeated.  
At the first level of jurisdiction, prosecutors initiate investigations following reports 
from the police, citizens, and private and public agencies. They can begin investiga-
tions on their own whenever they themselves deem that a crime might have been 
committed.6 The police are bound to report “without delay” to the prosecution ser-
4 Decree-Law of Nov. 20, 1991, no.367.  A Decree-Law (decreto legge) is a quasi-legislative act issued 
by the Executive that is effective for 60 days after its issuance, but expires if not approved by Parlia-
ment within that period. A Legislative Decree (decreto legislativo) is a form of delegated legislation 
in which the executive issues regulations on the basis of instructions in a legge delega, or law, issued 
by Parliament.
5 These are appointed by the SCM for a three year term, renewable only once.
6 Codice di procedura penale [Code of Criminal Procedure] [hereinafter Code of Criminal Proce-
dure], Art. 330.
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vice all criminal violations of which they acquire knowledge.7 Special police units 
(polizia giudiziaria) are stationed near the prosecutors’ offices and conduct investiga-
tions under the close supervision of the prosecutor, who also decides, case by case, 
on the means of investigation to be used.   
The territorial jurisdiction of prosecutors in carrying out forensic activities is the 
same as that of the courts to which their offices are functionally connected. The scope 
of their territorial jurisdiction in conducting investigations, however, is unrestrict-
ed; that is, they may conduct investigations on the entire national territory and also 
abroad (obviously within the limits imposed by other countries). In Italy, prosecu-
tors can freely investigate elected members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies 
without prior authorization. If, however, on the basis of their findings, they deem it 
necessary to restrict the liberties of an elected representative (personal and house 
search, arrest, wiretapping etc.), parliamentary authorization is required.8
A special unit of the court of first instance, called a “judge of preliminary investi-
gations” (giudice per le indagini preliminari), has the specific task of ensuring that 
investigations are carried out in accordance with the law, and in particular of autho-
rizing all restrictions on personal freedoms of suspects, such as preventive detention 
(which may not exceed 6 years), house arrest, search, seizure, etc. The decisions of 
the giudice per le indagini preliminari to restrict a suspect’s personal freedoms can be 
appealed both to a special panel of three judges (tribunale del riesame) and directly 
to the Supreme Court of Cassation on matters of law.
Another special unit of the courts of first instance, called a “judge of preliminary 
hearing” (giudice dell’udienza prelininare), decides on prosecutors’ requests to ter-
minate a case or have it tried by the trial court. Due to the constitutional provision 
of compulsory criminal action, under no circumstances can prosecutors themselves 
decide to terminate a case. Both at the first level of jurisdiction and at the appellate 
level, prosecutors can appeal judicial decisions without restriction, be they acquit-
tal of the suspect or partial rejection of the sanctions requested by the prosecutors 
themselves.
7 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 347.
8 La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana [Constitution of the Italian Republic] [hereinafter Consti-
tution], Art. 68.
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Table 1
III. The Superior Council of the Magistracy (SCM)
In order to protect judicial independence, the Italian Constitution, enacted in 1948, 
provides that all decisions concerning prosecutors and judges, from recruitment to 
retirement (recruitment, promotions, role assignment, transfers, discipline, disability, 
etc.), are within the exclusive competence of a Council composed primarily of mag-
istrates (i.e., judges and prosecutors) elected by their colleagues. More specifically, it 
provides that two thirds of the members must be magistrates and that one third of the 
members be elected by Parliament from among law professors and lawyers with 15 
years of professional experience. It further provides that the SCM is presided over by 
 
Procura generale presso  
la Corte di Cassazione
General Public  
Prosecutor’s Office (1)
Direzione nazionale antiMafia
Anti-Mafia National Directorate (1)
Procure della Repubblica  
per i minorenni
Juvenile Public  
Prosecutors’ Offices (29)
Procure generali presso  
le Corti d’appello
General Public Prosecutor’s  
Offices at the Court of Appeal (26)
Giudici di pace
Justice of the Peace (848)
Court of limited jurisdiction 
in civil and criminal matters
Tribunali 
Tribunals  (166+222)
Court of general jurisdiction. 
Court of appeal on decisions 
by justices of the peace
Corti di Appello 
Courts of Appeal (26)
Appellate Court on civil,  
criminal, and juvenile matters 
Tribunali Minorenni 
Juvenile Courts (29)
Procure della Repubblica 
Public Prosecutors’ Offices (166) 
Direzioni  distrettuali antiMafia 
Anti-Mafia District Directorates
Corte Suprema di Cassazione 
Supreme Court of Cassation (1)
Court of last resort only on ques-
tions of law
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Table 1
III. The Superior Council of the Magistracy (SCM)
In order to protect judicial independence, the Italian Constitution, enacted in 1948, 
provides that all decisions concerning prosecutors and judges, from recruitment to 
retirement (recruitment, promotions, role assignment, transfers, discipline, disability, 
etc.), are within the exclusive competence of a Council composed primarily of mag-
istrates (i.e., judges and prosecutors) elected by their colleagues. More specifically, it 
provides that two thirds of the members must be magistrates and that one third of the 
members be elected by Parliament from among law professors and lawyers with 15 
years of professional experience. It further provides that the SCM is presided over by 
 
the President of the Republic—who rarely participates in meetings of the SCM—and 
includes among its members the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation and 
the Prosecutor General of Cassation. The elected members are renewed in toto every 
four years.9 In addition to the three ex officio members, there are currently eight 
members elected by Parliament and 16 members elected by prosecutors and judges. 
All decisions of the SCM are made in plenary session,10 with the exception of disci-
plinary judgments, for which a special section of the SCM is provided (sezione disci-
plinare). This section is composed of six members of the SCM elected by the plenary 
session—four representatives of the magistrates and two of Parliament. Decisions 
by the disciplinary section are too numerous to analyze here.11 Judgments on disci-
plinary violations for both judges and prosecutors are based on a norm worded in 
rather vague terms, which leaves ample room for discretion.12 Disciplinary sanctions 
include reprimand, censure, loss of seniority up to a maximum of two years, expul-
sion, or dismissal.
The SCM also organizes extensive programs of initial and continuing education for 
prosecutors and judges, but none exclusively reserved for prosecutors.13  
Since the first SCM was elected in 1959, it has progressively expanded its role far 
beyond the formal boundaries of judicial personnel management. This has generated 
recurring conflicts with the other branches of government, including the President 
of the Republic.14  In very general terms, the SCM operates on the assumption that 
9 The structure and functions of the SCM are regulated by Articles 104–107 of the Constitution.
10 Most of the decisions of the SCM on matters concerning the status of prosecutors (and judges) are 
taken subsequent to an advisory opinion formulated by the competent district council (consiglio 
giudiziario), i.e. the district of the court of appeals in which the prosecutor (or judge) works. There 
are 26 district councils, one for each court of appeals district.  Each council is presided over by the 
president of the court of appeals and composed of the Prosecutor General of the court and eight 
magistrates (prosecutors and judges) elected by their colleagues serving in the prosecutor’s offices 
and courts of the district.   
11 For an illustration of the activities of the disciplinary section, see G. Di Federico, Recruitment, Pro-
fessional Evaluation, Career and Discipline of Judges and Prosecutors in Italy, in Recruitment, pro-
fessional evaluation and career of judges and prosecutors in Europe: Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain (G. Di Federico ed., 2005), Research Papers 
IRSIG-CNR, at 151–153. The full text of this book is available on the website of the Research Insti-
tute on Judicial Systems of the Italian National Research Council, at www.irsig.cnr.it. 
12 The norm provides that magistrates are subject to disciplinary proceedings and sanctions when 
they “fail to accomplish their duties and conduct themselves, either in their office or outside, in a 
way that makes them unworthy  of the trust and consideration that a judge must enjoy, or when 
they jeopardize the prestige of the magistracy.” Royal Decree of May 1946, no.511, Art. 18.
13 Initial education lasts 18 months. For a description of its organization and contents, see Di Fed-
erico, supra note 11, at 137-38. Activities in the area of continuing education are intense. In the year 
2004, for example, 49 seminars were organized lasting two or three days each. Over 4,000 magis-
trates participated. Sixteen seminars were open to judges and prosecutors from other countries. 
None of the seminars was reserved exclusively to prosecutors. It would be contrary to the policies 
of the SCM to formally recognize and acknowledge the existence of a difference in the professional 
“culture” of the two components of the magistracy. 
14 For example, conflicts with the President of the Republic as president of the SCM took place in 
1968 and in 1985–1986 when President Saragat and President Cossiga, respectively, tried to pre-
vent the SCM from deciding on questions within the exclusive competence of Parliament or of the 
executive. In July 2005, an SCM decision to express, once again and at its own initiative, opinions 
and criticisms of the legislative initiatives of members of Parliament on matters pertaining to the 
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it is within its competence to define what judicial independence means, its operative 
implications, and how to protect it vis-à-vis the executive and the legislature, on the 
one hand, and with regard to work relations among and within the prosecutors’ of-
fices (and the courts), on the other.
The majority of SCM members are judges and prosecutors elected by their colleagues. 
In addition, the electoral system in use since 1968 makes the majority of the SCM 
extremely sensitive to magistrates’ group interests and eager to follow and imple-
ment the policies advocated by the powerful trade union of magistrates (Associazione 
Nazionale Magistrati Italiani), in particular those policies agreed upon by its various 
factions.15
Four of the policies jointly advocated by the various factions of the magistrate’s trade 
union since the 1960s and implemented in various ways by the majority of the SCM 
are relevant here. The implementation of those principles clearly emerges from a 
monitoring of the activities of the SCM in the last 40 years.
(a)  substantive professional evaluations for the judicial career of prosecutors (and 
judges) are considered, per se, a threat to judicial independence. Therefore, in 
interpreting laws regarding promotion, the SCM should use its discretionary 
powers to eliminate differences in its evaluations of prosecutors’ (and judges’) 
professional performances, except in cases of visible and grave violations of the 
prosecutor’s or judge’s duties.
(b)  the supervisory powers of the heads of prosecutors’ offices (and presidents of 
courts) should be limited and closely monitored by the SCM; conversely, the 
operational independence of individual prosecutors should be protected and 
encouraged;
(c)  the SCM has the right to protect the independence and image of impartiality of 
prosecutors and judges by issuing public reprimands of members of the execu-
tive, Parliament or other politicians whenever their initiatives, public statements or 
opinions are considered, by a majority of the SCM, to be offensive to magistrates. 
administration of justice provoked a firm reaction on the part of the presidents of the Senate and 
the Chamber of Deputies. But the reaction had no effect: the vice president of the SCM immediately 
wrote an official, public letter to the president of the Senate reaffirming the right of the SCM to 
express opinions on and criticize any legislative initiative concerning the administration of justice, 
be it of the executive or of members of Parliament. The progressive broadening of the powers of the 
SCM is paralleled by the expansion of its staff (now over 250 people). The French SCM has a staff 
of only 11. 
15 From 1959 to 1968, the higher ranks of the magistracy were greatly overrepresented and were 
elected only by their peers. The electoral system was changed in 1967, and since 1968 no higher 
ranking magistrate can be elected to the SCM without the electoral support of lower ranking mag-
istrates. No other Superior Council of the Magistracy in continental Europe (i.e. France, Spain, 
Portugal, etc.) has such a predominance of members elected by the magistrates, nor an electoral 
law that so motivates SCM members to represent the interests of the lower ranks of the judiciary. 
In order to fully appreciate this aspect and its implications for the actual workings of the SCM, one 
must also note that the overwhelming majority of members of the SCM (at present 16 out of 27) are 
magistrates elected to represent one of the four factions of the magistrates’ trade union. Indeed, in 
the last 30 years, all magistrates elected to the SCM had previously spent years as active and visible 
leaders both of the magistrates’ trade union and of one of its factions.  
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(d)  the SCM has the right to express opinions, criticisms, and suggestions, not only 
regarding any bill introduced into Parliament by the executive or by MPs, but 
also regarding any amendment introduced in the course of the Parliamentary 
debate on those bills.  
The consequences of (a) and (b) will be discussed below. With regard to the activities 
of the SCM indicated under (c), no law provides the SCM with the authority to issue 
such reprimands. It is not relevant here to discuss whether it is legitimate that, in a 
Parliamentary system, the SCM, presided over by the president of the Republic, can 
censure criticisms of the behavior of magistrates expressed by the Prime Minister or 
other members of the executive. It is, however, relevant to note that most of these 
reprimands were issued by the SCM in response to harsh criticisms by the Prime 
Minister and other ministers of criminal prosecution initiatives undertaken by pub-
lic prosecutors.
Such reprimands, widely publicized in the media, serve a dual function. They both 
advise the public that the Prime Minister or other powerful politicians are attempt-
ing to intimidate public prosecutors and reassure public prosecutors that the SCM, 
the organization that determines so many aspects of their future professional status, 
supports their initiatives and protects their “external independence.” On some oc-
casions, SCM solidarity with prosecutors goes beyond censures and is accompanied 
and reinforced by publicized visits to prosecutors’ offices by official delegations of 
SCM members.16
IV. Recruitment, Professional Evaluations, and Career of Prosecutors 
and Judges
A.  Recruitment and promotion of prosecutors and judges
As in other countries of continental Europe, in Italy the recruitment of career mag-
istrates takes place on the basis of public competitive examinations opened to law 
graduates of “good moral standing.” This way of recruiting judges and prosecutors 
is considered the best way to guarantee a non-partisan selection conducive to better 
protection of judicial independence.   
The SCM decides on the admission of candidates to the competitions and appoints 
the examining commissions, which are presided over by high ranking members of 
the judiciary and are composed, for the most part, of magistrates and some university 
16 The last decision of this nature dates to February 16, 2005. The reprimand regarded a minister’s 
criticism of some of the criminal initiatives of the chief prosecutor of Verona. The SCM delegation 
thereafter went to Verona to directly convey the solidarity and support of the SCM to all prosecu-
tors in that area.
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law professors. Previous professional experience is not required, nor is it in any way 
evaluated in the process of selection. Applicants for the entrance examinations are 
selected on the basis of their general institutional knowledge of several branches of 
the law, as verified by written and oral exams. In Italy, this is virtually the only system 
of recruitment of career magistrates.17 The great majority of successful candidates 
enter the competition between the ages of 25 and 27.   
This model of selection—in Italy as well as in other continental European coun-
tries—is based on the assumption that the magistrates thus recruited will develop 
their professional competence and be culturally socialized within the judicial struc-
ture where they are expected to remain, and indeed usually do remain, for the rest of 
their working lives, ascending a career ladder whose steps are based on evaluations 
that take seniority and merit into account in various ways (as we shall see, in Italy this 
has been substantially modified). This model of recruitment and career is basically 
the same as that adopted for the higher ranks of national ministerial bureaucracies. 
For this reason, the judiciaries of continental Europe are usually called “bureaucratic 
judiciaries.”18 
In Italy, as well as in other continental European countries, young law graduates 
without previous professional experience are not recruited to fill specific vacancies in 
specific prosecutorial offices (or courts). Rather, they are recruited from time to time 
to fill all vacancies that have meanwhile occurred in the entire corps of the magis-
tracy. Only after recruitment and initial training does the SCM assign them to spe-
cific prosecutors’ offices (or courts) of first instance to fill vacancies. Thereafter, they 
may ask to be transferred from one court or prosecutor’s office to another and, when 
promoted, be assigned to fill still other vacancies at the higher levels of jurisdiction. 
Recurrent evaluations of prosecutors and judges during the course of their long ser-
vice is a basic organizational feature of the judicial systems of continental Europe 
that recruit from among law graduates with no previous professional experience.19 
These evaluations serve a variety of functions: first, to verify that the young magis-
trates have actually acquired the necessary professional competence, and thereafter 
to choose the most qualified among them to fill vacancies at the higher levels of 
jurisdiction. Last but not least, such evaluations ensure that magistrates maintain 
their professional qualifications throughout their many years of service (in Italy, 40-
45 years) and until retirement (the compulsory retirement age in Italy was recently 
raised to 75).
17 The only, extremely limited, exception is the appointment for “exceptional merits” of university law 
professors and lawyers with 15 years of professional experience as judges of the Supreme Court of 
Cassation. At present, only six out of 375 judges of the Court of Cassation were appointed in this 
way. In France, for example, around 20 percent of career magistrates are recruited from the legal 
or paralegal professions. See A. Mestitz, Selezione e formazione dei magistrati e degli avvocati in 
Francia (1990), at 208–209. 
18 For an illustration of the characteristics of bureaucratic judiciaries, see G. Di Federico,             The Italian 
Judicial Profession and Its Bureaucratic Setting, 1 Juridical Review (1976), at 40.
19 See Di Federico,  supra note 11. 
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Traditionally, and until the mid-1960s, in Italy seven evaluations of professional per-
formance occurred along the career ladder, but only two were highly competitive and 
selective: one to become a magistrate at the appellate level, and another at the cas-
sation level. Professional performance was evaluated by commissions composed of 
higher ranking magistrates on the basis of the written work of the candidates (opin-
ions, pleadings, etc.)20 The three subsequent steps on the career ladder (representing 
a mere 1.18% of all positions available in the entire judicial structure, see table 2, 
ranks 5, 6, and 7) would as a rule be acquired, short of disability or maximum age 
retirement, on the basis of seniority in the rank of magistrate of cassation.21
Our research data show that prior to the mid-1960s, approximately 55% of magis-
trates would terminate their career at the age of 70 as appellate magistrates, and that 
a good number of those would reach that level of career only during the very last 
years before retirement. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, this career system was 
widely criticized by a large majority of magistrates (above all by those who still had 
to go through the very selective competitive steps) on the grounds that professional 
evaluations based on written opinions  and placed in the hands of a limited number 
of older, higher ranking magistrates (magistrati di cassazione) were hindering inter-
nal judicial independence and inducing, among lower ranking magistrates, a wide-
spread conformity with the judicial interpretations of a “conservative” judicial elite 
that had entered the magistracy in the 1920s and 1930s during the fascist regime.22 
B. Promotion without evaluation 
The laws that had regulated the system of promotion until the mid-1960s were radi-
cally changed by Parliament between 1966 and 1973, under pressure from the SCM 
and the powerful Association of Magistrates and with the support of the leftist par-
ties (most notably the numerous MPs from the Italian Communist Party). The new 
laws continued to require evaluation of professional performance for all the steps of 
the existing career, but left the SCM wide discretion in interpreting the law. By then 
the system for the election of the magistrates in the SCM had already been changed 
as described above, making two thirds of the Council extremely responsive to the 
expectations of their colleagues. The result has been that the new laws regulating 
the career of magistrates have been interpreted by the SCM with such extreme self-
complacency as to amount to a de facto refusal to enforce any form of professional 
evaluation whatsoever. Thus promotions “for judicial merit” to the highest ranks are 
20 Di Federico, supra note 18.
21 In bureaucratic judiciaries, organizational roles are ordered according to a hierarchy of ranks to 
which differing degrees of material and psychological gratification are attached. There is a very 
specific relationship between the hierarchy of ranks and the jurisdictional hierarchy of courts, in 
the sense that judges promoted to a higher rank must be assigned to courts that are higher on the 
jurisdictional ladder, or else be assigned to lower jurisdictional courts and function only in a super-
visory capacity (for example, as president of a lower court). This system still exists in countries of 
western continental Europe (like France, Spain, Portugal, Germany), but, as we shall see, has been 
substantially altered in Italy.
22 G. Freddi, Tensioni e conflitto nella magistratura (1978), at 115–147.
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granted even to those magistrates who take prolonged leaves of absence to perform 
other activities in the executive or legislative branches of government.23 While in oth-
er countries of continental Europe, heads of prosecutors’ offices (and of courts) still 
play a crucial role in the assessment and evaluation of professional performance,24 
in Italy, in conformity with the policy advocated by the magistrates’ trade union and 
by its representatives in the SCM, their role in professional evaluations has lost its 
original relevance.25  
At present, and for the past 30 years, the evaluation of candidates with the minimum 
seniority requirements to compete for promotion to different levels of the judicial hi-
erarchy is no longer based either on written or oral exams or on an evaluation of their 
written judicial work, but on a “global” assessment of their judicial performance, as 
determined by the SCM.26 In the absence of serious disciplinary or criminal viola-
tions, all candidates with the required seniority are promoted. Furthermore, those 
promoted in excess of the existing vacancies acquire all the economic and symbolic 
advantages of the new rank, while remaining pro tempore to exercise the lower ju-
dicial functions of their previous rank.27 In fact, most will never acquire the higher 
judicial position formally connected with their new career rank. In other words, 
simply by passing an entrance examination that tests his or her general knowledge 
of various branches of the law, the young law graduate can rest pretty much assured 
that the mere passage of time will lead him or her, in 28 years’ time and with no 
further checks of professional qualifications, to reach the peak of the judicial ca-
reer, which until the mid-1960s was reserved for only a little over 1percent of mag-
istrates. While only some 100 magistrates reached the upper level of the judicial 
service until the mid-1960s (and all occupied the high judicial positions formally 
connected to their high career rank), now there are consistently more than 1,500 
(and, of course, most still exercise their judicial functions at the lower levels of the 
jurisdictional ladder).28  
The changes introduced in the career system brought about quite a few relevant mod-
ifications in the personnel management system of the magistrates (prosecutors and 
judges).  Below we will summarize only those that are most relevant in discussing 
judicial independence: that is, the greater discretion of the SCM in decisions that 
deeply affect the expectations of prosecutors and judges; the economic status of mag-
istrates; and the surge in extra-judicial activities.
23 See subsection E below; see also infra note 33.
24 See Di Federico, supra note 11.
25 Id. at 137–142.
26 Id.
27 Thus one of the basic traditional characteristics of western continental judicial bureaucracies, sum-
marized in note 21 supra, has been radically changed in Italy.
28 As of September 2002, for example, the percentage of middle and high ranking magistrates who 
exercised the judicial function formally corresponding to their career rank was relatively low, com-
prising only 5.5 percent (89 out of 1,560) of appellate magistrates, 1.6 percent (24 out of 1,533) of 
the second highest rank (magistrati di cassazione), and 7.9 percent (90 out of 1,137) of the highest 
career rank (magistrati di cassazione con funzioni direttive superiori).  
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C. Transfer of prosecutors
One means of protecting judicial independence is forbidding transfer of judges from 
one office to another without their consent.29 Unlike other countries, in Italy the con-
stitutional principle of “non-transferability”30 applies not only to judges, but also to 
prosecutors. Furthermore, in the last 30 years it has acquired a far broader scope.
As already indicated, promotion to higher rank no longer entails—and de facto ex-
cludes—that magistrates be assigned judicial functions different from those they ex-
ercised prior to their promotion. Indeed, they continue to exercise their previous 
functions. When vacancies in judicial positions correspond to their new career rank, 
they may apply for them, if they so wish. Thus the principle of non-transferability 
now covers magistrates’ entire working life, starting from their first assignment at 
the end of their initial training. The choice of magistrates to fill vacancies in judicial 
positions reserved for the higher ranks of the service is always restricted to those 
who voluntarily apply for them. In other words, ex officio assignment of judges and 
prosecutors to fill existing vacancies is de facto possible only for the first assignment 
of judicial roles to newly recruited magistrates. Anyone fully satisfied with his first 
assignment, after initial training, can remain in that position for the next 45 years, 
while being promoted step by step to the highest rank.
D. Independence and the greater discretion of the SCM in decisions affecting 
expectations of prosecutors and judges
 Detailed evaluations of professional performance, once repeatedly made during the 
course of an entire career, normally provide specific information on the professional 
and personal characteristics of magistrates that greatly restrict the use of discretion in 
all decisions concerning not only promotions, but also transfers and role assignment.   
The de facto abolition of substantive professional evaluations (which are now all 
written in laudatory terms) has increased the discretion of the SCM in deciding on 
transfers and role assignments.  Such decisions are, as a rule, emotionally charged 
for magistrates, who may compete to be assigned to a more desirable location or 
important office (such as the position of head of a prosecutor’s office in a larger city). 
Research clearly shows that, in the course of the past 30 years, Italian magistrates 
have realized the need to cultivate relationships with decision-makers in the SCM if 
they are to achieve their aspirations in such matters. A reading of records of plenary 
sessions of the SCM reveals the conflicts that often take place among representatives 
of various factions of the magistrates’ trade union in support of their voters, particu-
larly regarding assignments to important and desirable positions.31 For this reason, 
29 Constitution, Art. 107.
30 Id.
31 G. Di Federico,   Lottizzazioni correntizie e politicizzazione del SCM: quali rimedi, 2 Quaderni Co-
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
314
almost all magistrates become members of the trade union and one of its factions. 
The strong links between the policies of the magistrates’ trade union and those of 
the magistrates’ representatives on the SCM causes a high level of conformity among 
magistrates on those policies that are agreed upon by all four of its factions. The few 
magistrates who, in word or deed, have ignored the shared policy values of their trade 
union have unfailingly seen their requests and wishes disregarded by the SCM.32
E.  Independence and extrajudicial activities 
In countries of continental Europe with “bureaucratic judiciaries,” members of the 
judicial corps (prosecutors and judges in our case) are allowed, like other state em-
ployees, to engage in a variety of non-judicial activities on a part-time or full-time 
basis: in other agencies of national and local government, in European or interna-
tional organizations, as elected members of national or local legislative assemblies, 
etc. Often the extrajudicial activities carry with them additional sources of income. 
The acquisition of favors and positions from agents external to the judiciary that 
provide financial or other benefits poses, per se, a problem for judicial independence 
and the very image of judicial impartiality. 
The extrajudicial activities of prosecutors and judges increased in number, kind, and 
duration starting in 1970, when it became clear that the SCM would promote to the 
top ranks even members of the magistracy who had not performed judicial functions 
for decades.33 Extrajudicial activities performed on a full-time or part-time basis by 
Italian magistrates in the last 30 years number in the tens of thousands. In recent de-
cades, one type of activity in particular has led to a dangerous blurring of the bound-
aries between the judiciary and the political class: the extrajudicial engagement of 
members of the judiciary in active partisan politics.  
stituzionali, (1990), at 69–87. The reader may wonder what role is played in the decision making            
processes of the SCM by the members elected by Parliament (one third of the Council). When the 
representatives of the four factions of the magistrates’ trade union disagree, this contingent usually 
acts in support of one or more of those factions. Their position as decision makers is weak not only 
because they are a relatively small minority, but also because they often have different orientations, 
having been elected by Parliament on the basis of an agreement between the political majority and 
minority at the time of their election.  
32 For an example, see Section VII below; for the literature on the subject, see note 74 infra.
33 Some of the promotions granted by the SCM in the early 1970s eliminated any doubt or residual 
restraint that the magistrates might have entertained on the matter and vividly showed them the 
advantages of seeking prestigious and lucrative extrajudicial appointments. Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, 
later president of the Republic, and Brunetto Bucciarelli Ducci were among the very few magis-
trates who had until then been elected to Parliament. They had been elected in 1946 and 1948 
respectively as young magistrates at the beginning of their judicial careers. After that, they were 
always reelected as MPs. Until the early 1970s, they had not progressed in their judicial careers. In 
1973, they were promoted retroactively by the SCM, step by step, to the top of the judicial hierarchy 
“for judicial merit,” without having performed judicial functions for a single day in more than 25 
years. The material and immaterial benefits that magistrates acquire by becoming members of Par-
liament are substantial (for example, they receive a double pension; until 1991, they also received 
both the salary of members of Parliament and that of magistrates).
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In the elections of 1994 and 1996, over 50 magistrates asked for and obtained from 
the SCM a leave of absence to run as candidates for various political parties. Twenty-
two of these were actually elected in 1994, and 27 in 1996. In the last 10 years, two 
magistrates have been elected presidents of regions; in the same period, there have 
been several magistrate ministers, magistrate undersecretaries of state, mayors of 
small and large cities, magistrates elected to regional and municipal assemblies, and 
magistrates in charge of various branches of local government. In the early 1990s, 
a member of the magistracy was elected national secretary of a political party (the 
Partito Social Democratico).  
The confusion of the boundaries between the magistracy and the political class is not 
fully revealed merely by considering the relatively large number of magistrates active 
in party politics. First of all, the number of magistrates who maintain relationships 
with various political parties in order to obtain these much-sought after positions is 
far higher than those who are successful. Second, a good many extrajudicial posi-
tions of lesser importance (heads of cabinets of ministries and undersecretaries of 
state, high level executive posts in the various ministries, heads of the secretarial 
units of ministers and undersecretaries, members of the legislative departments of 
various ministries, and consultants to parliamentary commissions) are obtained 
through the more or less direct sponsorship of the various political parties. They 
often become—or are in any case sought after and perceived by magistrates as—steps 
toward the acquisition of the political credit and party support needed to attain even 
more desirable extrajudicial positions. 
Another worrisome aspect of the relationship between judicial independence and 
the appointment or election of public prosecutors (and judges) to an active role in 
party politics is that, at the end of their mandates, prosecutors (and judges) usually 
return to their previous judicial activities and may even find themselves in a position 
to prosecute or judge politicians of a political orientation opposed to that of the po-
litical party they had previously represented.34
Why are political parties and political leaders in Italy, more so than in other coun-
tries, interested in granting members of the judiciary positions of political represen-
tation or other desirable positions that they can supply? A famous member of the 
judiciary, Adolfo Beria d’Argentine, twice head of the magistrates’ trade union, gave 
one revealing answer. Commenting on the first election in which a substantial num-
ber of prosecutors and judges were elected to Parliament, he said, “The real explana-
tion is that political parties are convinced, more or less correctly, that the magistracy 
is a seat of real, heavy, often brutal power . . .  and that therefore it is convenient to 
have personalized channels of communication with it.”35  
34 See, e.g., G. Di Federico, Se il giudice è un ex onorevole del PCI, Il Resto del Carlino, Nov. 28, 
1999; G. Di Federico, Quel giudice molto Onorato e molto PCI, Il Resto del Carlino, Dec. 6, 
1999. 
35 A. Beria d’Argentine,   Perchè a tanti magiostrati non piace il ‘giudice candidato, Corriere della 
Sera, Apr. 28, 1979, at 1. 
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F. Independence, salaries, pensions, and retirement bonuses
One of the most obvious consequences of a career system in which all prosecutors 
(and judges) who remain in service until retirement age reach the highest career rank 
is that all of them also reach the highest salary level.36 Through a complex combina-
tion of lawsuits, judicial decisions, and powerful pressures on Parliament, in 1984 
prosecutors and judges obtained salaries, pensions, and retirement bonuses that are 
by far the highest in public service. Also, increases in their salaries, pensions, and 
substantial retirement bonuses are based on an automatic mechanism that periodi-
cally increases to their advantage the difference between their economic status and 
that of other sectors of the public service.37
These measures were, once again, requested, justified, and obtained as a means to 
further guarantee the independence of judges and prosecutors from possible, even 
indirect, pressures from the legislative and/or executive branches of government. The 
system of promotion de facto based on seniority of service, the privileged level of 
salaries, retirement benefits, and pensions, and the automatic mechanisms for future 
pay increases were also advocated to foster among magistrates a sense of present 
and future security that is thought to be a necessary prerequisite for an independent 
and detached exercise of the prosecutorial and judicial functions (one of the conse-
quences is that the number of participants in the recruitment process to enter the 
judiciary has consistently increased in recent decades, and is by far the highest in 
Europe).38 Table 2 provides basic data on the gross and net salaries of magistrates, 
listed by career rank and seniority
36 With the sole exception of the four judicial positions indicated in Table 2, ranks 5 and 6. 
37 G. Di Federico,   Costi e implicazioni istituzionali dei recenti provvedimenti giurisdizionali e legislativi        
in materia di retribuzioni e pensioni dei magistrati, in 2 Rivista trimestrale di diritto pu��lico 
(1985), at 331–373; F. Zannotti, La magistratura, un gruppo di pressione istituzionale. L’autodetermi-
nazione delle retribuzioni (1989).
38 In recent decades, the number of applicants for the entrance examination to the magistracy has 
increased enormously.  There are usually more than 10,000 applicants (in the competition issued in 
2005, this reached a peak of 41,536) and more than 5,000 of them actually show up for the written 
examinations (the number of positions available is, on average, around 200-300 for each competi-
tion). Our interviews with newly recruited magistrates show that the increase in the number of 
candidates is due in large part to the appeal of economic and career privileges. Our more recent 
data on this matter has not yet been published. For an analysis of the motivations of newly recruited         
magistrates in the 1970s and 1980s, see A. Negrini, Origini territoriali e motivazioni di scelta della 
carriera, in Caratteristiche socio-culturali della magistratura: le tendenze degli ul-
timi 20 anni (G. Di Federico ed., 1989), at 58 (in particular Table 17).   
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TABLE 2 
Gross and net salary by seniority of service and career rank*
Rank Seniority
Gross monthly
salary (for  
13 months**)
Net monthly 
salary (for 
13 months**)
Net yearly 
salary for  
13 months**)
1. Uditore
initial 2,695.18 1,791.61 23,290.93
6 months 2,949.30 1,936.94 25,18022
18 months 3,404.27 2,208.37 28,708.81
2. Magistrato  
di Tribunale
2 years 4,153.23 2,600.24 33,803.12
4 years 4,300.69 2,674.26 34,765.38
5 years 5,299.43 3,206.51 41,684.63
9 years 5,983.24 3,572.07 46,436.91
3. Magistrato  
di Appello
13 years 6,951.10 4,070.07 52,910.91
20 years 7,679.99 4,421.69 57,481.97
4. Magistrato  
di Cassazione
21 years 8,754.85 4,963.16 64,521.08
28 years 9,562.15 5,328.52 69,270.76
5. Magistrato di  
Cassazione con funzioni 
direttive superiori
29 years 10,663.94 5,860.60 76,187.80
final 13,022.94 6,996.90 90,959.70
6. Presidente Aggiunto di 
Cassazione; Procuratore 
generale di Cassazione; 
PresidenteTSAP
 Initial salary 15,192.83 8,037.03 104,481.39
7. Primo Presidente  
Corte di Cassazione  Initial salary 15,318.96 8,104.10 105,353.30
*          As of 2003.
**        Every year, in the month of December, all public servants in Italy receive a double salary.
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The level of pensions and retirement bonuses39 is related not only to years of service 
in the judiciary, but also to a series of other factors that allow for some variation from 
case to case, relevant principally with respect to the amount of retirement bonuses. 
The actual monthly pension of those who left the judiciary at age 70 or older in 2002 
was over 6,000 euros for 13 months.40 In the same period, the average amount of net 
retirement bonuses was 330,226 euros.41 In only 3 cases was the net retirement bonus 
slightly lower than 300,000 euros. Otherwise it was well over that amount, up to a 
maximum of 372,140 euros. The net retirement bonus for the 5 top positions (those 
indicated in Table 2, ranks 5 and 6) is well over 400,000 euros.
V.  The Ministry of Justice and Prosecutorial Independence
In many countries, the role of the Minister of Justice is often seen as an actual or 
potential threat to an independent prosecution service. One cannot entertain such 
suspicions with regard to Italy.42
As in other parliamentary systems, the Minister of Justice is formally in charge of 
promoting and implementing the policies of the executive with regard to the justice 
system. The Italian Constitution explicitly assigns the Minister of Justice two tasks: 
(a) the “organization and functioning of the services of the justice system”43 and (b) 
the prerogative of initiating disciplinary proceedings against magistrates.44 He or she 
also has the responsibility for recruiting most of the non-judicial personnel of the 
prosecutorial offices and the courts (once assigned to a prosecutors’ office or to a 
court, the non-judicial personnel are hierarchically subordinate only to the magis-
trates heading those offices). Here we shall summarize the actual powers of the Min-
ister with reference to (a) his role in preparing and managing the budget of the justice 
system (b) his role in the management of the judicial corps (prosecutors and judges).
Budgetary relationship: For decades the Ministry of Justice, the executive and Parlia-
ment have been criticized by the magistrates because, in their view, the percentage 
39 The expression “retirement bonus” is used here to indicate the amount of money magistrates re-
ceive when they retire. 
40 In December of each year, all public servants in Italy receive a double salary, be they in service or 
retired.
41 It was impossible to acquire all the data concerning the exit bonuses of all magistrates who retired 
in 2002 (the Ministry of Justice does not have such information). However, the sample we have is 
very large, encompassing around half of magistrates who retired in that period, and can certainly 
be considered representative of the whole.   
42 G. Di Federico, Independence and accountability of the judiciary in Italy: the experience of a former 
transitional country in a comparative perspective, in Judicial Integrity (A. Sajo ed., 2004), at 
198–200 (the limited powers of the Italian Minister of Justice are highlighted in a comparison with 
those of his French colleague).
43 Constitution, Art. 110.
44 Constitution, Art. 107.
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of national financial resources earmarked for the administration of justice was insuf-
ficient to sustain the proper and efficient performance of the justice system. How-
ever, Ministers of Justice have never been seriously accused of using their budgetary 
powers to influence the activities of prosecutors (and judges) or to penalize criminal 
investigations or initiatives contrary to their political interests or that they for any 
reason disliked. 
Since 2001, the state budget for the judiciary has progressively increased from 6.06 
billion euros in 2001 to 7.72 billion euros in 2004, an increase of 27.5 percent in four 
years. In 2004, the allocation for the justice system was equivalent to 1.71 percent 
of the national budget.45 The Minister of Justice does not have any financial control 
or power of supervision whatsoever over the expenses that prosecutors personally 
deem necessary for their criminal investigations (including wiretapping, expertise 
of any kind, travel expenses both national and international, recovery of ships or 
aircraft wrecks in deep sea, or anything else). The only task of the Minister of Justice 
is to procure the money ex post facto to cover those costs.46  
Surprisingly, this peculiar aspect of the Italian prosecution service has not been the 
object of public debate or criticism. There is, it is true, repeated complaint about the 
very widespread use of wiretapping. This is not so much a response to its exceedingly 
high cost47 as a reaction to the illegal, though relatively frequent, release of transcripts 
of its content, especially when politicians or other well known citizens are involved. 
In the area of judicial personnel management, the law provides that the Minister 
of Justice:
(a) can participate in plenary sessions of the SCM without the right to vote  (the law 
provides that he cannot even be present when votes on the status of prosecutors and 
judges take place).48  He hardly ever participates in those plenary sessions;
(b) can communicate to the SCM his opinions and proposals on any deliberations 
included in the agenda of the plenary sessions. He does so hardly ever, if at all (for 
example, this was not done at all in the last three years);
(c) participates with limited powers in the decisional processes for the appointment 
of heads of prosecutorial offices and courts. One of the committees of the SCM 
(called “commissione per il concerto”) chooses one or more names of magistrates it 
considers suited to those positions, and thereafter meets with the Minister to hear his 
45 For more details, see the website of the Ministry of Justice, at www.giustizia.it/uffici/inaug_ag/ag-
2004minstro.htm.
46 Since 2002, orders of payment issued by prosecutors are paid by the Post Office, which serves as a 
bank. The Ministry periodically reimburses the Post Office.
47 The Ministry of Justice declares that in 2005, the cost of wiretapping was 307,346,676 euros (385 
million dollars).  Actually the cost is far higher, as that figure does not include the cost of the per-
sonnel that operates wiretapping  equipment and transcribes recorded conversations (i.e. police 
officers and clerks). Newspapers have published articles maintaining that, in absolute terms, the 
number of cases of wiretapping is far higher in Italy than in any other democratic country. See, e.g., 
Le intercettazioni dei pm, Li�ero, Aug. 12, 2003. We have no data to confirm that assertion.
48 Law of Mar. 24, 1958, no.195, Art. 16.
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opinion. The Minister, however, does not have veto power on the names submitted to 
his consideration, and even without his or her agreement, the names chosen by the 
committee are submitted for final decision to the plenary session of the SCM;  
(d) can initiate disciplinary proceeding against magistrates who, in his opinion, vio-
late disciplinary norms. Disciplinary action can also be initiated by the Prosecutor 
General at the Court of Cassation, who is also in charge of all prosecutorial activities 
before the disciplinary section of the SCM.49  Before initiating disciplinary action, the 
Minister of Justice can order a ministerial investigation, conducted by magistrates 
serving in a special ministerial unit called “Ispettorato.” The Minister of Justice has 
on occasion been accused by the magistrates’ trade union, and sometimes by the 
SCM, either of using ministerial investigations illegally or of initiating disciplinary 
proceedings against prosecutors in an attempt to intimidate them. In some cases, 
prosecutors have even been successful in impeding inspections ordered by the Min-
ister to determine whether a disciplinary violation had been committed.50 
The Minister of Justice, like other ministers, depends for his initiatives and activities on 
his ministerial staff. One cannot fully appreciate the constraints under which the Min-
ister of Justice operates without taking into account the fact that all high level execu-
tive positions in the Ministry of Justice and almost all intermediate and low level posts 
are occupied by magistrates.51 Furthermore, there is a widespread conviction among 
magistrates that all executive positions in the Ministry must remain in their hands as a 
guarantee that the Minister of Justice will not take initiatives detrimental to judicial and 
prosecutorial independence.52 Even when assigned by the SCM to serve at the Ministry 
of Justice, magistrates remain under the full authority of the SCM in matters of disci-
pline, promotions, and future destinations or role assignments as magistrates. As a con-
sequence, in conducting their activities at the Ministry, they are much more concerned 
with fulfilling the expectations of—or at least not entering into conflict with—their 
professional trade union and their colleagues who have been elected members of the 
SCM, than with the expectations of the Minister himself. The SCM has repeatedly shown 
its determination to disregard the requests or aspirations of those very few magistrates 
who have not conformed to its expectations while serving at the Ministry of Justice.53 
49 Law of Mar. 24, 1958, no.195, Art. 4.
50 The last case with which I am familiar happened in 2003. A member of Parliament who was tried 
before a panel of judges of the Milan Tribunal requested that the documents collected during a pro-
ceeding against “unknown persons” eight years previously be made available to his lawyers, as he 
believed information in the documents would be useful for his defense. The prosecutors in charge 
of the case refused to reveal the contents of the investigation dossier. Because the law also provides 
that investigations should not last more that two years, the Minister of Justice ordered a review. The 
Milan prosecutor’s office successfully refused to reveal the content of the dossier, on the grounds 
that it would prejudice the investigation in that case. The SCM sided with the prosecutors and 
passed a resolution to censure the Minister. See G. Di Federico, Il pubblico poliziotto, Il Giomale, 
July 28, 2003, at 1.
51 As of July 2005, the number of magistrates serving in the Ministry of Justice was 81. 
52 See G. Di Federico �� M. Sapignoli, Processo penale e diritti della difesa: la testimonianza di 1000     
avvocati penalisti (2002), at 30–33 (in note 53 at page 33 there is a quotation from an official docu-
ment from the magistrates’ trade union in which the presence of magistrates in all key positions 
in the Ministry of Justice is justified as a means to protect judicial independence with regard to 
ministerial initiatives that might endanger it).  
53 Id. at 34–35. For an example, see Section VII below; for literature on the subject, see note 74            infra.
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VI. The Constitutional Principle of Compulsory Criminal Action  
and its Implications at the Operative Level
So far, we have analyzed many of the aspects of the Italian judicial system that charac-
terize the relationship between independence and accountability for prosecutors and 
judges alike. Now we turn to those that more specifically concern the prosecution 
service and individual prosecutors.  
It is impossible to understand the rationale behind the organization of the prosecu-
tion service, the relationships among the various prosecution offices, and the rela-
tionships between the chiefs of the prosecution offices and individual prosecutors 
without first understanding the reasons for the adoption of the principle of “compulso-
ry criminal action,” its interpretations, and the ideology behind those interpretations.  
The attempt to balance the values of independence and accountability is a subject of 
debate in many countries.54 From a formal point of view, the “solution” adopted in 
Italy seems ideal. In preparing the text of the Italian Constitution after World War II, 
the founding fathers devoted a great deal of attention to public prosecution. To avoid 
the possibility that the powers of public prosecution might be used in a politically 
discriminatory fashion, as in the previous fascist period, they felt it necessary to sever 
the traditional tie that had until then linked public prosecutors hierarchically to the 
Ministry of Justice.
The Constitutional Assembly decided that prosecutors should have a monopoly over 
initiating criminal proceedings, and at the same time “have at [their] disposal” a ju-
dicial police.55 It specifically wanted such a monopoly to be exercised in full indepen-
dence, without any of the direct or indirect forms of political accountability existing 
in other constitutional democracies.
Somewhat naively, to avoid discretionary or arbitrary, and therefore politicized, use 
of prosecutorial powers, it decided that it would be sufficient to prescribe mandatory 
criminal prosecution for all criminal violations.56 None of the authors of the Consti-
tution seems to have doubted that such a provision could be de facto observed, or that 
all offenses could be equally prosecuted. They also firmly believed that independence 
and mandatory prosecution, two sides of the same coin, would be the safest guaran-
tee of the constitutional precept that all citizens are equal before the law.57
54 On the relationship between independence and accountability, see G. Di Federico, Prosecutorial 
Independence and the Democratic Requirement of Accountability: Analysis of a Deviant Case in a 
Comparative Perspective, 38 British Journal of Criminology (1988), at 371; G. Di Federico, 
The Independence and Accountability of the Public Prosecutor: In Search of a Difficult Equilibrium, 9 
Mediterranean Journal of Human Rights (2005), at 114–118. 
55 Constitution, Art. 109.
56 Constitution, Art. 112.
57 All proposals to establish avenues of accountability within the democratic process for the activities              
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The traditional organizational model of the public prosecution service in Italy was 
the same as in France. The Minister of Justice was at the apex of the hierarchical 
pyramid of the entire network of prosecution offices (with the exception only of the 
Prosecutor General’s office at the Court of Cassation).58 The hierarchical line of com-
mand ran from the Ministry of Justice to the 23 prosecutors general at the courts of 
appeal, to the more that 150 chiefs of the prosecutors’ offices at the level of the tribu-
nals located in their districts.59 The chiefs of the prosecutors’ offices at the tribunal 
level exercised supervisory powers over the prosecutorial activities of the over 800 
Preture located in the “circondario,” that is, in the area of their territorial jurisdiction 
(the preture were courts of limited jurisdiction manned by career magistrates; they 
were abolished in 199860).  
The prosecutors general at the courts of appeals had ample discretionary powers in 
distributing, withdrawing, and reassigning cases among the prosecutors in their of-
fices. They could furthermore take over cases from any of the prosecutors’ offices 
at the tribunal level operating in their district; on those cases, they or one of their 
“subordinates” (given the telling name of sostituti procuratori)61 could investigate and 
perform all the necessary forensic activities.62 Likewise, the chief of the prosecution 
office at the tribunal level could, at his discretion, distribute, withdraw, and reassign 
cases to his subordinates.   
With the elimination of the hierarchical powers of the Minister of Justice over the 
prosecution service after the Second World War, any form of coordination among 
prosecutors’ offices at the national level also vanished. However, the hierarchical 
of public prosecutors were voted down. The Constitutional Assembly not only rejected a proposal 
to keep public prosecution under the supervision of a Minister of Justice responsible to Parlia-
ment, but also rejected the proposal to establish a Prosecutor General appointed by Parliament. 
The requirement of compulsory criminal action was deemed a sufficient guarantee against pos-
sible prosecutorial abuses in the exercise of their powers of investigation and criminal initiative 
(for a summary presentation of the decisions of the Constitutional Assembly on these issues, see 
Francesco Rigano, Costituzione e Potere Giudiziario (1982), at 131–157. See also Commentario della 
Costituzione, Tomo IV, La Magistratura (G. Branca ed., 1987, at 39–85). The need to preserve total 
prosecutorial independence and mandatory criminal initiative are so rooted in the Italian legal and 
political culture that they survive even against empirical evidence of their dysfunction. While it is 
now widely acknowledged that prosecutors do exercise unaccountably broad discretionary pow-
ers with great political relevance, the majority of the Parliamentary Commission now in charge 
of revising the Italian Constitution has chosen to reconfirm both the principles of prosecutorial 
independence and compulsory criminal action. Various explanations have been offered to account 
for this curious decision. They cannot be adequately presented here for at least two reasons: first of 
all, because they are complex and would require a separate paper; second of all because, I humbly 
admit, I myself have serious difficulty understanding them in full. 
58 Due to the fact that the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation did not have (and does not 
now have) any powers in the area of criminal investigation and criminal action.
59 Precise numbers are not indicated because, in the period under consideration, the number of those 
offices increased.
60 Legislative Decree of Feb. 19, 1998, no.51.
61 The same formal definition of “sostituti” (substitutes) to denote ordinary prosecutors was originally 
and symbolically meant to explicitly indicate that the powers of the prosecutor’s offices at all levels 
of jurisdiction were concentrated in the hands of the chief, and that the “substitutes,” for all their 
activities, were operating in his name with only delegated powers that could be withdrawn at any 
time.
62 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 53.
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powers of the prosecutors general at the courts of appeals and of the chief prosecu-
tors at the tribunals remained untouched and substantially operative until the early 
1960s. Such powers began to be effectively contested by the majority of the magis-
trates after the creation of the SCM, and more markedly after 1968 and in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  During those years, substantive changes were introduced, largely without 
modification of existing laws.63   
The basic ideas behind those changes—ideas largely shared by the magistrates’ trade 
union and by its representatives in the SCM—can be summarized as follows: 
(a)  any exercise of discretionary powers by the heads of offices conflicted with the 
constitutional principle of compulsory criminal action, and was therefore also a 
potential breach of the related principle of the equality of all citizens before the 
law. This included any directives on priorities to follow, how to deal with spe-
cific cases, the investigative means to employ, or whether to restrict a suspect’s 
personal liberties;
(b)  the protection of the internal independence of each prosecutor therefore should 
not be different from that of a judge;  
(c)  the constitutional norm providing that the specific judge should be “predeter-
mined by law”64 should also apply to prosecutors. Internal regulations concern-
ing case distribution should guarantee that, when a new case is filed, the exist-
ing rules, and not the chief of the office, automatically determine the prosecutor 
in charge of the case, and no one should have the discretionary power to take it 
away from him;
(d)  coordination of investigative activities conducted by prosecutors operating in 
different areas of the country should take place on the basis of voluntary col-
laboration among prosecutors in charge of related cases, not through hierarchi-
cal channels; 
(e)  it was the task of the SCM, conceived of as the “organizational apex of the mag-
istracy,” to implement these ideas through its policies in the area of judicial 
personnel management.  
It would go beyond the scope of this report to delineate the means through which 
those policies were implemented and describe visible episodes in the process of 
change. Before the end of the 1980s, however, these policies had produced most of 
the desired effects, and they were formally recognized and legitimized by a series of 
laws passed between 1988 and 1998. These laws form the backdrop to our discussion 
of relations among prosecutors’ offices, the regulations on their internal organiza-
tion, and some of their implications for the relationship between the independence, 
accountability, and effectiveness of public prosecution.
63 It would be beyond the scope of this chapter to describe here the changes that took place during 
those years in the traditional relationships among and inside prosecutors’ offices, the role played 
by the magistrates’ trade union and its representatives in the SCM in determining those changes, 
and the means through which changes were introduced without modification of existing laws. For 
information on this see G. Di Federico,    Obbligatorietà dell’azione penale, coordinamento delle attivi-
tà del pubblico ministero e loro corrispondenza alle aspettative della comunità, in Accusa penale e 
ruolo del pu��lico ministero (A. Gaito ed., 1991), at 185–194.     
64 Constitution, Art. 25.
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VII. Relations Among the Prosecution Offices
The Code of Criminal Procedure which came into effect in 1989,65 and the modifica-
tions to the Statute of the Magistracy (ordinamento giudiziario) connected with it, 
drastically restrict and closely regulate the power of the prosecutors general at the 
courts of appeals to take over (avocare) single cases or specific investigations from 
the prosecutors’ offices operating in their districts.66 The law provides that when-
ever the prosecutor general decides to take over a case or an investigation, he must 
justify his initiative and communicate notice of his decision and justifications to the 
Superior Council of the Magistracy.67 The aforementioned laws do not grant any hi-
erarchical power to the prosecutors general at the courts of appeals to coordinate 
investigations or other activities carried out by the prosecution offices operating in 
their judicial districts.  
More generally, the Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in1989 does not provide 
any authoritative instrument for the coordination of investigative activities of the 
various prosecutors’ offices, either within or across districts.  It explicitly provides 
that such coordination should take place on a voluntary basis.68 The content of the 
norms that drastically limit the powers of the prosecutors general at the courts of ap-
peal is basically a legitimization a posteriori of developments that de facto had already 
taken place in the preceding years. It is interesting to note that the two ministerial 
commissions delegated to actually write those norms were composed in good part of 
magistrates who where militant members of the magistrates’ trade union.69 
The strong opposition to any form of hierarchical supervision of the activities of 
prosecutors, as well as the efficacy of the magistrates’ union and of the SCM in op-
posing such measures, was again evident on the occasion of the creation of the Na-
tional Anti-Mafia Directorate. The unit was created in 1991 to meet the functional 
need of coordinating, on a national level, investigations of Mafia crimes on a national 
and international level. The first version of the legislative decree70 assigned the direc-
tor of that office (a magistrate, to be appointed by the SCM) substantive hierarchical 
powers with regard to the activities of prosecutors at the local level, in the sense that 
he could issue binding instructions, take over cases from local prosecutor’s offices, 
and directly conduct the necessary investigative activities.  
The reactions of the best-known magistrates in the prosecution offices, the magis-
trates’ trade union, and the SCM was fierce and raged relentlessly for weeks, un-
65 The Code was approved by Parliament in 1988 but only became effective the following year.
66 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 372, 412.
67 Ordinamento giudiziario [Statute of the Magistracy],  Royal Decree of Jan. 30, 1941, Art. 70.
68 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 371.
69 Di Federico, supra note 63, at 176–177 (see in particular note 6).
70 Decree-Law of Nov. 20, 1991, no.367.
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til the Minister of Justice agreed to eliminate from the legislative decree any trace 
of hierarchical supervision over the activities of local prosecutors.71 Here again, the 
view prevailed that in order to protect the independence of prosecutors, spontaneous 
collaborations are the only legitimate means to promote the necessary coordination 
among prosecutors’ offices.  
The powers assigned to the National Anti-Mafia Director are an illustration of that 
view. He has the right to be informed of all investigative activities in the area of Mafia 
crimes and can temporarily send one or more of the 20 prosecutors from his office 
to collaborate with investigations conducted by one or more of the 26 District Anti-
Mafia Directorates;72 he can issue instructions to the 26 District Directorates in order 
to avoid investigative conflicts and promote more effective ways to coordinate their 
joint investigative activities; if such instructions are not followed and conflicts arise 
nevertheless, the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor can summon local prosecutors in-
volved to a meeting, in order to resolve the conflicts among them with their partici-
pation. If such a meeting is ineffective, he can take over the case and conduct the in-
vestigation directly under only two circumstances, which amount to illegal conduct 
by local prosecutors: prolonged and unjustified investigative inactivity, or unjustified 
continuous violation of the norm providing for voluntary collaboration. This has not 
happened in the last 14 years, that is, since the creation of the National Anti-Mafia 
Directorate. Should such an event occur, the law provides, on the one hand, that 
the National Anti-Mafia Director’s decision can be opposed before the Prosecutor 
General at the Court of Cassation, and on the other, that he must communicate his 
decision and its justifications to the SCM.  
The events connected with the creation of the National Anti-Mafia Directorate illus-
trate the role that the SCM plays in using its decisional powers to induce conformity 
to the ideological tenets of the magistrates’ trade union on matters regarding the 
judiciary and its organization. Such episodes also further illustrate the magistrates’ 
trade union’s expectations that magistrates temporarily serving in executive positions 
at the Ministry of Justice should operate to prevent the Minister from undermining 
judicial and prosecutorial independence, as defined by the magistrates’ association. 
The magistrate temporarily serving at the Ministry of Justice who inspired and wrote 
the first version of the legislative decree concerning the creation of the National 
Anti-Mafia Directorate, on behalf of the Minister, was Giovanni Falcone. Falcone 
was internationally famed for the efficacy and success with which, over many years 
of service as a magistrate in Palermo, he had conducted numerous investigations 
on Mafia crimes at the national and transnational levels. After having collaborated 
with the Minister of Justice on the decree, he was accused by the magistrates’ trade 
union and its representatives in the SCM of trying to undermine prosecutorial in-
dependence and sacrificing his own independence.73 These accusations were more 
71 The Decree-Law of Nov. 20, 1991 in the revised version was then approved by Parliament (Law of 
Jan. 20, 1992, no.8).
72 For a brief presentation of the National and District Anti-Mafia Directorates, see Section II above.
73 See, e.g., an article published in the official newspaper of the Communist Party by a member of the 
SCM at the time: A. Pizzorusso, Falcone superprocuratore? Non può farlo, vi dico perchè, L’Unità, 
Mar. 12, 1992, at 3.
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than mere words; they also had punitive implications. Falcone applied for the post 
of National Anti-Mafia Director. Though he was by far the most qualified candidate 
for the job, he was outvoted in the SCM commission for the appointment of heads of 
judicial offices. This was a clear and visible admonition to any magistrate who might 
follow in his footsteps and deviate from the expectations of the SCM.74 The recom-
mendation of the commission that outvoted Falcone in favor of another candidate 
was never confirmed by the plenary session of the SCM, as Falcone was assassinated 
by the Mafia on May 23, 2002.
VIII. The Internal Organization of the Prosecution Offices  
and the Independence of Each Prosecutor  
Three closely related aspects of the evolution of the prosecutorial function in Italy 
must be taken into account in order to comprehend the role of chief prosecutors and 
the level of operative independence of each prosecutor in the exercise of his investi-
gative and forensic functions.  These are (a) the regulations concerning the internal 
organization of the offices of prosecution; (b) the powers granted to prosecutors for 
the exercise of their investigative and forensic functions; (c) the implications of the 
fact that the principle of compulsory criminal action is not de facto attainable and 
that, as a consequence, the investigative and forensic functions of prosecutors are, to 
a greater or lesser extent, discretionary in nature.
 It is important to keep in mind that what will be said with regard to criminal initia-
tive and criminal investigations concerns primarily the offices of prosecution at the 
lower levels of jurisdiction, as investigative activities at the level of the courts of ap-
peals are relatively infrequent.
Supervisory powers of office heads: During the 1970s and 1980s, the tenet that the Superior 
Council of the Magistracy should act as the “organizational apex of the magistracy” had 
taken root and the SCM progressively succeeded in regulating the internal relations of 
the prosecutors’ offices (as well as those of the courts). A law enacted in 1998 officially 
empowers the SCM to elaborate, approve, and enact the norms that regulate the inter-
nal organization of the prosecution offices.75 The body of norms elaborated by the SCM 
for the internal organization of prosecutors’ offices and courts looks very much like a 
code (composed of 115 norms, most of them set out in  numerous and lengthy sections). 
74 To describe in detail all the examples that could be cited in support of this statement would be 
beyond the scope of this chapter. For a more complete description of other occasions in which 
Falcone experienced discrimination by the SCM and the reason behind that discrimination, see F. 
La Licata, Storia di Giovanni Falcone (1993), at 121–128, 189–221. For other examples, see: Corrado 
Carnevale, Un giudice solo (2006); A. Mestitz, Selezione e formazione professionale dei magistrate e 
avvocati in Francia (1990), at XXII note 11. 
75 Legislative Decree of Feb. 19, 1998, no.51, Art. 6.
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One of the main aims of this elaborate body of norms is to reduce as much as pos-
sible the discretionary powers of the heads the prosecutors’ offices (a) by establishing 
strict criteria on the basis of which the offices should be organized and the work load 
distributed and (b) by providing an effective procedure to insure compliance with 
those norms.
Every two years, the head of each prosecution office must prepare a detailed orga-
nizational plan in which, among other things, he must specify the division of work 
among the members of the office, the criteria with which incoming cases will be 
assigned to each prosecutor, and who will do this prosecutor’s work in case of his ab-
sence. If, in the course of the two years, one or more organizational positions should 
become vacant, the chief of the office cannot fill those positions at his discretion. He 
must hold a formal internal competition among the members of the office and then 
choose among the applicants according to the rules issued by the SCM. 
The chief of the office must communicate all the aforementioned decisions, as well 
as any deviation from the organizational plan during the two-year period, to the 
competent district council   (consiglio giudiziario distrettuale), which is presided 
over by the president of the district court of appeals and composed of a majority of 
magistrates elected by their colleagues in the district.76 He must also communicate 
criticisms (if any) of his decisions by members of his office. The district council must 
express its opinion on the plan and the criticisms of the individual prosecutors. These 
documents are then sent to the SCM, which analyzes them and decides whether the 
decisions of the head prosecutors are in conformity with the regulations. If they are 
not, the chief prosecutor is invited to modify his decisions. When conflicts arise, 
informal contact and pressures frequently occur between the prosecutors and their 
colleagues who are elected members of the district councils and of the SCM. 
This shows the extent to which the SCM has worked to guarantee the functional 
independence of individual prosecutors for all activities, investigative and forensic, 
related to the cases of which they are in charge. The main supervisory powers over 
the day-to-day activities of his office formally remaining in the hands of the chief 
prosecutor are those of summoning periodic office meetings and asking individual 
prosecutors to inform him of the investigative activities related to cases he considers 
particularly important. He can deviate from the regulations concerning case distri-
bution, but he must justify these decisions and have them reviewed by the local dis-
trict council and the SCM.77 In other words, cases assigned to a substitute prosecutor 
tend to become very much like personal property.  
The Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in 1989 recognized and further defined 
powers that to a large extent had characterized the role of the prosecutor for at least a 
decade. The most relevant are: (a) the prosecutor may initiate criminal investigations 
not only at the request of other agents (police, other public authorities, citizens, etc.), 
but also on his own initiative, whenever he believes that a crime has been commit-
76 There are 26 consigli giudiziari, one for each court of appeals district. See supra note 10. 
77 I was a member of the commission of the SCM dealing with the internal organization of all the pros-                   
ecutors’ offices for three years, and not a single case of this sort was ever brought to our attention.                
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ted;78 (b) he has full control of the police, in the sense that he is personally in charge 
of directing investigative activities,79 and can decide what means of investigation to 
use (without budgetary limitations).80 In the course of the investigative phase, he de 
facto becomes an independent police officer. If his cases acquire public visibility, as 
often happens, his statements on the case are publicized, his picture is printed in the 
main newspapers, and he appears on television to announce investigative successes, 
surrounded by (silent) members of the police forces operating under his direction. 
He is also totally independent in his forensic activities.81 He can decide to appeal 
decisions of the trial judge if the latter does not accept his requests, and he can also 
decide on his own to “follow his cases” to the higher level of jurisdiction, by acting 
as prosecutor at the appellate level as well.82 This broad prosecutorial independence 
with regard to cases assigned to them is often referred to as “personalization of pros-
ecutorial functions” (personalizzazione delle funzioni del pubblico ministero).  
In assessing the independence of individual prosecutors, the other peculiar aspects of 
the Italian judicial organization indicated above must be kept in mind, in particular: 
(a) that, de facto, their career is not based on substantive evaluation of professional 
performance, but on seniority; (b) that their salaries are increased periodically on the 
basis of a favorable mechanism; (c) that they cannot be transferred to another office 
unless they themselves so wish.  
Compulsory action and de facto discretion:  In this and in the two previous para-
graphs, we have dealt with the organizational characteristics of the prosecution ser-
vice that favor prosecutorial independence. To fully understand the predominance of 
independence over accountability, it is necessary to take into account that, on the one 
hand, the entire structure of the public prosecution service is built on and around 
the idea that the constitutional principle of compulsory criminal action is factually 
attainable and, therefore, better pursued if prosecutors can operate unfettered by hi-
erarchical constrictions. On the other hand, however, penal action in Italy is just as 
discretionary as in other countries, and perhaps more so, due to the phenomenon of 
the “personalization of prosecutorial functions” described above.  No constitutional 
provision can change the hard fact that in Italy, as elsewhere, the sheer magnitude 
of criminal activity precludes the possibility of prosecuting all criminal offenses, let 
alone prosecuting them with equal attention and effectiveness. As a consequence, 
this de facto discretion permeates prosecutorial decision making across all activi-
ties that prosecutors perform (priority in pursuing cases on the docket, amount and 
nature of investigative resources to employ in each case, restriction of personal free-
doms or property rights).83
78 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 330.
79 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 347.
80 See Section V above.
81 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 53.
82 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 570.
83 G. Di Federico, supra note 63; M. Fabri, Discrezionalità e modalità di azione del pubblico ministero 
nel procedimento penale,IX Polis no.2 (1997), at 171–192.
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Quite a few important, and negative, consequences are caused by the combination 
of the broad powers assigned to prosecutors, on the one hand, and the constitutional 
principle of compulsory criminal action, which is not factually viable but is at the 
same time legally binding, on the other. It has become quite legitimate for a willing 
prosecutor to start and carry out, with the utmost independence, investigations of 
any kind, on any citizens, using the various police forces to verify whether the of-
fenses he assumes have actually been committed. He cannot be held accountable for 
these decisions in any way, even if such accusations turn out to be totally unfounded 
at the trial stage, after having caused irreversible and often devastating consequences 
to the lives of the suspects. He can, in any case, successfully claim that, due to the 
constitutional imperative of compulsory criminal action, he could not have done 
otherwise, because he was convinced that a crime had been committed.
Prosecutorial definition of criminal justice policy:  Furthermore, prosecutorial use of 
non-transparent, unregulated, discretionary power in the areas of investigation and 
penal initiative has de facto placed in the hands of prosecutors the day to day defini-
tion of a substantial portion of the country’s criminal justice policy. That is, criminal 
justice policy is now in the hands of a bureaucratic corps that bears no political re-
sponsibility for it.84 This has opened the door to more ample use of prosecutorial dis-
cretion than in countries where the discretionary powers of prosecutors are exposed 
and restricted. Where priorities are openly regulated through decisions taken within 
the democratic process, prosecutors are rendered accountable for their actions. This 
is not the case in Italy.
Under such conditions, it should come as no surprise that the independence accorded 
individual prosecutors has led to use of their de facto discretionary powers in ways 
that differ substantially depending on their personal ambitions. This phenomenon, of-
ten highlighted by the press in the last 20 years, emerges very clearly from interviews 
with members of the magistracy and even from occasional official statements by well-
known prosecutors, who have criticized the total absence of a binding judicial policy.85 
Giovanni Falcone, Italy’s famed prosecutor of transnational organized crime men-
tioned above, commented: 
How can it be conceivable that, in a liberal democratic regime, we do not yet have 
a judicial policy, and everything is left to the absolutely irresponsible decisions of 
the various prosecutors’ offices, and often even to the personal decisions of their 
members? In the absence of institutional controls on the activities of public pros-
84 In January 2007 the President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac, appointed a reform commis-
sion on the justice system (Commission de reflection sur la justice). Due to recurrent criticism of the 
negative influence of politics on proper functioning of the prosecution service, the President spe-
cifically asked the Commission to consider the possibility of adopting the principle of compulsory 
criminal action, as in Italy, and eliminating the Minister of Justice’s hierarchical powers over the 
prosecution service. On this point, the Commission noted that it is de facto impossible to pursue all 
criminal offenses. As a consequence, all discretionary choices in the area were part of the nation’s crim-
inal justice policies and therefore had to be maintained as the political responsibility of the executive. 
85 Paradoxically, the interconnected constitutional provisions of prosecutorial independence and         
mandatory criminal action in many ways impede the very achievement of the ultimate value, the 
equal treatment of all citizens under law, that the authors of the constitution wanted to protect.
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ecutors, the peril exists that informal influences and hidden connections with hid-
den loci of power might influence their activities. It seems to me that the time has 
come to rationalize and coordinate the activities of public prosecutors rendered 
de facto unaccountable by a fetishist conception of the principle of mandatory 
criminal initiative.86
He also argued that  
Judicial policies cannot be left in the hands of the head of the [prosecutors’] of-
fices, or worse, in the hands of each member of the various offices, without any 
institutional control.  Such a system does not favor the effectiveness of the judicial 
function in terms of a real, coordinated, generalized repression of criminal phe-
nomena, nor is it conducive to the equal protection of the citizens under the law . 
. . nor does it favor the image of justice, which . . . [thus] appears to public opinion 
as a variable of the system that has gone completely wild.”87
The relevance of the “fragmentation” of prosecutorial powers and its many negative 
implications is further confirmed by the answers to a series of questions asked in 
three different periods (1992, 1995, and 2000) of a sample of 1,000 defense lawyers 
with regard to their personal experience in criminal proceedings. On average, 70 
percent declared that there are substantial differences in the way individual prosecu-
tors define priorities in the exercise of their functions. Around 55 percent of the law-
yers also said that there are substantial differences in the ways individual prosecutors 
decide “in very similar cases” regarding the nature and extent of the means at their 
disposal during the investigative phase.88
Lawyers maintain that the vast amount of unregulated discretionary power exercised 
by prosecutors restricts the role of the defense and renders the protection of their 
clients’ civil rights during the lengthy phase preceding the public trial far more de-
pendent on the good will of prosecutors than on their own professional capacity as 
lawyers. Furthermore, lawyers indicate that prosecutorial independence in fact cov-
ers up decisions actually motivated by personal ambition or political orientation, or 
else by a desire for fame and the gratifications that go with it.89 In particular, lawyers 
claim that prosecutors often use prolonged preventive detention as a way to obtain 
confessions corresponding to the investigative objectives they are pursuing or con-
firming their working hypotheses (91.5 percent of the lawyers maintain that preven-
tive detention was actually used for devious reasons).90 Such accusations are widely 
shared, have recurrently been the subject of heated debates in the media and the 
political arena, and have found receptive ears even in the Bureau de la Federation In-
86 G. Falcone, Interventi e Proposte (1982-92) (1994), at 173–174 (emphasis added).  Similar views are 
expressed by another well known prosecutor, see Carlo Nordio, Giustizia (1997). 
87 Falcone, supra note 86, at 180–181.
88 Di Federico �� Sapignoli,    supra note 52, at 17, 107–112. Regarding the lawyers’ responses here and      
below, it is in my view unthinkable that a large majority of three samples of 1,000 criminal lawyers 
interviewed in three different years would indicate the existence of phenomena that do not exist or 
are only marginal.  
89 Id.
90 Id.
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ternationale des Droits de l’Homme.91 Lawyers have repeatedly organized demonstra-
tions and even prolonged strikes to protest the progressive erosion of their defensive 
role, to no avail.
The level of discretion that characterizes Italian prosecutors’ actions in criminal pro-
ceedings and the coercive measures at their disposal have progressively led them to 
acquire, de facto, the control and definition of a consistent share of public policy in 
the criminal sector, and with it also the ever more visible role of “problem solvers” 
for a considerable number of current political, social, and economic issues over the 
last 30 years or so, including workplace safety, environmental pollution, tax evasion, 
bank fraud and similar economic crimes, terrorism, organized crime, and corruption 
among public officials and politicians. Their successful initiatives in the area of politi-
cal corruption have caused substantial changes in the political leadership and party 
structure of the country,92 and have also consistently occupied the front pages of our 
national newspapers and television news programs.
The preceding discussion is still not sufficient to fully illustrate the overwhelming 
prevalence of independence over accountability in the actual workings of the Italian 
judicial system. Several concrete examples follow.
▶ In 1992 the chief of the prosecutor’s office in Palmi, in southern Italy, decided              
on his own initiative to investigate the relationship between the Freemasons 
and organized crime. In 1994 he extended his investigations to members of a 
new political party called Forza Italia. Under his direction, the police conducted 
investigations covering the entire country. So much material was collected that 
the Ministry of Justice rented a warehouse in which to store it and hired com-
puter specialists to retrieve it. The media followed the investigations with great 
interest due to the importance of the people actually or potentially involved. 
The chief prosecutor of Palmi acquired national fame and was praised for his 
independence in conducting investigations without regard to the position of 
the suspects. He was promoted to chief of the largest prosecutor’s office in Italy, 
in Naples. On February 25, 2001, the case was finally brought before a judge in 
Rome. The judge closed the case, saying that no indications could be found in 
the monumental documentation that a single crime had been committed. He 
also stated that no indications could be found even to justify the investigation. 
No questions were raised about the vast resources wasted without cause. After 
all, a specific article of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation to ascertain whether a crime has been committed.93 
Furthermore, any limitations on his powers to investigate would have been con-
trary to the principle of compulsory criminal action. The more than 60 people 
91 La Missione della F.I.D.H., Le Nuove Li�ertà, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 3–6. The writings on the mat-    
ter (newspaper and magazine articles, books) are numerous.  See, e.g., L. Mantovani, The Italian 
Guillottine, Operation Clean Hands and the Overthrow of Italy’s First Republic (1998); N. Colajanni, 
Mani Pulite? Giustizia e politica in Italia     (1999); G. Gargani, In nome dei pubblici Ministeri (1998).
92 In the years 1992–1994 the most prominent leaders of the five political parties that had composed 
the governing majority in the preceding 30 years were investigated for corruption and related 
crimes. All five parties disappeared from the political scene in the elections held in 1994.
93 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 330.
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investigated for more than eight years did not even receive formal apologies.94
▶ Public prosecutors are required by law to seek evidence in favor of, as well as               
against, a suspect.95 In fact, prosecutors hardly ever do so on their own initia-
tive. In telephone interviews with a sample of almost 3,000 criminal lawyers, 
more than 13 percent said that prosecutors sometimes go so far as to hide evi-
dence in favor of the suspect .96 Initially, I believed such responses were a sign 
of frustration at the very limited role played by criminal lawyers in investiga-
tions. Later, while analyzing disciplinary proceedings for 1998, I found a case in 
which a prosecutor had not revealed to the appellate judge crucial exculpatory 
evidence regarding a suspect held in preventive detention. As a consequence, 
the innocent suspect remained in jail and was not released until eight months 
later. In the disciplinary proceeding that followed, the facts of the case were 
undisputed, yet the prosecutor received no disciplinary sanction.97
▶ Two prosecutors at the prosecution office in Rome were convinced that a female             
witness knew that a suspect had fired the gun that had killed a student at the Uni-
versity of Rome.  On June 11, 1997, they interrogated the witness in their office. 
She was accompanied by her brother-in-law, a police officer. The interrogation 
was videotaped by a hidden camera. 98 The prosecutors left the room after having 
accused the witness of refusing to identify the suspect. They intended to video-
tape what she would say once she was alone with her brother-in-law, whom she 
trusted and who could advise her with the authority of a law officer. The brother-
in-law pressed her to reveal what she knew to the prosecutor, but she insisted, 
in emotional fashion, that she knew nothing. The videotape then showed one of 
the prosecutors returning and harshly questioning the witness as she cried and 
repeated that she knew nothing. The prosecutor then advised her that if she did 
not “tell the truth” she might end up being accused of having had a part in the 
homicide, and even said “you will most certainly be sentenced for homicide.”99 
Three days later, she confessed to having seen the suspect fire the gun. The entire 
videotape accidentally became public and was broadcast on television, and some 
magazines even circulated the cassettes. The impact on public opinion was great; 
the press, political leaders, and the Prime Minister expressed their concern.  Criti-
cism was even voiced at a public meeting of the SCM. Yet the two prosecutors 
who had conducted the investigation were not censured. During the public trial 
of the homicide of the student, the Rome Tribunal decided not to take the content 
of the videotape into account and gave full credit to the testimony of the wit-
ness, who, on the witness stand, confirmed having seen the suspect fire the gun. 
94 This case is described in Delfo Del Bino, Il caso massoneria, un decennio di politica, giustizia e 
democrazia (2001).
95 Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 358.     
96 See Di Federico �� Sapignoli, supra note 52, at 16, 102 (Table 4.3).
97 See the decision of the disciplinary section of the SCM of Jan. 23, 1998, no.9/98 and the decision of 
the Court of Cassation (Sezioni Unite) of  May 4, 1999, no. 282.
98 The transcript of the interrogation is published in A. Beretta Anguissola �� A. Figà Talamanca, La 
prenderemo per omicida. Caso Marta Russo: il dramma di Gabriella Alletto (2001), at 73–225.
99 Id. at 210. It would be difficult here to give even a summary of the crudeness of the interrogation, in                 
which the prosecutor suggested that she might receive a sentence of 24 years and comments such 
as “think of your children” were addressed to the witness. 
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IX.   Relationship Between Prosecutors and Judges
As we have already said, judges and prosecutors are recruited through the same pub-
lic competition soon after graduation from university. They can initially be assigned 
to serve either as prosecutors or judges and thereafter can switch, even repeatedly, 
from one function to another. They follow the same career path, receive the same 
salary, and belong to the same trade union. They jointly elect their representatives 
to the self-governing body of the magistracy. In sum, through a very effective, pro-
longed process of socialization, they develop a strong sense of common destiny. In 
addition, judges and prosecutors have their offices in the same buildings and have 
daily informal contacts. 
Such close ties render those temporarily playing the part of judges particularly sensitive 
to the expectations of their colleagues temporarily playing the role of prosecutors, mainly 
during the investigation phase, when decisions must be made by the judge on prosecu-
tors’ requests concerning, among other things, restrictions on privacy and the suspects’ 
personal freedom. Field research confirms the existence of informal ex parte commu-
nications between prosecutors and judges with reference to decisions the latter must 
make on matters concerning measures to be adopted during the investigative phase. 
There is also documentary evidence not only on the inclination of judges to 
satisfy the expectations of their “colleagues” acting as prosecutors during the 
investigative phase, but also to the effect that this phenomenon is not de facto 
considered a violation of judicial ethics, as it is in other countries.100 Due to the 
informal nature of such phenomena, it is not possible to specify its frequency 
and distribution on the basis of direct observation and official documents. Two 
factors, however, clearly suggest that it is frequent and widespread. One is the 
exceptional frequency with which judges decide in conformity with prosecutors’ 
requests, both during the investigative phase (including requests concerning the 
limitation of suspects’ personal liberty, such as preventive detention) and at the 
end of this phase, when they must decide whether to terminate the case or send 
it to a full public trial. The second is the fact that the overwhelming majority 
of our three samples of 1,000 defense lawyers indicated that informal ex parte 
communications on the substance of the cases at hand do take place between 
prosecutors and judges, excluding the defense, on a daily basis.  They further 
indicated that judges’ decisions during and at the end of the investigative phase 
consist, with rare exceptions, of passive, almost rubber stamp acceptance of the 
requests formulated by their colleagues-prosecutors.101 A clear-cut division be-
100 G. Di Federico, Il pubblico ministero. indipendenza, responsabilità, carriera separata, in XXIX 
L’Indice Penale no.2 (1995), at 399–437 (in particular pages 421–422 and note 30). See also Di 
Federico �� Sapignoli, supra note 52, at 122–124 (in particular note 49 and Table 4.19).
101 Di Federico �� Sapignoli,    supra note 524, at 122–124 (in particular Table 4.19). It is possible that the     
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tween judges and prosecutors is among the primary requests of the association 
of criminal lawyers.
The following illustrates the grave anomalies that may occur in a judicial system 
where judges and prosecutors are colleagues belonging to the same corps. In 1984, 
a panel of judges of the Tribunal of Milan, going against the prosecutor’s request, 
released a detainee in preventive custody after an appeal. The prosecutor then tele-
phoned the judge who had presided over the panel and harshly reproached her 
“with violent verbal aggression” for having disregarded his request to keep the de-
tainee in prison. The judge reported the incident to the president of the tribunal, 
who called a meeting with both the prosecutor and the judge to discuss the mat-
ter, without taking sides. A few weeks later, the presiding judge of the panel had 
another “case of identical nature” to that which had given rise to the conflict, with 
the participation of the same prosecutor. She wrote to the president of the tribu-
nal asking to be replaced by another judge because, due to the earlier experience, 
she feared that “the same distasteful situation may arise again” and therefore felt 
“deprived of the serenity which is necessary to adjudicate.” The president of the 
tribunal accepted her request and appointed another presiding judge.102 No dis-
ciplinary action was taken against the prosecutor or the president of the tribunal. 
The participants in this illustration seemed far more interested in maintaining peace 
“in the family” and good relations among colleagues than in protecting judicial in-
answers given by these defense lawyers might exaggerate the dimensions of such phenomena. Of 
course, no one can provide a reliable measure of such events, because they take place at an informal 
level and hardly ever come to the surface. However, other sources indicate that they do occur and 
are widespread: (a) quite e few disciplinary proceedings take place either concerning actual “col-
laborations” between prosecutors and judges in preliminary investigations or showing that  pros-
ecutors expected a collaborative attitude on the part of their “colleague” judges (see, for example, 
the following sentences from the disciplinary section of the SCM: no.066-1992 (93); no.015-1993; 
no. 031-1996; no. 036-1996; no. 081-1998; no.034-2000); (b) in a public debate that took place in 
Naples in 1996, the director of the office of the judges of preliminary investigations in  that city 
openly admitted that the rate of  judges’ acceptance of prosecutors’ requests had sharply diminished 
in the period in which he and all the judges in his office had  been temporarily transferred  to a 
building some distance  from that of the prosecutors; (c) various forms of  passive acceptance by 
judges of prosecutors’ requests during and at the end of the investigative phase were clearly indi-
cated by magistrates in the interviews I conducted  in 1991–1993, when I was in charge of a large 
research project financed by the Ministry of Justice on the application of the (then) new Code of 
Criminal Procedure. In some cases, the judges of preliminary investigations even justified their 
passive acceptance of prosecutors’ requests by pointing out that, in organized crime cases, requests 
for preventive detention often concerned numerous suspects and that the documentation support-
ing those requests was so ponderous that it could not be analyzed within the term of 48 hours 
imposed by the law. Rather than releasing suspects who might be dangerous or could damage the 
delicate and time consuming investigative work of the prosecutors,  they therefore thought it was 
better to accept the request for preventive detention; after all, the suspects could appeal their deci-
sion within a short period of time before a panel of judges (the so called “giudice del riesame”).          
102 The entire story is described in the hand-written letter with which the judge asked the president of                 
the tribunal to be replaced (the description of the case, as well as the quotations, are taken from that 
letter). The letter was accidentally found by the lawyer in the second case, who published it, adding 
that in the second case, the prisoner remained in prison, as desired by the prosecutor. A. Viviani,   
La degenerazione del processo penale in Italia (1988), at 78–80, 177–178 (the text of the letter is      
reprinted at pages 177–178; the case is described and commented upon at pages 78–80). The book 
presents several other examples similar to those described above. 
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dependence and the rights of citizens. The episode came to the attention of the SCM 
twice. The first time was on the occasion of the prosecutor’s professional evaluation 
for promotion to the second highest career rank. The episode was considered irrel-
evant, and he was promoted.103 The incident was reviewed a second time when he 
asked to be appointed deputy chief of one of the three largest prosecutors’ offices in 
the country: he was appointed nevertheless.104   
The types of examples presented above have usually surfaced by mere accident. While 
no firm conclusions can be drawn about the extent of such behavior, it is clearly de 
facto considered legitimate, since when such cases emerge, the prosecutors involved 
are not in any way sanctioned or penalized. The very wide margins of independence 
that each prosecutor enjoys in the conduct of the investigative and forensic activities 
of the cases on his docket allow for great and multifaceted variations from prosecu-
tor to prosecutor, and even from case to case. As a researcher who for many years 
has had the opportunity to be a “participant observer” in the actual functioning of 
the Italian judicial machinery,105 I could offer, for example, many instances in which 
prosecutors conduct investigations directly, like police officers, as well as many oth-
ers in which prosecutors not only completely delegate the investigative phase to the 
police, but even go so far as to say that it is degrading for a magistrate to get involved 
in investigations and “act as a policemen.” I could also indicate cases in which the 
head prosecutor exercises substantial supervisory authority over the activities of the 
prosecutors in his office (with their tacit consent).
X. Effectiveness of the Prosecution Service: Statistics
 
Much of what has been said so far deals with the relationship between independence 
and accountability, and shows how the value of independence (both external and 
internal) is in many ways overriding. In the prosecution service, as in any other orga-
nization, a very low level of concern for and protection of the value of accountability 
is associated with a very low level of effectiveness (leaving aside other intervening 
variables). Yet no efforts are made in Italy to collect reliable analytical data on the 
effectiveness of the prosecution service and of individual prosecutors.  No such data 
is collected in the processes of professional career evaluation. Other countries evaluate 
the effectiveness of the prosecution service based on the ratio of success of prosecutors in 
court and their efficiency in using investigative resources as against the results obtained. 
103 Transcript of the SCM session of Jan. 10, 1996 (4 PM).
104 Transcript of the SCM session of Dec. 19, 2002.
105 In forty years of research on judicial systems, I have often been in charge of consulting or operative 
functions in the Italian judicial system. My experience includes responsibility for the research and 
work flow management office of the SCM (1968–1970); work as a consultant to various ministers 
and undersecretaries of justice; memberships of various commissions of inquiry created by the 
Ministry of Justice and the President of the Republic (as president of the SCM); and membership 
in the SCM (2002–2006). In the years 1991–1993 I directed, on behalf of the Minister of Justice, the 
team that monitored application of the new Code of Criminal Procedure.
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In Italy, the very use of such data to evaluate the effectiveness of individual prosecutors 
and prosecution offices would be considered a menace to the independence of prose-
cutors in the application of the constitutional principle of compulsory criminal action.
A partial, limited official indication of the low level of effectiveness of our prosecu-
tion service in the area of criminal investigation can be found in the yearly reports 
on the administration of justice issued by the Prosecutor General at the Court of 
Cassation every January upon inauguration of the judicial year. Year after year, these 
reports indicate that a very high percentage of the perpetrators of crimes remain 
unidentified and unpunished. Some 95 percent of the thefts, around 80 percent of 
robberies, and around 50 percent of homicides are unsolved—more generally, some 
80 percent of all reported crimes.106 And these figures may be low estimates, accord-
ing to the Prosecutor General himself.
XI.  Current Reforms 
Between December 5, 2005 and April 5, 2006, laws were enacted that modify some of 
the most controversial features of the prosecution service described so far. Some of those 
laws, however, included provisions that delayed their actual application to a later date.
The opposition parties of the time strongly opposed those reforms and promised to 
change them if they came to power in the upcoming election. In fact, on April 10, 
2006, they did win the election and are currently debating what to do about these 
reforms. At the time of this writing (mid-May 2006) it is therefore impossible to 
forecast the fate of the reforms—whether they will be abolished altogether or par-
tially implemented with substantial changes. All we can do here is indicate how these 
reforms would modify both the status of prosecutors and judges and some of the 
most controversial features of the Italian prosecution service. Regarding the latter, 
the main modifications would be:
(a)  as of 5 years after recruitment, magistrates would no longer be allowed to move 
from the role of prosecutor to that of judge and vice versa;107 
(b)  chief prosecutors would have the power to issue regulations binding on pros-
ecutors in their offices in carrying out their investigative activities;108
(c)  all prosecutorial initiatives involving limitations on personal liberties or prop-
erty rights of suspects would require authorization by the chief prosecutor or 
his representative;109 
106 The full text of the yearly reports of the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation are available 
on the web site of the Italian Ministry of Justice, at www.giustizia.it. 
107 Legislative Decree of Apr. 5, 2006, no.160.    
108 Legislative Decree of Feb. 20, 2006, no.106.     
109 Id.
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(d)  the chief prosecutor, or his representative, would be the only magistrate entitled 
to provide the media with information on the activities of his office;110 
(e)  when a citizen is acquitted at the first level of jurisdiction, prosecutors would no 
longer be able to challenge that verdict before the appellate court. However, the 
number of circumstances under which a prosecutor could challenge a sentence 
of acquittal directly before the Supreme Court of Cassation would increase.111  
Promotions of prosecutors (and judges) to higher levels of jurisdiction would no 
longer exceed the number of existing vacancies and would be based on competitive 
evaluations (written and/or oral and/or relative to the actual activities of the candi-
dates). Those choosing to compete for positions at higher levels of jurisdiction would 
be allowed to enter the competition with lower seniority than presently required. If 
successful, they would therefore attain higher salary levels sooner than at present, and 
also sooner than their colleagues who do not compete. Magistrates choosing not to 
participate in competitions for promotion to higher ranks would remain at the lower 
levels of jurisdiction, but would nevertheless attain the same salary increases available 
at present, based on the same summary and ineffectual professional evaluations illus-
trated above. In other words, all magistrates would continue to reach the top of the sal-
ary and pension ladder, and would receive the same exit bonuses described above.112 
As regards the disciplinary system for prosecutors (and judges), the major innova-
tion proposed in the law is the introduction of a relatively detailed list of disciplinary 
violations and sanctions connected to them.113 Furthermore, the law introduces the 
principle of compulsory disciplinary action.   
Most of the reform bills indicated above were introduced in Parliament by the former 
Minister of Justice in March 2002. Many changes were introduced in the course of the 
long parliamentary debate, due to various highly effective sources of resistance to the 
innovations originally proposed. The powerful Italian magistrates’ trade union has 
conducted a very active and vocal campaign of opposition to the bill; the magistrates 
twice went on strike against the pending reforms. Harsh criticisms of the reforms 
proposed in the bills have also been expressed in the official opinions that a majority 
of the SCM has prepared for the Minister of Justice. This comes as no surprise, as the 
majority of members of the SCM are elected from among the most active members of 
the trade union of magistrates. The militant aggressiveness of the magistrates’ trade 
union against the reforms and the government that proposed them can also be better 
understood if we consider that, without exception, all reforms passed by Parliament 
in the past 40 years on the Statute of the Magistracy were always introduced in re-
sponse to specific requests by the magistrates’ trade union, or with its consent.  
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Legislative Decree of Apr. 5, 2006, no.160.     
113 Legislative Decree of Feb. 23, 2006, no.109.     
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XII. Closing Remarks 
The role and the functions of the public prosecutor have often been the subject of 
debate and reform in many democratic countries. International bodies such as the 
United Nations Congresses on the Prevention of Crime, the Council of Europe, and 
the European Union have issued numerous recommendations on this topic. This in-
terest is certainly justified, for at least two reasons:
(a) because of the crucial role public prosecution plays in the repression of crime. 
Public prosecutors are the “gate keepers” of criminal justice, since without their ini-
tiative, there cannot be judicial punishment. Furthermore, their role has acquired 
an ever-growing importance due to the increase in the magnitude and complexity 
of criminal phenomena experienced at the national and international level by all 
countries in recent decades;
(b) because of the devastating consequences that undue, improper, or partisan use of 
criminal initiative may entail for the protection of civil rights and for safeguarding 
the social, economic, familial, and political status of citizens and equal protection 
before the criminal law. As we know, criminal initiative often is, de facto, a sanction 
in itself, rarely remediated by a judicial acquittal that follows years later.
The Italian case illustrates the negative consequences of a system in which the un-
realistic principle of compulsory criminal action prevails. In such a system, a good 
part of the actual day to day definition of public policy in the criminal sector rests 
de facto in the hands of a bureaucratic corps that applies police powers and criminal 
initiatives with complete independence, and with a discretion for which they can in 
no way be held accountable. The absence of any regulation of discretionary powers 
in the exercise of criminal enforcement leads, of necessity, to very varied use of the 
powers of investigation and criminal initiative on the part of individual prosecutors’ 
offices and prosecutors. Paradoxically, this severely undermines the very protection 
of the principle of the equality of the citizen before the criminal law that compul-
sory criminal action and independent public prosecutors were together supposed 
to guarantee, according to the authors of the Constitution. This goes hand in hand 
with all the negative consequences that derive from this system for the protection of 
civil rights during criminal proceedings, the correct and efficient use of material and 
human resources, and the efficient repression of the more complex forms of crimi-
nality, which often requires close coordination of the activities of the various public 
prosecutors’ offices. 
I would like to close with a thought about the use of the concept of independence. I 
believe that using it interchangeably with reference both to judges and to public pros-
ecutors generates some confusion and misunderstanding, which, though particularly 
evident in the Italian case, are present also in the debate about judicial systems in 
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other civil law countries. From the functional point of view, the term “independence” 
has, and cannot but have, different meanings when referring to the status of the judge 
and to that of the public prosecutor. That is, the objectives, and also the guarantees, 
of independence in democratic countries are, as a rule, different for judges and pros-
ecutors. To engage in a thorough comparative discussion of the differences and the 
negative consequences that occur when those differences are not taken into account 
goes beyond the scope of this presentation. Here I shall simply point out that the in-
dependence of the judge is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition to guarantee 
some of the fundamental characteristics of his specific role—that is to say, that of a 
passive agent who impartially judges controversies submitted to him by others, after 
having heard the contending parties on an equal footing. It is therefore necessary to 
create the best conditions to ensure that he is free from influences from within and/
or outside the judiciary. In a democracy, the very legitimacy of his role depends not 
only on his being, but also on his appearing, independent and impartial.
The functional characteristics of the role of public prosecutors are very different. 
Far from being passive and super partes, their role is by its very nature essentially 
active. It is the prosecutor’s duty to promote enforcement of criminal law, and in 
many countries, including Italy, to direct investigations by the police. As a party to 
the proceedings, he cannot be impartial, nor does the legitimacy of his role depend 
on appearing to be so. The difference between the roles of judges and public prosecu-
tors is visible even when considering them from the perspective of internal indepen-
dence: in order to be effective, the activity of the public prosecutor often requires 
hierarchical coordination of his activities with other members of his office or with 
the activities of other prosecutors’ offices, while for judges, similar hierarchical co-
ordination of their activities and their decisions would represent a clear violation of 
their independence. 
Also of great relevance are the differences with regard to external independence. The 
intrinsically discretionary nature of criminal action makes the definition of the pri-
orities to be followed in its exercise an integral and relevant part of the choices that 
must be made for the effective repression of criminal phenomena. Due to their great 
political relevance, such choices are as a rule defined, at least in general terms, in the 
context of the democratic process, and are binding on public prosecutors. Therefore, 
the external independence of public prosecution is not necessarily compromised by 
instructions received from the outside (as would be the case for judges). The external 
independence of the public prosecutor consists, rather, in not receiving instructions 
of a specific nature related to specific cases, in a non-transparent way.
-
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I. Background
South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994 was achieved by means of a negoti-
ated settlement involving the government at the time, the African National Congress 
(ANC), as well as various other political forces.
The “Interim Constitution,”1 a key result of these negotiations,2 provided inter alia 
for electoral rules that the country’s first democratic election was to be conducted 
in April 1994. The Interim Constitution also contained a number of Constitutional 
Principles on which the “Final” Constitution was to be based.3
Key among the principles, for the purposes of this report, is that the Final Constitu-
tion must be the “supreme law” binding on all organs of state and all levels of govern-
ment.4 There must be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsive-
ness, and openness.5 The judiciary must be appropriately qualified, independent, and 
impartial and have the power and jurisdiction to safeguard and enforce the Constitu-
tion and all fundamental rights.6
The Interim Constitution also provided for an amnesty application process for politi-
cally-motivated crimes committed during the Apartheid era.7 This lead to the passing 
of legislation providing for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process.8
South Africa thus entered into a process of institution building and constitutionalism 
after 1994. Grand reconstruction plans focused on remodeling services, legislative 
reform, and institutional transformation and development. During this period, state 
institutions, including criminal justice departments, had to perform under difficult 
conditions while simultaneously transforming to meet the needs of the new consti-
tutional state. New laws and policies aimed at building a new South Africa based on 
a culture of human rights, democracy, and non-racialism were promulgated. In 1998 
alone, 132 pieces of legislation were considered by Parliament.9
The Final Constitution dramatically improved the legislative framework for account-
ability, providing that all executive organs of state must be accountable to Parlia-
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, assented to 25 January 1994, com-
menced 27 April 1994.
2 The negotiations commenced in December 1991.
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, Schedule 4.
4 Constitutional Principle IV, Schedule 4, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
5 Constitutional Principle VI, Schedule 4, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
6 Constitutional Principle VII, Schedule 4, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
7 (No Section) Chapter 15, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
8 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
9 J. Redpath, “Government on the March,” Fast Facts (South African Institute of Race Relations), 
November 1998, at 2.
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ment.10 Parliamentary portfolio committees were established to give effect to this 
oversight function. Parliament and it committees have the power to summon any 
person to appear before them, give evidence, or produce documents, and they may 
receive petitions, representations or submissions from the public.11 In addition to 
Parliamentary oversight, the Constitution established a range of independent over-
sight institutions (known as Chapter 9 institutions), including the Auditor General, 
the Public Protector, and the South African Human Rights Commission.12
South Africa’s legal system is based on a combination of Roman-Dutch law and Eng-
lish common law which must be interpreted in light of the Constitution. Most of 
South Africa’s substantive legal principles are based on Roman-Dutch law, while the 
majority of procedural and evidentiary laws are based on English common law.
South Africa’s prosecution service
During much of the twentieth century, there was no formal or substantive separation 
of powers between South Africa’s most senior prosecutors—the provincial attorneys-
general—and the executive, and direct or indirect political influence on the prosecu-
tion process was possible.13 However, in 1992, the authority to institute prosecutions 
became the sole responsibility of the attorneys-general and their delegates, free of 
ministerial interference, via a legislative amendment that removed the power of the 
Minister of Justice to interfere with the attorney-generals’ decisions.14 The function 
of the Minister of Justice in relation to attorneys-general was reduced to that of a 
co-coordinator, ensuring that the reports of the attorneys-general were submitted to 
Parliament. At most, the Minister could ask an attorney-general to furnish him with 
reports and provide explanations regarding the handling of particular cases.15
The amendment was at the time viewed with some cynicism, promulgated as it was 
by the old government barely two years before a new government, with new Minis-
ters, was to come into being. The legislative amendment provided that an attorney-
general held office until age 65 and could not be removed except for misconduct, 
ill-health, or incapacity.16 The ANC regarded the legislation as “an attempt by the 
old-order prosecutors to protect their entrenched positions.”17
10 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 55(2).
11 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 56. 
12 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, chapter 9 (the whole). 
13 For example, section 3(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 allowed the Minister of Justice 
to reverse any decision arrived at by an attorney-general: “An attorney-general shall exercise his 
authority and perform his functions under this Act or under any other law subject to the control 
and directions of the Minister, who may reverse any decision arrived at by an attorney-general and 
may himself in general or in any specific matter exercise any part of such authority and perform any 
of such functions.”
14 Section 8 of the Attorney General Act 92 of 1992 repealed section 3(5) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act  51 of 1977.
15 Attorney General Act 92 of 1992, section 5 and 6.
16 Attorney General Act 92 of 1992, section 4(1)(a) �� (2)(a).
17 D. Van Zyl Smit �� E. Steyn., “Prosecuting authority in the new South Africa,” (unpublished paper 
prepared for workshop of experts on the review of criminal justice in Northern Ireland, Belfast), 9 
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The new Parliament of 1994, termed the Constitutional Assembly for the purposes 
of passing the final Constitution, introduced a constitutional provision dealing spe-
cifically with a prosecuting authority for the country.18 This provision provides, inter 
alia, that:
▶ A single national prosecuting authority, structured according to an Act of Par-
liament, shall have the power to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the 
state.19
▶ National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its 
functions without fear, favor, or prejudice.20
▶ The President shall appoint a National Director of Public Prosecutions who is 
head of the prosecuting authority.21
▶ The National Director determines, with the concurrence of the Minister of Jus-
tice and after consultation with the Directors of Public Prosecutions, general 
policy to be observed in the prosecution process.22
▶ The National Director must issue policy directives to be observed in the pros-
ecution process,23 and the National Director may intervene in the prosecution 
process when policy directives are not complied with.24
▶ The National Director may review a decision to prosecute or not prosecute, 
after consulting the relevant Directors of Public Prosecutions.25
▶ The Minister of Justice must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting 
authority.26
One of the attorneys-general at the time objected to the inclusion of this provision in 
the constitutional text during the Constitutional certification process.27 The grounds 
raised were that the provision impinged on the separation of powers between the legis-
lature, executive, and judiciary and interfered with appropriate checks and balances.
The Constitutional Court rejected the objection, arguing that the prosecuting au-
thority is not part of the judiciary, and that the appointment of the National Director 
of Public Prosecutions by the President does not in itself contravene the doctrine of 
separation of powers.28 Moreover, the court noted that the constitutional provision 
requiring that subsequent legislation had to ensure the prosecuting authority exer-
cise its functions without fear, favor, or prejudice was in fact a guarantee of prosecu-
June 1999, at 5.
18 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(1)-(5).
19 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(1) read with section 
179(2).
20 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(4).
21 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(1)(a).
22 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(5)(a).
23 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(5)(b).
24 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(5)(c).
25 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(5)(d).
26 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 section 179(6).
27 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). Summary of objections and submissions, An-
nexure 3.
28 See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996  1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), at para. 141.
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torial independence.29 Parliament duly passed the National Prosecuting Authority 
Act (NPA Act) in 1998 to give effect to the constitutional provision dealing with the 
prosecuting authority and to spell out the details of a new prosecutorial system for 
the country.30
Recent strategic developments
Despite the various problems encountered by the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA), many argue that is has performed well since being established, especially con-
sidering the dysfunctional system it inherited from the apartheid era.
However, several serious challenges still remain, including: poor court performance, 
a growing backlog of cases, low prosecution rates, growing numbers of sentenced 
prisoners and prisoners awaiting trial, the need to maintain positive public percep-
tions, clarifying the role and positioning of its elite crime fighting unit, the Director-
ate of Special Operations, allegations of criminality among its own members,31 high 
staff turnover,32 and the need to deal with the consequences of complex and politi-
cally sensitive investigations into high profile political figures.
The leadership of the NPA identified these challenges and initiated an extensive re-
view of the organization, culminating in Strategy 2020.33 The key strategic change brought 
about by Strategy 2020 is summarized in the new mission statement of the NPA:
Guided by the Constitution, we in the National Prosecuting Authority ensure jus-
tice for the victims of crime by prosecuting without fear, favor or prejudice, and by 
working with our partners and the public to solve and prevent crime.3
This new mission of crime prevention will be served by, inter alia, prosecutors taking 
a problem-solving approach to crime, enhancing their role in guiding investigations, 
applying case flow management principles, and engaging in joint problem solving 
with other stakeholders in connection with crime prevention.35
Some commentators have criticized this approach, which encompasses crime pre-
vention as being too broad and detracting from the NPA’s core function of prosecu-
tion, while others are grateful that a government agency perceived to be relatively 
successful is taking the lead on crime prevention.
29 See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996  1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), at para. 146.
30 National Prosecuting Authority Act  32 of 1998.
31 M. Letsoalo, “Ructions rock Scorpions,” Mail & Guardian, November 3, 2006, (page unknown) 
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=288833��area=/insight/insight__national/
(accessed 10 July 2007).
32 During 2005/06 some 20% of all NPA employees resigned. (No author) Annual Report 2005/06, 
National Prosecuting Authority (2007), at 70.
33 Id. at 9.
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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II. Structure and Organization of the National Prosecuting Authority
2.1. Internal structure of the National Prosecuting Authority
The NPA is structured internally into business units, arranged under four Deputy 
National Directors and a Chief Executive Officer. The CEO leads the administra-
tive arm of the NPA, which includes corporate services; an Integrity Management 
Unit to monitor, evaluate, and maintain the NPA’s integrity (including preventing 
and overseeing the investigation by business units of any internal criminal, unethi-
cal, or dishonest behavior or mismanagement)36; and an Internal Audit Unit, which 
is responsible for risk management and governance processes.37
The largest of the business units is the National Prosecution Service (NPS), which 
performs the core function of instituting criminal proceedings on behalf of the 
state.38 The remaining business units operate independently of the NPS, providing 
services that are supportive in nature or involve specialized types of prosecution. 
Other business units include:
▶ The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), which engages in specialized 
investigation and prosecution of organized crime, including racketeering and 
money laundering offenses, complex and serious financial crime, and public 
and private sector corruption.39 The DSO was launched by President Thabo 
Mbeki in September 1999, soon after he became President. Opposition par-
ties voiced concerns that the DSO would become Mbeki’s elite “private police 
force.”40 However the DSO’s apparently effective operation and tendency to target 
the wealthy and powerful,41 coupled with  well-managed publicity, soon made the 
DSO popular among the public, but brought the unit and the NPA into conflict 
with the police.
▶ The Asset Forfeiture Unit, which focuses on the implementation of civil and 
criminal asset forfeiture legislation.42
36 The Integrity Management Unit does not have its own investigative capacity. (No author) “Integrity 
Management Unit,” NPA website, (undated), http://www.npa.gov.za/ReadContent386.aspx
37 Annual Report 2005/06, supra note 32, at 99.
38 Id. at 18.
39 Id. at 33.
40 J. Redpath, The Scorpions: Analyzing the Directorate of Special Operations, Institute for Security 
Studies Monograph Series No. 96, March 2004, at 12-13.
41 Id. at 50-56.
42 Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998, Chapters 5 and 6. 
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▶ Four business units that are clustered under the National Special Services Divi-
sion:
▷ The Witness Protection Unit provides specialized witness protection ser-
vices to law enforcement agencies, both local and international, under 
witness protection legislation.43
▷ The Priority Crime Litigation Unit, created in 2003 by Presidential procla-
mation,44 manages and directs the prosecution of: 
◆ Rome Statute45 crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.
◆ Crimes against the state, including national and international terrorism.
◆ Contraventions of legislation outlawing mercenary action46 and nu-
clear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation,47 and legisla-
tion governing arms control,48 the use of nuclear energy,49 and the 
intelligence services.50
◆ Any prosecutions or missing persons cases arising out of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission process.51
▷ Activities of the Sexual Offenses and Community Affairs (SOCA) Unit 
include formulating appropriate policy in relation to the prosecution of 
sexual offenses, establishing and maintaining special courts for the pros-
ecution of sexual offenses, developing community awareness programs 
and training plans around sexual offenses, as well as managing domestic 
violence cases.52
▷ The Specialized Commercial Crime Unit prosecutes complex commercial 
crime cases emanating from the provincial branches of the South African 
Police Service.53
43 Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998.
44 Proclamation in terms of section 13(1)(c) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 
1998: (no gazette number) Proclamation by the President of the Republic of South Africa, Na-
tional Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998, March 24, 2003, http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/
PCLU%20PROCLAMATION.tif (accessed July 20, 2007).
45 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Act 27 of 2002.
46 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998.
47 Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993.
48 National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002.
49 Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999.
50 Intelligence Services Act 65 of 2002.
51 (No gazette number) Proclamation by the President of the Republic of South Africa, Nation-
al Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998, 24 March 2003, http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/
PCLU%20PROCLAMATION.tif (accessed 20 July 2007).
52 Offenses in terms of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998.
53 Annual Report 2005/6, supra note 32, at 46.
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2.2.  Internal structure of the National Prosecution Service 
The National Prosecution Service is led by a Deputy National Director.54 Provincial 
leadership of the NPS is provided by nine Directors of Public Prosecution (DPPs).55 
The primary responsibility for instituting and conducting criminal proceedings lies 
with the DPPs, in respect of offenses committed in their jurisdiction, except for 
prosecutions falling within the exclusive authority of the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions.56 In practice, the DPPs authorize prosecutors within their jurisdiction 
to institute and conduct criminal proceedings.57
Each DPP is supported by senior managers, that is, Corporate Managers, Deputy 
Directors of Public Prosecution, and Chief Prosecutors, who have responsibility in 
the high courts and lower courts respectively.58 Figure 1 outlines the various types of 
courts in South Africa. Some 1,567 criminal courts, both high and lower courts, are 
in session nationally every month, with 1,037 of them being district courts where 
prosecutors conduct the bulk of prosecutions.59
Figure 1: Court Structure in South Africa
Courts 
Magistrates’ Courts High  
Courts
Supreme  
Court  
of Appeal
Constitutional  
CourtDistrict Regional 
Offense  
jurisdiction
Not murder,  
rape or treason Not treason All offenses
Appeals  
only
Constitutional  
matters
Sentencing  
jurisdiction 3 years* 15 years* Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited
Presiding  
officers Magistrates
Regional  
Magistrates Judges
Judges  
of Appeal
Constitutional  
Court Judges
No. of presiding 
officers 1,500 285 210 20 11
* Unless specifically extended by legislation.
54 Id. at 18.
55 South Africa is comprised of nine provinces. (No author) “Directors of Public Prosecutions,” (un-
dated),  http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/Directors%20of%20Public%20Prosecutions%20(N
PA).doc
56 (No author) “Career Opportunities at the NPA,” (undated), http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/
Career.pdf
57 Id. 
58 M. Mpshe, “Justice in our society so that people can live in freedom and security,” Stakeholder Con-
ference 2007 hosted by the NPA, March 28, 2007, at 3.
59 C. De Beer, “Charts of National Performance Overview 2002-2005”, (undated), NPA spreadsheet 
obtained via email communication, May 26, 2006 (no page numbers).
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Deputy Directors of Public Prosecutions oversee and conduct prosecutions in the 
High Courts. In addition, there are several senior state advocates and state advocates 
(who, unlike Senior Public Prosecutors and prosecutors, have a right of appearance 
in the High Court), who conduct most of the High Court prosecutions. Deputy Di-
rectors usually prosecute the most serious and contentious cases, while DPPs rarely 
appear in court.
The lower courts are overseen by 36 Chief Prosecutors, who are each responsible for 
an allocated number of magisterial district areas. There are 354 magisterial district 
areas in the country.60 The Chief Prosecutor is responsible for the overall manage-
ment of all the prosecutors in his area of responsibility. This management role is 
largely related to administrative issues, however, and the Chief Prosecutor seldom 
interferes with prosecutors’ day-to-day prosecutorial decision-making.
Office organization: Each office, depending on its size, may have a Chief Prosecutor 
and/or one or more Senior Public Prosecutors (SPPs) and/or Control Prosecutors 
(responsible for case allocation) who provide leadership and oversight at that court 
center, plus Public Prosecutors. Individual offices generally have their own internal 
arrangements and hierarchy structures; there is no standard or mandatory pattern.
Prosecutors assigned to prosecute in the regional court at a court center are termed 
regional court prosecutors. Those assigned to prosecute in the district courts are 
termed district court prosecutors. A very small court center may have only a district 
court (more serious cases are referred to the nearest regional court) with a small 
prosecutors’ office headed by a senior (with a small “s”) prosecutor and not a Se-
nior Public Prosecutor. By contrast, larger offices normally have more than one SPP 
among whom responsibilities are divided.
The SPP is responsible for the general management of the prosecutors under him and 
can overrule prosecutorial decisions taken by any prosecutor under him. In practice, 
the decision whether to prosecute most serious and high-profile regional cases is 
taken by the SPP as a matter of course. The SPP is also usually the only prosecutor 
in the office who can take informal appeals from the public on matters within the 
relevant court’s jurisdiction.61
Policy hierarchy: The National Director has broad authority over prosecutors in the 
exercise of all their duties.62 The National Director sets policy for the NPA, with the 
concurrence of the Minister of Justice and after consulting the provincial Directors.63 
The Minister’s right of concurrence means that he can effectively veto policy propos-
als, but the National Director can disregard provincial Directors’ advice.64
60 (No author) “Magisterial Districts,” Statistics South Africa Website, (undated) http://www.statssa.
gov.za/census01/census96/HTML/Metadata/Codelists/Magdist.html (accessed July 3, 2007).
61 These include appeals to have charges dropped, admission of guilt fines reduced (very common in 
respect of traffic infringements), or to reconsider a decision not to prosecute.
62 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(1).
63 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(5)(a), and National Pros-
ecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 21(1).
64 Van Zyl Smit �� Steyn, sopra note 17, at 9. 
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The National Director issues policy directives which “must be observed in the pros-
ecution process.”65 The first Prosecution Policy had to be submitted to Parliament 
within six months of the National Director being appointed.66 The first set of policy 
directives came into operation in 1999, “to deal with all the professional duties of 
prosecutors,”67 and all subsequent amendments must be included in the National Direc-
tor’s annual report to the Minister who, in turn, submits it to Parliament for a vote.68
A provincial Director may also issue circulars with general instructions to prosecutors 
in her jurisdiction, provided these are not inconsistent with the policy directives of the 
National Director.69 The NPA has also issued prosecutors with an ethics manual.70
Prosecutors’ decisional authority: The National Director can intervene in any prosecu-
tion process in which policy directives are not being followed.71 Even if a prosecutor 
follows all policy directives, the National Director may still review his decision to 
prosecute or not prosecute after consulting the relevant Director and taking repre-
sentations from the accused, the complainant, and any other person whom the Di-
rector considers relevant.72 However, the Director may not intervene in the conduct 
of the case other than the decision to prosecute.73 More broadly, the National Direc-
tor may conduct any investigation he deems necessary concerning a prosecution, 
and may order provincial Directors to submit reports on any case or prosecution.74 
The National Director’s power to review decisions to prosecute can serve to ensure 
that prosecutorial independence is not abused. However, this power also poses a “po-
tential danger that the National Director could prevent a prosecution that would be 
politically embarrassing.”75
In practice, prosecutors of a more senior rank with administrative authority over 
junior colleagues in a territorial jurisdiction can overrule a prosecutor’s decision 
whether to prosecute or not.76 This happens frequently at the lower levels of the pros-
ecution service, with inexperienced junior prosecutors asking their seniors for advice 
65 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 21(1).
66 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 21(2).
67 (No Author) National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Policy Manual, National Prosecuting 
Authority, October 1999, at B.1.
68 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 21(2).
69 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 24(4)(c)(ii)(bb) read with section 24(5).
70 (No author) Ethics: A practical guide to the ethical code of conduct for members of the National 
Prosecuting Authority, National Prosecuting Authority, March 2004. The manual is authored by 
the NPA’s Research and Policy Information Service Centre and vetted by the organization’s senior 
leadership. It covers a wide array of issues, including serving the public interest, prosecutors’ du-
ties to the court, prosecutors’ responsibilities to unrepresented accused, professional integrity and 
responsibility, and how prosecutors should interact with defense lawyers and state witnesses. The 
manual is advisory and describes its aim as “merely to provide a practical guide that will point 
prosecutors in the right direction” (at iv).
71 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(2)(b).
72 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(2)(c). 
73 Van Zyl Smit �� Steyn, sopra note 17, at 9.
74 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(4)(a).
75 J. Sarkin and S, Cowen, “The draft National Prosecuting Authority Bill: A critique,” South African 
Criminal Journal (No. 1, 1997), at 70.
76 See National Prosecuting Authority Act  32 of 1998, section 25.
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and guidance in individual cases. Among middle and higher ranks of the prosecution 
service, however, such interference—especially if unsolicited—is rare.
Other central functions affecting policy: The annual budget proposal prepared by the 
Department of Justice includes “service delivery” objectives and indicators, with 
quantifiable goals for performance in certain functional areas77 and performance in-
dicators—such as, for example, conviction rates, number of incidents threatening 
witness safety, and average court cycle times.78
In addition, all prosecutors are required to sign a performance contract when they 
are appointed, and all senior managers (above the level of Deputy Director) are re-
quired to sign standardized yearly performance contracts; these contracts outline the 
key performance indicators for the individual prosecutor.
All human resource functions of the prosecution service—for appointment, transfer, 
discipline, and dismissal—are centralized in Corporate Services at the head office of 
the NPA. For example, if a senior prosecutor in a specific office wants to appoint ad-
ditional staff, he must submit a request through the provincial Director to the head 
office. If approved, the position is advertised and the human resources division at the 
head office conducts a short-listing process.
2.3. Budgetary process
Each year the Department of Justice, in consultation with the National Director, pre-
pares a budget proposal for the NPA.79 Parliament then votes a budget for the NPA, 
out of which the NPA has to pay all its expenses.80 The Director-General of Justice81 
accounts for state monies received or paid on behalf of the NPA.82
The Department of Justice provides the National Treasury with a budget estimate for 
the forthcoming year. This document, together with those of all other national gov-
ernment departments, is submitted to Parliament by the Minister of Finance in his 
annual national budget speech, and is at that point a public document.
The Department of Justice’s budget proposal contains a separate section for the 
NPA, which typically includes one- and three-year budget estimates broken down by 
77 These areas include, for example, prosecution of criminal cases; access to justice for women and 
children; confident and safe witnesses in court for the witness protection program. See (no author) 
200 Estimates of National Expenditure, Safety and Security, Vote 25, National Treasury, February 
2004, Pretoria, at 649-652.
78 (No author) 200 Estimates of National Expenditure, Safety and Security, Vote 25, National Treasury, 
February 2004, Pretoria, at 649-652. 
79 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 36(2).
80 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 36(1).
81 The Director-General is the highest ranking public servant in a national government department, 
reporting directly to the Minister.
82 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 36(3)(a).
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functional area and economic classification.83 The budget proposal also includes “service 
delivery” objectives and indicators for the functional areas for the forthcoming year.84
2.4. The status of the Prosecutor General (National Director) and his deputies
The political status of the National Director is high; he reports directly to the Minister 
of Justice. The reporting lines of the NPA run parallel to that of the Department of Jus-
tice.  In essence the NPA is an entity entirely separate from the Department of Justice.
The NPA Act, as required by the Constitution, makes provision for the establishment 
of a single National Prosecuting Authority, headed by the National Director. The Na-
tional Director is appointed by the President for a non-renewable term of ten years, 
and can only be removed by the President and Parliament for misconduct, sustained 
ill-health, incapacity, or because he generally is not a fit or proper person for office.85 
The appointment is largely discretionary.86 The President also sets the remuneration 
and terms of service for the National Director, provided that the salary of the Na-
tional Director is at least that of a High Court judge.87
The National Director has complete authority over all members as well as over the 
exercising of all powers by members of the prosecution service.88 The National Direc-
tor may review a decision to prosecute or not.89 This power does not, however, give 
the National Director the authority to intervene with the way in which a case is being 
prosecuted.90 However, when policy directives are not being complied with in any 
prosecution process, the National Director may intervene.91
In practice, the National Director receives representations from the public relating to 
the way in which specific cases are being prosecuted. If deemed necessary, a meeting 
is arranged with the provincial Director in the relevant province to discuss the case in 
question. The DPP has the final say on the way in which the case is prosecuted within 
the relevant jurisdiction, within the bounds of policy directives.
The National Director determines and issues policy directives,92 but this is in con-
sultation with (“in consultation with” implies consensus is required) the Minister of 
83 See, e.g., (no author) 2007 Estimates of National Expenditure, Vote 22, Justice and Constitutional 
Development, National Treasury, February 2007, Pretoria, http://www.treasury.gov.za/
84 See, e.g., id. 
85 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 12(1).
86 Whomever the President appoints must have legal qualifications to practice law in all courts of the 
country, be a South African citizen and “be a fit and proper person.” National Prosecuting Author-
ity Act 32 of 1998, section 9(1).
87 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 17(1). In practice, the National Director’s 
salary is stable, and usually reflects an annual cost-of-living increase.
88 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(1).
89 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(2)(c).
90 Van Zyl Smit �� Steyn, sopra note 17, at 14.
91 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(2)(b).
92 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(2)(a). 
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Justice and the provincial DPPs.93 The National Director does not directly appoint 
senior staff. The President or the Minister of Justice makes the senior appointments.
The President appoints up to four Deputy National Directors of Public Prosecutions, 
after consultation with the Minister of Justice and the Deputy National Director of 
Public Prosecutions.94 Deputy National Directors hold office until the age of 65, un-
less they choose to vacate office or are removed for misconduct or inability to hold 
office.95 
The President also appoints, after consultation with the Minister of Justice and Na-
tional Director, provincial Directors of Public Prosecutions.96 The Minister of Justice 
appoints provincial Deputy Directors of Public Prosecutions after consultation with 
the National Director.97 As with the National Director, the remuneration and terms 
and conditions of service of the Deputy National Directors and the provincial Direc-
tors are determined by the President.98
The National Director must submit an annual report to the Minister of Justice, which 
the Minister must then submit to Parliament within 14 days of its next sitting.99 The 
report must include information on the activities of the National Director, his senior 
staff and the prosecuting authority as a whole; the personnel situation of the NPA; the 
financial status of the administration and operation of the NPA; recommendations 
or suggestions regarding the prosecuting authority; information relating to training 
programs for prosecutors; and any other information the National Director deems 
necessary.100 At his discretion, the National Director may also submit to the Minister 
or Parliament reports on matters relating to the prosecution service.101
The National Director, Deputy National Directors and Directors must give written 
notice to the Minister of Justice of all direct and indirect pecuniary interests. More-
over, Directors and Deputy Directors may not perform any paid work outside their 
official duties without the consent of the President.102
93 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 21(1). 
94 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 11(1). 
95 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 12(6), (7) and (8).
96 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 13(a).
97 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 15(1)(a).
98 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 17(1). The salary of a Deputy National 
Director may not be less than 85% of the National Director’s salary, and the salary of a provincial 
Director may not be less than 80% of the National Director’s.
99 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 35(2)(a).
100 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(4)(g).
101 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 35(2)(b).
102 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 39.
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2.5. The status of individual prosecutors
Prosecutors are appointed on the recommendation of the National Director.103 How-
ever, the Minister, in consultation with the National Director and after consultation 
with the provincial Directors, prescribes the appropriate legal qualifications for the 
appointment of a person as prosecutor in a lower court.104 Line prosecutors’ career 
paths are largely governed by public service rules. Conditions of service of Deputy 
Directors and prosecutors, except remuneration, must be determined according to 
the Public Service Act, including the advertisement of positions, appointment, ben-
efits, disciplinary actions, and dismissal. Promotions are determined at head office 
level on the basis of performance reports received from line managers.
Appointment: According to the Public Service Act, anyone appointed to the public 
service must be a South African citizen, of good character, and someone who com-
plies with any prescribed requirements.105
Due regard to equality and the other democratic values and principles enshrined in 
the Constitution must be taken into account in making appointments. All persons 
who qualify for the appointment must be considered. Evaluation of persons must be 
based on training, skills, competence, knowledge, and the need to redress the imbal-
ances of the past to achieve a public service broadly representative of the South Afri-
can people, including representation according to race, gender, and disability.106
The NPA’s staffing should “reflect broadly the racial and gender composition” of the 
country.107 Some 70 percent of the NPA’s employees are from “previously disadvan-
taged” racial population groups, while women comprise 47 percent.108 However, the In-
dian/Asian (6 percent) and white (30 percent) racial groups are respectively 2.5 and 3.2 
times over-represented compared to the racial composition of the country as a whole.109
Tenure: The security of tenure of prosecutors below the level of Director is the same 
as for any government employee, as dictated by the Public Service Act.110 Accord-
ing to the Act, public servants may only be dismissed on a number of prescribed 
grounds. These include continued ill-health, the abolition of a post or institutional 
reorganization, where a dismissal will promote efficiency in the department where 
103 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 16(1): “Prosecutors shall be appointed on 
the recommendation of the National Director or a member of the prosecuting authority designated 
for that purpose by the National Director, and subject to the laws governing the public service.”
104 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 16(2).
105 Public Service Act 103 of 1994, section 10(1).
106 Public Service Act 103 of 1994, section 11(1).
107 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 8.
108 Annual Report 2005/6, supra note 32, at 74.
109 According to the mid-year population estimates published by Statistics South Africa on July 3, 
2007, the SA population is 79.6% black, 9.1% white, 8.9% Colored, and 2.5% Indian/Asian;  and 50.7% 
female. (no author) Mid-Year Population Estimates 2007 Statistics South Africa, July 3, 2007, at 1, http://
www.statssa.gov.za/PublicationsHTML/P03022007/html/P03022007.html (accessed July 20, 2007).
110 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 19. Public Service Act 103 of 1994, section 17(2).
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the person concerned is employed, where it is in the interest of the public service, 
on account of unfitness to perform the job or incapacity to perform it efficiently, on 
account of misconduct, or where continued employment constitutes a security risk 
for the state.111 During the first 12 months of their appointment, prosecutors below 
the level of Director are on probation and can be dismissed with one month’s written 
notice, or immediately if the person’s conduct is unsatisfactory.112
Unless one or more of the aforementioned reasons for dismissal is present, prosecu-
tors below the level of Director have security of tenure until they reach the age of 65, 
at which time they are generally obliged to retire.113
Promotion: Prosecutors below Director level are paid a salary in accordance with the 
scale for rank and grade determined by the Minister of Justice, after consultation 
with the National Director and the Minister of Public Service and Administration 
and with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, and subject to Parliament’s 
approval.114 The salary scales of prosecutors (including Deputy Directors) must be 
published in the Government Gazette.115 A reduction in the salaries of Deputy Direc-
tors and prosecutors requires an Act of Parliament.116
Restriction on activities: Prosecutors, as public servants, may not perform outside 
remunerative work without authorization from the National Director.117 Prosecutors 
may not accept any gift, donation, treat, favor, or sponsorship (other than in a bona 
fide private capacity) which may compromise, or may appear to compromise, their 
professional integrity or that of the profession as a whole.118
Prosecutors are permitted to join unions. Most belong to a union representing either 
public servants or prosecutors specifically.119 Many senior prosecutors also belong to 
a professional association for state advocates.120 Prosecutors, as public servants, may 
belong to and serve on the management of a lawful political party and attend public 
political meetings, but they may not preside or speak at such meetings and are pro-
hibited from drawing up or publishing any writing or delivering a public speech to 
promote or prejudice the interests of any political party.121
Prosecutors perform an “essential service,” under the terms of labor legislation.122 
The import of this is that participation in a strike may constitute a fair reason for 
dismissal (i.e., the strike is illegal and not protected).123 However, in both 2001 and 
111 Public Service Act 103 of 1994, section 17(2).
112 Public Service Act 103 of 1994, section 13(5).
113 Public Service Act 103 of 1994, section 16(1).
114 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 18(1).
115 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 18(1).
116 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 18(6).
117 Public Service Act 103 of 1994, section 30.
118 (No Author) National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Policy Manual, National Prosecuting 
Authority, October 1999, at B.121.
119 Public Service Association (PSA) and National Union of Prosecutors of South Africa (NUPSA).
120 Society of State Advocates.
121 Public Service Act 103 of 1994, section 36.
122 Government Gazette GNR.1216 of September 12, 1997.
123 Section 68(5), Labor Relations Act 66 of 1995.
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2007 prosecutors participated in strike action during public servants’ strikes.124 It is 
unclear whether dismissals of prosecutors followed these strikes.
2.6. Individual accountability of prosecutors
A member of the NPA is obliged to “serve impartially and exercise, carry out or per-
form his or her powers, duties and functions in good faith and without fear, favor or 
prejudice and subject only to the Constitution and the law.”125 Prosecutors must take 
an oath or make an affirmation to this effect.126 No one may interfere with or obstruct 
the work of the prosecuting authority.127
Evaluation: Senior Public Prosecutors and Chief Prosecutors are responsible for the 
day-to-day management of the prosecutors under their control. SPPs must complete 
progress and evaluation reports for all prosecutors in their office; these reports are 
submitted to the Chief Prosecutor and provincial Director. After approval by the Di-
rector, the reports are submitted to the NPA’s human resources department at head 
office. Such reports influence the awarding of promotions and performance bonuses. 
During 2005-06, some 96 percent of all posts in the NPA were evaluated.128
Disciplinary procedures: The National Director is obliged, after consultation with the 
Deputy National Directors and Directors, to advise the Minister of Justice on creat-
ing a process allowing individuals to register complaints about improper conduct by 
members of the NPA.129 The Integrity Management Unit launched a dedicated toll-
free integrity telephone “hotline” in 2005 to provide both NPA employees and the 
public with a mechanism to report concerns.130
Disciplinary hearings131 are carried out in accordance with applicable labor law.132 A 
total of 63 reports of misconduct were addressed in 2005-06, resulting in 22 internal 
disciplinary hearings.133 More than a third (36 percent) of the allegations of miscon-
duct related to theft, bribery, corruption, defeating the ends of justice, or fraud.134
124 P. Govender, and B. Naidu, “Three case studies paint a gloomy picture of bread-and-butter issues in 
the civil service,” Sunday Times, June 3, 2007, (page unknown).
125 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 32(1)(a).
126 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 32(2)(a).
127 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 32(1)(b). See also National Prosecuting Au-
thority Act 32 of 1998, section 41(1) (providing for a fine or imprisonment for such an offense).
128 Annual Report 2005/6, supra note 32, at 67.
129 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(5).
130 Id. at 15.
131 A “disciplinary hearing” is a formal procedural step at which the employee has an opportunity to 
present her case against the employer’s allegations, before an employer may dismiss an employee, 
even in the case of serious misconduct such as assault or theft.
132 Labor relations in the public service are governed by a myriad of acts. The legislative framework is 
further enhanced through a number of collective agreements reached in the Public Service Coor-
dinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC) and the various sectoral bargaining councils. In this context, 
the Disciplinary Code and Procedures for the Public Service, effective as of  July 1, 1999, and Sched-
ule 8: Code of Good Practice: Dismissal Public Service Act 66 of 1995 are particularly relevant. 
133 Annual Report 2005/6, supra note 32, at 85.
134 Id. 
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Civil and criminal liability: Traditionally, individual prosecutors are not criminally 
or civilly liable for anything they do in “good faith” in performance of their duties.135 
The  state is held vicariously liable for any wrongful conduct (including negligent 
acts or omissions) by any prosecutor acting in his official capacity.136 This has been 
extended to cover damage inflicted by a party unrelated to the state, as a result of 
negligence on the part of a state official.137
Code of conduct: The NPA has a code of conduct, with which all prosecutors must 
comply.138 Prosecutors’ performance contracts include an undertaking to comply 
with the code of conduct, and prosecutors who fail to comply with the code can have 
internal disciplinary proceedings instituted against them.139 The National Director 
drafts the code of conduct for the NPA in consultation with the Minister of Justice, 
the Deputy National Directors, and the provincial DPPs.140 The code of conduct must 
be published in the Government Gazette, and all new prosecutors receive a copy. The 
code of conduct emphasizes the essential need for prosecutions to be fair and effec-
tive and for prosecutors to act without fear, favor or prejudice.141 It contains a number 
of specific prescriptions on how this is to be accomplished.142
2.7. Training of prosecutors
Preparatory education: Legal and investigation positions in the NPA at entry level 
must be advertised externally, excluding positions earmarked for Aspirant Prosecu-
tors and DSO Trainee Investigators.143 Aspirant Prosecutors must have a school Se-
nior Certificate pass with matriculation exemption (i.e. university entrance pass) fol-
lowed by a minimum of a B. Iuris diploma, but preferably a Bachelor of Laws (LLB).
Thereafter, prosecutors undergo an Aspirant Prosecutor Training Course, a six-
month program offered by the NPA at Justice College.144 Justice College is a branch 
of the Department of Justice that is responsible for the training of magistrates, pros-
ecutors, clerks of the court, interpreters, and other court officials.145 The continued 
employment of all new employees in the NPA is subject to a twelve-month probation 
135 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 42.
136 State Liability Act 20 of 1957, section 1. 
137 Minister of Safety & Security & another v Carmichele [2003] JOL 12119 (SCA).  
138 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(6)(a).
139 In terms of applicable labor legislation. 
140 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(6)(b). In framing the code of conduct 
account was taken of the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, the aims set out in the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act, and the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors.
141 See National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Policy Manual, supra note 118, at C.1.
142 Id. at C.2 – C.4.
143 (No publisher) National Prosecuting Authority, 2004, Recruitment, Selection and Appointment 
Policy for the National Prosecuting Authority, at 3.1.1(b), http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/
Recruitment%20Policy.doc (accessed July 10, 2007).
144 (No publisher) National Prosecuting Authority, undated, Career Opportunities at the NPA at (no 
page numbers)  http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/Career.pdf (accessed July 7, 2007).
145 (No publisher) Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2007, Justice College Work 
Program 2007-08, at cover page.
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period.146 The probationary period may be reduced or excluded under certain condi-
tions.147 Prosecutors who are Advocates of the High Court with an LLB qualification 
and at least two years prosecutorial experience can become state advocates and argue 
cases in the High Court.148
Continuing training: Yearly national training is organized for all prosecutors, includ-
ing refresher courses in general criminal procedure, evidence, and trial advocacy, and 
dedicated training in the latest legal developments relevant for prosecutors.149 Such 
training occurs via a selection process, as places on courses are limited.150 A detailed 
record is kept of prosecutors’ attendance. The NPA also encourages staff members to 
further their professional qualifications. Various scholarship schemes are offered to 
employees, ranging from full scholarships to interest-free student loans. Training is 
recorded on employees’ employment records and consequently considered together 
with performance reports for evaluation purposes.
III. Functions and Powers of Prosecutors
3.1. Prosecutorial functions in criminal justice
Prosecutors institute, conduct, and discontinue criminal proceedings on behalf of the 
state, and may carry out any activities necessary or incidental to these functions.151 
South Africa’s criminal procedure is based on an accusatorial system in which the 
judge plays the role of a detached umpire.152 South Africa does not have a pure ac-
cusatorial system, however, and elements of the inquisitorial approach have been 
adopted, particularly where this is necessary to protect vulnerable accused persons. 
For example, a presiding officer may not simply accept a plea of guilty, but must 
question an accused pleading guilty to establish whether in fact the accused should 
be found guilty.153
Prosecutors’ primary function is “to assist the court in ascertaining the truth.”154 
A prosecutor is ethically bound to display the highest degree of fairness to an ac-
146 Recruitment, Selection and Appointment Policy for the National Prosecuting Authority, supra note 
143, at  3.1.1(b).
147 Id. 
148 Career Opportunities at the NPA, supra note 144.
149 See inter alia  (no publisher) Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2007, Justice 
College Work Program 2007-08.
150 Id. 
151 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 20(1).
152 T. Geldenhuys ��  J. J. Joubert, et. al., Criminal Procedure Handbook, Kenwyn: Juta (1994), at 14.
153 Criminal Procedure Act 51of 1977, section 112.
154 S v Jija 1991 (2) SA 52 (E).
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cused.155 Thus, information favorable to the defense must be disclosed,156 and if there 
is a discrepancy between a witness’s oral testimony in court and earlier written state-
ment, the prosecutor must draw attention to this fact and make the written statement 
available to the defense for purposes of cross-examination.157 This legal position is 
reflected in the NPA policy manual.158
In practice, however, prosecutors’ performance is measured predominantly by their 
conviction rate—the number of successful convictions as a proportion of prosecu-
tions. Consequently, there is pressure on prosecutors to: (a) secure a conviction where 
a prosecution has been initiated, and (b) to decline to initiate a prosecution unless a 
conviction is assured.159
Discretion to initiate prosecution: South Africa does not have a system of mandatory 
prosecution. Rather, a prosecutor has a duty to prosecute if there is a prima facie case 
and there is no compelling reason for a refusal to prosecute.160 A prima facie case 
means that the allegations and supporting statements available to the prosecution are 
of such a nature that if proved in a court of law on the basis of admissible evidence, 
the court should convict.161 The prosecution does not have to ascertain whether there 
is a defense, but whether there is reasonable and probable cause for prosecution.162 
Prosecutor policy guidelines lay down that “the test of a reasonable prospect must be 
applied objectively after careful deliberation, to avoid an unjustified prosecution.”163
Prosecutors must act impartially and in good faith. “They should not allow their judg-
ment to be influenced by factors such as their personal views regarding the nature of 
the offense or the race, ethnicity or national origin, sex, religious beliefs, status, political 
views or sexual orientation of the victim, witnesses or the offender.”164 More broadly, 
the NPA as a whole and individual prosecutors are to exercise this discretion so as to 
“make the prosecution process more fair, transparent, consistent and predictable.”165
According to NPA policy, however, prosecutors may decline to prosecute even pro-
spectively successful cases should the “public interest demand otherwise.”166 In de-
termining the public interest, prosecutors are supposed to consider factors such as 
the nature and seriousness of the offense, the interests of the victim and the broader 
community, and the circumstances of the offender.167 This aspect of NPA policy has 
155 S v Mofokeng 1992 (2) SACR 261 (O) at 264C. 
156 S v Van Rensburg 1963 (2) SA 33 (N).
157 S v Kamte 1992 (1) SACR 677 (A).
158 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Policy Manual, supra note 118, at B.4.
159 See M. O’Donovan, J. Redpath, �� V. Karth, Indicators for Community Courts (draft report), Cape 
Town: Open Society Foundation for South Africa (June 2007), at 17 et. seq. 
160 T. Geldenhuys, �� J. J. Joubert, et. al., supra note 152, at 50.
161 Id.
162 Beckenstrater v Rotcher and Theunissen 1955 (1) SA 129 (A) at 137.
163 (No publisher) National Prosecuting Authority, (undated), Prosecution Policy, at A3.
164 Id. at A2.
165 Id. at A1. However, the Policy is written in “general terms to give direction rather than to pre-
scribe… to ensure consistency by preventing unnecessary disparity, without sacrificing the flex-
ibility that is often required to respond fairly and effectively to local conditions.” Id. at A2.
166 Id. at A4-A5.
167 Id. at A5-A6.
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only a limited echo within the law. For example, where the offense is trivial,168 the 
accused is very old or very young,169or where there are tragic personal circumstances 
of the accused,170 the case law indicates this may justify a decision not to prosecute a 
prospectively successful case.
In practice, NPA policy allowing for a decision not to prosecute has been broadly 
interpreted, making a decision to prosecute the exception rather than the rule. Thus 
in 2005-06, the NPA received 517,101 new dockets from the police, but prosecutions 
were instituted in only 74,059 (14 percent) of cases, and declined in 307,362 (60 per-
cent), while 136,589 cases (26 percent) were referred for further investigation.171
Furthermore, in practice the prosecution often does not have all the information 
required to make a decision on whether to prosecute on first appearance of the ac-
cused. For example, dockets sent to prosecutors may fail to indicate that fingerprint 
results are pending.172 But any matter that has been withdrawn before an accused has 
pleaded to the charge can be prosecuted on the same or related charges, where new 
evidence is subsequently discovered.173 
However, if a case is stopped after an accused has pleaded to the charge but before 
conviction, the accused is entitled to an acquittal and cannot be prosecuted in respect 
of the same facts again.174 A case can only be stopped with the consent of the National 
Director or a person authorized by the National Director.175
A court will not interfere with a bona fide (good faith) decision to prosecute176 or not 
to prosecute,177 nor will it compel a decision on whether to prosecute within a speci-
fied time period.178 However, the exercise of discretion by a DPP can be reviewed 
by the courts on the basis of ordinary administrative law grounds of review, such as 
male fides (bad faith).179
168 S v Snyman 1980 SACC 313, at 314.
169 Stoker & Van Der Merwe 1981 SACC 73.
170 See Richings 1977 SACC 13, in which the accused’s negligent driving caused the death of his young 
children.
171 C. De Beer, “Charts of National Performance Overview 2002-2005” (undated), NPA spreadsheet 
obtained via email communication, May 26, 2006, (no page numbers).
172 See, e.g. S. Johnston, “Robbery victim told: We see you,” Die Burger, July 12, 2007, http://www.
news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_2145523,00.html (accessed July 12, 2007).
173 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 6(a).
174 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 6(b).
175 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 6(b).
176 Allen v Attorney-General 1936 CPD 302.
177 Gillingham v Attorney-General 1909 TS 572.
178 Wronsky v Prokureur-Generaal 1971 (3) SA 292 (SWA).
179 See Mitchell v Attorney-General, Natal 1992 (2) SACR 68 (N).
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Pre-trial diversion: Probation officers are empowered to investigate the circumstances 
of an accused to provide a pre-trial report recommending to the prosecution the esir-
ability or otherwise of prosecution.180
All children who are arrested must be assessed for diversion before their first appear-
ance in court.181 Newly established Community Courts in South Africa also routinely 
assess adult accused persons charged with less serious offenses.182 The prosecution 
then has quasi-judicial discretion on whether to follow the recommendation of a pro-
bation officer and withdraw a matter for diversion, or to proceed with prosecution. The 
final decision on the fate of an accused is thus in the hands of the prosecution.
In practice, the extent of diversion, particularly of adults, is severely limited by the 
lack of availability of appropriate diversion programs. Thus during 2005-06, the pros-
ecution diverted 37,516 cases, compared to the 335,028 cases that were finalized with 
a verdict in court.183
Private prosecutions: If the prosecution declines to prosecute, any person with a sub-
stantial interest in the matter (such as a victim or close relative of the victim) may 
institute a private prosecution.184 A private prosecutor may only prosecute after ob-
taining a certificate nolle prosequi from the National Director stating that prosecu-
tion is declined; the grant of the certificate may not be refused.185 However, the courts 
have held that an applicant for such a certificate must show he or she has the relevant 
interest in the matter concerned.186
A private prosecutor must deposit a sum of money with the court, currently R 1,500 
(US$ 215),187 which is forfeited if the private prosecutor fails to prosecute or if the 
case is dismissed.188 An additional amount, set by the court as security for the costs 
which the accused person may incur in his defense, must also be deposited with the 
court.189  If the private prosecution fails, the court may order the prosecutor to pay 
the costs of the accused.190 If the prosecution was “unfounded and vexatious,” the court 
may order additional costs to be paid to the accused.191 If the private prosecution suc-
ceeds, the court may order the accused or the state to pay the costs of prosecution.192 
In practice, private prosecutions are rare.193 This may be because those who have the 
means to institute private prosecution may prefer to bring a civil action, in which the 
180 Probation Services Act 116 of 1991, section 4(1)(i) and (j).
181 Probation Services Act 116 of 1991, section 4B.
182 See O’Donovan, Redpath �� Karth, supra  note 159, at 3.
183 De Beer, supra  note 171.
184 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 7(1).
185 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 7(2)(a) and (b).
186 Singh v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development, RSA & another [2006] JOL 1809 (N).
187 Government Gazette GNR.239 of 1 February 2003: Determination of amounts for the purposes of 
certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977.
188 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 9(1)(a) and 9(3).
189 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 9(1)(b).
190 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 16(1).
191 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 16(2).
192 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 15.
193 See, e.g. Phillips v Botha [1999] 1 All SA 52 (A).
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burden of proof is lower and there is the prospect of financial compensation in the 
form of damages, rather than costs alone. Civil actions may also be brought (instead 
of or in addition to prosecutions) against the state in cases where damages arise from 
criminally negligent actions undertaken by state employees in the course of their em-
ployment,194 or for negligence by the state resulting in the commission of offenses.195
Private prosecution by statutory right: Any body upon which the right to prosecute 
in respect of any offense is expressly conferred by law, may institute and conduct a 
prosecution in respect of such offense in any court competent to try that offense.196
For example, local government legislation confers on municipalities the authority to 
prosecute municipal by-laws and other legislation administered by the municipality, 
by way of delegation of prosecutorial authority from the National Director.197 These 
matters are prosecuted by prosecutors employed by the municipality and heard in Mu-
nicipal Courts, which are magistrates’ courts funded by the municipality but presided 
over by magistrates assigned by the nearest district court.198 Funds generated by fines 
processed in these courts, predominantly traffic fines, accrue to the municipality.
The prosecutorial delegation to municipal prosecutors is specifically subject to the 
control and direction of the National Director or his designate, and the delegation 
may only be to a competent person.199 In practice, control and direction of municipal 
prosecutors by the NPA is limited. Municipal prosecutors are instructed and directed 
on a daily basis by their managers in the municipality.200 In some jurisdictions, par-
ticularly in the case of Municipal Traffic Courts, municipal prosecutors have been 
appointed from the ranks of traffic officers, bringing their independence and impar-
tiality further into question.201
Control of the investigative pre-trial phase: In the National Prosecution Service, prosecu-
tors receive case dockets from the police and make a decision whether to prosecute or 
not, or they refer the matter back to the police for further investigation. Where the mat-
ter is referred back to the police, the prosecution usually provides some indication as to 
what further evidence is required to ensure a prosecution. A matter is generally referred 
back when it seems likely that the police may be able to obtain such further evidence.
Within the specialized units of the NPA, however, there is much closer control of 
the investigative pre-trial phase by the prosecution. For example, the Specialized 
194 See Minister of Safety & Security v Luiters [2006] JOL 1696 (SCA). 
195 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening)  CCT8/00, and Minister of Safety & Security & another v Carmichele [2003] JOL 
12119 (SCA).
196 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 8(1).
197 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, section 112, read with National Prosecuting 
Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(8)(b).
198 M. Lue-Dugmore �� J. Redpath, A Study of Municipal Courts in South Africa: Research Report for the 
City of Cape Town (unpublished) August 2006, at 11.
199 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 22(8)(b).
200 Lue-Dugmore, M. �� Redpath, J., A Study of Municipal Courts in South Africa: Research Report for 
the City of Cape Town (unpublished) August 2006 at 58 et. seq.
201 Id. 
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Commercial Crime Unit makes use of “prosecutor guided” investigations,202 while 
the Sexual Offenses and Community Affairs Unit has adopted a “victim-centered, 
prosecutor-guided, and court-directed approach” to the prosecution of sexual of-
fenses in these courts.203
Within the Directorate of Special Operations, prosecutors and investigators work to-
gether in teams on every matter, with prosecutors usually leading such team investiga-
tions. This is one of the characteristics that have brought the constitutionality of the 
DSO into question, because of the possible impact on the impartiality of the prosecu-
tion.204 However, the Khampepe Commission of Inquiry into the Mandate and Loca-
tion of the Directorate of Special Operations found this argument to be unfounded and 
determined that the “information gathering powers of the DSO” should not be amend-
ed. In June 2006, the Cabinet endorsed the Khampepe Commission’s Findings.205
Control of On-Going Prosecution 
Power to request summonses: The prosecution (or a commissioned officer of the po-
lice) has the power to apply to a magistrate for the issuing of a summons for the ar-
rest of an accused who is not in police custody.206 Where the prosecution intends to 
prosecute an accused, and the accused is not in custody and no warrant has been or 
is to be issued for the arrest of the accused for that offense, the prosecutor may secure 
the attendance of the accused for a summary trial in a lower court having jurisdiction 
by drawing up the relevant charge and handing such charge, together with relevant 
contact information of the accused, to the clerk of the court, who must issue a sum-
mons.207 The prosecutor may also request the magistrate to issue a summons to a wit-
ness to ensure his appearance at trial.208 A summons is not a requirement for witnesses 
to give evidence, however, and witnesses may be informally requested to appear.209
Power to grant or appeal bail: A DPP or duly authorized prosecutor may, in respect of 
certain specified offenses 210 and in consultation with the police official charged with 
the investigation, authorize the release of an accused on bail.211 For minor offenses, 
the police may grant bail.212 For serious offenses, the court must decide on bail. The DPP
202 Annual Report, supra note 32, at 46. 
203 Id. at 44.
204 Redpath, supra note 40, at 63-65.
205 Annual Report, 2005/06, supra note 32, at 5.
206 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 43(1).
207 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 54(1).
208 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 205(1).
209 S v Matisonn 1981 (3) SA 302 (A).
210 For example, culpable homicide, assault involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm, arson, 
housebreaking, malicious injury to property, robbery other than a robbery with aggravating cir-
cumstances and provided the amount involved in the offense does not exceed R20,000, and theft.
211 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 59A.
212 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 59.
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may appeal to the superior court having jurisdiction against the decision of a lower court 
to release an accused on bail or against the imposition of a condition of bail.213
Power to select the court of trial: The court before whom an accused appears for the 
purposes of a bail application must refer such accused to a court designated by the 
prosecutor for purposes of trial.214 If an accused appears in a magistrate’s court and 
the prosecutor informs the court that the alleged offense merits punishment in excess 
of the jurisdiction of a magistrate’s court, the court must, if so requested by the pros-
ecutor, refer the accused to the regional court for summary trial without the accused 
having to plead to the relevant charge.215
Power to conclude plea and sentence agreements: A prosecutor authorized by the Na-
tional Director and an accused who is legally represented may, before the accused 
pleads to the charge, negotiate and enter into an agreement in respect of a guilty 
plea by the accused to the offense charged (or to an offense of which he or she may 
be convicted on the charge) and a just sentence to be imposed by the court.216 The 
court must satisfy itself of the guilt of the accused as well as the justice of the sentence 
agreement, or determine a sentence it considers to be just.217 Both the accused and 
the prosecution then have an opportunity to withdraw from the agreement upon be-
ing informed of what the court considers to be a just sentence.218 If they abide by the 
agreement, the conviction is passed and the just sentence imposed.219 If they withdraw, 
the trial must then proceed de novo before another presiding officer, and no reference 
may be made to the agreement in the trial.220 During 2005/06, just over 3,000 cases 
were finalized by way of plea and sentence agreements.221
Powers in relation to assessors: South Africa abolished the jury system in 1969.222 How-
ever, the presiding judge may in certain cases summon not more than two assessors 
to assist him at the trial.223 The selection of assessors is solely the prerogative of the 
judge. There is no statutory provision for recusal of superior court assessors. However, 
the superior courts have inherent jurisdiction to entertain an application for recusal of 
an assessor. Magistrates may also be assisted by assessors in specified cases.224
Generally speaking, accused persons prefer to proceed without assessors, because 
lay persons are perceived to be more punitive than presiding officers. Where a mag-
istrate is assisted by an assessor, both the prosecution and the defense may apply for
213 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 65A.
214 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 75(3).
215 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 75(2)(b).
216 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 105A.
217 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 105A(8) and (9)(a).
218 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 105 (9)(b).
219 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 105(9)(c).
220 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 105(9)(d).
221 J. H. T. Schutte, “Plea agreements 05/06” (undated), NPA spreadsheet obtained via email commu-
nication, May 26, 2006, (no page numbers).
222 Abolition of Juries Act 34 of 1969.
223 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 145.
224 Magistrates Courts Act 32 of 1944, section 93 ter.
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the recusal of an assessor where her impartiality is in question and address argu-
ments to the magistrate on the desirability of the recusal.225
Powers in trial:  The prosecutor may at trial, before any evidence is adduced, address 
the court for the purpose of explaining the charge and indicating, without comment, 
to the court what evidence he intends to adduce in support of the charge.226 The 
prosecutor may then examine the witnesses for the prosecution and adduce such evi-
dence as may be admissible to prove that the accused committed the offense referred 
to in the charge.227 After all the evidence has been adduced, the prosecutor may ad-
dress the court, and thereafter the accused may address the court.228 The prosecutor 
may reply on any matter of law raised by the accused in his address, and may, with 
leave of the court, reply on any matter of fact raised by the accused in his address.229
Post-trial functions: A court may, before passing sentence, receive such evidence as it 
thinks fit in order to inform itself as to the proper sentence to be passed.  The accused 
may address the court on any evidence received as well as on the matter of the sen-
tence, and thereafter the prosecution may likewise address the court.230 Prosecutorial 
policy provides that prosecutors must ensure that the court is informed of the exis-
tence of aggravating circumstances and, where an accused is undefended, mitigating 
factors.231 In cases involving crimes of a serious nature, including violent crimes and 
sexual offenses against women and children, the prosecution is supposed to provide 
evidence relating to the impact of the crime on the victim and the community, statis-
tics regarding the frequency and relative seriousness of the offense, and any relevant 
previous convictions the accused might have.232 The judge, who generally has a wide 
range of sentencing options to choose from, is not obliged to take heed of the sugges-
tions made by either the prosecution or the defense, however.233
The NPA has representation on the Correctional Supervision and Parole Review 
Board (CSPR Board).234 The CSPR Board takes decisions by majority vote and has 
the power to confirm decisions of the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board or 
to substitute a decision of its own.235 The Correctional Supervision and Parole Board 
makes decisions regarding granting or cancellation of correctional supervision, 
parole, or day parole,236  and its decisions are final and can only be referred to the 
CSPR Board by the Minister or Commissioner of Correctional Services.237
225 Magistrates Courts Act 32 of 1944, section 93 ter (10) (a) and (c).
226 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 150(1).
227 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 150(2)(a).
228 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 175(1).
229 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 175(1).
230 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 274.
231 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Policy Manual, supra note 118, at B.61, 63.
232 Id. at B.61-62.
233 See Martin Schönteich, “Sentencing in South Africa. Public perception and the judicial process,” 
ISS Papers, Paper 43, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (November 1999), at 13-17 (discussing 
the more commonly used sentencing options).
234 Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, section 76.
235 Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, section 77. 
236 Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, section 75.
237 Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, section 75(8).
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3.2. Relationship with the judge at the pre-trial stage
Pre-trial and investigatory detention: The Constitution’s Bill of Rights assures the 
rights of those held in detention by providing that anyone arrested on suspicion of 
committing an offense must be brought before a court within 48 hours,238 and has the 
right to be released if the interests of justice so permit.239 Legislation also provides 
that an accused must be brought before a court within 48 hours. Bail applications 
may be postponed by the court for a period of no more than seven days at a time.240 
The right to legal representation241 and to receive visits242 is also guaranteed for all 
detained persons, including sentenced prisoners, in the Bill of Rights. The right to si-
lence is guaranteed243 and no one arrested may be compelled to make a confession,244 
even during a state of emergency.245
The 48-hour rule has come under pressure on a number of occasions. For exam-
ple, in late 2006, the Minister for Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, appeared 
before the Safety and Security Committee of Parliament to argue that 48 hours 
was not long enough for police to gather sufficient evidence for the state success-
fully to oppose a bail application.246
Legal provisions regarding bail applications have changed frequently since 1994, 
during 1995,247 1997,248 1998249 and 2000,250 possibly reflecting the state’s continued 
struggle to combat crime within a human rights framework. Generally speaking, the 
amendments have progressively moved toward making it more difficult for an ac-
cused to be granted bail. Some analysts argue this is a response to negative publicity 
around crimes committed by accused persons who had previously been released on 
bail, coupled with perceptions of a lack of experience among prosecutors.
For example, prior to the 2000 amendment, a person accused of a less serious of-
fense251 was entitled to be released on bail at any stage of proceedings “unless the 
court finds that it is in the interests of justice that he or she be detained in custody.”252 
238 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 35(1)(d). 
239 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 35(1)(f). 
240 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 50(6)(d).
241 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 35(2)(b)��(c).
242 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 35(2)(f). 
243 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 35(1)(a).
244 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 35(1)(c).
245 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 37(5), Table of Non-Dero-
gable Rights.
246 (No author) SABC News, November 1, 2006, 15h15, http://www.sabcnews.com/politics/govern-
ment/0,2172,137670,00.html (accessed July 15, 2007).
247 Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 75 of 1995.
248 Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 85 of 1997.
249 Judicial Matters Amendment Act 34 of 1998.
250 Judicial Matters Amendment Act 62 of 2000.
251 That is, an offense not listed in Schedule 5 or 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
252 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 60(1)(a), prior to amendment by the Judicial Matters 
Amendment Act 62 of 2000.
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Now, the accused is only “entitled to be released on bail at any stage preceding his or 
her conviction in respect of such offense, if the court is satisfied that the interests of 
justice so permit.”253 Consequently, there must be evidence adduced that it is in the 
interests of justice that the accused must be released.
For the most serious offenses,254 unless “exceptional circumstances” exist which sat-
isfy the court that it is in the interests of justice to grant bail, the accused must be 
retained in custody. 255 For other serious offenses,256 the accused must be detained in 
custody unless the accused adduces evidence which satisfies the court that the inter-
ests of justice permit his or her release.257 The burden of proof is thus on the accused 
to establish that is his or her release is in the interests of justice.258
Given the problem of overcrowding in prisons in South Africa, prosecutorial policy 
encourages prosecutors to consider carefully whether bail is in the interests of justice 
in each case.259 While the ultimate decision on whether to grant bail is the judicial 
officer’s—“the grant or refusal of bail is unmistakably a judicial function”260—they 
are in practice strongly influenced by the prosecutor’s recommendation. However, 
judicial officers are “expressly not to act as a passive umpire”261 in bail applications, 
but must adopt an inquisitorial approach.
Prosecutors must continuously reassess the state’s attitude to bail in respect of an 
accused in custody awaiting trial. If an accused has been in custody for longer than 
three months, prosecutors must specifically raise the issue at each court appearance 
and ask the court to record the reasons for the further detention.262
The preparatory examination: The DPP may direct that a trial in a superior court be 
preceded by a preparatory examination in a magistrates’ court (or that a trial be con-
verted into a preparatory examination) if he is of the opinion that is in the interests 
of justice to do so.263 A preparatory examination is not a trial, but an examination 
held before a magistrate to determine whether the evidence justifies a trial before a 
court.264 The accused does not plead at the commencement of the examination, but at 
its conclusion.265 After considering the record of a preparatory examination, the DPP 
253 Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977, section 60(1)(a) as amended.
254 Offenses listed in Schedule 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 as amended, including, 
inter alia, certain aggravated forms of murder, rape, and robbery.
255 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, as amended, section 60(11)(a).
256 Offenses listed in Schedule 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, as amended, including 
treason and forms of murder, attempted murder, and rape and a number of drug and corruption-
related offenses.
257 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended, section 60(11)(b).
258 See Verwey & others v S [2006] JOL 17220 (W), at para 9.
259 (No publisher) National Prosecuting Authority, NPA Awaiting Trial Detainee Guidelines (undated), 
at 19, http://www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/ATD%20Guidelines%20(3c)%20doc%20final.pdf (ac-
cessed 26 June 2007).
260 See Dlamini v S; Dladla and others v S; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat [1999] JOL 9 (CC) at para 10.
261 See Dlamini v S; Dladla and others v S; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat [1999] JOL 9 (CC) at para 10.
262 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Policy Manual, supra note 118, at B.16 – B.21.
263 Criminal Procedure Act 52 of 1977, section 123(1).
264 Geldenhuys �� Joubert, et. al., Criminal Procedure Handbook, supra note 152, at 132.
265 Id. at 132.
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may (a) in respect of any charge to which the accused has pleaded guilty, arraign the 
accused for sentence before any court having jurisdiction, (b) arraign the accused for 
trial before any court having jurisdiction, whether the accused has pleaded guilty or 
not guilty to any charge and whether or not he has been discharged by the magis-
trate, (c) decline to prosecute the accused, and advise the lower court concerned of 
his decision.266
Other surveillance warrants: Any law enforcement officer, official of the state or any 
other person authorized for such a purpose may make use of a trap or engage in an 
undercover operation in order to detect, investigate, or uncover the commission of 
an offense, or to prevent the commission of any offense.267 However, the evidence so 
obtained is admissible in court only if that conduct does not go beyond providing 
an opportunity to commit an offense.268 Even where the conduct does go beyond 
providing the opportunity for committing an offense, a court may nevertheless admit 
the evidence obtained if it is in the public interest.269 The burden of proof with regard 
to admissibility rests with the prosecution, but the accused must raise grounds to 
challenge admissibility. If the accused is not represented, the court must raise the 
question of admissibility.270
3.3. Powers outside the criminal justice system
The National Director, usually in the form of the Asset Forfeiture Unit, has the power 
to institute civil proceedings for the forfeiture of assets in the High Courts.271 Al-
though no person need be found guilty of a criminal offense, proof is required that the 
property being targeted is either an instrumentality of an offense, the proceeds of un-
lawful activities, or associated with terrorist activities.272 All other civil proceedings on 
behalf of the state are usually instituted or defended by the State Attorney’s Office.273
266 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 139.
267 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 252A(1).
268 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 252A(1).
269 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 252A(1) read with Section 252A(3)(b).
270 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 252A(6).
271 Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998, section 37 and 38(1). 
272 Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998, section 38(2).
273 State Attorney Act 56 of 1957, section 3. 
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IV. Relationship of the Prosecution Service  
to Other Organs of the State
4.1. Political developments affecting the NPA
The NPA appears to have become embroiled in political battles for power within 
the ANC, broadly put, between the neo-liberal camp represented by President (and 
president of the ruling ANC) Thabo Mbeki, and the populist camp, led by Deputy 
ANC President Jacob Zuma.
In 1998, when the first National Director, Bulelani Ngcuka, was appointed by Presi-
dent Mbeki, commentators were concerned about his strong ANC links. Questions 
were raised as to whether high-profile ANC members would receive “special treat-
ment” at the hands of the prosecution.274 Indeed, in 1998, the National Director inter-
vened in favor of three convicted ANC appellants in a bail application pending their 
appeal. Their appeal was successful, appearing to vindicate his position.275 However, 
prosecutions of two senior ANC politicians, MP Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and 
party chief whip Tony Yengeni, both culminating in 2003, proceeded unhindered.276
In 2000, the DSO unit of the NPA began a corruption investigation into a multi-bil-
lion Rand arms procurement package concluded by the South African government 
in 1999. In July 2003 it transpired that South Africa’s then-Deputy President Jacob 
Zuma was a suspect in this matter. In August 2003, the National Director announced 
that despite the existence of a prima facie case against the Deputy President, the NPA 
would not prosecute.277 The case against Schabir Schaik, the arms deal businessman 
alleged to have had a corrupt relationship with Zuma, was to proceed, however.
In September 2003, allegations that the National Director was an apartheid-era spy 
emerged, apparently from the Zuma camp. President Mbeki responded by appoint-
ing the Hefer Commission of Inquiry to investigate whether the National Director 
had in fact been a spy and whether he had misused the NPA as a result.278 The Hefer 
Commission found no evidence that the National Director had been a spy. Given 
this finding, Judge Hefer felt that the question of whether the National Director had 
misused the NPA fell away.279
The prosecution against Schaik continued, initially with Ngcuka as National Director. 
However, in July 2004 the National Director announced his decision to resign, citing 
274 Redpath, supra note 40, at 69.
275 Id. 
276 Id.
277 C. Johnson, “Zuma not to be prosecuted,” The Mercury, 27 August 2003.
278 Judge J Hefer, Hefer Commission of Inquiry Report, January 7, 2004, at para 2. Available on http://
www.iss.co.za/CJM/pdf/heferreport.pdf (accessed July 10, 2007).
279 Id. at para 88. 
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personal reasons. In June 2005, Schabir Schaik was convicted, and shortly thereafter 
President Mbeki announced that Deputy President Jacob Zuma would be relieved of 
his government duties because of the latter’s relationship with Schaik, as found in the 
judgment.280 Zuma would, however, remain Deputy President of the ANC (Update: 
in December 2007 Zuma was chosen as the ANC Party President).
Not long thereafter, the NPA announced it would prosecute Zuma on two counts of 
corruption, with the trial to begin in July 2006. However, in September 2006 the High 
Court refused the prosecutions’ request for a further postponement and struck the 
matter from the roll. The NPA maintained it would still bring the matter to trial once 
the various issues delaying the trial had been resolved.
In December 2006, following three weeks of investigations, Zuma was charged with 
the rape of a prominent HIV/Aids activist in his home. Zuma voluntarily suspended 
his participation in ANC party structures until the resolution of the trial. In May 
2007 Zuma was acquitted, the court finding that consensual sex had taken place.281 
Zuma then resumed his activities as Deputy President of the ANC. Zuma’s corrup-
tion trial remains pending.
In April 2005, President Mbeki appointed a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into 
the Mandate and Location of the Directorate of Special Operations (the Khampepe 
Commission).282 This was done to resolve tensions which had developed between 
the police and the DSO, with the police claiming the DSO should form part of the 
police. In July 2005, the Khampepe Commission submitted an interim report to the 
President, the findings of which were only publicized in June 2006.283 The Commis-
sion recommended that the DSO be retained within the NPA, but that political over-
sight and responsibility for the law enforcement component of the DSO should be 
conferred on the Minister for Safety and Security. The Cabinet elected to accept the 
recommendations.
In July 2007, the ANC policy chief, Jeff Radebe, told an ANC policy conference that 
the DSO, South Africa’s municipal police forces, and the provincial traffic police 
must be brought under the control of the South African Police Services—despite the 
contrary findings of the Khampepe Commission, published almost a year earlier.284 
The issue of the DSO being brought under the police may have emerged again be-
cause press reports emerged in October 2006 that the DSO was investigating crimi-
280 (No author) “Statement of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the Joint Sitting of Parlia-
ment on the Release of Hon Jacob Zuma from his Responsibilities as Deputy President: National 
Assembly,” SA government website, June 14, 2005, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2005/
mbek0614.htm
281 S v Zuma [2006] JOL 17305 (W).
282 (No author) “Statement on the Commission of Inquiry into the Mandate and Location of the Di-
rectorate of Special Operations – Khampepe Commission,” SA government website, July 25, 2005, 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05072614451001.htm (accessed July 9, 2007).
283 (No author) “Statement on the Report of the Khampepe Commission of Inquiry,” South African 
Government Information, June 29, 2006 http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2006/06062915451001.
htm (accessed July 20, 2007).
284 Paddy Harper, “All-in-one plan for police,” Sunday Times, July 1, 2007, http://www.suntimes.co.za/
article.aspx?ID=505777 (accessed July 9, 2007).
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nal allegations against the National Commissioner of Police and other senior police 
officers,285 and that the Commissioner was closely linked with the “landlord of a huge 
smuggling syndicate.”286
In January 2006, special policy directives for the prosecution of apartheid-era politi-
cal criminals were adopted, bringing an end to a moratorium on prosecutions, which 
had been prompted by ANC concerns about a clear policy on such prosecutions after 
an ANC member who failed to apply for amnesty was successfully prosecuted in 
2004.287 While making provision for special plea and sentencing agreements with the 
state, the NPA maintained the directives did not amount to an amnesty process for 
perpetrators. Rather, it provided that perpetrators could approach the NPA with infor-
mation on crimes committed prior to May 11, 1994 in the form of a sworn affidavit and 
become state witnesses in resulting trials, provided a full disclosure was made.288
Any decision not to prosecute such a matter, and the reasons therefore, must be made 
public and reported to the Minister of Justice. Individuals not prosecuted by the state 
could still face civil action. Prosecutions could arise from victim complaints as well 
as ongoing investigations into cases arising from the TRC hearings. In July 2007, the 
NPA announced that the former apartheid Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, 
was to be prosecuted for plotting to kill a prominent anti-apartheid activist.
4.2. Relationship with the legislature
South Africa’s Parliament is in general perceived to be weak, largely because the 
most senior politicians in the ruling party tend to be deployed to executive positions. 
Consequently, more junior ruling party politicians who are Members of Parliament, 
and who comprise roughly two thirds of Parliament, appear to find the exercise of 
strong oversight over the executive fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless, the NPA is 
accountable to Parliament in respect of its powers, functions, and duties, including 
decisions regarding the institution of prosecutions.289 The National Assembly does 
not, however, directly appoint prosecutors, control their career paths, or advise the 
Minister and the NPA on appointments.
Oversight: The National Assembly’s Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitu-
tional Development has primary responsibility for overseeing the activities of the 
NPA.290 The committee can summon any person to appear before it to give evidence 
285 Wisani wa ka Ngobeni, Dominic Mahlangu and Dumisane Lubisi “Scorpions spied on Selebi,” Sunday 
Times, October 29, 2006 (http://www.suntimes.co.za/article.aspx?ID=305138 (accessed July 9, 2007).
286 Simphiwe Piliso, Jocelyn Maker and Jessica Bezuidenhout, “Selebi named in explosive diary,” Sun-
day Times http://www.suntimes.co.za/article.aspx?ID=316074 (accessed July 9, 2007).
287 SAPA, “Prosecution Policy unveiled for apartheid-era crime,” Mail & Guardian, January 17, 2006, at 4.
288 SAPA, “Prosecution Policy unveiled for apartheid-era crime,” Mail & Guardian, January 17, 2006, at 4.
289 National Prosecuting Authority Act  32 of 1998, section 35(1).
290 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 56. The National Assem-
bly appoints a number of portfolio committees from among its members to monitor the work of 
Government departments. Portfolio committees consider draft legislation, deal with departmental 
budget votes, oversee the work of the department, and enquire and make recommendations about 
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under oath or produce documents; require any person or institution to report to it; 
or receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested persons or 
institutions. Other committees also have oversight responsibility over the NPA, de-
pending upon the subject matter. For example, the Safety and Security committee has 
oversight in relation to the operation and effectiveness of joint task teams consisting 
of members of the police and prosecution service.
Despite their strong mandate, however, committees differ in their effectiveness as 
overseers of the executive’s actions. The role each committee plays is strongly linked 
to how active its chairperson is, and there is no common understanding among 
Members of Parliament about the role and powers of committees.291 Moreover, many 
parliamentary committees are burdened with reviewing draft legislation and holding 
public hearings and submissions on legislative proposals. This is especially true for 
the Portfolio Committee of Justice and Constitutional Development, which has had 
one of the heaviest loads of new legislation since 1994.
Other legislative influence—legislated performance goals: Parliament has the power 
to hold the executive accountable legislatively, by requiring public accountability for 
funding and performance, and by reinforcing the distinction between the respon-
sibility of a Minister for policy and outcomes, and of the head of the government 
department— the “accounting officer” (the actual term used in the legislation to re-
fer to the responsible officer)—for implementing the policy and achieving defined 
outputs.292 The employment contract of each accounting officer incorporates these 
performance standards.293
In 2001, the NPA moved to a separate financial management system and appointed 
a Chief Executive Officer as its accounting officer. Accounting officers are obliged to 
meet outputs against a range of predetermined indicators. In this way, departments 
“must be specific about what is intended to be, and has actually been, delivered.”294 
In particular, accounting officers are responsible for developing three-year strategic 
plans that run concurrently with a department’s Medium Term Expenditure Frame-
work, and one-year operational plans. These plans must provide a detailed quan-
tification of resources, outputs, and indicators, so that Parliament can understand 
“exactly what it is ‘buying’ for the community when it approves the budget.”295
Accounting officers have to report monthly (to the Minster and Treasury), quarterly 
(Treasury)  and yearly (via Annual Report to the Treasury and the Minister). 296 Both 
these reports and the monthly reports are publicly available.297 The Annual Report 
the department’s structure, functioning and policy. Committees may also investigate any matter of 
public interest within their responsibility.
291 R. Calland (ed.), The First 5 Years. A Review of South Africa’s Democratic Parliament, Cape Town: 
Idasa (1999), at 31.
292 Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, section 1 and 36.
293 (No author) Guide for Accounting Officers. Public Finance Management Act: National Treasury (Oc-
tober 2000), at 26.
294 Id. at 8.
295 Id. at 8.
296 Id. at 21.
297 According to guidelines drawn up by the National Treasury for accounting officers, accountabil-
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must review performance and achievements against the operational plan and bud-
get,298 and should also “indicate the department’s efficiency, economy and effective-
ness in delivering the outputs specified in the operational plan, as well as any other 
information required by the legislature.”299 The National Assembly’s Standing Com-
mittee on Public Accounts also reviews this report,300 after which it is made available 
to the public.
While the use of legislated performance goals creates the environment for more ef-
fective oversight, limited capacity among Members of Parliament and their staff has 
meant that these roles are not always effectively fulfilled; committee members and 
research staff often fail to understand their roles and the issues they oversee and have 
limited capacity to draft reports or track recommendations made to Government 
officials.301
4.3. Relationship with the executive
The Minister of Justice and the President have considerable influence over the com-
position and general policy of the NPA. However, the decision to prosecute particu-
lar cases rests solely with the National Director and the NPA, although the Minister 
may require the National Director to provide reasons for any decisions.302
The Minister of Justice: The Minister is “responsible for the administration of justice 
[and] must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting authority.”303 The Na-
tional Director determines prosecution policy and appoints senior NPA staff only 
with the concurrence of the Minister, and has extensive obligations to inform and 
consult with the Minister.304
The Minister holds regular meetings with the National Director to discuss particular 
high profile cases and general prosecution policies. These structured meetings take 
place on a weekly basis, and the National Director also provides the Minister with 
regular written reports on specific cases. The National Director also arranges meet-
ings between the Minister and members of the NPA at the Minister’s request.305
ity officers “should expect the press, parliamentary committees, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and the public to monitor their department’s progress through these reports.” Guide for Ac-
counting Officers. Public Finance Management Act, supra note 293, at 21.
298 Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, section 40(3)(a).
299 Guide for Accounting Officers. Public Finance Management Act, National Treasury (October 2000), 
supra note 293, at 21.
300 The National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts is responsible for overseeing 
public expenditure of all government departments. It can investigate irregularities and can call par-
ties involved before it to account for and explain their actions.
301 (No author) “The Parliamentary Centre in Southern Africa, Legislative Accountability Program,” 
Parliamentary Centre Website (no page numbers), http://www.parlcent.ca/africa/southernafrica_
e.php, (accessed June 3, 2004).
302 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 33(2)(b).
303 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(6).
304 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(5).
305 For example, the Minister requested detailed briefings from the National Director on the debate 
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At the request of the Minister, the National Director is obliged to furnish the Minis-
ter with information concerning prosecution policy, prosecutorial policy directives, 
and any particular case or matter dealt with by the NPA at the Minister’s request.306 
The National Director must provide the Minister with reasons for decisions taken by 
Directors. These can include reasons relating to the success or failure of a particular 
case and decisions about appealing cases. The National Director must submit to the 
Minister annual reports provided to the National Director by the Directors on the 
latter’s activities during the previous year.307
The Minister also chairs a broader Ministerial Coordinating Committee308 that de-
termines policy guidelines and specific responsibilities for the DSO as well as pro-
cedures to coordinate the Directorate’s work with other executive bodies such as the 
police.309 However, the Committee has met infrequently since the creation of the 
DSO in 1999.
The Minister may, after consultation with the National Director, appoint Deputy 
Directors of Public Prosecutions to the NPA office at the seat of each High Court 
and in the office of the National Director. Directors and Deputy Directors of Public 
Prosecutions appointed to the office of the National Director are normally assigned 
to specific portfolios or projects, including legislation development and drafting, in-
ternational cooperation and treaty affairs, and legal and strategy advice.
Other than the functions highlighted above, in practice the Minister of Justice does 
not engage extensively in the day-to-day management and running of the NPA. The 
Minister may on occasion request that various units in the NPA write legal opinions 
on high profile or contentious topics or cases, but this does not happen regularly. The 
Minister is also required to approve all international traveling arrangements of NPA 
staff, including the National Director.
The President: The President makes a number of appointments affecting the NPA. 
The President appoints the National Director,310 and, upon the nomination of the 
National Director and after consulting with the Minister of Justice, also appoints up 
to four Deputy National Directors of Public Prosecutions.311 To date, all candidates 
recommended by the National Director have been appointed.
After consultation with the Minister and the National Director, the President may 
also appoint (on the recommendation of the National Director) a Director of Public 
surrounding the institutional placement of the DSO prior to the Khampepe Commission.
306 National Prosecuting Authority Act  32 of 1998, section 33(2)(a)-(f).
307 Section 34 read with section 33(2)(e), National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. 
308 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 31(2)(a)(i). The Committee is comprised 
of cabinet members responsible for justice and constitutional development, safety and security, 
correctional services, intelligence services, defense, and other cabinet members the President may 
designate. Section 31(2), National Prosecuting Authority Act  32 of 1998.
309 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 31(1).
310 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 179(1)(a), read with National 
Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 (as amended), section 10.
311 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 11(1) and 13(1)(a).      
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Prosecutions at the seat of each High Court,312 as well as one or more Directors of 
Public Prosecutions to the Directorate of Special Operations.313
The President may by proclamation establish up to two additional Investigating Di-
rectorates within the Office of the National Director, regarding matters not contem-
plated for the Directorate of Special Operations.314 The President may only issue such 
a proclamation on the recommendation of the Minister and National Director, and 
must also submit the proclamation to Parliament before publication, but Parliament 
cannot veto it.315 The President then appoints a Director to head the new Investigat-
ing Directorate, again after consultation with the Minister and the National Direc-
tor.316
Finally, the President may, after consultation with the Minister and the National Di-
rector, appoint one or more Directors as “Special Directors” with special portfolios 
within the NPA317 To date, the President has appointed six Special Directors, all based 
at the head office and reporting directly to the National Director.
In addition, the President has indirect influence over DSO within the National Pros-
ecuting Authority through his power to appoint the Minister of Justice and Con-
stitutional Development and the other Ministers on the Ministerial Coordinating 
Committee.318 However, given the continued infrequent meetings of this committee, 
this influence is likely to be minor.
4.4. Relationship with the police
It is possible for members of the public to report suspected crimes directly to an In-
vestigating Director of the NPA.319 This, however, occurs extremely rarely, and virtu-
ally all crimes are reported to the police. There is a single national police agency, the 
South African Police Service (SAPS), whose constitutional mandate is “to prevent, 
combat and investigate crimes, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the in-
habitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.”320
All police officers have investigative powers,321 and there is a dedicated Detective 
Service of the SAPS with responsibility for investigating crime.322 In 2004, the police 
312 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 11(1) and 13(1)(a).
313 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 13(1)(aA). 
314 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 7(1A). 
315 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 7(2).
316 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 , section 13(1)(b).
317 National Prosecuting Authority Act. 32 of 1998, section 13(1)(c).
318 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 91(2).
319 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 27.
320 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 205(3). See also South African 
Police Service Act  68 of 1995, section 5 read with Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
200 of 1993, section 214.
321 South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, section 13(1)-(13).
322 “Top Structure National Level: SA Police Service,” SAPS annual report 2003/04, http://www.saps.
gov.za/profile/struct.htm#struct2 (accessed June 7, 2004).
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employed some 28,000 detectives out of a total force (including civilians) of approxi-
mately 124,000.323 The Organized Crime and Commercial Crime Units in the SAPS 
has a staff compliment of approximately 1,300 detectives. The DSO of the NPA, by 
comparison, is much smaller, with a total staff of less than 600, including investiga-
tors, analysts, and prosecutors.
The police thus initiate most criminal inquiries However, for a case to enter the po-
lice records, two things must happen. First, the complainant must report the incident 
to the police. Second, the police must actually record the case and open a docket. 
Inappropriate exercise of the latter discretion has been found to be a strong factor in 
case attrition, particularly in relation to allegations of sexual offenses.324
The SAPS has limited discretion to withdraw or terminate criminal cases (as “unde-
tected—suspect identity unknown”; “undetected—complainant not traced” or “no 
consequence”) once they have been initiated.325 They may only withdraw relatively 
minor cases. Once the police open a formal investigation into a serious offense, they 
may only close the investigation as being of “no consequence” on receipt of an af-
fidavit from the complainant requesting withdrawal.326 Once the matter has been re-
ferred to court, the prosecutor has discretion to prosecute or not, and the matter no 
longer lies with the police.
The NPA and the police are administratively and institutionally autonomous. The 
head of the police is the National Commissioner of Police, appointed by the Presi-
dent.327 The National Commissioner is broadly responsible for policing at the nation-
al level,328 in accordance with constitutional provisions, national policing policy, and 
the directions of the Minister for Safety and Security.329 The National Commissioner 
appoints Provincial Commissioners,330 who are responsible for day-to-day policing, 
including the investigation and prevention of crime and maintenance of police sta-
tions.331 The Minister determines national policing policy, after consultation with the 
provincial governments and taking into account the “policing needs and priorities of 
the provinces.”332 
The NPA has no formal influence over policy formation, investigative strategies, or 
personnel policies for the police. Similarly, the police have no formal influence over 
the NPA. However, at the ministerial level, their respective ministers are members of 
323 (No author) 200 Estimates of National Expenditure, Safety and Security, Vote 25, National Treasury, 
February 2004, Pretoria, at 690.
324 See L. Artz  �� D. Smythe, “Case Attrition in Rape Cases: A Comparative Analysis,” South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice, August 2007 (forthcoming).
325 SAPS Standing Orders G325 quoted in Artz, �� Smythe, Id.
326 Artz �� Smythe, Id.
327 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 207(1).
328 See section 11 South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, read with section 218 Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
329 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 207(2).
330 South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, section 6, read with Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act 200 of 1993, section 218(1)(b).
331 See South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, section 12 read with Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, section 219.
332 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of1996, section 206(1).
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the same ministerial “cluster” (the criminal justice cluster) designed to co-ordinate and 
synchronize policy developments among associated government departments; conse-
quently, there may be indirect influence exerted through the cluster mechanism.
The functional roles and duties of the police and NPA are likewise largely separate,333 
although the NPA may in certain circumstances direct the activities of the police. 
In the usual course, the police initiate and conduct criminal investigations.334 When 
their investigations are complete, the police hand their findings in the form of a po-
lice docket to a prosecutor. Prosecutors are therefore not ordinarily involved in in-
vestigations, unless they are members of one of the NPA’s specialized businesses units 
that engage in prosecution-led investigation, although they may request the police to 
investigate certain aspects of a crime, or focus their investigations on specific issues 
in a case, with a view to securing a conviction.
Prosecutors may instruct police officers to carry out further investigation required 
for the successful prosecution of the case.335 However, it is not clear whether po-
lice are obliged to comply with the prosecutor’s instructions. As with most interde-
partmental relationships, compliance with instructions of this nature will be largely 
volitional. However, the prosecutor normally has direct access to complain to the 
investigating officer’s supervisor if instructions are not complied with. For egregious 
cases, the prosecutor can file a formal disciplinary complaint to the Provincial Police 
Commissioner about the police member’s dereliction of duty, or charge him with 
obstructing justice.
The NPA’s internal policy notes that “in major or very complex investigations, such 
an involvement may occur at an early stage and be of a fairly continuous nature. If 
necessary, specific instructions should be issued to the police with which they must 
comply.”336 The NPA policy also states that, “in practice, prosecutors sometimes refer 
complaints of criminal conduct to the police for investigation. In such instances, they 
will supervise, direct and co-ordinate criminal investigations.”337 Such cases may en-
joy higher prioritization than cases initiated by member of the public.
Directors of NPA offices at the seat of a High Court may “give written directions or 
furnish guidelines” to the Provincial Commissioner of Police338 or any police officer 
conducting investigations into offenses in the Director’s area of jurisdiction,339 and 
can “supervise, direct and co-ordinate specific investigations” by the police in their 
area.340 Subject to the directions of the National Director, such directions and guide-
lines may be given only in relation to particular cases.341 In most provinces, the 
333 This is in part a consequence of the English legal tradition that prevails in the country.
334 “[The] decision to start an investigation into possible or alleged criminal conduct ordinarily rests 
with the police. The NPA is usually not involved in such decisions although it may be called upon 
to provide legal advice.” supra note 163, Prosecution Policy, at A10.
335 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 34(2).
336 Prosecution Policy, supra note 163, at A10.
337 Id. at A10.
338 There are nine Provincial Commissioners of Police, one for each of the country’s provinces.
339 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 24(4)(c).
340 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 24(1)(c).   
341 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 24(5).
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Director and the Provincial Commissioner of Police meet on a monthly basis to 
discuss important cases and recent criminal developments and trends, and to share 
general information relevant to policing and prosecution. In practice, Directors 
generally avoid giving direct instructions to the Provincial Commissioners, and 
decisions are mostly taken jointly.
The Investigative Directorates: The NPA has its own separate investigative capability. 
The Directorate of Special Operations has authority to “investigate, and to carry out 
any functions incidental to investigations” relating to organized crime or any other 
category of crime the President proclaims.342
“Special Investigators” appointed to the DSO have the same criminal procedure pow-
ers as police officials concerning the investigation of offenses, the entry and search 
of premises, the seizure and disposal of articles, arrests, and the execution of war-
rants.343 However, they do not have the power to conduct road blocks or cordon off a 
scene.344 On the other hand, DSO investigators have slightly wider powers than SAPS 
members once designated to investigate a matter by the Investigating Director of the 
DSO.345 These include somewhat extended powers of search and seizure.346
Investigating Directorates have considerable powers. An Investigating Director (the 
head of the Directorate) may summon any person and question him under oath, and 
may retain and examine any document or object.347 With a court warrant, Investigat-
ing Directors may, through the agency of designated special investigators, conduct 
searches and seizures related to their investigations, which are somewhat broader in 
scope than usual—the item sought by the search does not have to be specified in the 
application for a warrant.348
By arrangement with the police service, Investigating Directorates may be assisted in 
their duties by police officers and detectives.349 Heads of Directorates must immedi-
ately report to the National Commissioner of the Police evidence of any offense the 
Directorate itself is not investigating.350
The NPA is sometimes required to work with investigating organs other than the po-
lice. These include the following agencies: Independent Complaints Directorate (ci-
vilian oversight mechanism largely responsible for investigating police misconduct 
and deaths in police custody); National Intelligence Agency (domestic intelligence 
service); South Africa Secret Service (foreign intelligence service); Military Intelli-
gence; South African Revenue Service (SARS); and “Chapter 9” institutions, such as 
342 The President may only issue such a proclamation on the recommendation of the Minister of Jus-
tice and the National Director, and must submit the proclamation to Parliament before publication. 
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 7(1)(a) and (2).
343 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 30(2).
344 These powers are contained in section 13 of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995.
345 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 28.
346 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 29.
347 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 28(6).
348 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 29.
349 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 4(a)(iv).
350 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 28(1)(d).
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the Human Rights Commission, Auditor General, Commission for Gender Equality, 
and the Public Protector.351
The NPA has established formal cooperative structures with some of these inves-
tigative organs. For example, the NPA’s Directorate of Special Operations and As-
set Forfeiture Unit have established a formal working relationship with the South 
African Revenue Service, and the NPA works closely with investigators from the 
Revenue Service. All “Chapter 9” institutions have the power to investigate matters 
within their mandate. These institutions are limited to making recommendations, 
however, and have no powers of arrest or punishment, instead relying entirely on 
the relevant department to implement their recommendations. If their investigations 
reveal criminal conduct, then the matter is handed over to the police or prosecuting 
authority for further investigation and possible prosecution.
4.5. Relationship with the judiciary
The judiciary and the NPA are distinct entities, and although they have traditionally 
shared certain administrative institutions and support functions, these connections 
have significantly decreased in recent years. The judiciary consists of judges who 
preside in High Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the Constitutional Court, 
and magistrates who preside over matters in the lower courts. Judges are normally 
appointed from the ranks of senior counsel in private practice or are exceptionally 
qualified and experienced magistrates.
Magistrates, in turn, have traditionally been appointed from the ranks of experienced 
prosecutors, and are consequently generally viewed to be technically proficient in 
criminal law but more punitive than judges, who generally do not have a prosecuto-
rial background, in their approach. However, an increasing tendency since the end of 
apartheid in 1994 is to select magistrates from the ranks of private attorneys.
More prestige is attached to the position of judicial officer, especially that of judge, 
than that of all but the most senior members of the prosecuting authority. Moreover, 
the level of remuneration of judicial officers tends to be higher than that of prosecu-
tors, especially when comparing the pay of magistrates with prosecutors working in 
the lower courts.352 As a result, it is extremely rare for a judicial officer to become a 
prosecutor. There is, however, nothing in law preventing this.
Some tension has arisen between magistrates and prosecutors in some courts as the 
NPA takes a greater role in the establishment and running of courts, particularly 
Community Courts. This is because the magistrate has always traditionally been 
viewed as the “head” of a particular court and the NPA may be seen to be usurping 
351 The main purpose of these institutions is to strengthen the constitutional democracy in South Af-
rica; they assist Parliament in its role as watchdog over the Government and state organs. See Con-
stitution of the  Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 9.
352 Martin Schönteich, Lawyers for the people. The South African prosecution service, ISS Monograph 
Series, No. 53, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (March 2001), at 118-121.
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that role. Various developments, such as diversion and plea and sentence agreements, 
have also moved the locus of decisional power to the prosecution and away from the 
magistrate.
The remuneration of judges, magistrates, and prosecutors comes from the budget 
of the Department of Justice, approved by the National Assembly.353 However, the 
amounts allocated for these three categories comprise separate line items in the De-
partment’s budget, so that monies cannot be reallocated between them. The Judicial 
Services Commission and Magistrates Commission administer judges and magis-
trates respectively. Prosecutors fall under the administrative umbrella of the NPA. 
Since 2001, the NPA has had its own administrative support staff and financial and 
human resources experts, separate from the Department of Justice, while judges are 
still supported by Ministry staff.
V. Publicizing the Prosecution Service’s Activity
Media relations and information access: The NPA has a dedicated section for Commu-
nications, which falls under the CEO’s Corporate Services. The NPA does not have 
dedicated public or media relations sections outside of the head office. In practice, 
the various DPP offices and the separate units within the NPA liaise with the media 
relations section at the head office, especially with regard to specific campaigns and 
media launches. Prosecutors are supposed to refrain from making media statements 
or comments.354
Media access to ongoing proceedings is somewhat limited by the NPA’s confidential-
ity requirements. It is a criminal offense for prosecutors to disclose any information 
acquired in the performance of their official duties without the permission of the 
National Director or a person authorized in writing. This includes the contents of 
documents or evidence in the possession of the NPA or the investigative record cre-
ated by an Investigating Director.355
Public opinion: A 2001 opinion survey of attitudes about the NPA among the general 
public, as well as crime victims and state witnesses who interacted with prosecutors, 
showed that only 47 percent of respondents thought that the NPA was effective in 
meeting its responsibilities. Individual components of the NPA received a higher ef-
fectiveness ranking, however, ranging between 49 percent and 84 percent.356
353 (No publisher) Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Annual Report, Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development 2003/04.
354 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Policy Manual, supra note 118.
355 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, section 41(6).
356 See Martin Schönteich, “NPA in the dock. Thumbs up for the prosecution service,” SA Crime Quar-
terly 3, Institute for Security Studies (March 2003), at 29-31.
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People who had directly interacted with the prosecution service as state witnesses or 
crime victims were more positive about the work of the NPA than the general popu-
lation. The great majority of state witnesses and crime victims surveyed said that the 
prosecutor they had dealt with was willing to help them (87 percent), had under-
stood their concerns (86 percent), and that their human rights had been respected 
and protected during their court appearance (88 percent).357
People who had interacted with prosecutors were most likely to be dissatisfied with 
the service provided because of frequent postponements, numerous delays in the 
court process, and a lack of information provided by prosecutors. Even court users 
dissatisfied with some service standards expressed a high opinion of the prosecutor’s 
professional competence; over four-fifths (82 percent) of court users said that pros-
ecutors know “more” or “the same” as defense attorneys, and 89 percent of respon-
dents thought that the prosecutor dealing with their case knew what to do.358
A more recent survey on public confidence in the criminal justice system conducted 
for the NPA found somewhat different results.359 For the prosecution service, some 
82 percent of respondents had “some” or “a lot” of confidence, with 18 percent aying 
they had “none at all.” The survey found that among victims of crime, those whose 
cases had been to court were less confident in both the prosecution and the police 
than those victims who had not. Simple exposure to the court system (in any capac-
ity, not just as a victim) was also correlated with decreased confidence in the police, 
the courts, and the prosecution service. The markedly differing results of this survey 
have been explained by postulating that the  2001 survey was essentially an exit poll 
which dealt with immediate impressions on leaving court that day, while the 2005 
survey was a national survey, thus eliciting a more long term view which may have 
encompassed multiple trips to court.
VI. Statistics
Data currently routinely collected by the NPA is primarily designed to measure effi-
ciency (e.g. number of cases prosecuted), rather than effectiveness (e.g. improvement 
in public confidence in NPA or criminal justice system, or decline in public fear of 
crime), or fairness.
357 Id.
358 Id.
359 Redpath J, Public Confidence in the Criminal Justice System: Results of a National Survey, NPA 
Serurubele report (unpublished), April 2005.
Report on the South African National Prosecuting Authority
383
Figure 2. Disposition of criminal cases, 2002/03-2005/06.
Case Status 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
New dockets received 484,547 514,355 523,169 517,101
New cases enrolled* 1,037,961 1,029,847 996,098 987,704
Cases removed from the roll** 500,886 720,154 681,032 707,656
Cases finalized with a verdict 358,057 347,737 335,974 335,028
Cases convicted (guilty verdict) 299,275 297,502 291,212 292,789
* Includes enrollments arising from the previous year’s dockets.
** Includes diversions and transfers to another court.
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I. General Issues
The prosecution services in the United States are probably the most diversely struc-
tured and decentralized prosecution services in the world. The U.S. Constitution 
establishes a federal republic comprised of 50 states and the District of Columbia, 
each with its own system of three separate branches of government. Under the U.S. 
Constitution, the 50 states retain considerable sovereignty and authority. Each state 
has its own elected executive (governor), legislature, and court system that is inde-
pendent of the federal level. The constitution gives the federal, or national, govern-
ment strong but limited powers. All other powers are constitutionally reserved to the 
states and the people.1 The state courts have jurisdiction over a much wider variety 
of disputes than the federal courts, and law enforcement and criminal justice are 
traditionally regarded as state and local government responsibilities.2 As a result, the 
vast majority of criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits in the U.S. are handled in the 
completely separate state court systems of each of the 50 states.3 Therefore, in order to 
understand the organization, structure, and operation of prosecutors in the U.S., we 
must focus on state level prosecutions. The federal level is interesting for comparison 
purposes, but does not provide a representative picture of prosecutors’ offices and 
prosecutions in the U.S. 
Since each state has its own constitution and set of laws that govern the structure and 
authority of its prosecutors’ offices as well as the scope of legislation, there is signifi-
cant variety among the 50 U.S. states and prosecution services. Furthermore, the vast 
majority of U.S. states have created a system in which individual and completely in-
dependent prosecutors’ offices are established on the county level.4 As a result, there 
are 2,341 independent prosecutors’ offices on the local level in the U.S. Depending 
on the size of the jurisdiction, these offices can range in size from one or two staff 
members to over 1,000. Some have jurisdiction over civil or administrative cases, 
others do not. Most have jurisdiction over misdemeanor and felony cases, but not 
1 U.S. Const., Amend. X.
2 For an overview of state court responsibilities, see National Center for State Courts, Examining the 
Work of  State Courts (2003).  
3 The number of crimes that can be prosecuted on the federal level has increased; starting in the 
1930s, and increasingly since the 1980s, Congress has adopted legislation giving federal prosecu-
tors authority to prosecute crimes that were previously handled on the state and local levels. As a 
result, a number of crimes may be prosecuted by either state and local authorities or the federal 
government acting through the U.S. Attorney’s offices. Because the federal government has greater 
resources devoted to its investigative agencies, in practice cases that are more difficult to investigate 
will often be handled by the U.S. Attorneys offices. Also, because some cases have more severe 
criminal penalties on the federal level, those cases may be brought to U.S. Attorneys offices. How-
ever, federal prosecutors still handle less than 10% of all criminal cases filed in the U.S. and an even 
smaller portion of all civil cases.
4 In 18 states, prosecutors cover judicial districts that may or may not coincide with county borders.
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all.5 Accordingly, the complexity of their organization, their need for management 
structures, and their capacities to handle certain types of cases, in particular large, 
complex cases, differ significantly. 
Each state also has an independent Attorney General’s Office. In some states, the 
state level elected6 Attorney General has limited concurrent jurisdiction over crimi-
nal prosecution, but rarely exercises the authority.7 In contrast, the federal level U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices, of which there are 94, served by 93 U.S. Attorneys,8 are part of and 
under the control of the executive branch.  
Most local prosecutors in the U.S. would argue that they represent one of the most 
independent prosecution services in the world.9 Most Chief Prosecutors, often called 
District Attorneys (DAs), are elected in local popular elections These DAs head an 
organization completely independent from any other branch of government or pros-
ecution service, and are accountable only to the law and the people through the elec-
tion process. They must account for their budgets, but do not otherwise report to 
anyone. Since local elections, even if they are non-partisan, require gaining popular 
support and can be quite costly, the independence of prosecutors has been ques-
tioned.10  In responding to voters’ demands, prosecutors walk a fine line between car-
rying out the will of the electorate and improperly subsuming their own professional 
judgment in exercising prosecutorial discretion.11
Prosecutorial independence in the U.S. is further intensified by the DA’s wide margin 
of discretion. The DA can decide to pursue or drop cases brought by police. Most 
offices have no supervisory control over the police, but can decide to conduct their 
own investigations.12 They can decide which charges to file, which pleas to accept, 
and which sentences to seek in individual cases, and set general policies for decision 
making for entire classes and types of cases. Over the past two decades, legislators 
5 See Catherine Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public Accountability: The Evolv-
ing Strategy of the American Prosecutor, (2000), a working paper of the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University. 
6 In 43 states, the Attorney General is popularly elected. See State Attorneys General: Powers and 
Responsibilities (Lynne Ross ed., 1990).
7 Not all state Attorneys General have jurisdiction over criminal cases. Those that do, exercise ju-
risdiction only over a limited type of cases, and/or criminal cases committed in several counties 
in their state. In addition, city attorneys serving in municipalities that are independent from the 
county government may have jurisdiction over some misdemeanor cases, in addition to their gen-
eral responsibility for providing legal council to the city government.
8 One U.S. Attorney is appointed to serve in each of the 94 federal judicial districts, with the excep-
tion of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, where a single U.S. Attorney serves both dis-
tricts.
9 Robert Johnson, Independence and Accountability of Prosecutors in the U.S., Paper presented at the 
9th Annual Meeting of the International Association of Prosecutors, Seoul (2004).
10 Abbe Smith, Can You be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor? 14 Georgia Journal of Legal 
Ethics 355-369 (2001). 
11 Ric Simmons, Election of Local Prosecutors (2004), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-
law/ebook/part7/elections_prosecutors.html.
12 In 2001, a majority of offices serving medium and large jurisdictions, i.e., with populations over 
250,000 and over 500,000, reported having investigators on staff, including contract investigators. 
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2001 (2001). In addition, prosecutors in 
a few states, such as New Jersey, have certain supervisory powers over police investigations.
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have sought to limit some of the discretion of the judiciary by enacting sentencing 
guidelines and legislation such as “three strikes” laws.13 These laws have conversely 
further increased the ability of prosecutors to negotiate sentencing options with de-
fendants and their counsel.14  
This broad range of discretion and independence requires mechanisms for account-
ability. While the DA is independent and has almost no reporting requirements,15 a 
system of checks and balances exists that ensures that prosecutors abide by the law, 
act in accordance with ethical standards established for the legal profession, and are 
responsive to the needs of the community. As outlined in more detail in the follow-
ing sections, these mechanisms include procedural safeguards; the influence of the 
courts on how cases proceed through the system and their outcomes; the strong role 
played by the defense and private bar in “monitoring” prosecutorial activities; the 
standard disciplinary procedures applicable to any lawyer; the role of private advo-
cacy groups and the media in demanding justice; and last but not least, the very fact 
that DAs are elected. If the public does not feel that the DA fulfills the mandate of the 
office, the likelihood of reelection is small.
The independence of DAs and their responsibility to the public has also enabled and 
encouraged them to experiment with new approaches and institute innovations that 
increase their efficiency and responsiveness to the community. The diversity of of-
fices and needs, combined with DAs’ flexibility, have resulted in the creation of many 
new programs to tackle special issues, such as repeat offenders16 and victims with 
special needs,17 or to address particular crime problems in targeted communities.18  
The diversity of prosecution services in the U.S. makes it difficult to provide a com-
plete picture of prosecutor offices and their operations. Still, there are sufficient com-
monalities among the state level prosecutors’ offices to present an overview of how 
they are structured and operate. Since they handle the large majority of cases, this 
report will focus predominately on state level prosecution offices. The federal system 
and divergent state systems will be presented when the differences are of interest for 
comparative purposes. 
13 So-called three strikes laws are mandatory sentencing laws requiring  long periods of imprison-
ment for persons convicted of felonies on three (or more) separate occasions.
14 Lisa L. Miller and James Eisenstein. The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in 
Cooperation and Discretion, 30 Law and Social Inquiry 239-269 (2005). 
15 The funding authorities require reporting on the budget, and some states require general reporting 
on budget and operations by any agency that receives state funding.
16 See, e.g., E. Chelimsky and J. Dahmann, Career Criminal Program National Evaluation: Final Re-
port, (1981), published by the National Institute of Justice.
17 For example, the Sacramento County (California) District Attorney’s Office established a special 
Adult Sexual Assault Prosecution Unit (ASAP), comprised of eight attorneys responsible for the 
prosecution of sexual offences involving victims 14 years and older. The ASAP unit works with 
the county’s Sexual Assault Response Team (SART), which is comprised of nurse practitioners and 
physicians’ assistants specially trained in the collection of sexual assault evidence, local law enforce-
ment agencies, and counselors from a community rape crisis center.
18 Community oriented prosecution, for example, originated and continues to evolve in the U.S. See, 
e.g., Heike Gramckow, Community Prosecution in the U.S., 5 European Journal on Criminal 
Policy and Research 9-26 (1997).
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II. Structure and Organization of the Prosecution Service 
2.1. Structure of the prosecution services 
State prosecutors:  The state level prosecution system in the U.S. is highly decentral-
ized. These offices, established along county or local court district lines, are com-
pletely independent. Each DA’s office has completely different jurisdiction from the 
next and from the federal U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. None has supervisory power over 
the other. Headed by a (generally elected) Chief Prosecutor, who may be serving in 
a part-time capacity if serving a low population county, DAs’ offices range in size 
from one or two to over 1,000 staff members in high population counties like Cook 
County (Chicago), Los Angeles (California), or Manhattan (New York). Most pros-
ecutors’ offices in the U.S. are relatively small, with an average staff size of 9, including 
the Chief Prosecutor. In 2001, half of all offices served districts of 36,000 people or 
less.19
Altogether, the over 2,300 local prosecutors’ offices in the U.S. had a staff of approxi-
mately 80,000 in 2001.20 A rate of 10 assistant prosecutors serving 100,000 residents 
has been fairly stable for the past 10 years.21 This number may seem low in comparison 
to other countries. This is possible since many functions in the office are frequently 
carried out by non-legal staff, such as clerical support staff, investigators, and victim 
advocates,22 allowing prosecutors to focus on their core prosecution functions and 
efficiently moving other responsibilities to non-legal staff with specialized skills and 
often lower salaries. Combined with the fact that prosecutors have the discretion to 
decline prosecutions and that almost 90 percent of all criminal cases in the U.S. result 
in plea bargains, which require significantly less time on the part of the prosecutor 
than going to trial, this allows prosecutors’ offices to function with a comparatively 
small number of prosecutors. 
The internal organizational structure of local prosecutors’ offices also differs depend-
ing on the jurisdiction. Such structure is not regulated by law or rules and is solely at 
the discretion of the DA. Creating an efficient and functional internal structure that 
also provides effective reporting and accountability mechanisms is more an issue for 
mid- to large-size offices than for smaller ones.    
Within a DA’s office, authority is clearly hierarchical and policy setting is central-
ized. The DA sets case processing policies, and the rest of the office is charged with 
19 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 12.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 In 2001, the ratio of assistant prosecutors to support staff was 1 to 1, the rate of attorneys to investi-
gators was 3.6 to 1, and the rate of attorneys to victim advocates was 5.6 to 1. See Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, supra note 12.
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implementing these policies. In the majority of small prosecutors’ offices in the U.S., 
this is relatively easy to achieve, but in large offices with hundreds of prosecutors, in-
vestigators, and support staff operating throughout a large county or judicial district, 
establishing a well functioning organization is not a simple feat. Larger offices, such 
as the Los Angeles DA’s Office, are generally led by a management team comprised 
of Deputy DAs, all of which serve at the pleasure of the DA and change when the DA 
changes.23 Deputies may be assigned to head special crimes or regional divisions, 
some of which may be established separately from the headquarters.24  
In large offices, deputies may not only be assigned to head special crime divisions, 
but may be designated to oversee administrative divisions. Well-functioning admin-
istration is not only a matter of office efficiency, but is key to ensuring accountability. 
Prosecutors are rarely trained in managing staff or special divisions, let alone plan-
ning for and managing other administrative functions, such as overall office opera-
tions, IT functions, finances, and budgets. Courts in the U.S. have benefited for the 
past 30 years from support by specialized court administrators,25 but no equivalent 
position has been created in most state prosecutor’s offices. Except in the largest of-
fices, operations are still handled largely by prosecutors themselves or by adminis-
trative support staff not trained in general management operations for prosecutor’s 
offices. Some DAs’ offices can draw upon the support of their state’s DAs’ Association 
to provide some management support,26 but generally speaking, management and 
administration of prosecutors’ offices is still evolving in the U.S. 
Federal level:  In contrast, prosecutors on the federal level are part of the executive 
branch, i.e., the Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ is headed by the Attorney 
General, a cabinet level position appointed by the President. The DOJ enforces fed-
eral criminal laws and represents the U.S. in the federal courts. In addition to the 
various divisions within the DOJ in Washington D.C., there are 94 U.S. Attorney’s of-
fices across the United States, which represent the federal government in each district 
in federal criminal and civil cases to which the U.S. is a party.27
The U.S. Attorney’s offices (U.S.AOs), too, vary in size and composition, from about 
12 positions for the District of Guam to 360 in the District of Columbia, depending 
on the size and needs of the jurisdiction.  In 2005, the 93 U.S.AOs, plus the office 
23 PriceWaterhouse, Applied Management and Planning Group, American Prosecutors Research In-
stitute, Management Audit of the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Criminal Prosecution Func-
tion (1998).
24 See, e.g., the organizational structure of the Alameda County (California) DA’s office, at http://
www.co.alameda.ca.us/da/daorg.htm.
25 See PriceWaterhouse, supra note 23. 
26 The number and independence of prosecutors’ offices in the U.S. has led chief prosecutors to form 
professional associations on the state and national level. Most states have a “prosecutor coordina-
tor” directing a staff that coordinates the activities of the state prosecutors, provides prosecutor 
training, and informs them of significant issues. State prosecutors have created the National Dis-
trict Attorneys Association (NDAA), which works on a national level much like the state prosecu-
tors’ organizations. It has a board of directors with representatives from each state. These organiza-
tions are important resources for state prosecutors and those who may want to interact with those 
prosecutors. For more information about NDAA and state prosecutor organizations, see NDAA 
website, www.ndaa-apri.org.
27 For an overview of the responsibilities of the DOJ, see the DOJ website, www.usdoj.gov.
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
392
serving the District of Columbia, had a total of 5,517 full time attorneys and 5,625 
support staff, most focusing on criminal cases.28  
In addition to the 94 headquarter offices, 128 branch offices have been established to 
facilitate geographic access and adequate caseload coverage. For example, the Dis-
trict of Maryland is comprised of two divisions, a Northern and a Southern Division, 
located in separate courthouses. The office’s criminal division is situated in both loca-
tions.29 Generally the offices are divided into at least a criminal, civil, and adminis-
trative division. Larger U.S.AOs may also have an appellate division. In large juris-
dictions, each division may be comprised of several groups handling certain types 
of cases. The Criminal Division of the U.S.AO in Phoenix, for example, has three 
groups: one for violent crimes, the second for economic fraud, and the third for drug 
and immigration cases.30  
Management support, in particular for key internal accountability and reporting 
structures, such as data collection and overall reporting assistance, budget develop-
ment, and human resources management, is provided by the Executive Office of U.S. 
Attorneys (EOU.S.A).31
2.2. Independence of prosecutorial decision-making, accountability,  
and safeguards in the system
State level:  Independence of prosecutorial decision making in the U.S. is different 
from the independence of judicial decision making. On the local level, most chief 
attorneys in the U.S. are directly elected by the people of the jurisdiction they serve 
in a general election and for a set term (4-8 years).32 There are no term limits, except 
in the State of Colorado, and the requirements for running for election are quite 
minimal; generally one need only have passed the local bar and be a local resident. 
Significant experience and good standing are helpful in winning an election. While 
experienced candidates therefore stand a good chance of winning or being reelected, 
recent law school graduates have in some cases run and won elections.33  The elec-
tions are an indicator of the DA’s ability to connect with the community and other 
justice agencies.
Prosecutors’ offices are hierarchical institutions where only the DA is elected or oth-
erwise appointed in a democratic process. By electing the DA, the people authorize 
28 See Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EO USA), United States Attorneys’ Annual Statisti-
cal Report (2005).
29 See United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/md/in-
dex.html.
30 See website of the United States Attorney’s Office, overview of District of Arizona, http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/az/office.html.
31 For more detail on the responsibilities and organization of the EOU.S.A, see www.usdoj.gov/usao/
eousa.
32 Over 95% of the DAs in the states are directly elected by the people in the jurisdiction for which 
they are the prosecutor. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 12.
33 Robert Johnson, supra note 9.
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the DA to establish policies for implementing the laws. Assistant DAs must therefore 
follow these policies, as long as they are within the scope and meaning of the laws 
the policies aim at enforcing. Other individual prosecutors are not fully independent in 
their decision making as individual judges are. Unlike judges, assistant prosecutors are 
tied to the general policy directives issued by the DA (or the AG on the federal level). 
Prosecutorial policies differ among prosecutors’ offices and the state and federal lev-
els as a result of the different laws that govern their decisions, the discretion enjoyed 
by prosecutors in the U.S., and each individual DA’s vision for pursuing crime in his 
or her jurisdiction. Since laws are generally written in quite abstract terms to fit a 
broad range of situations, prosecutors in all countries use some degree of discretion 
in their decisions to file a case in court, the charges applied, and the sentence they 
seek. This is a reality even in countries that do not formally recognize prosecuto-
rial discretion. However, in the U.S., prosecutorial discretion is particularly broad. 
It allows prosecutors to decide not to pursue cases that are brought to them by the 
investigative authorities. For offices with investigative resources, it also allows them 
to investigate cases that are not or are insufficiently pursued by law enforcement. It 
allows prosecutors to drop charges in exchange for a plea or information and to bar-
gain about the sentence pursued. 
The benefit of this situation is that DAs can set policies that fit their jurisdictions and 
their budgets. A DA’s prosecution policies may vary over time to reflect the need to 
respond to particular crime trends and, to some extent, the personal crime policy of 
the DA—the “platform” he or she was elected on. Concretely, this means that a DA 
may have a policy of not pursuing certain misdemeanor violations, such as prostitu-
tion.34 It may also mean a policy of pursuing certain crimes leniently or aggressively.35 
The DA may require that no plea offers are made in certain types of serious cases, 
such as child abuse. These policy decisions are not regulated, and different offices 
follow different principles, with the minimum requirement being legality—that is, 
that all legally required elements of the crime are substantiated. Office resources may 
limit a prosecutors’ ability to proceed with all cases that fulfill the evidentiary re-
quirements, pushing the DA to set processing priorities or even limit the range of 
cases to be pursued. DAs can find guidance for establishing policies for screening, 
charging, diversion, and plea negotiations in the National Prosecution Standards de-
veloped by the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA).36 Their state’s DA 
association may also be of assistance. The NDAA standards are not binding, but pro-
vide guidance based on lessons learned in offices of all sizes throughout the U.S. The 
only limit on these policies is the margin of discretion permitted by law and the state’s 
professional ethics rules. 
The drawback is the potential—and actual—variation in charging, plea, and sentenc-
34 Fifteen years ago, the State’s Attorney in Montgomery County (Maryland), for example, issued a 
policy that simple prostitution cases would no longer be prosecuted by his office.
35 For example, a former DA in San Francisco won two terms after campaigning on a platform of 
leniency and alternative sentences for drug crimes and prostitution. See Patrick Hoge, DA Hallinan 
Holds Fast to Long-Held Convictions, San Francisco Chronicle, October 23, 2003, at A 19.
36 National District Attorneys Association (NDAA), National Prosecution Standards (2d ed. 1991), 
available at ndaa.org/pdf/ndaa_natl_prosecution_standards.pdf.
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ing policies within a state or even within a county if the DA changes, as well as the 
potential for DAs to adjust policies to win elections.37  
Small prosecution offices may not see a need for detailed formalized policies. DAs 
with no assistants or only a small number may believe they can communicate policy 
informally. The larger the office, the more difficult it is to ensure that the policies set 
by the DA are followed. Well structured offices therefore have comprehensive policy 
manuals that outline policies and how they should be applied to prosecutorial deci-
sions.38 As a practical matter, most chief prosecutors allow their assistants discretion 
over which cases to pursue and how to pursue them. 
When establishing general policies, DAs in tune with the needs of the various neigh-
borhoods and communities they serve will listen to recommendations from pros-
ecutors serving in various areas—if the office is organized by geographic areas—or 
generally recognize the need for differing prosecution strategies related to problem 
areas, as expressed by residents and local law enforcement. The development and 
spread of community oriented prosecution in the U.S. is one means used by DAs to 
better respond to the needs of their communities.39
The public holds the DA accountable through elections. Once elected, a DA is not 
responsible to anyone but the voters. There are no reporting requirements, and na-
tional standards for prosecutors’ offices established by the National District Attor-
neys Association40 and the American Bar Association (ABA)41 are non-binding and 
do not include performance measures for individual prosecutors or even offices. Still, 
DAs are generally very cognizant of the need to operate efficiently and transparently. 
A majority of offices try to implement the NDAA standards42 and may regularly post 
information about the office.43 Many large state prosecution offices publish an annual 
report that they distribute widely. Such reports are created in a format designed to be 
understandable to the general public, as their purpose is both to inform the public 
and applaud the chief prosecutor. However, prosecutorial policies and statistics relat-
ed to prosecutorial decisions, from filing and charging to plea bargaining, conviction 
rates, and sentencing statistics, while regularly collected and sometimes published in 
an annual report, are not always readily available in a way that would allow insight 
into office performance.44  
37 These differences can be significant. For example, it has been reported that the DA in Harris Coun-
ty (Houston, Texas) is responsible for 10% of all executions in the country. Mike Tolson and Steve 
Brewer, Harris County is a Pipeline to Death Row, Houston Chronicle, Feb. 21, 2001 at 1.
38 A survey conducted in Minnesota, for example, indicated that about 52% of county attorneys and 
25% of city prosecutors had or were developing written guidelines in 1995. Smaller jurisdictions 
were less likely to have written guidelines than more populous ones. See Office of the Legislative 
Auditor, Non-Felony Prosecution—A Best Practices Review (1997), available at www.auditor.leg.
state.mn.us/ped/bp/nf97.htm.
39 See, e.g., LA County District Attorneys Office, Policy and Procedures Manual. 
40 NDAA Standards, supra note 36. 
41 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function (1993), see www.
abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc_blk.html.
42 Considering that a majority of offices are members of the NDAA, this statement made by NDAA 
board members appears reasonable.
43 See, e.g., http://www.brooklynda.org.
44 A review of the websites of the larger jurisdictions in the U.S. (available at www.eatoncounty.org/
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Fiscal accountability to the respective funding authority is established by relevant 
state and county laws. These may set additional reporting and auditing requirements, 
including some limited performance measures.45
Overall, all prosecutors’ offices underlie the requirements of Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and public hearing rules applicable in their jurisdiction,46 which provide the 
public with access to information and decisions from within the DA’s office, but for-
mal reporting requirements related to office and individual prosecutor performance 
do not exist. While standards and performance measures have been established for 
courts and even individual elected judges, they have not been developed as yet for 
state prosecutors.
Elected DAs cannot be removed from office during their term by anyone, except 
through a state disciplinary procedure for violating the ethics rules established by 
the state’s attorney licensing authority, and/or if they have been convicted of a serious 
crime and therefore lose their license to practice law.47
Each state’s ethics rules for lawyers also have specific sections relating to prosecutors. 
Complaints about a prosecutor’s conduct violating these provisions may be made to 
the state legal ethics authority, and gross violations will result in serious sanctions. 
These ethics rules cannot address or limit the range of prosecutorial discretion, such 
as a decision not to charge a case or to charge or bargain a provable case. The Bar 
Association generally establishes a complaint, review, and disciplinary process to ad-
dress matters of questionable professional conduct. Some states, such as Missouri, 
changed to a commission system to address such issues. The disciplinary process 
differs to some extent from state to state, but they generally follow a process similar 
to the one established by the Virginia State Bar (VSB) Association:
The VSB receives written complaints from the public, judges, and other lawyers about 
conduct that might violate ethics rules. Each complaint is sent to the Office of Bar 
Counsel, where it is analyzed by the Intake Office, staffed by lawyers and assistants. 
If the office decides that the complaint does not constitute a violation of the areas 
regulated by the bar, no further action is taken and the complainant is notified in 
writing.48 The Intake Office’s decision not to pursue a complaint may be reviewed 
prosecutor/proslist.htm) showed that all provide information about general office operations and 
other details of interest to the public; however, operational statistics are rarely provided. One notable 
exception is the Thurston County (Washington) Prosecutor’s office, which publishes its annual report 
on the web. See http://www.co.thurston.wa.us/pao/PAO_2001Report/2001_annual_report.htm. 
45 State laws, in particular, increasingly require performance measure-related reporting of opera-
tions, budgets, and expenditures from any agency that receives state funding. See, e.g., Franklin 
County (Ohio) Prosecuting Attorney, www.franklincountyohio.gov/commissioners/budget/apps/
04Budget/programOverview_final.cfm?id=43��program=43A306. 
46 On the federal level, this is the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, As Amended By Public 
Law No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048. See usdoj.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XVII_4/page2.htm. For a 
state example, see the New York State Freedom of Information Law and Open Meetings Laws, avail-
able at www.dos.state.ny.us/coog/coogwww.html.
47 Even then, it is theoretically possible that they can be reelected if they regain their license. There 
have also been instances where DAs who were debarred tried to remain in office until their terms 
ran out.
48 Violations of professional rules include unprofessional behavior and ethics violations, but not rea-
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by the Bar Counsel, and its decisions are randomly reviewed by a supervisory com-
mittee composed of attorneys and members of the public. If a rule might have been 
violated, the VSB investigates the situation.49
If a lawyer is found to have violated an ethics rule, one of the following levels of dis-
cipline may be imposed:
▶ The lawyer could receive an admonition or reprimand, meaning he or she will 
be informed about what rule has been broken and a notation is made on the 
lawyer’s bar record; or
▶ The lawyer’s license to practice law could be suspended for up to 5 years; or
▶ The lawyer’s license could be revoked, which means the lawyer is disbarred 
from the practice of law in that state.50 
If there is no ethical or criminal violation, no effective complaint procedure exists 
against an act or decision of a DA. Any complaint may be made to the media, but 
the only effective remaining recourse for the aggrieved person is the next election.51 
Complaints about acts or decisions by assistants may be made to the DA, and will 
generally lead to a review of the matter. 
Federal level:  U.S. Attorneys are appointed for four years by the President and serve 
at his pleasure. Federal prosecutors are guided by DOJ policies when applying discre-
tion in their decision making process. These DOJ policies in turn largely reflect the 
President’s crime policies. At the same time, the Attorney General may have priori-
ties or initiatives that he/she would like to emphasize through the various U.S.AOs. 
Such direction comes from the Attorney General through the EOU.S.A. The EOU.S.A 
helps coordinate the initiatives through the various U.S.AOs nationwide by formu-
lating guidelines, assisting in their implementation, and providing related training. 
However, the discretion to decide which individual cases to charge, in most instanc-
es, remains with the individual U.S.AO. In certain instances, the Attorney General 
does provide direction. For example, he will determine in all “capital” cases whether 
the death penalty will be sought. The Attorney General, through special DOJ Divi-
sions, also retains control over certain types of cases, i.e. tax cases and criminal civil 
rights cases. In these types of cases, the individual U.S.AO must obtain authorization 
to indict.52
U.S. Attorneys retain significant discretion to set prosecution priorities and poli-
cies in their own districts. These priorities vary based on the particular needs of the 
district as well as the vision of the U.S. Attorney for the office. For example, since 
most drug cases can be pursued under state as well as federal law, cases that federal 
authorities can pursue more efficiently than state authorities, such as complex drug 
sonable professional decisions within the margin of discretion. For more detail, see Virginia State 
Bar Association, www.vsb.org/profguide/index.html. If a criminal violation is suspected, the case 
will be forwarded to the relevant investigative agency.
49 See Virginia State Bar Association, id.
50 Id.
51 See Robert Johnson, supra note 9.
52 See United States Attorneys’ Manual, available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam.
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cases involving organized crime, may be referred to federal agencies.53 The U.S.AOs 
thus develop different policies regarding the cases they will take at the request of 
state authorities. Specifically, the political interest in pursuing certain crimes and the 
resources available determine policies on when to adopt such cases in an individual 
jurisdiction. For example, the U.S.AO in one jurisdiction may require more drugs to 
be involved for it to consider a case for prosecution than his colleague in another.54 
Similarly, one study indicated significant differences among U.S.AOs’ willingness to 
seek the death penalty.55 Prosecutorial initiatives may be based on the specific needs 
of the particular district. Where violent crime is a significant problem, the U.S.AO 
may prosecute large numbers of possession of firearms cases, cases generally left to 
state and local authorities, to help reduce the level of violent crime.56
U.S. Attorneys are responsible for reporting their activities to the Attorney General.57 
For that purpose, the Case Management Staff of the EOU.S.A maintains a central 
caseload and collection management system. This system is used to respond to re-
quests for statistical information and to produce management reports for use within 
the DOJ. This information is also used to allocate resources to the various U.S.AOs, 
produce the U.S. Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report, and meet the accounting 
requirements for debts collected by U.S. Attorneys. U.S. Attorneys also develop a 
Monthly Resource Summary Report that reports the use of personnel resources al-
located to the office. The information from this report is used for budget formulation 
and justification and for monitoring resource allocation.58
The DOJ, through the Office of Evaluation and Review, evaluates each U.S.AO once 
every three years, to ensure each office is in compliance with DOJ policies and prac-
tices. The main purpose is to review the operations of each office and make recom-
mendations for best practices and to require corrective action where indicated.59  
2.3. Internal supervisory and accountability structures
State level:  Assistant prosecutors generally serve at the pleasure of the DA and must 
comply with general charging, filing, plea bargaining, and trial policies established 
by the DA. Office policies set the framework for individual prosecutors’ work and ac-
countability, and well run offices issue policy and procedures manuals to all staff and 
train them on it. Generally, senior prosecutors advise junior prosecutors on applying 
53 Id.
54 See Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United State Attorneys’ 
Offices, 46 Hasting Law Journal 1319-25 (2002).
55 See Denise Lieberman (American Civil Liberties Union), Prosecutors: The First Line of Offense. 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Arbitrariness in Administration of the Death Penalty (2001), available 
at http://www.mindspring.com/~emcadp/ACLUDenise.html.
56 See Lisa Miller and James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in 
Cooperation and Discretion, 20 Law and Social Inquiry 239-268 (2005).
57 The 2003 annual AG’s report can be viewed at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ar2003/in-
dex.html.
58 Id.
59 Id. 
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the policies. In this way, senior prosecutors ensure that the DA’s policies are followed. 
Offices that value good management and performance also track the extent to which 
individual prosecutors’ decisions comply with existing policies, within a reasonable 
range of discretion. The DA and other supervising prosecutors may and will inter-
vene to ensure that cases are handled within the generally set policy framework. 
In smaller offices, supervision and communication about cases will be informal, 
through regularly scheduled or ad hoc meetings. The larger the office, the greater 
the need for more formal structures for communication and review. Results from 
organizational studies60  indicate that larger offices tend to create specialized screen-
ing or intake units to review cases brought by the police to decide whether to accept 
them for prosecution, what charges to apply, whether to request additional investiga-
tion with or without prosecutorial input, and which prosecutor to assign to the case. 
Considering the important decisions made at this stage, it is generally recommended 
that experienced prosecutors staff these intake units to increase efficiency and to 
ensure that cases are either sent forward or, if not substantiated by sufficient evidence 
or if prosecution is not in the interest of the public, are dropped or sent back to the 
investigative agency. 
Reviewing the case to ensure not only that sufficient evidence supports the charge, 
but that all evidence was collected according to the law, is of particular importance. 
Evidence rules in the U.S. apply strict standards for weighing the legality and admis-
sibility of evidence. Exclusionary rules prohibit the use of any evidence not collected 
in accordance with procedural rules and regulations.61  
The screening process is structured in different ways in different offices. Where a 
special screening unit exists, the investigating officers may discuss the case file and 
the merits of the case with the screening prosecutor. The prosecutor may point out 
weak points, and together they will weigh the need for additional information and 
next steps, including alternatives to prosecution if appropriate. Even where special 
screening units are established, investigators will not always be available or screening 
prosecutors may prefer a file review without input from the police officer. While the 
latter may make the screening process faster, it is likely to necessitate increased com-
munication between the investigative agency and the prosecutor’s office and result 
in a higher potential for misunderstandings. Not all DAs’ offices have the manpower 
to staff a special screening unit; they may, however, still have the ability to rotate the 
responsibility for case screening among more experienced prosecutors.62  
After screening, the case will be assigned according to the policies, size, and struc-
tures of the office. In the majority of smaller offices, there is no opportunity for ex-
clusive specialization. Cases will be assigned by the DA or next senior prosecutor by 
a policy determined office by office. In larger offices, cases often will be assigned to 
60 See Joan Jacoby, Peter Gilchrist, and Edward Ratledge, Prosecutors Guide to Intake and Screening 
(1999), published by the Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies.
61 Exclusionary rules are prevalent in the U.S. as a way to protect the accused from illegal police ac-
tivities and curb overly eager law enforcement efforts to collect evidence. See Edwards, Criminal 
Liability for Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 41Virginia Law Review 621 (1955).
62 Jacoby et al., supra note 60.
Prosecutor Organization and Operations in the United States
399
special divisions, and within those divisions to individuals or teams. Still, the DA, as 
the elected official, always has the discretion to realign assignments.
Cases may be assigned to vertical or horizontal handling. Vertical prosecution re-
quires that a single prosecutor handle a case from start to finish, i.e., from investiga-
tion through trial, sentencing, incarceration, and probation or parole, and in some 
cases from juvenile or family court to adult criminal court. The theory behind verti-
cal assignments is that a single prosecutor handling a case exclusively from begin-
ning to end will be able to conduct it more effectively than if different prosecutors 
handled the case at the different stages of the process (i.e., horizontal prosecution).63 
Vertical prosecution is generally preferred for more complex cases, while efficiency 
concerns often require some horizontal processing.
An office may be organized into special units that handle certain types of cases (i.e. 
domestic violence, murder, or drug crimes) vertically. The office may have a mixed 
structure, for example with misdemeanors or simple felonies being handled horizon-
tally and more serious case types vertically. Prosecutors may handle cases individual-
ly, or a case may be assigned to a team, under the leadership of a senior attorney, that 
handles it from filing through disposition and sentencing and beyond. The benefit is 
that team members can support each other in complex cases and junior prosecutors 
have an opportunity to learn from senior ones. 
If a case presents a real or perceived conflict of interest for the office, it will be re-
ferred to another state prosecutor’s office or to a private attorney. Such cases often 
involve a defendant who has a connection to the prosecutor’s office or someone who 
is a victim in one case while being accused in another.
Federal level: On the federal level, case assignment practices vary among the different 
U.S.AOs. Medium and small offices will likely have a practice of horizontal pros-
ecutions, while larger offices may not. Most medium to larger U.S.AOs have some 
specialization in criminal prosecutions, for example white collar crimes, drug pros-
ecutions, and crimes of violence. Cases will be assigned to these respective divisions, 
but the opportunity exists in many offices for a prosecutor to handle cases outside 
his/her particular group. Ultimately, the U.S. Attorney in any office has the authority 
and discretion to assign and reassign cases; however, cases assignments are almost 
always handled by supervisory Assistant U. S. Attorneys (AU. S. As). 
2.4. The status and accountability of individual prosecutors
State level: Assistant prosecutors, while often serving at the discretion of the elected 
DA, may generally only be removed for good cause. In jurisdictions where assistant 
63 Prosecutors in gang units, for example, are usually specialists with greater knowledge of gang cul-
ture and activities. They can develop better follow-up investigation, control, and continuity, thereby 
increasing the chance of successful prosecution of more serious gang charges. K. Ehrensaft, Pros-
ecutor Models, (1991), published by the U.S. Dept of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention.
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prosecutors are civil servants, they enjoy the protection of the civil service system as 
it relates to salary, promotions, and dismissal, but this does not extend their discre-
tionary powers beyond the policies the DA establishes, and frequently excludes those 
appointed to management positions. Deputy DAs therefore tend to change when the 
DA changes. 
Codes of conduct and related disciplinary procedures established by each state’s 
Bar Association apply to all lawyers in that state. NDAA and ABA standards con-
tain references to professional conduct and ethics, but do not formulate a national 
model code of conduct for prosecutors.64 At a minimum, prosecutors are expected 
to avoid activities that are likely to appear to, or actually do, conflict with the duties 
and responsibilities of their office. With this general guidance in mind, prosecutors 
may engage in religious or civic activities, as well as partisan activities that are legal 
and ethical, as long as they do not interfere with their prosecutorial work. Generally, 
prosecutors’ offices prohibit assistant prosecutors from actively soliciting support for 
religious groups or political parties within the office, and such activities are not sup-
posed to be conducted in conjunction with prosecutorial work. On the other hand, 
it is not uncommon for assistant prosecutors to be asked to actively support the re-
election of their DA.
To assist individual prosecutors in applying the DA’s policies with consistency and 
accountability, the DA may not merely establish policies, but may issue more detailed 
guidelines for adhering to them. 
The DA or the supervisory prosecutor may also instruct an Assistant DA on how 
to act in a particular case. If individual prosecutors do not follow these directions, 
a complaint may be launched, an internal disciplinary action may be taken against 
them, and the DA may reassign the case to another prosecutor. Individual offices 
often establish processes for internal review, with consequences up to and including 
termination of employment. Assistant DAs who significantly and frequently diverge 
from the DA’s policies are likely to lose their jobs.65  
Performance measures for individual offices and/or prosecutors are not well estab-
lished. Many offices focus assessments and performance measures on overall behav-
ior and attitudes, such as conviction rates, and less on specific office goals and objec-
tives. One reason is that traditional measures of office and prosecutor performance, 
such as conviction, dismissal, and incarceration rates, depend on office policies and 
other external factors and are not a good measure of individual performance. They 
may lead to decisions that are at odds with the obligation to pursue justice. They also 
do not measure the performance of special programs, such as community oriented 
prosecution or victim services. Another reason is that no national performance stan-
64 See ABA Standards, supra note 41.
65 In most states, ADAs serve at the pleasure of the DA, meaning they can be dismissed if they fre-
quently fail to follow policies. In some states, ADAs are part of the state’s civil service system and 
part of civil servant units that limit the DA’s ability to terminate ADAs. These limitations do not, 
however, limit the ability to terminate an assistant who repeatedly refuses to comply with office 
policies or direct orders from the DA. All systems would consider such conduct just cause for ter-
mination.
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dards for prosecutors (or offices) that focus on overall goals have been established.66 
New efforts to establish measurements of prosecutorial performance are focusing 
on establishing overall goals that can be applied across offices, but they have not yet 
resulted in acceptable benchmarks and performance standards.67 One internal mea-
sure some offices apply is the extent to which individual prosecutors adhere to office 
policies. If collected and analyzed across all prosecutors, this provides a tool to iden-
tify divergences that may indicate whether individual prosecutors abide by the DA’s 
policies within an acceptable margin of discretion, or if policies need to be adjusted 
or training and guidance materials enhanced.
Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability when initiating and pursu-
ing criminal prosecution,68 but have no immunity from criminal liability for acts in 
the course of their work or outside their work as prosecutors. The Supreme Court did 
not extend absolute immunity to prosecutor actions involving investigative activities, 
and some lower courts have established only a qualified defense for such activities. 
Prosecutors’ offices may obtain insurance to cover the cost of defending a civil suit 
against a prosecutor. If this insurance does not cover all potential costs of such a suit 
or is not available, prosecutors may pay for their own insurance.
Federal level:  AU.S.As also operate under the general directions and guidelines es-
tablished for their offices. In practice, they can apply their own discretion within this 
framework. While U.S. Attorneys are appointed and subject to removal at the will of 
the President,69 AU.S.As are appointed by their U.S. Attorney and may be removed 
for cause by that official. 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires all federal 
agencies to set goals and objectives, measure performance, and report their accom-
plishments in order to move toward a performance-based environment. In accor-
dance with this legislation, the EOU.S.A developed performance measures for U.S. 
Attorneys’ activities, and is exploring ways to measure performance in individual 
U.S.AOs. The Attorney General’s report for the DOJ’s fiscal year 2005 Congressional 
budget submission included an outcome measure—percentage of cases favorably re-
solved—that is intended to show how U.S. Attorneys contribute to the DOJ’s overall 
mission. The EOU.S.A is also developing performance indicators to measure prog-
ress toward implementing special initiatives, such as programs to curb gun violence, 
and conducts related performance evaluations that are summarized in reports for the 
Deputy Attorney General and the Attorney General, who are in turn responsible for 
reporting the results to Congress.
Performance of all attorneys and support staff of a U.S.AO is reviewed on an an-
nual basis. The evaluation is based on Performance Work Plans that must contain 
66 Courts, in contrast, have been working on developing such standards since the mid-1980s. In 1987, 
the National Center for State Courts initiated the Trial Court Performance Standard Project to 
develop measurable performance standards for state trial courts. 
67 American Prosecutors Research Institute, Prosecution in the 21st Century—Goals, Objectives and 
Performance Measures (2003).
68 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 408.
69 Parsons v. U.S., 167 U.S. 314 (1897).
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one or more critical performance elements. These elements must include a written 
standard of performance that defines the rating for successful performance in such 
terms as quality of work, quantity of work, timeliness, individual or group goals and 
objectives, or other such terms that are appropriate for the position. During the per-
formance review, the rating officials evaluate actual employee performance based on 
written performance standards.70
As federal employees, assistant AU.S.As are free to engage in legal and ethical reli-
gious, civic, and certain political activities outside their office. However, as employees 
of the DOJ they are required to enforce the laws of the U.S. in a neutral and impartial 
manner. Therefore, for the public to retain confidence in its prosecutors, AU.S.As 
must ensure that politics or religious views do not compromise the integrity of their 
work. 
Specific statutory restrictions on political participation applicable to all employees 
limit political activities in conjunction with their offices.71  Attachment A outlines 
which types of activities fall under these restrictions.
AU.S.As are subject to the same ethics process as state prosecutors. Further, the DOJ’s 
Ethics Office, located in the Justice Management Division, is responsible for adminis-
tering a DOJ-wide ethics program and for implementing DOJ-wide policies on ethics 
issues. The office provides advice and training and supervises the ethics programs of 
the U.S.AOs. Each U.S.AO assigns a staff member to serve as the Deputy Designated 
Agency Ethics Official responsible for administering the ethics program within the 
office. In addition, the Professional Responsibility Advisory Office provides answers 
to ethics questions and is a helpful resource for designated ethics officers.
The DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigates allegations of mis-
conduct by DOJ attorneys that relate to investigations, litigation, or the provision of 
legal advice. The Inspector General (OIG) has authority to investigate other allega-
tions of misconduct by any Department employee not related to the practice of law. 
All U.S. Attorney staff are required to report to their supervisors any evidence of mis-
conduct that may be in violation of any laws, regulations, or professional standards. 
Supervisors then evaluate whether the misconduct is serious, and if so report it to the 
appropriate investigative office. Reporting through the chain of command ensures 
that supervisors are aware of any problems within their offices. Because some com-
plainants may wish their identities kept confidential, complaints may also be made 
directly to an investigative office. The decision to report an allegation does not create 
any inference that the allegation is well founded. This is an important reassurance to 
employees who are the subjects of unwarranted allegations of misconduct that their 
supervisors are obligated to report.
After the OPR receives an allegation, it conducts a preliminary review and opens 
an investigation only if it concludes that further investigation is warranted. Upon 
70 See U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 52.
71 In 1994, Congress amended the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. 73121-7326, to remove certain restrictions on 
political participation by most government employees. 
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completion of an investigation, the OPR notifies the subject, the supervisor, and the 
complainant.  
Disciplinary actions and grievances against AU.S.As are sensitive issues and must be 
coordinated with the EOU.S.A Legal Counsel’s office. The authority to initiate and 
implement disciplinary actions against AU.S.As is delegated to the Director of the 
EOU.S.A or a designee. Limited authority for disciplinary actions against AU.S.As 
has been delegated to U.S. Attorneys, who can issue written reprimands and initiate 
suspensions of 14 days or less.
Disciplinary actions can include reprimands, reductions in grade/pay, furloughs for 
30 days or less, suspensions, and removals. An employee who receives a reprimand 
or a suspension for 14 days or less may request a review of the action by filing a griev-
ance. If the immediate supervisor lacks the authority to resolve the grievance, it must 
be referred to the next level management official within the district or the EOU.S.A. 
Once a decision is issued, there is no further right of review. More serious disciplin-
ary actions must be appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board; such appeals are 
coordinated by the Legal Counsel’s Office of the EOU.S.A. 
Civil and criminal liability is the same as for state level prosecutors. Therefore, fed-
eral prosecutors also carry professional liability insurance. The DOJ will partially 
reimburse law enforcement officers, attorneys, and supervisors and managers for this 
insurance.72
2.5. Selection requirements and training
State level:  Official requirements for becoming a prosecutor in local offices are gener-
ally limited to having acquired a law degree from an accredited law school and passed 
the state bar exam. This requirement generally applies to the elected chief prosecutor 
as well as to assistant prosecutors. In order to be elected, however, one must have the 
stature (and finances) to gain a majority of the public vote. For assistant prosecutors, 
individual offices set different criteria that are often driven by the availability of quali-
fied candidates. Offices may set individual requirements that fit their office’s mission 
and philosophy. In practice, many offices require some prior experience either as a 
prosecutor in another office, an intern in a prosecutor’s office, a law clerk at a court, 
or in private practice. The more competition for positions, the higher the require-
ments. Individual prosecutors are usually either hired after the position has been 
advertised or are selected throughout the year in a regular cycle. 
In the past, younger attorneys were attracted to DAs’ offices to gain trial experience 
before moving to the more lucrative private sector. However, the increasing demands 
of large private firms on their attorneys and an oversupply of lawyers has encouraged 
a trend towards careers in prosecutors’ offices. It is not unusual to have 50 to 100 
applicants for an open position, except in offices in rural areas. Often successful can-
72 Section 636 of the FY 2000 Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriation Act.  
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didates come from small rural offices, where they gain the experience necessary to 
be successful applicants. Once in a large office, they can progress to more responsible 
and supervisory positions. In smaller offices, a senior prosecutor may seek to become 
the DA if the DA resigns or is not adequately performing.
After hiring, prosecutors generally have no further training requirements other than 
the continuing legal education (CLE) requirements established for practicing attor-
neys by the attorney licensing authority in each state. CLE requirements vary some-
what from state to state. In general, they require participation in approved education 
courses, including ethics classes.73  
While prosecutors have different needs for skills training than other legal profes-
sions,74 and prosecutors operating in special divisions or in managerial positions 
have very special educational needs, no standards have been established for their 
education. Also, participation in training is rarely linked to performance evaluations 
or promotion of individual prosecutors.   Prosecutors have the opportunity to par-
ticipate in CLE courses offered by their state bar association, private legal education 
organizations, internal office training, or their state’s prosecutors’ association. The 
costs are generally carried by the individual prosecutor, sometimes reimbursed by 
the office. Since 1998, the National Advocacy Center (NAC) has been dedicated to 
addressing the training needs of local prosecutors.75  
Federal level: In each district, AU.S.As are appointed by the Attorney General, al-
though in practice all hiring decisions in a U.S.AO are made at the local level.76 The 
federal rules for hiring are complex and detailed.77  Although the EOU.S.A has speci-
fied certain required procedures for hiring new AU.S.As, for the most part the pro-
cess used for hiring is determined by each U.S.AO.
Because U.S.AOs are considered prestigious places to work, most vacancies generate 
a large number of applicants. In many offices, the U.S. Attorney create a committee to 
screen and interview candidates and recommend a certain number for his/her final 
interview and selection. Applicants for AU.S.A positions must possess a J.D. (law 
degree) from an accredited law school, be an active member of the bar (any jurisdic-
tion), and have at least 2 years of post-J.D. experience. In addition, individual offices 
may have special requirements depending on the type of cases the prosecutor may 
be designated to focus on. Only U.S. citizens can be considered for these positions, 
73 For example, the Virginia Bar Association requires 12 hours of training, including 2 hours of eth-               
ics/professionalism per year. Non-compliance triggers a fine. See  supra note 48.
74 Such training needs include, for example, trial advocacy, interviewing techniques, and jury selection.
75 The NAC is operated by the Department of Justice, Executive Office for United States Attorneys, 
Office of Legal Education and NDAA. The facility was built to train federal, state, and local pros-
ecutors and litigators in advocacy skills and management of legal operations. Information on its 
various training programs can be found at the website of the Office of Legal Education (OLE) of 
the EOU.S.A, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/ole.html, and at NDAAs website, www.ndaa-apri.
org/education/nac_index.html.
76 By statute, the Attorney General also has direction of all U.S. Attorneys and their assistants, see 28 
U.S.C Secs. 514, 515, 519.
77 See United States Attorneys Manual, supra note 52.
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and AU.S.As generally must reside in the district to which they are appointed.78 
Employment is contingent upon a satisfactory background investigation conducted 
by the FBI.
For continuing legal education on the federal level, the vast majority of training is 
done at the NAC through the Office of Legal Education (OLE). This includes a vari-
ety of courses in trial advocacy and skills, training in substantive legal subject mat-
ters, and management skills. 
2.6. Prosecutor budgets and finances
State level:  The level of financial independence and related reporting and account-
ability mechanisms are an important indicator of prosecutorial independence and 
transparency of operations, as well as important measures of office efficiency and 
accountability. The majority of local offices are funded by the county or municipal-
ity they serve, and to a lesser extent by the state.79 County and state budgets are, 
however, dependent on their economic situations and related tax revenues collected 
in the county or state. Therefore, if the law allows it, local prosecutors may seek ad-
ditional funding from the state or a city government within their jurisdiction. They 
may also develop revenue creating initiatives, such as forfeiture programs.80 DAs have 
also learned to take advantage of initiatives offered by the federal government to ad-
vance certain crime enforcement and prevention policies. Such policies may involve 
enhanced domestic violence prosecution, efforts to curb drug and gun crimes, or 
community oriented prosecution efforts. Local prosecutors’ offices can compete for 
federal grants to develop and implement such programs, often with the idea that the 
federal government will provide the start-up money and the local budget will provide 
funds to sustain these programs in the future.81 Some DAs may even seek to reach 
out to the private sector to fund special services and programs or create volunteer 
services for certain support functions.82   
The amount of money requested and allocated to a DA’s office will vary with its size, 
the size of the population it serves, and its workload. Local prosecutors’ budgets re-
ported in 2001 ranged from $6,000 to $373 million.83 Particularly in states where local 
DAs’ offices receive a significant portion of the funding from the state, efforts have 
been made to develop some standard formula for determining an appropriate budget 
78 For a sample job announcement for AU.S.As, see http://www.usdoj.gov/oarm/jobs/ausaAlexandri-
afraud.htm.
79 About half of the local prosecutors’ offices in the U.S. receive 85% or more of their funding from 
the county government, and only 6% receive all their funding from the state. See Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, supra note 12.
80 See Heike Gramckow, Joan Jacoby, and Ed Ratledge, Asset Forfeiture Programs (1992), published by 
the National Institute of Justice.
81 For an overview of federal support for such programs, see the Bureau of Justice website, www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/BJA.
82 See, e.g., the website of the Multnomah County Districts Attorney’s Office, www.co.multnomah.
or.us/DA/index.pnp. 
83 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 12.
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across the state.84 Population size and crime rate in the office’s jurisdiction provide 
some data that are used for estimating budget needs; still, the case and workload 
situation can differ significantly among offices with similar populations and crime 
rates, due to such factors as complexity of crimes, police activities, judicial policies, 
availability of alternative settlement opportunities, and prosecutorial policy. As a re-
sult, some offices have engaged in more detailed workload assessments.85 Many pros-
ecutors have learned to present budgets to fund their core prosecution functions as 
well as special programs and requirements. Still, prosecutors in the U.S. lag behind 
the courts in developing truly needs-based budgets that demonstrate workload and 
related cost factors as well as special program needs. 
Even with much creativity, the budget allocation to the prosecutor’s office may be 
insufficient to handle the core business of prosecution, let alone special programs. 
On more than one occasion, DAs have declared that they would no longer process 
certain cases because their budgets failed to cover all costs—and their discretionary 
power allows them to choose which cases to pursue.86 Such declarations need to be 
carefully measured to gain the public’s attention, in order to pressure the local or state 
funding agency to increase the budget for the office. It is a legitimate means in dire 
budget situations, but it can backfire.
Budget requests and presentations are made by the DA directly to the funding au-
thority. The process for presenting the budget differs among states and counties. 
Some limit the process to direct submission to and negotiation with the state or 
county executive, while others allow presentations to the state legislature or county 
board or a combination thereof.87 Independently of this process, DAs must provide 
justifying information to support their budget requests, the details of which also dif-
fer among funding authorities. Some states may provide for an appeal to the court if 
the requested budget amount is not provided, on the basis that the budget authority 
acted improperly and arbitrarily.88  
Well-developed explanations and justifications of prosecutor budgets are key to gain-
ing support from local and state governments and legislatures. Determining an ac-
curate budget is an increasingly technical process; successfully getting the desired 
budget approved is still a political process.
 In states where state funding represents a significant portion of their budget, local 
DAs rely increasingly on the assistance of a state association of DAs, where such 
exists. These DAs’ associations or Prosecution Coordination Commissions may pro-
84 See, for example, American Prosecutors Research Institute, Workload Study for the State of Tennes-
see (1999).
85 For a description of different methodologies to assess workloads in prosecutors’ offices, see Heike 
Gramckow, Estimating Staffing Needs for the Justice Sector (2002), published by the National Center 
for State Courts.
86 See Joan Jacoby, The American Prosecutor’s Discretionary Power, The Prosecutor (November/De-
cember 1997).
87 Three basic models of county governments exist in the U.S.: they can be led by an elected com-
mission, by a commission/administrator, or a council/executive. If the prosecutor’s jurisdiction 
includes an independent city, the city government is generally headed by an elected mayor.
88 See Robert Johnson, supra note 9.
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vide a range of support services to individual DAs’ offices, including taking on some 
or all of the budget development, presentation, reporting, and lobbying responsibili-
ties to the state legislature. The Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference, for 
example, is responsible for almost all budget development and management tasks 
for individual DAs’ offices in that state, and presents the budget requests and reports 
to the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration for inclusion in the 
executive’s budget request to the state legislature.89 In most states, however, these 
tasks are left entirely to the individual DAs’ offices. 
Any office that receives state or county funds must abide by the relevant accounting 
and auditing requirements. Increasingly, state (and local) laws require that budget 
requests be tied to outputs or goals, to provide some performance related account-
ability. Some prosecutors are concerned that unless great care is taken in establishing 
performance measures, any such standards could adversely impact the independence 
and impartiality of their offices. 
Once the budget is approved, the budget authority has no say in how the DA’s office 
applies the funds, unless specific line items were designated for specific activities or 
initiatives. The funding authority may also be permitted to adjust the funding level 
throughout the year if the overall budget situation changes significantly. Such adjust-
ments must, however, be across the state or county budget, or at least the justice sec-
tor, and cannot limit only the DA’s funding.
Federal level:  On the federal level, the U.S. Attorney’s budget is part of the DOJ’s 
budget, which is presented to Congress as part of the President’s budget. The main 
responsibility for collecting budget information and presenting it to the Attorney 
General rests with the EOU.S.A. The GPRA law90 requires that the budget be tied to 
performance goals established for all federal offices. 
III. Functions and Powers of Prosecutors in the Criminal Process 
Prosecutors in the U.S. have exclusive authority to bring criminal prosecutions. But 
they can also be involved in investigations, play a key role in providing services to vic-
tims and witnesses, make sentencing recommendations, and have input into parole 
and probation decisions. In 2001, nine out of ten local prosecutors’ offices reported 
handling misdemeanor cases in addition to felonies. In addition to handling non-
criminal matters,91 84 percent had jurisdiction over traffic violations and 89 percent 
89 See Tennessee District Attorneys’ General Conference, www.tndagc.com. 
90 See above, Section 2.4.
91 54% reported that they represented the local government in civil cases, and 48.6% handled child 
support enforcement. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 12.
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handled juvenile matters. At the federal level, in addition to civil matters,92 U.S.AOs 
actively support cooperation and coordination between all levels of law enforcement, 
including intelligence and resource sharing, problem solving, and training, through 
Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees (LECC)93 and other task forces. The of-
fices further assume a leadership role in the area of victims’ services and victim’s 
rights through their work with state and national advocacy groups and their own 
victim-witness assistance programs.
The functions of state and federal prosecutors in the criminal process are quite simi-
lar, with the exception of the DAs’ offices’ ability to conduct their own investigations 
and the fact that DAs’ offices handle a significantly broader spectrum of crimes and 
have a much larger caseload and fewer resources. Overall, prosecutors in the U.S. 
function as gatekeepers to the criminal justice system.94 Their role and discretion 
allow them to keep cases that are not substantiated by admissible evidence out of 
court, and to ensure that cases not in the public interest are not sent to court and that 
more important cases are investigated even if law enforcement does not pursue them. 
They must ensure that the adversarial system is balanced by not merely focusing on 
prosecution and seeking convictions, but also looking for exculpatory evidence and 
assisting witnesses and victims. They suggest appropriate sentences and monitor de-
cisions to release. 
While it is beyond the scope of this report to outline all prosecutorial responsibilities 
and functions in the criminal justice process, the following sections outline their key 
functions.95
The investigation phase:  DAs’ offices can request but not require investigative activi-
ties from law enforcement agencies, and they do not have supervisory authority over 
police investigative activities.96 They may, however, provide legal guidance, particu-
larly for conducting investigative activities that required judicial approval, such as ar-
rest and search warrants and wiretaps. The laws vary among the U.S. states, but such 
warrants and requests for electronic surveillance generally require judicial review 
(except in cases of emergency, for which judicial review must follow, usually within 
48 hours). Given the often complex and quite restrictive exclusionary rules, which 
can severely limit admissibility of evidence if the legal requirements for its collec-
tion were not fully met, a prosecutor’s legal advice is important to ensure that law 
92 U.S.AOs represent the U.S. in civil litigation. This includes defending the government against civil 
lawsuits, such as tort cases and contract disputes. It also includes representing the government in 
affirmative civil actions, including injunctive actions or other civil enforcement cases. A detailed 
description of these proceedings may be found in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 52. 
93 LECCs were developed to enhance cooperation and coordination among local, state, and federal 
law enforcement officials. LECCs are also responsible for assisting in enhancing community re-
lationships with law enforcement, acting as a point of contact for law enforcement agencies, and 
sponsoring or co-sponsoring free or low-cost training courses for law enforcement officials. In ad-
dition, LECCs are involved in a range of special crime prevention and enforcement activities. 
94 See Joan Jacoby, The American Prosecutor in Historical Context, The Prosecutor (July/August 
1997).
95 For more detailed information on the role and responsibility of prosecutors in criminal proceed-             
ings, see NDAA Standards, supra note 36. 
96 One exception is New Jersey, where prosecutors provide direction to investigative agencies.
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enforcement actions are not wasted. Due to the complexity of statutes and case law 
on electronic surveillance, prosecutors will almost always be involved in writing and 
submitting wiretap affidavits and requests.97  
The role of the prosecutor’s office in these instances is to ensure that these intrusive 
investigative measures are legally sound, so that the court provides authorization, 
the investigation is lawful, and investigative efforts are not tainted. These activities 
require close cooperation between police and prosecution. For example, in order to 
ensure that a search of a suspect’s home is conducted lawfully, police will often not 
only have a set of detailed procedural guidelines (often developed with the legal ad-
vice of the prosecutor’s office),98 but will request legal advice right before, and some-
times while, the search is conducted. This requires an assistant DA with knowledge 
of such operations to be on call. In order to provide this support to law enforcement 
agencies, larger offices in urban areas assign prosecutors to be available 24 hours a 
day, seven days a week.
Lack of investigative supervision does not mean that limited or nonexistent police 
investigative capacity would prevent the prosecutor’s office from pursuing certain 
cases. Some DAs’ offices have established their own investigative units to bolster the 
investigative capacities of the law enforcement agencies serving their jurisdictions. 
These units may be created to pursue cases that law enforcement agencies lack the 
manpower or the interest to investigate. Sometimes, keeping investigations apart 
from the executive branch-controlled law enforcement agencies may be the reason 
for establishing a special investigative unit in a DA’s office.99 DAs’ offices may also 
take the lead in or be part of a local or regional agency task force that involves pros-
ecutors and investigators in pursuing specific crimes. In addition, a DA may bring a 
matter before a grand jury, which may compel testimony and commence a prosecu-
tion by issuing an indictment.100
Prosecutors generally do not simply accept statements made to the police by vic-
tims, witnesses, and suspects, particularly in felony cases. They frequently interview 
97 The wiretap laws require, for example, a judicial order for the interception of call content, based on 
a finding of probable cause; such a judicial order may only be provided for a specific period of time 
and specific suspected criminal activity. On both the federal and state levels, a request for wire-
tap authorization cannot be made to a judge without first undergoing a rigorous internal review 
process by lawyers extensively familiar with the wiretap requirements and case law. The quality of            
submissions to judges for wiretap authorization is therefore quite high, and most applications for 
authority to conduct electronic surveillance are approved. For statistics on wiretap authorizations 
for 2001, see the 2001 Wiretap Report released by the Administrative Office of the United States      
Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap01/contents.html. 
98 Many DAs’ offices provide the relevant law enforcement agencies with model formats for warrants 
and train officers in the laws applicable to the issuance and execution of different warrants, espe-
cially if electronic surveillance is involved.    
99 H. P. Gramckow, E. J. Jacoby, and E. C. Ratledge, Prosecuting Complex Drug Cases. The Challenge for 
Local Prosecutors (1993), published by the National Institute of Justice.
100 As on the state level, one significant investigative tool for AU.S.As is the grand jury. Except in the 
case of misdemeanors and instances where the alleged offender waives the right to a grand jury 
indictment, the U.S. Attorney presents the evidence to a grand jury, which can conduct additional 
investigations. In complex cases, the AU.S.A may ask the grand jury to issue subpoenas for evi-
dence, documents, and/or testimony from witnesses. 
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them themselves in order to inform their own filing and charging decision, provide 
information for plea bargaining, develop their trial strategy, and prepare victims and 
witnesses for trial.
Pre-trial detention and release:  The decision to place a defendant in pre-trial deten-
tion is a judicial decision. The laws generally favor release of a defendant pending 
determination of guilt or innocence. At the same time, these laws seek to balance 
this with the need to protect the public interest. The states have varying but strict 
requirements requiring suspects to be either charged or released within a relatively 
short time period. Pursuant to a United States Supreme Court decision, a judge must 
approve any detention beyond 48 hours upon a demonstration of probable cause 
showing that the person committed a crime.101 While some variations in the justifica-
tion for pre-trial detention exist among the states, they generally include danger that 
the defendant will flee, commit another crime, seek to intimidate witnesses, or oth-
erwise unlawfully interfere with the orderly administration of justice. They can also 
include the danger that the defendant will harm him/herself.102 It is generally recom-
mended that prosecutors (and a pre-trial agency, where one exists)103 be involved in 
the inquiry into the facts relevant to pre-trial release, such as the nature of the current 
charge, past criminal record, facts indicating lack of ties to the community, likeli-
hood of flight, and facts indicating the possibility of violations of laws if released. The 
detention hearing will generally also explore the possibility of conditional release.104 
In addition, the court can decide to release the defendant on money bail. The burden 
of proof is on the prosecutor to establish the need for denying release or setting bail 
with appropriate conditions.105 
Charging and other pre-trial proceedings: Within the framework of office policies, as-
sistant prosecutors have the discretion to decide under which charge(s) to file a case 
in court or to decline prosecution. The prosecutor exercises this discretion in screen-
ing cases to determine when prosecution is not justified, not in the public interest, 
or not in the interest of justice. Prosecutors may decline to prosecute a case without 
a reason, and generally without the possibility of review. As a practical matter, such 
a decision must be based on reasons that are provided to and understandable by 
victims, police, and the public, and that understanding is sought by the prosecutor. 
101 Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
102 Similarly, under federal law, the release and detention of defendants pending judicial proceedings 
is governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Excessive Bail Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The latter provides procedures to detain 
dangerous offenders, as well as offenders likely to flee pending trial or appeal. See United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
103 For more information about pre-trial agencies, see Pretrial Services Resource Center, www.pretrial.org. 
104 Conditional release may involve reporting requirements, release into the custody of a reliable per-
son, supervision, including electronic supervision, and activity restrictions.
105 For more information on the bail system, see Spurgeon Kenney and Allan Henry, Commercial 
Surity Bail: Assessing its Role in the Pretrial Release and Detention Decision (1996), published by the 
Pretrial Services Resource Center. In 2000, an average 32% of defendants were released on the state 
level on financial bond and 6% on unsecured bond. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pretrial Release 
and Detention Statistics (2002). On the federal level, 48% of defendants were released during the 
pre-trial stage, 18.2% of them on financial bond and 47.2% on unsecured bond. See John Scalia, 
Federal Pretrial Release and Detention, 1996 (1999), published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
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To do otherwise would invite the DA’s defeat at the next election. The reasons given 
may be technical, such as absence of proof on critical elements, or justified by the 
prosecutor’s obligation, above all other considerations, to seek justice.106 Once a pros-
ecution has been commenced, the judgment to discontinue the prosecution is again 
that of the prosecutor. Often the elected prosecutor requires that assistants justify 
their decision not to prosecute in a written document for review by their superior, 
and that the explanations be given to the victims, police, and public.
Neither federal nor state courts have the authority to review decisions not to pros-
ecute. Courts may, however, dismiss cases brought before them that are not sup-
ported by sufficient evidence. They have no authority to order further investigation. 
An assistant prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute can be appealed to the DA. Oth-
erwise, the victim is limited to filing a civil case for damages incurred as a result of 
the incident.  
An alternative available to prosecutors is to divert a case into special programs that 
may involve community service, treatment, or voluntary payment of restitution to 
the victim. If successfully completed, the case will be dismissed by the prosecutor’s 
office and no criminal record established. Such programs may be initiated by, and are 
largely under the control of, the prosecutor’s office. They may take the offender before 
a case is filed in court, or may be court-connected programs that will commence after 
charging and merely defer prosecution, with the approval of the court.107
Depending on the jurisdiction, a number of pre-trial hearings and events must be 
scheduled once prosecution commences. First appearance hearings before a judge or 
magistrate are generally to be held “without unnecessary delay.”108 Most jurisdictions 
do not require the presence of the prosecutor or defense council. Some jurisdictions 
allow defendants to plea guilty at the first court appearance,109 however, and it is 
therefore recommended that the prosecutor be present. In some jurisdictions, partic-
ularly those without grand jury indictment procedures, the first time defense counsel 
and prosecutor are present is the probable cause hearing. In most jurisdictions, this 
hearing must be scheduled within 14 days of the first appearance. The purpose of 
this hearing is to determine probable cause for the offenses charged.110 In other juris-
dictions, the prosecutor may choose to use the grand jury for further investigations 
and for indictments. The use, composition, and responsibility of grand juries differ 
significantly among the states. Some rely largely on the prosecutor’s information in 
initiating charges; other states require indictment by a grand jury even for serious 
106 NDAA Standards, supra note 36, Standard 1.1.
107 For a short overview of diversion programs, see Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, Diversion 
Programs: An Overview, at www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html.
108 The definition varies among jurisdictions, depending on the decisions that must be made. If the ac-
cused is in pre-trial detention, a 48- or 72-hour rule must be adhered to in most jurisdictions. See 
NDAA Standards, supra note 36, Standard 46.1. 
109 An early plea is not merely important for timely processing; it may also be in the interest of the de-
fendant not to prolong the proceedings, particularly if pre-trial detention is ordered. In other cases, 
defendants charged, for example, with traffic offenses where another person has been injured may 
plead guilty to these charges, thereby establishing a double jeopardy bar to any subsequent filing of 
more serious charges if the injuries worsen. See Grady v. Corbin, 11 S.Ct. 2084 (1990).
110 See NDAA Standards, supra note 36, Standard 47.1-6.
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
412
misdemeanors. The use of the grand jury allows the prosecutor to draw upon another 
independent authority for additional independent review of facts.
If the accused is indicted, the next hearing will generally be the arraignment. The 
purpose of this hearing is for the court to appoint a defense counsel if this has not 
already happened, take a plea if that is desired, establish release conditions and bail, 
and set a trial date. The role of prosecutors at this hearing is not merely to weigh in 
on the court’s decisions, but to take this opportunity to discuss with defense counsel 
any discovery requests and pre-trial motions111 that may be made, with the aim of ex-
pediting the procedures. For the same purpose, courts schedule pre-trial conferences 
whenever a trial is likely to be protracted or unusually complicated. Matters usually 
considered during such conferences include stipulating facts that are not in dispute, 
identifying documents and exhibits submitted by the parties, use of juries and voir 
dire, and plea agreements.112 
The role of the prosecutor in all of these events is to ensure that all evidence is made 
available and is admissible, the rights of the defendant and the victim are protected, 
and the most efficient processes are applied. Since several court events may have to 
be scheduled and attended by all parties before trial finally takes place, the goal of 
expediting the process may not be initially obvious. However, each step permits clari-
fication and agreement on issues and plea acceptance; this reduces the likelihood of 
a long and complicated (and generally costly) trial, and in the vast majority of cases 
even eliminates the need for trial. Avoiding delay and cost are important concerns for 
the court and the prosecution. Prosecutors play a significant role in ensuring that court 
schedules are set to allow both parties reasonable preparation time, avoid unnecessary 
processing steps, and eliminate delaying tactics by any of the parties.113
Plea bargaining, trial, and sentencing:  Where it appears that the interest of the state in 
the effective administration of criminal justice will be served, the prosecution, while 
under no obligation to negotiate any criminal charge, may engage in plea negotiation 
for the purpose of reaching an appropriate plea agreement. Prior to negotiating, the 
prosecution considers factors such as the seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s 
prior record, attitude, and behavior.114 
If no plea agreement can be reached, or if the prosecutor does not offer a plea, the 
prosecution and defense prepare for trial and participate in the selection of jurors. 
The constitutional guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases can be waived by the 
defendant. In the interests of efficiency, states can determine the size of juries re-
111 The American system allows a number of motions to be made by either party to dispose of matters 
that would otherwise complicate or prolong the trial. These include schedules for completing dis-
covery, rulings for disclosure, court rulings on suppression of evidence, etc., as well as setting dates 
for a pre-trial conference and accepting the defendant’s plea, if one is offered. See NDAA Standards, 
supra note 36, Standards 50.1-5.10.
112 For more detail, see NDAA Standards, supra note 36, Standards 51.1-51.3.
113 For more information on delay reduction, see David Steelman. John Goerdt, and James McMillan, 
Caseflow Management: The Heart of Court Management in the New Millennium (2000), published 
by the National Center for State Courts.
114 See NDAA Standards, supra note 36, Standards 66.1-72.1. 
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quired for different types of cases.115 The process of selecting a jury in the U.S. is one 
of the many examples of checks and balances built into the criminal justice process. 
Both prosecution and defense engage in this process, which has developed into an 
art, if not a science.116   
Procedural rules outline the sequence in which the prosecution and defense present 
their arguments and evidence, present and examine witnesses, and present their con-
clusions to the jury during the trial. The prosecution carries the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. It is also the prosecutor’s re-
sponsibility to ensure that exculpatory evidence is presented. The procedural rules are 
designed to give both parties equal standing throughout the trial, and it is the court’s 
duty to ensure that this parity is respected. While it is the role of the prosecutor and 
the defense to examine witnesses, it is the judge’s role to control this process. 
After a defendant is found delinquent in juvenile court or guilty in adult court, the 
prosecutor must make a sentencing recommendation to the judge regarding supervi-
sion, probation, and/or incarceration. Such recommendations must be well grounded 
and based on a pre-sentence investigation by the probation department, if available. 
The probation officer’s report usually contains a wide range of information useful for 
sentencing purposes.117 To make sensible sentencing recommendations, the prosecu-
tor should also be familiar with the range of correctional options available.
Appeals:  State laws permitting prosecutorial appeal vary, and not all local prosecutors 
engage in appeals. In some states, the Attorney General may be responsible for repre-
senting the state in appeal proceedings; in others, it may be the Statewide Prosecutor 
Coordinator.118 The reason for this “division of labor” is that appeals, in general, are 
very time consuming, requiring thorough review of the entire case record, the filing 
of a brief and reply brief and, in most cases, participation in an oral argument, which 
for many offices requires travel to the seat of the relevant appeals court. Regardless 
of where the responsibility for appeals resides, prosecutor appeals can generally be 
filed without the concurrence of the court for judgments that dismiss indictments 
on substantive grounds, pre-trial orders that terminate or impede prosecution, trial 
orders of dismissal or directed verdicts upon a question of law, and judgments in-
volving sentences deemed grossly inadequate.119 In practice, prosecutors are care-
ful in reviewing options to appeal and weighing the effort involved. Because of the 
diversity among prosecutors’ offices and their decentralization, no data exists on the 
“average” rate of appeals pursued. Since over 90 percent of all cases are disposed of 
by pleas, however, and because of the effort involved, the rate of appeals versus cases 
filed must be low. Reported numbers of appeals on the federal and state level support 
this assumption.120
115 This follows the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1969), in which the 
court ruled that the constitution did not require a 12-member jury.
116 For more information on jury selection, see Thomas Munsterman, Gene Thomas, et al., Jury Trial 
Innovations (1997), published by the National Center for State Courts.
117 Ehrensaft, supra note 63.
118 For example, in New York state for the latter.
119 See NDAA Standards, supra note 36, Standards 89.1-89.7 for more detail.
120 In fiscal year 2005, 11,007 criminal appeals were filed on the federal level. See United States At-
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Post sentencing:   Prosecutors have the right to attend probation revocation and ter-
mination hearings and provide input based on information on the offender collected 
by their office. Similarly, prosecutors seek to provide input to parole board hearings. 
While these boards are independent and have broad discretion in their decisions to 
grant parole or early release, many jurisdictions require advance notice of such hear-
ings and allow the prosecutor to be heard. Prosecutor participation in these hearings 
is not required and is left to the discretion of the office. When offenders deemed 
particularly dangerous are involved, prosecutors generally appear at the hearing or at 
least provide a written statement. 
IV. The Relationship Between the Prosecution Service  
and Other State Structures 
4.1. Relationship with the legislature
State level:  The state legislature has no role in the nomination, selection, or remov-
al of DAs or individual prosecutors and no involvement in reviewing their perfor-
mance. The legislature, however, makes decisions about the structure of the prosecu-
tion authority, such as length of term of office and how funds are provided, and legal 
jurisdiction, that is, the authority to prosecute certain crimes. 
The legislature also influences the operations and range of discretion of the prosecu-
tors in its state through the legislative process. It may enact new laws criminalizing 
or decriminalizing certain behavior and may, through sentencing guidelines, set the 
range and scope of penalties that prosecutors can seek. Many DA offices not only try 
to keep abreast of legislative trends, but also seek to influence the legislative process 
to ensure that new laws reflect the needs of their communities and offices. Larger 
DAs’ offices in particular tend to actively engage with the legislature by sponsoring 
new legislation or commenting on pending drafts.
It is within the power of any state legislature to request information from private per-
sons and public officials if this information is essential for its legislative work. Accord-
ingly, DAs may be requested to report to the legislature on individual cases and will 
generally comply if asked. However, since most DAs are independent, they are not re-
quired to report to the legislature on their performance, and requests for such reports 
are very rare. 
torneys’ Annual Statistical Report, supra note 28. On the state level, the number of appellate court 
filings reached 278,000 in 2002. See National Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of  State 
Courts (2003).
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The state legislature may also request independent investigations by a grand jury 
in states where this mechanism exists. In other states, Special Investigative Com-
missions have been established to pursue certain types of cases at the request of the 
legislative branch.121 
Federal level: On the federal level, in contrast, the Senate has significant influence 
on the President’s appointments of U.S. Attorneys.122 Traditionally, when there is a 
vacancy, or at the beginning of a new presidential administration, the senior Senator 
of each state from the same political party as the President will submit his/her sug-
gestions to the President for nomination for U.S. Attorney for the judicial districts 
in that Senator’s state. The process and criteria by which the candidates are chosen 
are within the Senators’ discretion. This means that the two Senators of each state 
have significant decision-making power over who will be the U.S. Attorney(s) serv-
ing their state. Only in the most blatant instances of unsuitability have nominees 
been rejected by the President. 
Reports on performance of the U.S.AOs are included in the AG’s report to Congress. 
The U.S. Congress also has the right to request reports on individual cases. As a func-
tion of its legislative role under the Constitution, Congress can compel appearances 
and information from private persons and organizations and executive branch offi-
cials and agencies. Congress does not need to explain or justify its choice of subjects 
for hearings and investigations.123 Accordingly, the U.S. Congress has the right to 
hold independent investigations on the activities of the prosecution service and in-
dividual prosecutors. In practice, Congress rarely holds investigative hearings on in-
dividual prosecutions, focusing instead on whether the priorities and activities of the 
DOJ comport with the spending directives set by Congress. As a result, decisions on 
the allocation of prosecution resources at the federal level are not made in a vacuum 
by the executive branch alone. Congress has a significant impact in this area. 
To conduct investigations, Congress has established special standing and ad hoc 
committees.  It can also request, but not require, that the Attorney General appoint 
a special counsel to investigate certain type of cases if the DOJ may have a conflict 
of interest, for example in the investigation of high ranking administration officials. 
121 For example, in New Jersey, a State Commission of Investigation (SCI) was created in 1968 to ad-                
dress the intensifying problem of organized crime and political corruption. The Commission con-
sists of four commissioners, two appointed by the Governor and one each by the President of the 
state’s Senate and the Speaker of New Jersey’s General Assembly. Supported by staff attorneys and 
investigators, it may conduct public and private hearings, compel testimony and the production of 
other evidence by subpoena, and grant limited immunity from prosecution to witnesses. Since the 
Commission does not have prosecutorial functions, it is required to refer information suggesting 
possible criminal misconduct immediately to the New Jersey Attorney General. See New Jersey   
State Commission of Investigation, www.state.nj.us/sci . Similarly, the New York State Commission       
of Investigation undertakes investigations of corruption, fraud, and mismanagement in New York 
State and local government. New York State Commission of Investigation, www.sic.state.ny.us.           
122 28 U.S.C Sec. 541.
123 In Watkins v. United States (1957), the Supreme Court stated: “The power of the Congress to con-
duct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. The power is broad. It encompasses inqui-
ries concerning the administration of existing law as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. 
It comprehends probes into departments of the federal government to expose corruption, inef-
ficiency, or waste.”  
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This happens rarely and generally involves highly sensitive political issues and the 
highest state figures.124  
While Congress’ power of inquiry is broad, it is not unlimited. The Supreme Court 
has established that the power to investigate may be exercised only “in aid of the leg-
islative function,” and cannot be used to expose for the sake of exposure alone.125  
4.2. Relationship with the executive
State level:  The independent state prosecutors are not controlled by the executive in 
any respect. However, the fact that their budgets are ultimately dependent upon the 
decisions of the county/city/state executive, concerns over justice system effective-
ness, and the desire to be reelected provide a number of incentives to coordinate 
prosecutorial policies with other justice system agencies and the executive branch. 
Good relations with the executive branch on the county or state level are particularly 
essential during budget times. It is to the benefit of the prosecutor’s office to work 
in concert with the executive branch when it comes to law enforcement and legisla-
tive initiatives. Therefore, DAs and their deputies often serve on state or countywide 
coordinating councils for the criminal justice system or on special committees to 
pursue enforcement or crime prevention issues.
These communications, together with communications with victims and citizen 
groups, are not binding but are considered in prosecutorial decisions, whether for 
general policy setting or for individual cases. Working together with others in im-
portant statewide law enforcement and crime prevention initiatives means being able 
to leverage resources and increase coordination for efficiency. Such initiatives fre-
quently gain importance during an election year for any elected official, including an 
elected DA.126 DAs who do not consider public sentiments and law enforcement and 
political trends on the county or state level are likely to face difficulties when coordi-
nation with others is needed or when seeking reelection. More than a few DAs have 
faced the opposition of, for example, the local Fraternity of Police during election 
time because their prosecution policies conflicted with policing policies. 
Most DAs’ offices handle more than criminal prosecutions; they may also provide le-
gal advice to the relevant executive branch agencies or work closely with other inves-
tigating agencies, such as child protection agencies. Thus their need for coordination 
with these entities goes beyond the operational aspect, and can involve legislative 
advocacy to support those activities. 
Federal level:  U.S.AOs are part of the executive branch. They follow the directions of 
124 The Whitewater investigations against President Bill Clinton were one such example. For more 
detail on the appointment of special counsels, see Leslie Bennett, One Lesson from History: Appoint-
ment of Special Counsel and the Investigation of the Teapot Dome Scandal (1999).
125 Morton Rosenberg, Investigative Oversight: An Introduction Into the Law, Practice and Procedure of 
Congressional Inquiry (1995), published by the Congressional Research Service.
126 See Simmons, supra note 11. 
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the Attorney General, but also set their own policies. They receive significant man-
agement support from the EOU.S.A and generally aim to develop good working re-
lationships with the DOJ and other U.S. Attorneys’ offices. 
Although they are independent of one another, U.S.AO and federal investigative 
agencies in each district work closely together due to the complexity of many federal 
statutes and investigations. The U.S.AO can request, though not require, other agen-
cies to conduct additional investigations; prosecutors will provide legal advice, but 
have the discretion to decide whether or not to pursue prosecution. Similar coopera-
tion occurs in civil cases involving other U.S. government agencies.127 U.S. Attorneys 
may also recommend to the AG changes in policies and procedures to enhance the 
activities of other agencies that refer cases to their offices, but they cannot compel 
other agencies to take specific actions. 
4.3. Relationship with the police and other investigative organs
State level:  The executive branch agency with which prosecutors have the most in-
teraction is the police. Depending on the county or judicial circuit their office serves, 
DAs may receive cases from one or more law enforcement agencies. For example, 
the police agency serving Brooklyn County, NY, is the New York City Police Depart-
ment, and it is the primary law enforcement agency with which the Brooklyn DA’s 
office works. The DAs’ offices in most counties or judicial districts, however, must 
work with a number of law enforcement agencies. For example, the DA’s office in 
Multnomah County, Oregon, receives the majority of cases from the Portland Police 
Department, but other cases may be brought by the Multnomah County Sheriff ’s De-
partment, with county-wide jurisdiction, or a number of police agencies that serve 
smaller independent cities within the county, as well as the Oregon State Police. 
While most local and state police in the U.S. are not under the supervisory authority 
of the prosecutor’s office,128 DAs’ offices generally strive to develop good cooperative 
relationships with their law enforcement counterparts, which is crucial to ensuring 
successful investigations that produce evidence that holds up in court. Prosecutors 
need competent investigations in order to prosecute successfully, and police want 
their cases prosecuted. Still, there is a natural tension between these agencies. DAs, 
police chiefs, and sheriffs have found that increased communication between police 
and prosecutors improves understanding and cooperation, and is essential to ensur-
ing efficient use of each agency’s resources. Proactive communication by prosecutors 
with law enforcement officers means less prosecutor time in court, more effective 
prosecutions, and, in turn, less time spent by officers in court awaiting appearances 
for hearings that are frequently postponed. It is also key to ensuring that each agency 
understands why the other has established specific policies. For example, if a police 
127 The civil divisions of U.S. Attorneys’ offices provide litigation support in matters involving Social 
Security, commercial litigation, representing the federal government in tort litigation, bankruptcy, 
litigation involving federal prisoners, and immigration cases.
128 One exception is the state of New Jersey.
PROMOTING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
418
agency—possibly as a result of community complaints—decides not just to step up 
patrol efforts in red light districts, but to increase arrests of prostitutes and their cus-
tomers, the DA’s office must be informed and must agree on the correctness of this 
enforcement policy. Otherwise, it may dismiss all such cases, rendering the effort 
useless. In countries where neither police nor prosecutors have the discretion to drop 
or pursue cases, this may not be an obvious point of friction, although the same is-
sues often also undermine interdepartmental cooperation and effectiveness in those 
countries. It is generally in the interest of both agencies to come to a common under-
standing on such policies; however, particularly at election time, policy differences 
between the independent DA and the executive branch, of which the police is a part, 
may create polarization.
Also, since DAs’ offices are independent, and the law enforcement agencies that serve 
in their jurisdiction are part of the executive branch, neither has any direct influence 
on appointments, training, work assignments, promotions, or disciplinary actions 
related to officers of the other agency. However, in jurisdictions where police and 
prosecutors work well together, there may be coordination on all these issues, and 
each agency may seek the other’s input on them. The agencies may also work closely 
together on training issues.129 
To enhance the relationship with police, many prosecutors’ offices establish special 
liaison functions. For example, according to a survey conducted in Minnesota in 
1995, nearly 48 percent of county attorney’s offices and 44 percent of city prosecu-
tor’s offices in that state had established a formal liaison, usually just verbally or by 
brief letter, with their local law enforcement agencies for communicating informa-
tion such as the status of cases.130 These liaison officers ensure regular meetings and 
communication at all agency levels. It is less usual, especially in smaller offices, to 
establish more formal or permanent coordination mechanisms, such as Memoranda 
of Understanding (MOUs) that outline standard operating and communication pro-
cedures, or task forces.
Where a multi-agency task force has been created to more effectively pursue certain 
types of cases, the DA’s office may or may not have directive powers over the investi-
gators from other agencies participating in the task force.
In each state, in addition to local and state police, a number of other agencies—dif-
fering from state to state—have investigative powers. Most states provide for an elect-
ed sheriff in each county. They are the police authority in unincorporated areas and 
townships, and have concurrent police authority with city police in cities. In some 
counties, the Sheriff ’s Department functions as the main law enforcement agency. 
Other agencies of the executive branch, such as the state’s environmental enforce-
ment agency, housing and zoning, family services, and the like, have investigative 
powers related to their areas of authority. Generally the investigative jurisdiction of 
each agency is defined by geographic boundaries and subject matter. Agencies may 
129 For example, about 85% of county attorney’s offices and 47% of city attorney’s offices in Minnesota                
offered training to peace officers in 1995. Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, supra note 38. 
130 Id.
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designate a liaison to ensure communication and coordination among agencies with 
related responsibilities, or create combined task forces that allow for a stronger re-
sponse from all involved agencies.131
DAs’ offices generally also strive to develop good working relations with any agency 
that has investigative powers over cases their office may prosecute or litigate. This 
includes maintaining good relations with federal investigative agencies and the U.S. 
Attorney’s office responsible for their jurisdiction. Larger DAs’ offices are generally 
members of the LECC132 and other local and regional task forces. DAs’ offices con-
cerned with more holistic approaches to addressing crime problems will frequently 
participate in—or even spearhead—task forces or coordinating councils that involve 
not just law enforcement but other regulatory agencies and organizations, and even 
business councils and neighborhood organizations.133
In states where they are available and have the authority to investigate, grand juries 
are another institution upon which prosecutors can draw for investigations. 
Federal level:  Similarly, federal prosecutors and federal criminal investigative agen-
cies, while part of the federal executive branch, are entirely independent of each oth-
er. However, there is a high degree of cooperation between federal law enforcement 
agencies and the U.S.AOs. This cooperation is seen in work on various task forces, 
coordinating initiatives, and training provided by U.S.AOs to federal agents. 
While federal prosecutors do not conduct their own investigations, in complex cases 
they work closely with the federal investigative agencies in helping direct the course 
of investigations. This can include interviewing witnesses with the federal agents and 
determining appropriate investigative actions. A U.S.AO may also house a Federal 
Task Force that includes investigators from other agencies. 
Liaison officers, MOUs, and task forces are established to ensure communication and 
coordination. In addition, U.S. Attorneys take the lead in the LECCs that bring all 
law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies operating in a specific geographic area 
together. Still, all these mechanisms are only as good as the individuals and agencies 
that participate in them. Differences in policies or operations among department 
heads as well as personalities can do much to impede or promote interagency coop-
eration and communication.
131 See, e.g., California State University, Sacramento, Evaluation of Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Forc-
es in California (2003), published by California Office of Criminal Justice Planning.
132 See supra, note 93.
133 For example, to improve reporting, investigation, and prosecution of child abuse cases and enhance              
services to the victims, the Multnomah County (Portland, Oregon) DA convened a policy group 
composed of the Children’s Services Division, Portland Police Bureau, Multnomah County Sheriff ’s 
Office, Juvenile Court, Gresham Police Department, several area hospitals, the Multnomah County 
Education Services Division, representing area schools, and the Multnomah County Health Divi-
sion to develop protocols for the operation of the group members. The effort has led to improved 
communication protocols, increased reporting, and greater cooperation among the various agen-
cies to better protect children from abuse. See http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/da/mdt/index.php.  
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A number of agencies on the federal level have criminal investigative authority over 
certain types of cases. Not all federal investigative agencies that conduct criminal 
investigations are housed within the DOJ with the federal prosecutors. The Secret 
Service (which handles financial and computer crimes in addition to its protective 
duties) and the Customs Service, previously in the Treasury Department, are now 
both in the Department of Homeland Security, as is the enforcement arm of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, previously part of the DOJ. The criminal agents 
in the Internal Revenue Service report to the Secretary of the Treasury. Postal inspec-
tors with jurisdiction over mail fraud are part of the U.S. Postal Service. Criminal 
investigations are also conducted by personnel within various regulatory agencies, 
including the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and such executive departments as Agriculture, Labor, and Interior. 
Even within the DOJ, special agents in the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATFE) report to their 
own agency officials, with only the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General 
possessing hierarchical authority over them.134
Overlap of responsibilities is limited and generally addressed through agency policies 
and MOUs. The LECCs provide one coordination mechanism, along with district-
wide or regional tasks forces involving federal, state, and local law enforcement and 
prosecution agencies. Still, unclear or duplicate responsibilities can lead to lack of 
coordination. Since 9/11, significant resources have been committed to this problem, 
with great emphasis placed on better communications and coordination between 
federal agencies.135 Coordination mechanisms similar to those on the state and local 
levels have been established on the federal level. Liaison functions, task forces, inter-
agency agreements, and regular coordination meetings are conducted at all levels of 
the agencies’ hierarchies. Still, none of these efforts are foolproof.   
4.4.  Relationship with the judiciary
While prosecutors and other lawyers representing clients in courts are referred to as 
“officers of the court,”136 they do not belong to the judiciary. Their budgets are sepa-
rate from those of the state courts, and if they have investigative powers, they may 
seem more like enforcement agencies. On the federal level, prosecutors are a part 
of the executive branch, their budgets are part of the DOJ, and they are clearly an 
executive branch agency. But how does one classify local prosecutors who are inde-
pendently elected and belong neither to the executive nor the judiciary? The United 
134 See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and their Agents, Agents and their Prosecutors, 103 Colum�ia Law 
Review 750-831 (2003).
135 For example, reorganization under the Homeland Security Act shifted the BATFE from the Trea-
sury Department to the DOJ to address such gaps. 
136 See, e.g., the Preamble to the North Carolina Revised Rules of Professional Conduct, which refers 
to “A Lawyer’s Responsibilities” and states, “A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the 
legal system, and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” RRPC 
0.1(1).
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States has a history of public prosecution dating back 300 years.137 One could argue 
that prosecutors are a branch in themselves. Others have made the case that prosecu-
tion is the archetypical executive function.138 Considering the tradition of independent 
state level prosecutors in the U.S. who engage in investigative activities only when law 
enforcement agencies lack the capacity to do so, and otherwise function as officers of 
the court, it appears more logical to view them as part of the judiciary, if not another 
“branch “of government altogether. 
Notwithstanding this situation, the relationship between prosecutors and the judicia-
ry does not much vary on the state or federal level. The independence of the judiciary 
is well recognized and ensured (though differently) on both levels,139 and the judicia-
ry and the prosecution service usually enjoy a professional working relationship. A 
prosecutor’s duties necessarily involve frequent and regular official contacts with the 
judges in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction. In such contacts, the prosecutor must strive to 
preserve the appearance as well as the reality of the relationship required by profes-
sional traditions, ethical codes, and applicable law. A prosecutor may not engage in 
unauthorized ex parte discussions with or submission of material to a judge relating 
to a particular case that is or may come before the judge.140 In practice, prosecutors 
and judges know each other well, even in larger jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, 
such as Los Angeles County, certain prosecutors are typically assigned to particular 
court rooms, i.e., the same judge or judges. Even where prosecutors do not work 
with the same judge on an almost daily basis, they tend to develop good professional 
working relationships. 
DAs generally seek to establish good relations not just with individual judges, but 
with the judiciary in their jurisdiction and state per se, as well as with the individual 
courts with which they work. A 1999 study of nine trial courts indicated that the 
most efficient courts could operate in a speedier manner because of better commu-
nication and coordination among judges, court staff, and attorneys.141 DAs also co-
ordinate with the judiciary on justice system reform efforts and legislative proposals 
that may influence their work. They frequently participate in coordinating councils 
on the local or state level.
137 Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor, A Search for Identity (1980).
138 See Oregon Court of Appeals, State v. Coleman, 131 Or App 386, 390, 886 P2d 28 (1994), 
“[T]hroughout Oregon’s history, district attorneys have been regarded as prosecutors for the ex-
ecutive branch.” The disagreement about which branch of government prosecutors belong to is 
reflected, for example, in the fact that major nationwide websites on justice system matters do not 
even list prosecution separately, and may classify them alternatively as part of law enforcement or 
as part of the courts. See, e.g., the website of the National Criminal Justice Research Service, www.
ncjrs.org. 
139 For example, once a federal judge is appointed, that person has life tenure and cannot be removed 
from office unless Congress impeaches and convicts him or her. This is an essential part of the U.S. 
Constitution, which ensures that the judiciary is an independent and equal branch of the federal 
government. 
140 ABA Prosecution Standards, supra note 41, Standard 3-2.8 Relations With the Courts and Bar.
141 Brian Ostrom and Roger Hansen, Efficiency, Timeliness, and Quality: A New Perspective from Nine 
State Criminal Trial Courts (1999), published by the National Center for State Courts.
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On the other hand, prosecutors must not appear inappropriately close to judges, in 
order to avoid conflicts of interest. State ethics rules and interpretations for example 
prohibit assistant prosecutors from participating in campaign activities on behalf of 
candidates for public office and DA candidates from being endorsed by judges.142 
Close relationships may also result when a former prosecutor becomes a judge. Since 
the legal profession itself is not strictly regulated or clearly hierarchical, private law-
yers may become prosecutors or judges, and prosecutors may become judges and 
vice versa. While a former prosecutor may become a judge, however, the reverse 
career path is rare (though not impossible).143 
In the U.S., most assistant prosecutors are not civil servants. In many jurisdictions, 
assistant prosecutors serve at the pleasure of the chief prosecutor, who will only be in 
office for the period to which he or she is elected (ranging from 4 to 8 years, though 
longer if reelected). This, combined with the fact that prosecutors are less well com-
pensated than attorneys in larger law firms, leads to relatively high turnover in pros-
ecutors’ offices. In 2001, prosecutors stayed in office an average of 6.5 years.144 Unlike 
DAs, judges generally do not have to face competitive re-elections.145 These factors, 
combined with the fact that judges probably have the highest status among lawyers 
in the U.S. (despite often lower compensation), makes becoming a judge a career 
highlight for many lawyers in the U.S. 
The situation is similar on the federal level. While AU.S.As are federal employees 
drawing good salaries and benefits and can only be removed for cause, they are still 
part of the DOJ hierarchy, as are U.S. Attorneys. Federal judges, on the other hand, 
although appointed in a highly political process, are independent and appointed for 
life. They are also better paid than U.S. Attorneys. Some federal judges have experi-
ence as prosecutors, but few, if any, judges would elect to become prosecutors, as this 
would be seen as a step backward.
4.5. Relationship with and role of the defense bar 
The U.S. constitution provides that the accused shall “have the assistance of counsel 
for his defense.”146 This right has been interpreted to require that the state provide 
a defense lawyer for those unable to pay for private counsel. Some states provide ad-
equate public defense services, while others do not.147 Prosecutors generally recognize 
that having a competent defense lawyer representing the accused is important for 
142 The former is from a New York ethics ruling (1995-675), the latter from Utah (1978-48). See National 
Center for Prosecution Ethics, www.ethicsforprosecutors.com/ethics_advisory_opinions.html. 
143 On the other hand, because DA salaries in some states are set by the county, some DA salaries are 
higher than those of judges serving in their state. This and the independence of the DA can make it 
attractive for a judge to run for DA.
144 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 12.
145 For more detail on the election and re-election of state court judges, see Colleen Danos, Judicial 
Election reform: Leadership Challenges,(2001), published by the National Center for State Courts.
146 U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
147 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Indigent Defense Services in Large Counties, 1999 (2000). 
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the case to proceed efficiently and, more importantly, to protect against wrongful 
accusations.
The NDAA and ABA Standards require prosecutors to strive to preserve proper rela-
tions with members of the defense bar, maintain uniformity of fairness, and cooper-
ate with the defense at all stages of the criminal process.148 The duty of the prosecutor 
is to seek justice, not merely to obtain a conviction. The same standard also applies 
to the defense counsel.149 This obligation mandates fair, impartial, and professional 
conduct of all trial proceedings and in all relations with the opposing counsel. 
The adversarial form of the trial may create tensions, but in practice, the majority 
of communications between prosecutors and defense attorneys are courteous and 
professional, and disagreements are generally of a professional nature. Still, conflicts 
and communication issues exist in many jurisdictions; difficulty in resolving them 
generally results from personality conflicts. Complaints of unprofessional or unethi-
cal behavior on either side may be made during proceedings to the court or as part of 
a complaint process before the state Bar Association. 
The DA generally seeks the same professional and constructive relationship with the 
local defenders office, where such exists, and the local defense bar as with other parts 
of the justice system. Representatives of the defenders office or defense bar may be 
members of local or statewide criminal justice system councils, and can be important 
in efforts to increase the efficiency of court processes and in seeking criminal justice re-
forms. Public defenders services and prosecutors appear to be particularly at odds during 
budget times, which is largely due to the fact that they compete for the same funding.150  
V. Information Control
Public and media relations
State level:  The general public, civil society, and the media serve as important moni-
tors of prosecutorial behavior and operations. The public holds DAs accountable 
through elections. Local, state, and even national civil society groups, such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),151 frequently follow up on questionable 
prosecutorial decisions if they receive a complaint. The media generally reports on 
prosecutorial operations and decisions in cases of interest to the public, frequently 
148 See NDAA Standards, supra note 36, Standards 25.1-6.
149 David G. Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials, 64 Michigan Law Review 1493,1494 
(1966).
150 Statewide workload studies have frequently included both prosecution and defense services to ad-
dress the resource needs of both equally. See, e.g., American Prosecutors Research Institute, Work-
load Study for the State of Georgia (2000). 
151 For more information on the role and activities of the ACLU, see www.aclu.org. 
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involving questionable decisions.152 As the elected official, the DA is generally the 
“public face” of the office and the person who responds to media inquiries. Particu-
larly in larger offices, media relations and responses to public inquiries are guided by 
policies, and may be handled by specially designated attorneys or media experts on 
staff. Offices handling cases that attract special public and media attention may also 
hire media consultants for advice on responding to or forestalling inquiries.153  
Media relations can raise particular ethics dilemmas. Release of information during 
an investigation is generally controlled by the police agency, but upon charging, the 
authority to release information transfers to the prosecutor. Most state ethics codes 
require prosecutors to limit the information provided to the media in ongoing cas-
es.154 Prosecutors must also avoid any appearance that media reports have influenced 
their decisions. Still, it would be naive to believe that public or media criticism does 
not influence the prosecutor at all.155  
As elected officials, DAs are well aware that good public relations are important to 
ensure public support. Websites and annual reports providing information on an 
office’s operations and goals are an important element in public relations.156 In addi-
tion, many offices engage with the public through a range of outreach activities that 
focus on crime prevention and reduction as well as general public education about 
the law. These include special programs with schools and civic organizations to in-
crease crime awareness and prevent crime.157  
Most prosecutors work hard to increase public understanding and positive percep-
tion of the prosecutor’s role and decisions. As elected officials, the security of their 
jobs depends on the perception that they are doing them properly. State prosecutors’ 
organizations may also provide assistance in media relations, for example by provid-
ing standard statements and media kits for use by individual offices.158  
152 See, e.g., Jennifer Gonnerman, In Albany Primary, a Candidate for D.A. Attacks the Rockefeller 
Drug Laws-and Wins, The Village Voice, September 21, 2004.
153 For more information on handling notorious trials, see T. Murphy, P. Hannaford, G. Loveland, 
and T. Munsterman, Managing Notorious Trials (1992), published by the National Center for State 
Courts..
154 Most state ethics codes follow the ABA model rules for prosecution. Rule 3.6(a) states: A lawyer 
who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make 
an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of 
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
155 Kenneth Bresler, “I Never Lost a Trial.” When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 
Georgia Journal of Legal Ethics 537 (1996).
156 Two interesting examples of annual reports, available on the offices’ websites, are published by 
the Dade County (Miami, FL) prosecutor’s office and by the Maricopa County (Arizona) County 
Attorney’s office.  They introduce office goals, operations, and key staff, and present statistics to 
provide an understanding of the offices’ workloads and their contributions to controlling crime in 
their jurisdictions.
157 For example, the Prosecutor’s office in Kings County (Brooklyn, NY) informs on its website about               
many of its programs that engage children and adults actively in crime reduction efforts. See http:// 
www.brooklynda.org.
158 See, e.g., California District Attorneys Association, available at www.cdaa.org.
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Federal level: Federal guidelines for media and public education provide for balanc-
ing three principal interests: the right of the public to know, the individual’s right to 
a fair trial, and the government’s ability to effectively enforce the administration of 
justice.159 They also give weight to protecting the rights of victims and litigants, as 
well as the safety of other parties and witnesses. These principles must be evaluated in 
each case and discretion used, since not every situation can be predicted and covered 
by written policies. In addition, information disseminated by U.S.AOs is governed by 
the same state ethics rules and codes that control state prosecutions.
The Manual for U.S. Attorneys provides detailed guidance for any media contacts. 
The manual specifically prohibits publicizing information with a substantial likeli-
hood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Similarly, matters involv-
ing ongoing investigations should not be disclosed, unless they have already received 
substantial publicity or the community needs to be reassured that appropriate inves-
tigations are ongoing. Disclosure of information related to a person’s prior criminal 
record is also restricted.160
The Director of the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) has final responsibility for all 
matters involving the news media and the DOJ; the Attorney General must be kept 
informed at all times. Responsibility for all matters involving local media is vested 
in the U.S. Attorney serving the jurisdiction. Each U.S.AO designates one or more 
persons to act as point of contact on media matters. U.S. Attorneys coordinate their 
news media efforts with the Director of OPA in cases that go beyond their immediate 
district or are of national importance and involve nationwide media outlets. Simi-
larly, when OPA issues a news release or conducts a news conference that affects a 
specific office, it coordinates with the appropriate U.S. Attorney.161
All media relations are further influenced by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
and related legislation on the state level, which provide public access to DOJ and 
other agency records. 
VI. Use of Statistics and Performance Measures
The media and the public act as external monitors of prosecutorial behavior. Statisti-
cal information assists with internal monitoring and accountability. Statistical infor-
mation for prosecutors’ offices in the U.S. is publicly available, but detailed statistics 
that provide a solid overview of prosecutorial activities by crime type (or would cap-
ture the many other non-case related activities) are often not readily available on the 
local level. Offices may publish general filing or disposition statistics for felonies and 
159 See U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 52.
160 See U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 52.
161 For information on the public relations activities of individual U.S.AOs, see, e.g., Colorado: www.
usdoj.gov/usao/co and New Jersey: www.usdoj.gov.usao/nj. 
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misdemeanors and provide overall conviction rates, but more detailed information is 
rarely collected and analyzed for publication, or even to inform management about 
office and attorney performance. Not all offices recognize the value of collecting statis-
tics for management purposes or may not have the resources to collect and assess such 
data regularly. Additionally, such statistics are not easily analyzed and are difficult to 
compare with other jurisdictions, especially since no national benchmarks exist. 
For example, one measure frequently used to support budget requests and identify 
efficiency is the caseload of the office and individual prosecutors. It is estimated that 
local prosecutors’ offices in the U.S. handled over 2.3 million felonies and close to 7 
million misdemeanor cases in 2001.162 The number of cases handled by prosecutors 
will, however, vary due to many factors. A small office with a part-time DA in a ju-
risdiction with a few thousand people may receive only 10 or 20 felony cases a year, 
while in large metropolitan jurisdictions, an assistant prosecutor may process up to 
500 cases a year. An assistant’s caseload will vary depending on the type and serious-
ness of cases. Misdemeanor cases generally require less time than felonies. Since over 
90 percent of cases are resolved by plea, prosecutors may not even spend much time 
on felonies, unless they go to trial. This means that overall caseload alone does not 
reflect the true effort required for processing cases by office or by prosecutor.
In addition, caseloads and changes to them depend on many external factors, often 
outside the control of the office.163 It may be difficult to discern the impact of each of 
these factors. More importantly, such figures do not assist in establishing what im-
pact an increase in cases handled has on the ability of the office to process all cases. 
If a decline in violent crimes and increase in property crimes, for example, means 
that the office handles fewer serious cases than before, the shift in caseload may well 
be absorbed with current staffing.164
Another measure frequently cited as a performance measure is the conviction rate. 
This is a similarly poor measure of performance. In 1996, in at least half of all offices, 
88 percent of cases resulted in felony or misdemeanor convictions, and the median 
conviction rate for felony cases was 89 percent.165 But this high conviction rate is 
likely the result of the high degree of prosecutorial discretion in the U.S. Prosecutors 
generally do not file cases that have no chance of success, and the plea bargaining 
process almost eliminates less-substantiated charges. 
162 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 12.
163 For example, the Maricopa County (Phoenix, Arizona) Attorney’s Office reported an increase in 
case filings from 28,411 to 30,633, or about 8%, between 2001 and 2002. At the same time, the 
county’s population increased by 7.6% and the overall crime rate by 3.5%. The violent crime rate 
decreased by 2.2%, while the property crime rate increased by 4.1%. The increase in filings mir-
rors, but is also higher than, the increase in population and crimes, and could be a result of more 
suspects arrested by the police (due to policy changes within the police or increased number of 
officers on the streets), a change in prosecutorial policy, or a combination thereof. See www.mari-
copacountyattorney.org/Newsletters/default.asp. 
164 Maricopa County is one of the larger prosecuting attorney’s offices in the U.S. The above statistics 
alone do not even indicate if the office is adequately staffed and/or operating efficiently.
165 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 12.  
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 While many prosecutors appear interested in measuring office performance, few fol-
low a formal process of setting goals for prosecution and measuring progress towards 
them.166 Establishing performance measures is not easy, particularly for services like 
prosecution in which results are not always tangible or quantifiable. Unlike state 
courts, which have been developing meaningful national performance standards for 
almost 20 years,167 prosecutors have only recently begun to engage in such efforts.168 
Workload assessments have been conducted in a number of states to capture the true 
level of effort required for all the work prosecutors engage in and to provide a more 
precise measure for assessing staffing needs and estimating efficiencies across offices.169 
Offices are also increasingly trying to establish overall goals, such as “user” satisfaction 
and timeliness, and seeking to measure them through a range of methods. 
VII. Trends
Prosecutors’ offices in the U.S. are constantly challenged to keep pace with the ever-
changing needs of the diverse U.S. society. Prosecutors’ offices in the U.S. not only 
establish a range of specialized programs to address the needs of particular popula-
tion (and victim) groups, but seek to apply modern management approaches and 
technology to assist them in their efforts. 
Office automation. Technology plays an increasingly important role in ensuring that 
prosecutors’ offices are well managed, work efficiently, and provide quality services 
in a timely manner to their “clients.” Case management software, linkages to police, 
courts, and other justice sector agencies, electronic file management that allows for 
creating and securely sharing multi-media case files, and archiving software, in addi-
tion to legal research software, are increasingly found in prosecutors’ offices.170  
Statewide case and management information systems are still lacking in many states, 
or have limited capabilities because certain information is not collected or systems 
are not integrated; however, many prosecutors’ offices have improved their efficiency 
166 A 1995 study in Minnesota found that about 55% of county attorneys and 50% of city prosecutors 
had or were developing informal methods for measuring office performance. Only 3% of county 
attorneys and no city prosecutors indicated they followed a formal process of setting goals and ob-
jectives for misdemeanor prosecution. Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, supra note 38.
167 See National Center for State Courts, Trial Court Performance Standards, available at www.ncscon-
line.org/D_research/TCPS/index.html. 
168 For recent developments in national performance measures for the juvenile justice system, includ-
ing juvenile prosecution, see Caren Harp, Spotlight On: Performance Measures for the Juvenile 
Justice System: A National Demonstration Project, In Re vol. 6 (2003), and American Prosecutors 
Research Institute, Prosecution in the 21st Century (2004).
169 Such studies have been conducted in Delaware, Georgia, Michigan, North Carolina, and Tennessee, 
among others. For more detail on workload assessments, see Heike Gramckow, supra note 85.
170 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 12.
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and accuracy by computerizing case management.171 
Developing a case management system is related to the development of an informa-
tion sharing system. Case management systems are primarily designed to assist pros-
ecutors in tracking cases through the system, identifying where in the process a par-
ticular case is, and determining what actions need to be taken. Further, management 
decisions (e.g., staffing, caseload allocation, and budget allocation) may be supported 
by the type of information available from case management systems. However, to 
support policy decisions or decide what actions to take and how to respond in a 
specific case, both offender and case information are needed. If both systems—case 
management and offender information—are combined, this provides the most com-
prehensive information support for line operations and management.172
Prosecution offices that use computerized systems are generally able to automati-
cally produce letters, disposition reports, and other documents without re-entering 
pertinent data; monitor information on victims and witnesses; and communicate 
electronically with other agencies, thereby increasing their efficiency. 
Linkages to electronic criminal records databases for checking and updating are 
essential for prosecutorial decision making. Portable solutions such as laptops and 
palm pilots provide access to case files, legal documents, and up-to-the minute cal-
endar management even in the courtroom. 
New Roles for Prosecutors. Community prosecution strategies signal a major mile-
stone in changing the culture and role of the prosecutor by developing partnerships 
and collaborative, problem-solving approaches with the community and other agen-
cies.173 Community prosecution models in the U.S. vary widely. Just as police created 
different forms of community policing, prosecutors’ initiatives reflect the require-
ments of their own jurisdictions. Some prosecutors decentralized their offices to 
better respond to the needs of individual neighborhoods. Others placed specialized 
“community prosecutors” in selected areas to work closely with the residents and 
other agencies on crime prevention and/or identifying community problems to de-
velop coordinated responses.174 Assessments of these programs indicate increased 
171 See, e.g., Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, supra note 38.
172 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention., Enhancing Prosecutors’ Ability To Combat 
and Prevent Juvenile Crime in Their Jurisdictions, JAIBIG Bulletin 1999. For example, in Miami, 
a computerized records database for the Felony Records Center was created and has been con-
tinuously updated and enhanced since 1993. The ability to access file locations with the touch of a 
button allows staff to quickly identify where cases files are located, saving precious time. In addi-
tion, the data inputting and bar-coding of over 300,000 felony case files enabled the office to query 
records in the system, determining their location and giving personnel the ability to order the files 
electronically. For a brief description of an automated work-management system in Michigan pros-
ecutors’ offices, see http://www.michiganprosecutor.org.
173 In 2001, 23% of all offices reported assigning prosecutors to handle community-related activities.           
55% involved the community to identify crime or problem areas. See Bureau of Justice Statistics,     
supra note 12.
174 Heike P. Gramckow, Community Prosecution in the U.S., 5 European Journal on Criminal 
Policy and Research 9-26 (1997). For additional information on different types of community 
prosecution efforts established in the U.S., see by J.S. Goldkamp, C. Irons-Guynn, and D. Weiland, 
Community Prosecution Strategies: Measuring Impact, BJA Bulletin (2002).
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community satisfaction with the office and reduction of crime and order problems 
in the target areas.175
Victim and witness assistance. Prosecutors’ offices, more than any other criminal jus-
tice agencies, have been assigned the responsibility for creating and implementing 
assistance programs that provide victims and witnesses with information, the oppor-
tunity for increased participation in the justice process, and access to services. Pros-
ecutors have a vested interest in facilitating victim participation in, and satisfaction 
with, the criminal justice process. Prosecutions can quickly be rendered ineffective if 
victims and witnesses are frustrated by insensitive treatment and unwilling to report 
criminal activity, testify as witnesses, or work cooperatively within the system.176
 Many prosecutors’ offices are incorporating victim assistance services as part of reg-
ular operations rather than delegating them to a separate program or agency.177 Ad-
vocates act as liaisons for the victim and prosecutor, relaying important information 
between both parties and insuring that victims and witnesses appear at trial, which 
frees the prosecutor to focus on bringing offenders to justice.178 
175 See Goldkamp et al., id.
176 Office for Victims of Crime, A Victim’s Right to Speak—Impact Statements—A Nation’s Responsibil-
ity to Listen (2001).
177 In 2001, 6% of offices report having a victim/witness advocate on staff. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
supra note 12.
178 See Office for Victims of Crime, supra note 176.
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Attachment A
Excerpt from the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual  
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title1/
4mdoj.htm#1-4.320
1-4.000 STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
1-4.410 Restrictions on all Employees 
Employees in the Department of Justice may not: 
A. Use their official authority or influence to interfere with or affect the result of an 
election (5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1). 
B. Solicit, accept or receive a political contribution (5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(2), except 
for a political contribution to a multi-candidate political committee from a fel-
low member of a federal labor organization or certain other employee organiza-
tions, as long as the solicited employee is not a subordinate and the activity does 
not violate G below. 
C. Solicit, accept, or receive uncompensated volunteer services from an individual 
who is a subordinate (5 C.F.R. § 734.303(d)). 
D. Allow their official titles to be used in connection with fundraising activities (5 
C.F.R. § 734.303(c)). 
E. Run for nomination or election to public office in a partisan election (5 U.S.C. § 
7323(a)(3)), except that in certain designated communities an employee may run 
for office in a local partisan election but only as an independent candidate and may 
receive, but not solicit, contributions. 5 C.F.R. § 733.107 lists these communities. 
F. Solicit or discourage the political activity of any person who is a participant in 
any matter before the Department (5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(4)). 
G. Engage in political activity (to include wearing political buttons), while on duty, 
while in a government occupied office or building, while wearing an official 
uniform or insignia, or while using a government vehicle (5 U.S.C. § 7324(a). 
H. Make a political contribution to their employer or employing authority (18 
U.S.C. 603). 
1-4.420 Restrictions on Career SES, Criminal Division, and FBI Employees, and 
all Political Appointees 
These employees may not: 
A. Distribute fliers printed by a candidate’s campaign committee, a political party, 
or a partisan political group. 
B. Serve as an officer of a political party, a member of a national, state, or local 
committee of a political party, an officer or member of a committee of a partisan 
political group, or be a candidate for any of these positions. 
C. Organize or reorganize a political party organization or partisan political group. 
D. Serve as a delegate, alternate, or proxy to a political party convention. 
E. Address a convention, caucus, rally, or similar gathering of a political party or 
partisan political group in support of or in opposition to a candidate for par-
tisan political office or political party office, if such address is done in concert 
Prosecutor Organization and Operations in the United States
431
with such a candidate, political party, or partisan political group. 
F. Organize, sell tickets to, promote, or actively participate in a fund-raising activity of a 
candidate for partisan political office or of a political party or partisan political group. 
G. Canvass for votes in support of or in opposition to a candidate for partisan po-
litical office or a candidate for political party office, if such canvassing is done in 
concert with such a candidate, political party, or partisan political group. 
H. Endorse or oppose a candidate for partisan political office or a candidate for po-
litical party office in a political advertisement, broadcast, campaign literature, 
or similar material if such endorsement or opposition is done in concert with a 
candidate, political party, or partisan political group. 
I. Initiate or circulate a partisan nominating petition. 
J. Act as a recorder, watcher, challenger, or similar officer at polling places in con-
sultation or coordination with a political party, partisan political group, or a 
candidate for partisan political office. 
K. Drive voters to polling places in consultation or coordination with a political 
party, partisan political group, or a candidate for partisan political office. 
L. Run as partisan candidates for local partisan political office even in those com-
munities listed in 5 C.F.R. § 733.107 in which other Department of Justice em-
ployees may run for office. However, they may run as independent candidates 
in a partisan political election for a local office in the municipality or political 
subdivision, except for those appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. See 5 C.F.R. 733.105(b) and (c)(1). 
The restrictions listed above A through L apply only to Career SES, Criminal Divi-
sion, FBI Employees, and all Political Appointees, and are permissible activities for 
all other employees. 
1-4.430 Permissible Activities 
All employees may: 
A. Register and vote in any election. 
B. Express opinions as individuals on political subjects and candidates privately 
and, to the extent consistent with the restrictions above, publicly. 
C. Display a political picture, sticker, badge, or button in situations that are not 
connected to their official duties, but employees restricted as outlined in 1-
4.420 may not distribute such material. 
D. Participate in the nonpartisan activities of a civic, community, social, labor, or 
professional organization, or of a similar organization. 
E. Be members of a political party or other political organization and participate 
in its activities to the extent consistent with the restrictions set forth above. 
F. Sign a political petition as individuals. 
G. Make a financial contribution to a political party or organization, except to 
one’s federal employer. 
H. Take an active part, as a candidate or in support of a candidate, in a nonpartisan 
election. 
I. Be politically active in connection with a question which is not specifically identified 
with a political party, such as a constitutional amendment, referendum, approval of 
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a municipal ordinance or any other question or issue of a similar character. 
J. Serve as an election judge or clerk, or in a similar position to perform nonparti-
san duties as prescribed by state or local law, subject to the restrictions set forth 
above about certain employees not undertaking such activity in concert with 
political entities. 
K. Otherwise participate fully in public affairs, except as prohibited by law, in a 
manner which does not materially compromise their efficiency or integrity as 
employees or the neutrality, efficiency or integrity of their agency. 
1-4.440 Political Referrals 
In addition to restricting or limiting certain political activity, the Hatch Act also pro-
hibits selecting officials or others involved in the examining or appointing process for 
competitive service positions from receiving or considering a recommendation of an 
applicant from a Senator or Representative, except as to the character or residence of 
the applicant, unless the recommendation is based on personal knowledge or records 
of the sender. In no case are U.S.AOs required to return a letter to the sender even if it 
does not meet the requirement stated above. Additional guidance on this is available 
from the EOU.S.A Office of Legal Counsel. 
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Project team
Biographies
Anton Girginov is a public prosecutor at the Supreme Cassation Prosecution Office. 
He controls pre-trial investigations of different criminal offences and participates 
in international judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Anton Girginov has also 
worked for UN as an International Prosecutor in East Timor and Head Interna-
tional Trainer in Kosovo. After completing his law studies at Sofia University he 
obtained a Ph. D degree and became an associated professor and later, full professor 
of substantive criminal law. He gives lectures at the Plovdiv University and at the 
Southwest University, Blagoevgrad. Anton Girginov is the author of more than 90 
academic publications in the area of criminal law, eleven books among them.
Anton du Plessis is head of the International Crime in Africa Programme (ICAP) 
at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa. Until February 2008, An-
ton was a terrorism prevention expert in the Terrorism Prevention Branch of 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna. Prior to 
joining the UNODC, Anton was head of the Crime and Justice Programme 
at the ISS. In these positions, he has been a regular commentator in local and 
international media, both electronic and written. Anton is also an admitted ad-
vocate of the High Court of South Africa and has worked as a senior prosecutor 
for the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) of South Africa. In 2002, he was 
appointed as a Senior State Advocate and head of the NPA’s Sexual Offences 
Section. Anton has published and edited numerous publications, and has pre-
sented research papers at several local and international conferences. He is a 
member of several editorial committees and advisory councils and boards. He 
holds the following law degrees: B-Iuris, LL.B. and LL.M. (with specialisation in 
criminal law and human rights—cum laude).
Barry Hancock is a Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Judicature. He is a career 
prosecutor until 1990 when he became Head of Personnel and Training for the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).  In 1996 he helped develop the new inspec-
torate for the CPS and was appointed Senior Inspector.  Having been involved 
in the establishment of the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) he 
was appointed General Counsel in 1998 and went on to run its international 
conferences, edit and write its documents and co-ordinate its project work. 
Having retired from this post in 2007, he now represents the IAP in an advi-
sory capacity. He was editor of the IAP’s Directory of Prosecution Services, its 
Newsletter and electronic Journal as well as being co-editor of its Human Rights 
Manual for Prosecutors which has been translated into six languages. From 2003 
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to 2006 he was an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies at the University of London.  Barry Hancock is a member of the Man-
agement Board of the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland and of 
the U.K. Attorney General’s Advisory Board on Human Rights Guidance for the 
criminal justice system in Northern Ireland.
Belinda Cooper is a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute in New York and an 
adjunct professor at New York University’s Global Affairs Program. She teaches 
and lectures on human rights, international law, and transitional justice and is 
the editor of “War Crimes: The Legacy of Nuremberg,” which explores the inter-
connections between the Nuremberg tribunal and today’s international crimi-
nal tribunals. Cooper lived in Berlin, Germany from 1987-1994 and returned 
in 2002 as a fellow at the American Academy in Berlin. She has taken part in 
human rights fact-finding missions and has coauthored reports on domestic 
violence in Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Tanzania. Cooper has written for a wide 
variety of publications in German and English, including The New York Times, 
Newsweek, World Policy Journal and the Christian Science Monitor. She is also 
a translator of German scholarly books and articles, including most recently a 
textbook on international criminal law. Professor Cooper graduated summa 
cum laude with her B.A. in History from Yale College and received her J.D. 
from Yale Law School.   
Cristián Riego is an Academic Director of the Center for Justice Studies of the Ameri-
cas and Professor in Diego Portales Law School in Santiago. He is an attorney and 
earned his degree from the University of Chile.  He has a master of law degree 
from the University of Wisconsin. He was an investigating attorney at the Chile’s 
National Truth and Reconciliation Commission from June 1990 to February 1991 
and an Advisor to the Paz Ciudadana Foundation. He was a member of the High-
er Council of Educares University (1994-1996) and Advisor to the Department 
of Justice during the proceedings and negotiation of the Criminal Procedure Re-
form in the National Congress (1995-1996).  He was a member of the team that 
wrote the Juvenile Justice Reform project at the request of the Department of Jus-
tice. He has provided advisory service on numerous Judicial Reform projects in 
Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela, Panama, and El Salvador, and was Advisor to the 
Chilean Department of Justice for the preparation of a general implementation 
plan for the criminal procedure reform in 1997.  
Daniela Cavallini is a lawyer and researcher at the Center for Judicial Studies 
(C.E.S.R.O.G.), University of Bologna. She made some studies on the status of 
judges and prosecutors in Italy (principle of immovability, disciplinary respon-
sibility) and participated in various research projects on judicial systems, such 
as the research on “Recruitment, professional evaluation and career of judges 
and prosecutors in Austria, Germany, France, The Netherlands, Italy and Spain”, 
directed by prof. G. Di Federico. At present her main interests are: the reform of 
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the disciplinary responsibility of judges and prosecutors in Italy; status and dis-
ciplinary responsibility of lay judges in Italy (giudice di pace, giudice onorario 
di tribunale, etc.); structure and composition of courts in Europe. Some of her 
publications are: “Inamovibilità dei magistrati e funzionalità degli uffici giudiz-
iari. Tendenze in atto”, Rivista trimestrale di Diritto e Procedura civile, 2003, pp. 
1043-1078; “La giurisprudenza disciplinare sui ritardi dei magistrati ordinari 
nell’espletamento delle attività giudiziarie”, Rivista trimestrale di Diritto e Proce-
dura civile, 2004, pp. 1489-1528; “Provision of Information by Courts, the Case 
of Italy”, in P.M. Langbroek and W.J.M. Voermans (eds.) “Provision of Informa-
tion by Courts and Courts administrations: a comparative inventory of eight 
European Countries and in the USA”, Universiteit Utrecht, 2005, pp. 67-77; “Il 
giudice onorario di tribunale: quali limiti alle sue funzioni?”, Rivista trimestrale 
di Diritto e Procedura civile, 2007, pp. 199-223.  
Prof. Ekaterina Trendafilova is elected for a nine-year term as a judge at the Inter-
national Criminal Court. She has extensive experience in criminal law, criminal 
procedural law and international criminal law. She has been a Professor at Sofia 
University of criminal justice since completing her PhD in 1984. She has also 
experience as a human rights expert. She is a member of the Bulgaria Union of 
lawyers and a member of the Bulgarian Union of Scholars. She was called to 
the Bar of Bulgaria in 1995. She chaired the working group that prepared the 
reform of the Bulgarian criminal procedure code in line with the European and 
international standards for efficient administration of justice and protection of 
human rights (1998-1999). She was a deputy district attorney at Sofia District 
Court (1985-1989) and represented Bulgaria to the UN Commission for Crime 
and Criminal Justice (1992-1994). She chaired the Criminal Division of the 
Legislative Consultative Council in the Bulgarian Parliament. She has publi-
cations in Bulgaria and abroad in the field of human rights law, international 
criminal law and procedural law.
Dr. Endre Z. Bócz joined the Hungarian Public Prosecution Service in 1961, and had 
served for 40 years at the Budapest Chief Public Prosecution Office. As a pros-
ecutor, in 1976 he received a PhD degree in law and in 1979 he was appointed 
deputy head of the Budapest Chief Prosecution Office. In 1990 he became the 
chief prosecutor of Budapest. He was the founder of the International Associa-
tion of Prosecutors and had been its vice-president for three years (1995-1998). 
From 2002 to 2004 he was also a senior adviser to the minister of justice. He 
has been a professor of penal law at the Budapest and P�cs Universities ((1997-
2002), Head of the Department of criminology at the Hungarian Police Acad-
emy and Head of the Institute of Penal and Criminal Procedural Law at the 
Juridical Faculty of the „Károli Gáspár” University of the Reformed Church. He 
has participated in several expert committees responsible for making draft rec-
ommendations at the Council of Europe. He has taken part in the preparation 
of the Hungarian Penal Code (1973-1978) and the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(1990-1998). He has published several books and many case studies of inves-
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tigations and has a large number of publications on problems of the penal and 
criminal procedural law.  
François Falletti is “Avocat general” at the French Court of Cassation and National 
Member for France at Eurojust. He has a 30 year experience of prosecutor act-
ing in court and at the French ministry of justice where he has been “Directeur 
des affaires criminelles et des graces” from 1993 to 1996 before being appointed 
Chief prosecutor of the Court of Appeal of Lyon where he stayed until he joined 
Eurojust in September 2004. In his former positions he has been in charge of 
very wide range of cases and issues especially related to economic offences and 
MLA. He has worked for many years at the French ministry of Justice where he 
has participated in the drafting of many bills related to economic and financial 
offences, and has been involved for several years in the draft of the new criminal 
code (1994). He has been involved in many negotiations at international level, 
for instance as expert in the financial action task force set up in 1989 or in the 
frame of the Council of Europe, the EU and the UN. He has also been involved 
in the activities of organizations of prosecutors acting at european and interna-
tional level. He is President of the International Association of Prosecutors. He 
is teaching on criminal law. He is the author of many articles on international 
law and of several books on criminal law. 
Giuseppe Di Federico is a Law Professor emeritus of the University of Bologna, 
Director of the Research Institute on Judicial Systems of the Italian National 
Research Council (www.irsig.cnr.it), former member of the Italian Superior 
Council of the Magistracy. He is the author of many books and articles on the 
judicial systems of democratic countries.
 He has an extensive experience as consultant for judicial reforms in several 
countries: in Eastern Europe and Russia, in South America and in South East 
Asia:  He has conducted most of these activities under the auspices of interna-
tional organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development 
Programme, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
Dr. Heike Gramckow has over 20 years of experience in working with courts, pros-
ecutors, and police internationally.  Her particular focus is on justice system 
management.  She has global experience in guiding justice sector reform proj-
ects, and provided technical assistance and training in the field.  She directed 
several international reform projects and justice system assessments in coun-
tries as divers as Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Serbia, and the 
United Arab Emirates, among others.  She worked with common and civil law 
systems as well as with Shari’a courts and traditional justice systems. 
 Before joining the Justice Reform Practice Group of The World Bank in Wash-
ington, DC as Senior Counsel in early 2008, Dr. Gramckow was the Deputy 
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Director of International Programs for the National Center for State Courts. 
From 1997 to 2000 she was a director with the American Prosecutors Research 
Institute, where she led prosecutor-related projects, including training, audits 
of prosecutor operations, and program evaluations.  Before that she worked in 
US-based research and consulting firms conducting applied research related 
to justice system organizations.  She taught courses on international criminal 
justice systems and juvenile justice at American University in Washington, DC 
and courses on deviance and control at George Washington University.  She is 
widely published in the US and abroad.
James Lackner is an Assistant United States Attorney with the U.S. Attorney’s Office,      
District of Minnesota, a position he has held for approximately 25 years. He has         
prosecuted a wide variety of criminal cases. He graduated from Northwestern       
School of Law in 1978. He acted as a consultant in his individual capacity.         
 The views expressed in this book do not necessarily represent the views of the   
Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney’s Office or Mr. Lackner. 
Joachim Herrmann is a Professor emeritus of Law, University of Augsburg, Faculty 
of Law, Augsburg, Germany, Dr. jur., LL.M.  Attorney at Law, Augsburg. He was 
a visiting professor of law: University of Michigan, University of Chicago, Uni-
versity of Virginia, University of California - Davis, Pittsburgh University, Beijing 
University, Tokyo University, Waseda University, Tokyo, University of South Af-
rica, University of Pretoria. Main academic interests and publications in the fields 
of criminal law, criminal procedure, comparative legal systems, especially the 
characteristic features of continental European Law and Anglo-American Law, 
former Socialist Law, Islamic Law, Chinese Law, and Japanese Law.
Professor Károly Bárd is the chair of the Human Rights Program of the Central 
European University (Budapest). He started his career at the Faculty of Law 
of Eötvös Loránd University Budapest. Between 1990 and 1997 he served as 
vice-minister and later as deputy state secretary in the Ministry of Justice of the 
Republic of Hungary. Professor Bárd is a member of the Board of Directors of 
the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Crime Control affiliated with 
the United Nations (HEUNI). Currently he serves as Pro-rector for Hungarian 
and European Union Affairs of the Central European University.  
Martin Schönteich is the Senior Legal Officer: National Criminal Justice Reform, 
for the Open Society Justice Initiative. He previously worked as a Senior Re-
searcher for the Institute for Security Studies’ Crime and Justice Programme in 
Pretoria, South Africa. He has also worked as Parliamentary Affairs Manager 
for the South African Institute of Race Relations where he undertook policy-
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related advocacy and research work on issues affecting criminal justice and civil 
liberties in South Africa. After completing his law degree he worked as a Public 
Prosecutor for the South African Department of Justice. He is an Advocate of 
the High Court of South Africa.
Mirna Goransky is Deputy Prosecutor at the Attorney General Office in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, where she works on the reorganization of the prosecutors’ 
offices, including the design and replication of decentralization experiences. 
Currently on leave, she is working on a research on the organization of pros-
ecutors’ offices in Argentina, Chile and the US to propose a set of guidelines 
for better functioning in accordance with human rights standards.  She has 
published various articles on the administration of justice, criminal law and 
procedure and human rights.  
Rada Smedovska is a Senior Fellow Legal Research at RiskMonitor Foundation 
(www.riskmonitor.bg). She studied law at the University for Law and Political 
Science in Clermont-Ferrand, France and obtained a Master degree on internal 
public law in 2002.  Between 2002 and 2007 she was a coordinator at the Legal 
program of Open Society Institute Sofia. Her professional experience includes 
constitutional and judicial reform, special institutions for combating organized 
crime and democratic control over security services. She has several publica-
tions in Bulgarian and French in the field of constitutional policy, judicial and 
security sector reform. 
Robert M. A. Johnson is Anoka County Attorney from 1983 to the present.  He is 
past-president of the National District Attorneys Association.  He is a member 
of the American Bar Association and past-chair of the Criminal Justice Section. 
He is an Advisor to the American Law Institute—Model Penal Code: Sentenc-
ing.  He served as Chair of the Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force.  He 
served on the Board of Governors of the Minnesota State Bar Association and is 
past-president of the Minnesota County Attorneys Association and the Anoka 
County Bar Association.  Mr. Johnson was granted his BSB, University of Min-
nesota, 1965, and his JD, University of Minnesota Law School, 1968.  He was 
called to the Bar of State of Minnesota, 1968; U.S. District Court, District of 
Minnesota, 1971; and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1975.
Todd Foglesong is a Senior Research Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government 
and Coordinator of the Justice Systems Workshop for the Program in Criminal 
Justice Policy and Management (www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice). Todd’s 
research focuses on the use of arrest and pretrial detention around the world and 
the alignment of efforts across government agencies to provide public safety and 
justice. Prior to joining the program at Harvard, Todd worked at the Vera Insti-
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tute of Justice in New York City (www.vera.org).  Before that, he was an assistant 
professor of political science at the University of Kansas. With Peter Solomon, he 
wrote Courts and Transition in Russia:  The Challenge of Judicial Reform (West-
view, 2000) and Crime, Criminal Justice, and Criminology in Ukraine (National 
Institute of Justice, 2001).  Todd Received a B.A. in Russian and Economics from 
Bowdoin College and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University 
of Toronto.  He is a member of the board of RiskMonitor, a non-governmental re-
search center in Sofia, Bulgaria, that supports better public policies on organized 
crime and institutional corruption.  He speaks Russian and Spanish.
Werner Róth studied law at the universities of Frankfurt am Main, Vienna and 
Mainz. From 1964 he was employed by the State of Hessen, first as a public 
prosecutor in charge of the prosecution of Nazi crimes and later at the Hessian 
Ministry of Justice responsible for the organisation of the public prosecution 
services. From 1979 until his retirement in 2001 he headed the public prosecu-
tion office of Wiesbaden. Since his retirement he has been working as a lawyer 
in Frankfurt am Main. For thirty years he worked as examiner at the Second 
State Law Examination in Hessen and is also a co-founder of the International 
Association of Prosecutors. In addition he regularly gives lectures for prosecu-
tors and judges in Eastern Europe and China.
Yonko Grozev is a lawyer and Program Director with the Centre for Liberal Strat-
egies since 2005. Between 1995 and 2005 he was the head of the Legal Defence 
Programme of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. He has filed and won a large 
number of cases before the European Court of Human Rights on, among others, 
the right to life, prohibition of torture, fair trial, freedom of speech, religion and 
association and the prohibition of discrimination on ethnic grounds. In addition to 
his international and domestic litigation work, he has been active in research and 
advocacy on improving the work of the justice system in Bulgaria. He has also been 
active in providing trainings to lawyers in Central and Eastern Europe on litigation 
techniques before the ECHR. He is a graduate of the Harvard Law School.
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This book represents a comparative research 
of the prosecution institution in nine diff erent 
countries. The main objective of the compara-
tive analysis is to identify the international stan-
dards and best practices in terms of account-
ability, eff ectiveness and independence of the 
prosecution services. The study should guide 
and enrich national debates in countries where 
the prosecution needs to be reformed. 
In the last twenty years there have been sig-
nifi cant changes in criminal procedure and in 
public prosecution in many parts of the world. 
The reports included in the volume aim, in part, 
to examine some important instances and ex-
amples of that trend. The country reports repre-
sent a broad range of practices and approaches 
about the manner of organization of the pros-
ecution service. The focus of the research is on 
the lessons learned from the reform in demo-
cratic states and the challenges for the coun-
tries in transition in designing the prosecution 
institution. 
The comparative research shows that there is 
not a universal model of prosecutorial indepen-
dence and accountability. Hence, the reformers 
and decision makers have on their disposition 
a large variety of approaches to choose from 
on the occasion of a concrete reform. However, 
they should have in mind an important fi nd-
ing of the comparative analysis, namely—im-
porting an apparently successful element of a 
reform should not necessarily produce the ex-
pected positive results. 
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